{ "id": 2543664, "name": "R & R DELI, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SANTA ANA STAR CASINO; Tamaya Enterprises, Inc.; the Pueblo of Santa Ana; Conrad Granito, General Manager of Santa Ana Star Casino; Aaron Armijo, Chairman of Tamaya Enterprises, Inc., and Leonard Armijo, Governor of Pueblo of Santa Ana, Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "R & R Deli, Inc. v. Santa Ana Star Casino", "decision_date": "2005-12-21", "docket_number": "No. 25,582", "first_page": "85", "last_page": "92", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "139 N.M. 85" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "128 P.3d 513" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2006-NMCA-020" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "370 F.2d 529", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2050036 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/370/0529-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 U.S. 49", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1490382 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56", "parenthetical": "noting that tribes are generally not bound by any constitutional provisions that are \"limitations on federal or state authority\"" }, { "parenthetical": "noting that tribes are generally not bound by any constitutional provisions that are \"limitations on federal or state authority\"" }, { "parenthetical": "noting that tribes are generally not bound by any constitutional provisions that are \"limitations on federal or state authority\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/436/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 N.M. 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1558968 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404" }, { "page": "559" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/120/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 N.M. 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590356 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "312", "parenthetical": "noting that written contract with political subdivision creates a \"cognizable property interest\" but does not necessarily form the basis for a claim under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983" }, { "page": "223", "parenthetical": "noting that written contract with political subdivision creates a \"cognizable property interest\" but does not necessarily form the basis for a claim under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/109/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 470", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563571 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "477", "parenthetical": "\"interests in government benefits will be recognized as constitutional 'property' if the person can be deemed 'entitled' to them.\" (citation: omitted)" }, { "page": "518", "parenthetical": "\"interests in government benefits will be recognized as constitutional 'property' if the person can be deemed 'entitled' to them.\" (citation: omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0470-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMSC-028", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 142200 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 13-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/123/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 134", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563615 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139" }, { "page": "771" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0134-01" ] }, { "cite": "470 U.S. 869", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11300476 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"It is well established that a corporation is a 'person' within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"It is well established that a corporation is a 'person' within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"It is well established that a corporation is a 'person' within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/470/0869-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 N.M. 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 720236 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74" }, { "page": "572" }, { "page": "74" }, { "page": "572", "parenthetical": "\"Absent ambiguity, provisions of a contract need only be applied, rather than construed or interpreted.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/112/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 U.S. 165", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6177753 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172", "parenthetical": "\"Absent an effective waiver or consent, it is settled that a state court may not exercise jurisdiction over a recognized Indian tribe\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"Absent an effective waiver or consent, it is settled that a state court may not exercise jurisdiction over a recognized Indian tribe\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"Absent an effective waiver or consent, it is settled that a state court may not exercise jurisdiction over a recognized Indian tribe\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/433/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "2002-NMSC-012", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 