{ "id": 2545402, "name": "Cari I. AGUILERA, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the HATCH VALLEY SCHOOLS, Defendant-Petitioner", "name_abbreviation": "Aguilera v. Board of Education of the Hatch Valley Schools", "decision_date": "2006-03-14", "docket_number": "No. 29,190", "first_page": "330", "last_page": "338", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "139 N.M. 330" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "132 P.3d 587" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2006-NMSC-015" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "1999-NMSC-017", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 257701 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/127/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMCA-111", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1224678 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 5" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/136/0301-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 N.M. 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1552772 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351-52", "parenthetical": "holding that courts may look beyond the plain language of a statute where it would lead to absurd or unreasonable results" }, { "page": "1357-58", "parenthetical": "holding that courts may look beyond the plain language of a statute where it would lead to absurd or unreasonable results" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/117/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 N.E. 453", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1907, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 Ind. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ind.", "case_ids": [ 1640789 ], "year": 1907, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ind/169/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMCA-113", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 834303 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/125/0576-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMCA-041", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 257588 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 11-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/127/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 N.M. 554", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 720271 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579", "parenthetical": "Baca, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part" }, { "page": "1221", "parenthetical": "Baca, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/112/0554-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.M. 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 731602 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568" }, { "page": "818" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/114/0560-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563442 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84" }, { "page": "85" }, { "page": "85" }, { "page": "86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMSC-015", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 1427952 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 5" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/135/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 N.M. 610", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5335825 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "612-14" }, { "page": "368-70" }, { "page": "613" }, { "page": "369" }, { "page": "613-14" }, { "page": "369-70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/82/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 N.M. 182", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5348525 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185", "parenthetical": "\"[A] reduction in the teaching staff, without more, would not appeal' to be a good and sufficient reason for the dismissal of a tenure teacher when other teachers without tenure are retained in her place and stead.\"" }, { "page": "970", "parenthetical": "\"[A] reduction in the teaching staff, without more, would not appeal' to be a good and sufficient reason for the dismissal of a tenure teacher when other teachers without tenure are retained in her place and stead.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/71/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 N.M. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1597090 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "2" }, { "page": "686" }, { "page": "2" }, { "page": "686" }, { "page": "3" }, { "page": "687" }, { "page": "2-3" }, { "page": "686-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/107/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 N.M. 683", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2829292 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "684" }, { "page": "826" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/86/0683-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 N.M. 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5364897 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/80/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 N.M. 511", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1589312 ], "weight": 17, "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516" }, { "page": "76" }, { "page": "513" }, { "page": "74" }, { "page": "514" }, { "page": "75" }, { "page": "516" }, { "page": "77" }, { "page": "516" }, { "page": "76" }, { "page": "516" }, { "page": "76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/59/0511-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 N.M. 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1584613 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170", "parenthetical": "\"By statute [teachers] are assured an indefinite tenure of position during satisfactory performance of their duties.\"" }, { "page": "1014", "parenthetical": "\"By statute [teachers] are assured an indefinite tenure of position during satisfactory performance of their duties.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/99/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 N.M. 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1577069 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211" }, { "page": "613" }, { "page": "211" }, { "page": "613" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/50/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 N.M. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1560836 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1944, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592" }, { "page": "254-55" }, { "page": "593" }, { "page": "255" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/48/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 N.M. 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1565131 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45253", "parenthetical": "stating that a discharge cannot be without cause" }, { "page": "693-94", "parenthetical": "stating that a discharge cannot be without cause" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/45/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 P. 1007", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "year": 1921, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1009" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 N.M. 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8841823 ], "year": 1921, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/27/0250-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMCA-022", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 929164 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/137/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMSC-005", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 15945 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b617" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/133/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMCA-069", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 929233 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b621, 23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/137/0642-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1307, "char_count": 30855, "ocr_confidence": 0.673, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1767434712406039e-07, "percentile": 0.5876744165393426 }, "sha256": "df6fb2a7ce590777f6a8fa28b4f6e9f8deacaeccb4eae716708ce7ec174172e9", "simhash": "1:646f6157e10bd772", "word_count": 5033 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:33:27.919749+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: PAMELA B. MINZNER, PATRICIO M. SERNA, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, and EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justices." ], "parties": [ "Cari I. AGUILERA, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the HATCH VALLEY SCHOOLS, Defendant-Petitioner." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nBOSSON, Chief Justice.\n{1} Pursuant to a reduction in force (RIF) arising from a district-wide financial shortfall, Plaintiff Cari I. Aguilera, a certified arts teacher with the Hatch Valley Schools, was discharged during the term of her contract. Under the New Mexico School Personnel Act, a certified teacher may only be discharged for \u201cjust cause,\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 22-10A-27(A) (2003), defined as \u201ca reason that is rationally related to an employee\u2019s competence or turpitude or the proper performance of his duties,\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 22-10A-2(F) (2003). Ms. Aguilera was not charged with any infractions relating to competence, turpitude or performance.\n{2} An independent arbitrator reviewed the School Board\u2019s decision to discharge Ms. Aguilera and found there was no \u201cjust cause\u201d under Section 22-10A-2(F). However, the arbitrator also found that the discharge was authorized by the district\u2019s RIF policy, and therefore upheld the discharge. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding for Plaintiff that \u201cjust cause\u201d was limited to reasons based upon performance, competence, or turpitude, and did not include a RIF arising from fiscal problems in the school district. We granted certiorari to clarify the state statute defining \u201cjust cause\u201d and what constitutes grounds for teacher termination or discharge. We affirm the result reached by the Court of Appeals, but for different reasons. Contrary to the Court of Appeals, we determine that the plain meaning interpretation of the \u201cjust cause\u201d definition is not appropriate, but instead we look to judicial interpretations of \u201cjust cause\u201d prior to the time the Legislature defined the term to inform our construction of the statute.