260734 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 7" }, { "page": "\u00b6 30" }, { "page": "\u00b6 30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/132/0207-01" ] }, { "cite": "267 F.3d 848", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7348353, 9499804 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "852" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "852" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/am-tribal-law/3/0848-01", "/f3d/267/0848-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMCA-003", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1224591 ], "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 5" }, { "page": "\u00b6 5" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/136/0682-01" ] }, { "cite": "2002-NMCA-003", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 183082 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/131/0450-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 974, "char_count": 23385, "ocr_confidence": 0.656, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.310054358471585e-07, "percentile": 0.6241690152591908 }, "sha256": "c1962efaa996e240682f9ac0e88acdc347b43fb6ba1d93eb868fe96fff902f06", "simhash": "1:17073192028bd04b", "word_count": 3778 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:33:27.919749+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "BUSTAMANTE, C.J. and ALARID, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "R & R DELI, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SANTA ANA STAR CASINO; Tamaya Enterprises, Inc.; the Pueblo of Santa Ana; Conrad Granito, General Manager of Santa Ana Star Casino; Aaron Armijo, Chairman of Tamaya Enterprises, Inc., and Leonard Armijo, Governor of Pueblo of Santa Ana, Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nPICKARD, J.\n{1} In this case, we determine whether limited waivers of tribal sovereign immunity in a commercial lease and in a pueblo\u2019s gaming compact with the State are applicable to a suit based in contract and tort brought by a lessee of property located on tribal lands. Holding the waivers inapplicable, we affirm the trial court\u2019s grant of Defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss.\nSTANDARD OF REVIEW AND FACTS\n{2} When reviewing a trial court\u2019s grant of a motion to dismiss, we accept as true the facts pleaded in the complaint, and we review de novo the trial court\u2019s application of the law to those facts. Envtl. Control, Inc. v. City of Santa Fe, 2002-NMCA-003, \u00b6 6, 131 N.M. 450, 38 P.3d 891. In its complaint, Plaintiff alleged the following facts. Plaintiff entered into a lease with Tamaya Enterprises, Inc. (TEI), a federally chartered corporation wholly owned by the Pueblo of Santa Ana. The lease contemplated that Plaintiff would operate a restaurant located in the Santa Ana Star Casino. When the lease was entered into, the Pueblo also issued Plaintiff a liquor license.\n{3} The lease stated that nothing contained in it would be deemed a waiver of TEI\u2019s sovereign immunity from suit, but that the TEI Board of Directors would adopt a resolution providing \u201ca limited waiver of sovereign immunity and consent to be sued in the Pueblo of Santa Ana Tribal Court for the limited purpose of determining and enforcing the obligations of the parties under this Lease.\u201d The lease also stated that there would be no waiver of sovereign immunity with regard to the Pueblo itself.\n{4} The TEI Board of Directors subsequently adopted a resolution pursuant to the lease, which states that \u201cthe Board of Directors hereby approves a limited waiver of sovereign immunity and consents to be sued in the Pueblo of Santa Ana Tribal Court.\u201d The resolution also states that the waiver is applicable only to \u201cactions seeking one [or] more of the following remedies: injunctive relief, declaratory judgment, or specific performance.\u201d\n{5} After Plaintiff had been operating the restaurant for approximately one year, the Pueblo declined to renew Plaintiffs liquor license, stating that Plaintiff was in violation of the Santa Ana Liquor Code. Plaintiff had received no prior notice of any violations and was unaware of any investigations into the matter. Because the lease required Plaintiff to maintain a liquor license, Plaintiff believed that the Pueblo had purposefully prevented the renewal of the license so that it could take over the restaurant, which had been very successful. Pueblo officials also told Plaintiff that the decision was made for \u201cpolitical reasons.\u201d\n{6} Plaintiff brought suit against the Pueblo, TEI, the casino, and several Pueblo officials. Plaintiff alleged breach of lease, intentional interference with contract, discrimination and violation of state constitutional rights, constructive fraud, negligent misrepresentation, prima facie tort, breach of the covenant of good faith, conspiracy, and fraud. Defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss, arguing that nothing in the lease agreement, resolution, or the Pueblo\u2019s gaming compact with the State waived tribal sovereign immunity for purposes of the suit. The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that Plaintiffs claims were barred by sovereign immunity and were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Santa Ana Tribal Court.