\nBACKGROUND\n{3} At the end of Ms. Aguilera\u2019s second year as a high school art teacher, the Board agreed to employ her as an art teacher for a third consecutive year at the middle school, and the parties entered into a contract. However, in early fall of that year, the Superintendent of Hatch Valley, Mr. Billy Henson, notified Ms. Aguilera that he would be recommending to the Board that she be discharged pursuant to a RIF. Allegedly, the RIF was necessary because of shortfalls in state funding and the discontinuation of certain federal grant money. Superintendent Henson made the decision to eliminate Ms. Aguilera\u2019s position because art was considered a non-vital academic area. Due to low enrollment, it would have the least effect on the students. The Board accepted the Superintendent\u2019s RIF plan, along with his recommendation to discharge Ms. Aguilera in the middle of her contract.\n{4} Ms. Aguilera requested a hearing, and the Board upheld its decision. Ms. Aguilera appealed to an independent arbitrator who conducted a de novo review of the Board\u2019s decision. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 22-10A-28(D) (2003). After a hearing, the arbitrator found that Ms. Aguilera had an excellent work history with Hatch Valley, and was losing her job as a result of the school district failing \u201cto get its financial house in order.\u201d The arbitrator noted that Ms. Aguilera never \u201chad any negative reports in terms of job performance, competence or suggestion of moral turpitude, or ever failed to properly perform [her] duties while employed by the Hatch Valley Public School System.\u201d The arbitrator also noted there was evidence that Hatch Valley could have finished the year with sufficient funds to pay Ms. Aguilera\u2019s salary. ' The arbitrator concluded, however, that Hatch Valley\u2019s RIF policy constituted \u201cjust cause\u201d for the discharge of certified school personnel and termination of tenured employees.\n{5} Ms. Aguilera appealed the arbitrator\u2019s decision to the Court of Appeals which disagreed with the arbitrator\u2019s interpretation of state law, and held that the RIF policy did not constitute \u201cjust cause\u201d under the School Personnel Act. Aguilera v. Bd. of Educ., 2005-NMCA-069, \u00b6\u00b621, 23, 137 N.M. 642, 114 P.3d 322. The Court of Appeals determined that a plain reading of the definition of \u201cjust cause\u201d and the requirement that a discharge \u201conly\u201d be for \u201cjust cause,\u201d meant that Ms. Aguilera could only be discharged for reasons personal to her qualifications and performance, and not for a RIF. Id. \u00b6 13; see \u00a7 22-10A-27(A).\nDISCUSSION\n{6} The issue in this case is whether statutory \u201cjust cause\u201d allows for discharge of a teacher when exigent fiscal circumstances justify a RIF, but the teacher\u2019s competence, turpitude and performance do not. Because we are interpreting the School Personnel Act, and its application to this case, we apply a de novo standard of review. Rio Grande Chapter of Sierra Club v. N.M. Mining Comm\u2019n, 2003-NMSC-005, \u00b617, 133 N.M. 97, 61 P.3d 806; Crutchfield v. N.M. Dep\u2019t of Taxation & Revenue, 2005-NMCA-022, \u00b6 16, 137 N.M. 26, 106 P.3d 1273.\n{7} The term \u201cjust cause\u201d was not defined by statute until the Legislature amended the Act in 1991. See 1991 N.M. Laws ch. 187, \u00a7 3. However, prior to the 1991 amendment, New Mexico courts had interpreted the meaning of \u201cjust cause\u201d or comparable terms for almost half a century. To put the 1991 amendment in proper context, we look first to the history of our case law interpreting the predecessor statutes of the School Personnel Act, commonly known as teacher\u2019s tenure statutes. We consider whether the Legislature, in adding a \u201cjust cause\u201d definition in 1991, intended to codify that case law and its history or reject it in favor of a new, more limited concept of \u201cjust cause.\u201d Finally, we examine specifically whether a RIF can be \u201cjust cause\u201d for discharge under the Act, and if so, whether \u201cjust cause\u201d was proven to discharge Ms. Aguilera.\nThe History of the Teacher\u2019s Tenure Statute and the Swisher Rule\n{8} Long before any statutory directive, this Court acknowledged over 80 years ago that a school board had the implicit right to terminate a teacher for \u201cadequate cause,\u201d a right derived from its statutory power to employ that same teacher. Tadlock v. Sch. Dist. No. 29 of Guadalupe County, 27 N.M. 250, 256, 199 P. 1007, 1009 (1921); accord Landers v. Bd. of Educ., 45 N.M. 446, 45253, 116 P.2d 690, 693-94 (1941) (stating that a discharge cannot be without cause). Subsequently, in line with this Court\u2019s decisions, the Legislature amended the 1925 version of the Act, to say that no teacher could be discharged \u201cexcept upon good cause.\u201d 1941 N.M. Laws, eh. 202, \u00a7 3; see also Ortega v. Otero, 48 N.M. 588, 592, 154 P.2d 252, 254-55 (1944). The Legislature did not define \u201cgood cause.\u201d\n{9} Interpreting the public policy animating the 1941 amendment, we stated:\nThe effect of the amendment is to further protect the employment status of teachers.\nOf greater significance, however, is the time and circumstance of the amendment.\nThe Legislature of 1941 doubtless sensed the need to get in step with the march of progress toward a greater security to those who have become equipped through education and training to assume positions in our school system.\nWhat is known as Teachers\u2019 Tenure Acts have been adopted in most of the states of our union, the objects of which are to encourage men and women to make a lifetime profession of teaching and to stimulate them to seek positions in the school system requiring the qualifications of teachers, and to protect them in their employment from the whims of those possibly politically minded, and to insure their continuance in such employment.\nOrtega, 48 N.M. at 593, 154 P.2d at 255; see also Stapleton v. Huff, 50 N.M. 208, 211, 173 P.2d 612, 613 (1946). In light of the legislative policy to protect teachers as professionals, this Court determined that \u201cgood cause\u201d meant reasons related to satisfactory performance of duties. Stapleton, 50 N.M. at 211, 173 P.2d at 613; see also Atencio v. Bd. of Educ., 99 N.M. 168, 170, 655 P.2d 1012, 1014 (1982) (\u201cBy statute [teachers] are assured an indefinite tenure of position during satisfactory performance of their duties.\u201d).\n{10} It is from this statutory and jurisprudential genesis that this Court created the basis to analyze a discharge or termination of a teacher when the reason for severing the teacher\u2019s employment is not personal, but rather based on some exigent circumstance. In the Swisher case in 1955 this Court noted that \u201c[a]bsent grounds personal to the teacher,\u201d the standard to be applied in a discharge resulting from a RIF required the Board \u201cto show affirmatively that there was no position available [that the teacher] was qualified to teach.\u201d Swisher v. Darden, 59 N.M. 511, 516, 287 P.2d 73, 76 (1955), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Sanchez v. Bd. of Educ., 80 N.M. 286, 454 P.2d 768 (1969). Swisher arose from the aftermath of racial desegregation in the Las Cruces school system. 59 N.M. at 513, 287 P.2d at 74. The local school board closed the segregated, blacks-only high school where Ms. Swisher taught because most of the students had been integrated into mixed-race schools. Id. The local board discharged Ms. Swisher, despite her tenure, because it concluded that her services could no longer be utilized within an integrated school system. Id.\n{11} On appeal, the State Board of Education found no \u201cjust cause\u201d for the termination, pointing out that none of the personal grounds under the law \u2014 immorality, insubordination, incompeteney, or disloyalty to the United States \u2014 were present. Id. at 514, 287 P.2d at 75. On review, the district court upheld the State Board, and noted further that the local board chose not to retain Swisher because it believed that, as a black teacher, she would be unable to teach in a white or mixed-race school. Id. at 516, 287 P.2d at 77. On appeal to this Court, the local board argued that it had demonstrated sufficient cause because it made its decision in good faith and not for pretextual reasons. Id. at 516, 287 P.2d at 76. In our opinion, we agreed that under a \u201cjust cause\u201d standard a teacher could be terminated for more than just personal reasons, but if so, then \u201cmore was required\u201d of the school board to justify its decision. Id. We stated: \u201cAdmittedly, the [school where Swisher taught] was closed for economic reasons. But more was required. Absent grounds personal to the teacher, to terminate her services it was necessary to show affirmatively that there was no position available which she was qualified to teach.\u201d Id. A mere statement of systemic shrinkage due to desegregation was not enough.\n{12} Swisher remains today the seminal case on a school board\u2019s power to terminate a tenured teacher absent personal grounds. See Penasco Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 4 v. Lucero, 86 N.M. 683, 684, 526 P.2d 825, 826 (Ct.App.1974) (\u201cThe controlling rule on the local board\u2019s power to terminate a tenure teacher was stated in Swisher. ... \u201d). Swisher has been applied specifically to RIF situations, albeit with differing results. See N.M. State Bd. of Educ. v. Abeyta, 107 N.M. 1, 2, 751 P.2d 685, 686 (1988); see also Hensley v. State Bd. of Educ., 71 N.M. 182, 185, 376 P.2d 968, 970 (1962) (\u201c[A] reduction in the teaching staff, without more, would not appeal\u2019 to be a good and sufficient reason for the dismissal of a tenure teacher when other teachers without tenure are retained in her place and stead.\u201d).