\nDISCUSSION\n{7} On appeal, Plaintiff argues that Defendants waived sovereign immunity from suit in the lease agreement and in the gaming compact with the State. Plaintiff also appears to argue a separate waiver regarding alleged violations of constitutional rights. Because Plaintiff does not make different arguments with regard to the various Defendants, we do not distinguish between them, and we refer to them collectively as \u201cthe Pueblo.\u201d\n{8} The Pueblo argues that the suit is barred because there is no waiver of immunity in either the lease or the gaming compact and because Plaintiffs claims fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Santa Ana Tribal Court. We hold that the trial court lacked jurisdiction under either of the alternative theories argued by Plaintiff because the Pueblo did not waive its sovereign immunity in either the lease or the gaming compact. Thus, we need not address whether tribal court jurisdiction is exclusive.\nA. THE LEASE AGREEMENT AND RESOLUTION WAIVER\n{9} Plaintiff argues on appeal that \u201cDefendants specifically waived sovereign immunity as reflected in [the lease agreement and resolution] for any claims concerning the lease.\u201d We disagree.\n{10} It has long been recognized that Indian tribes have the same common-law immunity from suit as other sovereigns. Sanchez v. Santa Ana Golf Club, Inc., 2005-NMCA-003, \u00b6 5, 136 N.M. 682, 104 P.3d 548. A tribe is free to waive its sovereign immunity, but such waivers must be express and unequivocal. See id. Because a tribe need not waive immunity at all, it is free to \u201cprescribe the terms and conditions on which it consents to be sued, and the manner in which the suit shall be conducted.\u201d Mo. River Servs., Inc. v. Omaha Tribe, 267 F.3d 848, 852 (8th Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Any such conditions or limitations \u201cmust be strictly construed and applied.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\n{11} When a tribe is protected by sovereign immunity, a state court lacks jurisdiction to hear a suit. See Gallegos v. Pueblo of Tesuque, 2002-NMSC-012, \u00b6 7, 132 N.M. 207, 46 P.3d 668 (\u201cWithout an unequivocal and express waiver of sovereign immunity or congressional authorization, state courts lack the power to entertain lawsuits against tribal entities.\u201d); see also Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep\u2019t of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 172, 97 S.Ct. 2616, 53 L.Ed.2d 667 (1977) (\u201cAbsent an effective waiver or consent, it is settled that a state court may not exercise jurisdiction over a recognized Indian tribe\u201d).\n{12} As explained above, the Pueblo in this case did decide to waive its sovereign immunity under limited circumstances. The resolution issued pursuant to the lease agreement states as follows:\n[T]he Board of Directors hereby approves a limited waiver of sovereign immunity and consents to be sued in the Pueblo of Santa Ana Tribal Court, should an action be commenced to determine and enforce the obligations of the parties under this Lease, provided that the foregoing waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to TEI\u2019s obligations under the Lease is limited to actions seeking one [or] more of the following remedies: injunctive relief, declaratory judgment, or specific performance.\n{13} In examining this waiver, we are guided by the above principles of sovereign immunity, as well as by ordinary principles of contract interpretation. When a contractual provision is unambiguous, we only apply it and do not interpret it. Richardson v. Farmers Ins. Co., 112 N.M. 73, 74, 811 P.2d 571, 572 (1991). Here, we need not interpret or construe the waiver of immunity in the resolution because we find it to be unambiguous. By its clear terms, the waiver provides a consent to suit only if the suit (1) is brought in tribal court and (2) seeks \u201cinjunctive relief, [a] declaratory judgment, or specific performance.\u201d\n{14} Moreover, even if we were to interpret or construe the provision, we do not see how it could plausibly be read to encompass, as Plaintiff argues, \u201cany claims concerning the lease.\u201d Plaintiff offers no support for its position that we should construe the waiver to encompass a suit for damages (rather than injunctive or declaratory relief) in state (rather than tribal) court. The Pueblo clearly limited the waiver to claims brought in tribal court for injunctive and declaratory relief, and those limitations must be strictly construed. See Mo. River Servs., Inc., 267 F.3d at 852. Thus, we hold that the lease agreement and resolution do not waive the Pueblo\u2019s sovereign immunity with regard to this suit.\nB. THE GAMING COMPACT WAIVER\n{15} Plaintiff next argues that its suit is permissible because the Pueblo waived its sovereign immunity in the gaming compact it entered into with the State of New Mexico. As an initial matter, the parties dispute which version of the gaming compact is applicable. Plaintiff contends that the 1997 version of the gaming compact is applicable because it is a \u201ccurrent statute.\u201d Plaintiff notes that the 2001 gaming compact, relied on by the Pueblo, is \u201cnot a part of the state stahites.\u201d Plaintiff further argues that the 1997 gaming compact is still valid \u201cbased on its history of use by the Pueblo of Santa Ana and the State of New Mexico,\u201d and that the waivers of sovereign immunity in the 1997 gaming compact \u201ccannot be deluded [sic], since those waivers were the consideration which the gaming tribes gave for the contractual relationship with the state as contained in the compacts.\u201d\n{16} The Pueblo asserts that the 2001 version of the gaming compact is currently in effect because it superceded the 1997 version. The 2001 gaming compact was signed by Governor Johnson on October 2, 2001, signed by the Governor of the Pueblo of Santa Ana on October 1, 2001, and approved by the New Mexico Legislature. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 11-13-1, compiler\u2019s note (2004). Section 9(D) of the 2001 gaming compact states:\nUpon the publication of notice of the Secretary [of the Interior\u2019s] affirmative approval of this Compact in the Federal Register, the Predecessor Agreements shall be and become null and void, and of no further effect, ... and the terms and provisions of this Compact shall go into full force and effect, fully supplanting and replacing the Predecessor Agreements.\nSection 2(L) defines the term \u201cPredecessor Agreements\u201d to include the 1997 gaming compact. The Secretary of the Interior published an official notice of approval of the 2001 gaming compact in the Federal Register on December 14, 2001. Notice of approved Tribal-State Compacts, 66 Fed.Reg. 64,856 (Dec. 14, 2001).\n{17} Under these circumstances, we agree with the Pueblo that the 2001 gaming compact is applicable in this case because it superceded the 1997 gaming compact. We reject Plaintiff\u2019s argument that the 1997 gaming compact is still valid just because it is still in the New Mexico Statutes Annotated.\n{18} Plaintiff argues that even if the 2001 gaming compact is in effect, it also contains a waiver of the Pueblo\u2019s sovereign immunity that is applicable to this case. Section 8(A) of the 2001 gaming compact, entitled \u201cPolicy Concerning Protection of Visitors,\u201d states as follows:\nThe safety and protection of visitors to a Gaming Facility is a priority of the Tribe, and it is the purpose of this Section to assure that any such persons who suffer bodily injury or property damage proximately caused by the conduct of the Gaming Enterprise have an effective remedy for obtaining fair and just compensation. To that end, in this Section, and subject to its terms, the Tribe agrees to carry insurance that covers such injury or loss, agrees to a limited waiver of its immunity from suit, and agrees to proceed either in binding arbitration proceedings or in a court of competent jurisdiction, at the visitor\u2019s election, with respect to claims for bodily injury or property damage proximately caused by the conduct of the Gaming Enterprise. For purposes of this Section, any such claim may be brought in state district court, including claims arising on tribal land, unless it is finally determined by a state or federal court that IGRA [the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act] does not permit the shifting of jurisdiction over visitors\u2019 personal injury suits to state court.\nSection 8(D) states that the Pueblo \u201cwaives its defense of sovereign immunity in connection with any claims for compensatory damages for bodily injury or property damage up to the amount of fifty million dollars ($50,-000,000) per occurrence asserted as provided in this section.\u201d\n{19} Under these provisions, the Pueblo\u2019s sovereign immunity from suit will be waived in this case only if (1) Plaintiff is a \u201cvisitor\u201d as that term is used in the gaming compact and (2) the gaming compact\u2019s use of the phrase \u201cbodily injury and property damage\u201d contemplates suits like the present one alleging breach of contract and tortious business activity. We hold that Plaintiff is not a \u201cvisitor\u201d under the gaming compact and that the waiver of sovereign immunity in the gaming compact was not intended to encompass claims like those pleaded in this case.\n{20} Gaming compacts are contracts between two parties, and we treat them as such. Gallegos, 2002-NMSC-012, \u00b6 30, 132 N.M. 207, 46 P.3d 668. When interpreting a contract, our primary goal is to \u201cascertain the intentions of the contracting parties.\u201d Id (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). When a contractual provision is unambiguous, we need not engage in construction or interpretation of the provision\u2019s language. Richardson, 112 N.M. at 74, 811 P.2d at 572 (\u201cAbsent ambiguity, provisions of a contract need only be applied, rather than construed or interpreted.\u201d).\n{21} We find the waiver provision in the gaming compact to be unambiguous. By its plain language, the waiver is geared toward personal injury claims brought by casino patrons. We also note four statements in Section 8 that support this conclusion. First, Section 8 consistently uses the phrase \u201cbodily injury\u201d in conjunction with the phrase \u201cproperty damage.