\n{13} In Fort Sumner Municipal School Board v. Parsons, 82 N.M. 610, 612-14, 485 P.2d 366, 368-70 (Ct.App.1971), the school board was forced to conduct a RIF, and it decided to retain two non-tenured teachers instead of reemploying Parsons, a tenured teacher. The Court of Appeals held the Swisher requirement was met because, in a small school system, it was imperative to retain the two non-tenured teachers who could teach the same subjects as Parsons as well as other subjects that Parsons could not. Parsons, 82 N.M. at 613, 485 P.2d at 369. Therefore, it was necessary to retain these two teachers instead of Parsons to prevent the overall academic program at the school from being seriously compromised. Id. at 613-14, 485 P.2d at 369-70.\n{14} Following Parsons, this Court was faced with a similar situation in Abeyta, 107 N.M. at 2, 751 P.2d at 686, where, because of a RIF, the school board had three tenured social studies teachers, but only two positions available. Based on a performance evaluation, Abeyta was identified for termination. Id. The board considered realignment, a rearranging of staff to different positions, but rejected it because realignment would detrimentally affect other academic areas at the school. Id. Based on this record, we held that the board had satisfied the Swisher requirement. Id. at 3, 751 P.2d at 687. Before resorting to termination, it had considered reasonable alternatives for which Abeyta was qualified and rejected them based on reasons solidly grounded in the academic welfare of the school. Id. at 2-3, 751 P.2d at 686-87.\n{15} Abeyta and Parsons inform us that the Swisher rule is to be applied in the context of whatever special facts and circumstances pertain to each individual case. Pursuant to Swisher, a school board faced with a RIF must strive to find another eligible position for which the teacher is qualified. However, the school board is not required to imperil the quality of education, or conduct a realignment that is proven to have a deleterious effect on the overall academic program of the school system. Abeyta and Parsons represent the law in effect in 1991, before our Legislature, for the first time, enacted its own definition of \u201cjust cause.\u201d\nEffect of the 1991 Amendment to the School Personnel Act\n{16} The 1991 amendment to the School Personnel Act defined \u201cjust cause\u201d as \u201ca reason that is rationally related to an employee\u2019s competence or turpitude or the proper performance of his duties.\u201d Section 22-10A-2(F). Given Swisher\u2019s dominant position at that time in our case law, the question is whether the 1991 amendment defining \u201cjust cause\u201d was intended to codify Swisher or to overturn it. The Court of Appeals strictly interpreted the language of the \u201cjust cause\u201d definition to reach its conclusion. We believe, however, that the Legislature intended to incorporate this Court\u2019s case law when it defined \u201cjust cause.\u201d\n{17} At first glance, the \u201cjust cause\u201d definition might appear to give no room for the balance struck in Swisher, because it limits the grounds for discharge and termination to reasons rationally related to competence, turpitude, or proper performance of duties. See \u00a7 22-10A-2(F). Indeed, this is how Ms. Aguilera argues her case \u2014 that reasons external to teacher performance, such as a RIF, can never be grounds for termination. On the other hand, the Board argues that a properly justified RIF will always constitute \u201cjust cause,\u201d and nothing more need be shown. Notably, neither view allows for any compromise in the middle, much as this Court crafted in Swisher year\u2019s ago.\n{18} We believe both positions are extreme, and neither captures the essence of legislative intent. We look to the amendment to determine if the middle ground struck in Sivisher survives. Put another way, we look for any indication that the Legislature intended such a radical change that would eliminate its essential compromise. We first determine the intent of the Legislature in deciding to define \u201cjust cause\u201d for the first time, and then interpret the language of the definition itself based on that legislative intent.\n{19} The primary goal of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. State v. Young, 2004-NMSC-015, \u00b6 5, 135 N.M. 458, 90 P.3d 477. Normally, when the Legislature amends a statute, we presume it intends to change existing law. Wasko v. N.M. Dep\u2019t of Labor, 118 N.M. 82, 84, 879 P.2d 83, 85 (1994). However, \u201can amendment may clarify existing law, rather than change the law, if the statute was ambiguous or unclear prior to the amendment.\u201d Wasko, 118 N.M. at 85, 879 P.2d at 86; accord Resolution Trust Corp. v. Binford, 114 N.M. 560, 568, 844 P.2d 810, 818 (1992); See generally 1A Norman J. Singer, Statutes & Statutory Construction \u00a7 22:1, at 239, 241-42; \u00a7 22.30, at 357, 357-76 (6th ed.2002 revision). The Legislature may also amend a statute to adopt prior interpretations by the courts. See 2B Singer, supra, \u00a7 50:02, at 144, 144-50; State v. Ortega, 112 N.M. 554, 579, 817 P.2d 1196, 1221 (1991) (Baca, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing the Legislature amended felony murder statute to adopt the judicial interpretation given the prior act); 1A Singer, supra, \u00a7 22:31, at 380.