\u201d The juxtaposition of these terms indicates that the drafters of the gaming compact were referring to physical harms to persons or property. (We note the possibility that the drafters also intended the waiver to refer to related claims, such as emotional distress and loss of consortium. Because that possibility is not raised by this case, we expressly decline to address it.) Second, Section 8(A) begins by referencing the importance of \u201cthe safety and protection\u201d of visitors. The use of the word \u201csafety\u201d again indicates that the drafters were referring to physical damage to persons or property when they worded the waiver. Third, the final sentence of Section 8(A) states that the claims referenced in that section may be brought in state court \u201cunless it is finally determined ... that IGRA does not permit the shifting of jurisdiction over visitors\u2019 personal injury suits to state court.\u201d Id. (emphasis added). Section 8\u2019s reference to the type of claims it encompasses as \u201cpersonal injury\u201d claims further supports our interpretation of the waiver.\n{22} Finally, Section 8(A) refers to \u201cvisitors to a Gaming Facility\u201d and then states that the purpose of the section is \u201cto assure that any such persons who suffer bodily injury or property damage\u201d have a remedy. The term \u201cpersons\u201d is sometimes used to refer to corporations as well as natural persons. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 881 n. 9, 105 S.Ct. 1676, 84 L.Ed.2d 751 (1985) (\u201cIt is well established that a corporation is a \u2018person\u2019 within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.\u201d). However, corporations clearly do not suffer \u201cbodily injury.\u201d Thus, the gaming compact\u2019s reference to \u201cpersons who suffer bodily injury\u201d further supports our conclusion that the waiver of sovereign immunity was intended to cover only claims for physical injuries to persons and property and not claims like the present ones, which involve contract law and business torts.\n{23} With regard to the proper definition of the word \u201cvisitor\u201d as used in the gaming compact, Plaintiff argues that \u201c[t]here is no language in [the gaming compact] ... which limits the definition of \u2018visitors\u2019 to exclude commercial persons or corporations which do business with the casinos.\u201d Plaintiff also relies on a New Mexico Uniform Jury Instruction, which defines a visitor as \u201ca person who enters or remains upon the premises with the [express] [or] [implied] permission of the [owner] [occupant] of the premises.\u201d UJI 13-1302 NMRA. Plaintiff notes that, in the context of negligence actions, our Supreme Court has eliminated the distinction between licensees and business visitors. See Ford v. Bd. of County Comm\u2019rs, 118 N.M. 134, 139, 879 P.2d 766, 771 (1994).\n{24} We agree that there is no specific language in the gaming compact explicitly limiting the waiver to personal injury-type claims. We also agree with Plaintiff that it falls within the definition of a \u201cvisitor\u201d under the cited UJI, and we believe that Plaintiff correctly reads the Ford case. However, in determining the meaning of contractual provisions, our primary duty is to ascertain the intent of the drafters. Gallegos, 2002-NMSC-012, \u00b6 30, 132 N.M. 207, 46 P.3d 668. As we have shown in our analysis above, the drafters of the gaming compact intended to provide a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for purposes of providing a remedy to casino patrons who suffer physical injury to their persons or property. Plaintiff has not shown how the definition used in the UJI or the distinction between licensees and business visitors eliminated in Ford would inform our inquiry into the intent of the drafters of the gaming compact.\n{25} Moreover, we agree with the policy rationale asserted by the Pueblo for limiting the term \u201cvisitor\u201d to casino patrons and guests. The Pueblo notes that \u201cwhile an ordinary customer has no opportunity to negotiate the terms upon which he or she comes onto the gaming facility premises, a contractor or vendor has every such opportunity]}]\u201d In view of this observation, it makes sense that the State and the Pueblo would have been concerned with the safety of ordinary customers, rather than the financial well-being of entities who enter into business transactions with the Pueblo and can be assumed to be capable of protecting their own interests. For the above reasons, we reject Plaintiffs contention that it should be considered a \u201cvisitor\u201d to whom the waiver applies.\n{26} In support of its argument that the phrase \u201cbodily injury and property damage\u201d encompasses the type of claims brought in this case, Plaintiff argues that its contract with the Pueblo created a \u201cproperty right\u201d that was \u201cdamage[d]\u201d by the Pueblo\u2019s actions. Plaintiff cites numerous cases holding that intangibles such as rights under a contract can be \u201cproperty rights.\u201d See, e.g., Mills v. N.M. Bd. of Psych. Examiners, 1997-NMSC-028, \u00b6\u00b6 13-15, 123 N.M. 421, 941 P.2d 502 (holding that professional license constitutes a \u201cconstitutionally protected property interest\u201d for purposes of both procedural and substantive due process analysis); Bd. of Educ. v. Harrell, 118 N.M. 470, 477, 882 P.2d 511, 518 (1994) (\u201cinterests in government benefits will be recognized as constitutional \u2018property\u2019 if the person can be deemed \u2018entitled\u2019 to them.\u201d (citation: omitted)); Scott v. Bd. of Comm\u2019rs, 109 N.M. 310, 312, 785 P.2d 221, 223 (1989) (noting that written contract with political subdivision creates a \u201ccognizable property interest\u201d but does not necessarily form the basis for a claim under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983); Moongate Water Co., Inc. v. State, 120 N.M. 399, 404, 902 P.2d 554, 559 (Ct.App.1995) (noting that for purposes of Fourteenth Amendment, property interests are generally created by state law).\n{27} All of the cases cited by Plaintiff involve due process claims asserted against state actors. The Pueblo is not a state actor that is bound by the federal constitution or the New Mexico Constitution to afford due process to those with whom it conducts business. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978) (noting that tribes are generally not bound by any constitutional provisions that are \u201climitations on federal or state authority\u201d); Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minn. Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d 529, 533 (8th Cir.1967) (holding that the Due Process Clause has \u201cno application to actions of Indian tribes, acting as such\u201d (cited with approval in Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 56 n. 7, 98 S.Ct. 1670)).\n{28} However, in citing the above-mentioned due process eases, Plaintiff does not appear to argue that the Pueblo is a state actor who has violated its due process rights. Rather, Plaintiff seems to analogize the concept of a \u201cproperty right\u201d for purposes of due process analysis to the contractual rights at stake in this case. We are not persuaded by this analogy. As explained above, our duty is to ascertain the intent of the gaming compact drafters, and we are confident that their intent was to provide a remedy for casino patrons who suffer physical damage to their persons or property. Plaintiff has not shown how the definition of \u201cproperty\u201d in the due process context is relevant to our inquiry regarding the intent of the gaming compact drafters. Thus, we reiterate our holding that Plaintiffs claims do not fall under the waiver contained in Section 8 of the gaming compact.\nC. LACK OF ANY WAIVER FOR CLAIMS ALLEGING VIOLATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS\n{29} Finally, Plaintiff argues that in forcing it out of its business, the Pueblo has committed illegal discrimination on the basis of race and national origin. Plaintiff appears to claim that because \u201cthe Compact specifically requires the Defendants to not discriminate based on race and national origin,\u201d the Pueblo has waived its sovereign immunity with regard to discrimination claims. Plaintiff is correct that the gaming compact requires the Pueblo to adopt laws \u201cprohibiting the Tribe, the Gaming Enterprise and a Management Contractor from discriminating in the employment of persons to work for the gaming Enterprise or in the Gaming Facility on the grounds of race, color, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, age or handicap[.]\u201d\n{30} As the Pueblo points out, however, Plaintiff has not demonstrated how it is a \u201cperson\u201d who \u201cwork[s] for\u201d the Gaming Enterprise. According to Plaintiffs allegations, Plaintiff is a corporation that entered into a lease and contractual agreement with the Pueblo. However, even if the quoted provision were applicable to an entity in Plaintiffs position. Plaintiff has not indicated the basis on which it believes the provision waives the Pueblo\u2019s sovereign immunity with respect to claims for discrimination. Because waivers of sovereign immunity must be express and unequivocal, see Sanchez, 2005-NMCA-003, \u00b6 5,136 N.M. 682, 104 P.3d 548, and because the above-quoted provision makes no mention whatsoever of a waiver, we decline to hold that the provision constitutes a valid waiver of the Pueblo\u2019s sovereign immunity from suit.\nCONCLUSION\n{31} Because neither the lease agreement nor the gaming compact waived the Pueblo\u2019s sovereign immunity with regard to this suit, we hold that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, and we affirm the grant of the motion to dismiss.\n{32} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nBUSTAMANTE, C.J. and ALARID, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PICKARD, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Chris Lucero, Jr., Albuquerque, for Appellant.", "Rothstein, Donatelli, Hughes, Dahlstrom,' Sehoenburg & Bienvenu, LLP, Richard W. Hughes, Santa Fe, for Appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2006-NMCA-020\n128 P.3d 513\nR & R DELI, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SANTA ANA STAR CASINO; Tamaya Enterprises, Inc.; the Pueblo of Santa Ana; Conrad Granito, General Manager of Santa Ana Star Casino; Aaron Armijo, Chairman of Tamaya Enterprises, Inc., and Leonard Armijo, Governor of Pueblo of Santa Ana, Defendants-Appellees.\nNo. 25,582.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nDec. 21, 2005.\nCertiorari Denied, No. 29,625, Feb. 1, 2006.\nChris Lucero, Jr., Albuquerque, for Appellant.\nRothstein, Donatelli, Hughes, Dahlstrom,' Sehoenburg & Bienvenu, LLP, Richard W. Hughes, Santa Fe, for Appellees." }, "file_name": "0085-01", "first_page_order": 117, "last_page_order": 124 }