\n{20} The 1991 amendment did not alter any terms of the School Personnel Act dealing with grounds for discharge, or make substantive changes; it simply added a definition. Such a modest step is not usually a harbinger of radical change. See State v. Morrison, 1999-NMCA-041, \u00b6\u00b6 11-13, 127 N.M. 63, 976 P.2d 1015; cf. Blackwood & Nichols Co. v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep\u2019t, 1998-NMCA-113, \u00b6 15, 125 N.M. 576, 964 P.2d 137 (holding that substantial revision of statute materially changed existing law, rather than clarifying it). Normally, the Legislature will signal its intent to effect a substantial change in the law, and it did not do so in this instance. The 1991 amendment, adding only the \u201cjust cause\u201d definition, appears more like a supplementary act rather than an amendatory act, as it simply \u201cadds to, or completes, or extends that which is already in existence without changing or modifying the original.\u201d 1A Singer, supra, \u00a7 22:24, at 330-31 (quoting McCleary v. Babcock, 169 Ind. 228, 82 N.E. 453, 455 (1907)).\n{21} The statutory evolution of the \u201cjust cause\u201d requirement for discharge and termination supports our conclusion that no substantive change in the law was intended. Since it first required \u201cgood cause,\u201d see 1941 N.M. Laws, ch. 202, \u00a7 3, the Legislature has consistently required a showing of \u201cgood\u201d or \u201cjust cause\u201d for discharge. In the original codification of the 1978 statutes, the current version we follow, the Legislature required \u201cgood and just cause\u201d for both discharge and termination. See 1978 Comp., \u00a7 22-10-17 (discharge), as enacted by 1967 N.M. Laws, ch. 16, \u00a7 119 (recompiled as 1978 Comp., \u00a7 22-10A-27 by 2003 N.M. Laws, ch. 153, \u00a7 72); 1978 Comp., \u00a7 22-10-14 (termination), as enacted by 1967 N.M. Laws, ch. 16, \u00a7 116 (recompiled as 1978 Comp., \u00a7 22-10A-24 by 2003 N.M. Laws, ch. 153, \u00a7 72). In 1986, the Legislature changed the standard for termination of tenured employees, prohibiting only those terminations that were \u201cbased upon grounds that are arbitrary or capricious or legally impermissible.\u201d 1986 N.M. Laws, ch. 33, \u00a7 22. However, in the same amendment, the Legislature left intact the \u201cgood and just cause\u201d requirement for discharge. 1986 N.M. Laws, ch. 33, \u00a7 24. Finally, in 1991, the Legislature restored the \u201cjust cause\u201d requirement for termination and made only slight changes to the discharge statute by removing \u201cgood and\u201d from \u201cgood and just cause,\u201d in addition to defining \u201cjust cause.\u201d See 1991 N.M. Laws, ch. 187, \u00a7\u00a7 3, 4, 7.\n{22} Thus, it seems clear that the 1991 amendment was aimed at restoring \u201cjust cause\u201d as a condition to termination, thereby restoring to tenured teachers the protections they had enjoyed before 1986. It is equally clear that the Legislature made no substantive changes to the discharge statute, leaving intact the protections tenured teachers had enjoyed for decades. We discern no legislative intent from this textual history to effect the kind of radical change now suggested by Plaintiff: an intent to create a kind of \u201csuper-tenure,\u201d strictly limiting the grounds for either termination or discharge to personal factors and making teachers entirely immune from the economic consequences of a valid RIF. If that is the legislative intent, we await a clearer manifestation from the legislative branch.\n{23} We also observe that any plain meaning analysis of the amendment could lead to harsh, even absurd results. See State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 117 N.M. 346, 351-52, 871 P.2d 1352, 1357-58 (1994) (holding that courts may look beyond the plain language of a statute where it would lead to absurd or unreasonable results); Santa Fe County Bd. of County Comm\u2019rs v. Town of Edgewood, 2004-NMCA-111, \u00b6 5, 136 N.M. 301, 97 P.3d 633. It would mean that a school board could never discharge or terminate a teacher even when compelled by economic reasons to reduce its teacher force. Absent a clear-cut legislative directive, we will not assume the Legislature intended to leave a school board powerless to respond to financial crisis.\n{24} Instead of being forced to choose between two all-or-nothing positions, we believe the Legislature intended a more moderate view. It did not intend to tie the hands of a school board faced with the necessity of a RIF, but neither did the Legislature intend to place tenure teachers at the mercy of school administrators. We presume the 1991 legislature was aware of existing law, including the case law of our appellate courts. State v. Cleve, 1999-NMSC-017, \u00b6 14, 127 N.M. 240, 980 P.2d 23 (stating that the Legislature is presumed to know existing law when enacting a statute). In the absence of a clear legislative directive to abandon existing law, we continue to apply it. Existing law includes the balance struck in Swisher and its progeny between the competing demands of tenure protection and administrative exigency.\n{25} Swisher recognizes the limited circumstance when a board is forced to discharge or terminate a competent teacher for reasons external to the personal context. When we view \u201cjust cause\u201d in light of the legislative intent to protect both teachers and school systems, and our precedent dating back over half a century, we conclude that the 1991 statutory definition intended to codify and incorporate the Swisher rule into the School Personnel Act. Accordingly, we hold that when a school board is forced to reduce its teaching staff by way of a RIF, it must satisfy the Swisher requirement and prove that there is no other position for which the teacher is qualified consistent with the academic necessities of the district. This rule gives considerable protection to teachers and tenured employees, while still allowing a school board to conduct a RIF when faced with compelling circumstances.\nThe Swisher Rule was not Properly Applied in this Case\n{26} Because we hold that the Swisher rule applies to this case, we must now determine if the Hatch Valley School Board satisfied it. Unfortunately for the Board, we find nothing in the record to indicate the Board even considered the rule, much less satisfied it. We also determine that in his de novo review, the arbitrator applied the wrong standard, one that was inconsistent with Swisher.\n{27} The School Board\u2019s written decision makes no mention of any consideration by the Board of Swisher-type alternatives, and no evidence was presented to the Board to this effect. The Board\u2019s minutes of the meeting when it was suggested that a RIF was needed, show that Superintendent Henson informed the Board that attempts had already been made to reduce the work force through attrition, and he had considered cutting some extra-curricular activities. However, Superintendent Henson suggested that \u201cextra-curricular activities not be eliminated at this time because of the large numbers of students ... involved,\u201d and their importance to student success. Interestingly, the Superintendent also testified that of the 70 teachers in the Hatch Valley system, six are football coaches, and just that year, the number was increased from five to six. While these broad-based \u201calternatives\u201d may be valid considerations to determine where to apply the RIF, they do not address the individually based requirement of Swisher once a teacher is identified for discharge. They do not discuss particular alternatives for Ms. Aguilera and her particular qualifications. Similarly, the minutes of the September 30, 2002, meeting in which the Board actually approved the elimination of the middle school art program, reflect no determinations about whether there were other qualified positions for the only teacher in that program, Ms. Aguilera.\n{28} Under Swisher, it is the Board\u2019s burden and duty to make the proper determination that no other positions exist. The record is devoid of any evidence that this occurred. In his memorandum to the Board, purporting to lay out the RIF plan, Superintendent Henson indicated that substandard licensed personnel are the first people to be discharged. The arbitrator concluded this statement referred to Ms. Aguilera, as she had a substandard license. However, Superintendent Henson\u2019s plan to the Board never identified Ms. Aguilera as having a substandard license, and never indicated to the Board the significance of the statement. This information should have been presented to the Board to satisfy Swisher, as it had the ultimate authority to discharge Ms. Aguilera.\n{29} Because the Board never considered the Swisher standard or any evidence that Superintendent Henson applied Swisher, we hold the Board\u2019s decision was invalid. However, because the arbitrator conducted a de novo review, we must also determine if Swisher was properly applied in that proceeding. We hold it was not.\n{30} In the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the arbitrator found the RIF policy constituted \u201cjust cause\u201d for discharge or termination. The only limiting principle was that the RIF \u201cmust be exercised by the board in good faith and based on bonafide educational considerations, and not as a subterfuge for discharging ... without good or just cause or for any other impermissible reason.\u201d This surely does not satisfy Swisher. This Court expressly rejected the same argument of good faith when advanced by the Las Cruces Board in its attempt to terminate Ms. Swisher. See Swisher, 59 N.M. at 516, 287 P.2d at 76.\n{31} The arbitrator also noted the RIF plan requires \u201ca discussion of alternatives considered by the superintendent with an explanation as to why such alternatives were rejected.\u201d This requirement is much broader than the Swisher rule and focuses on school programs rather than individual affected teachers. Counsel for the Board, during closing statements argued for a more relaxed standard, stating:\nThe manner in which a company chooses to conduct a RIF is within its sound business discretion. And plaintiffs in this case, having failed to introduce any evidence that the RIF criteria or pretext for discriminatory motives____[TJhere is nothing that suggests that Mr. Henson ... targeted [Plaintiff] for the loss of [her job] for either impermissible discriminatory kinds of reasons....\nSwisher and Abeyta were mentioned by both counsel, but only in a vague fashion without ever really focusing on the specific requirement of Swisher that was applied to a RIF in Abeyta.\n{32} Unlike termination, which applies to the coming year, discharge results in a teacher losing her job in the middle of the school year, when there may be no opportunity to find other employment. Given the extreme hardship to the teacher, the justifications must be substantial to allow a school board to layoff qualified teachers in the middle of a school year pursuant to a RIF. The school board has to show not just projected financial burdens in the future, but that it cannot survive financially for the present year, which is already underway. To avoid such draconian consequences, the Legislature has authorized a school district to reserve up to 5 percent of its cash balance for an emergency fund to help get through the year when it experiences \u201cunforeseen expenditures incurred after the annual budget was approved.\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 22-8-41(B) (2004).\nCONCLUSION\n{33} We conclude that the Board failed to make the requisite showing under Swisher, both in its decision and before the arbitrator, and therefore failed to prove \u201cjust cause\u201d for the discharge of Ms. Aguilera. Accordingly, we affirm the result reached by the Court of Appeals, reverse the arbitrator\u2019s decision and remand for whatever further proceedings are necessary to implement this Opinion.\n{34} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: PAMELA B. MINZNER, PATRICIO M. SERNA, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, and EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justices.\n. The same definition of \"just cause\u201d in Section 22-10A-2(F), applies to both the discharge of certified school employees, see \u00a7 22-10A-27(A), and to the termination of tenured employees, see NMSA 1978, \u00a7 22-10A-24(D) (2003).\n. We note this case involves only the discharge of a certified teacher, and not termination. \"[D]is-charge\u201d is defined as \"the act of severing the employment relationship with a certified school employee prior to the expiration of the current employment contract.\u201d Section 22-10A-2(A). \"[T]ermma[tion]\u201d is \"the act of not reemploying an employee for the ensuing school year.\u201d Section 22-10A-2(D). In all cases of discharge, the teacher may only lose her position for \u201cjust cause.\u201d Section 22-10A-27(A). In termination cases, if the teacher is tenured, the teacher may not be fired except for \"just cause.\" Section 22-10A-24(D). A teacher obtains tenure by remaining employed by \"a school district or state agency for three consecutive years.\u201d Id. A non-tenured teacher may be terminated for any reason deemed sufficient by the school board. Section 22-10A-24(A). \"Just cause,\u201d as defined in Section 22-10A-2(F), applies to both discharge of any teacher and termination of a tenured teacher. Our decision regarding when an RIF is \"just cause\u201d to discharge a teacher, is equally applicable to termination of a tenured teacher.\n. There was evidence before the arbitrator similar in nature to that required by Swisher. Superintendent Henson testified about the nature of Ms. Aguilera\u2019s substandard license as compared to the high school art teacher's, and he also claimed to have considered a realignment. Theoretically, this evidence might have satisfied the Swisher requirement that the school consider other alternatives for which the teacher is qualified. However, nothing in the record indicates the arbitrator considered this evidence in light of Swisher or followed Swisher.", "type": "majority", "author": "BOSSON, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Castille & Ortiz, LLC, Robert D. Castille, Los Alamos, NM, for Petitioner.", "Martin, Lutz, Roggow, Hosford & Eu-banks, P.C., William L. Lutz, Las Cruces, NM, for Respondent.", "Cuddy, Kennedy, Albetta & Ives, L.L.P., John F. Kennedy, Samantha J. Fenrow, Santa Fe, NM, for Amicus Curiae, New Mexico School Board Association, New Mexico Coalition of School Administrators.", "Jones, Snead, Wertheim & Wentworth, P.A., Jerry Todd Wertheim, Santa Fe, NM, for Amicus Curiae, National Education Association of New Mexico.", "Willie R. Brown, Santa Fe, NM, for Amicus Curiae, Public Education Department." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2006-NMSC-015\n132 P.3d 587\nCari I. AGUILERA, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the HATCH VALLEY SCHOOLS, Defendant-Petitioner.\nNo. 29,190.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nMarch 14, 2006.\nCorrected April 24, 2006.\nCastille & Ortiz, LLC, Robert D. Castille, Los Alamos, NM, for Petitioner.\nMartin, Lutz, Roggow, Hosford & Eu-banks, P.C., William L. Lutz, Las Cruces, NM, for Respondent.\nCuddy, Kennedy, Albetta & Ives, L.L.P., John F. Kennedy, Samantha J. Fenrow, Santa Fe, NM, for Amicus Curiae, New Mexico School Board Association, New Mexico Coalition of School Administrators.\nJones, Snead, Wertheim & Wentworth, P.A., Jerry Todd Wertheim, Santa Fe, NM, for Amicus Curiae, National Education Association of New Mexico.\nWillie R. Brown, Santa Fe, NM, for Amicus Curiae, Public Education Department." }, "file_name": "0330-01", "first_page_order": 362, "last_page_order": 370 }