{ "id": 3671424, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Timothy WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Williams", "decision_date": "2006-06-29", "docket_number": "No. 25,958", "first_page": "194", "last_page": "198", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "140 N.M. 194" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2006-NMCA-092" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "141 P.3d 538" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "107 N.M. 305", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1597107 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "306", "parenthetical": "\"The fixing of penalties is a legislative function and the trial court has authority to impose only what has been authorized by the legislature.\"" }, { "page": "586", "parenthetical": "\"The fixing of penalties is a legislative function and the trial court has authority to impose only what has been authorized by the legislature.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/107/0305-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMCA-043", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 2544519 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/139/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "2002-NMCA-110", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 15699 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 22, 23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/133/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMSC-001", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 77119 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0768-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMCA-035", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1428051 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 21-25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/135/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMCA-032", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1427939 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 23" }, { "page": "\u00b6 24" }, { "page": "\u00b6 32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/135/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMSC-004", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 827335 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0642-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 N.M. 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 725510 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456" }, { "page": "158" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/115/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 N.M. 111", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1588680 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119" }, { "page": "1266" }, { "page": "120" }, { "page": "1267" }, { "page": "119" }, { "page": "1266" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/100/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMCA-065", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 929253 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 11" }, { "page": "\u00b6 10" }, { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/137/0583-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 560, "char_count": 12364, "ocr_confidence": 0.661, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0366306834083482e-07, "percentile": 0.5495720020742522 }, "sha256": "02db3806ee3cba4d4ebf6b66fa8fe3c4a2f33935499d7f55f0b68041740098f4", "simhash": "1:638eae37b5100d60", "word_count": 1940 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:21:44.975087+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: JONATHAN B. SUTIN and CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Judges." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Timothy WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nWECHSLER, Judge.\n{1} Although charged with crimes that require, on conviction, registration under SORNA, Defendant Timothy Williams pleaded no contest to crimes that do not require registration. The district court sentenced Defendant to probation and included a condition that Defendant provide the Bernalillo County sheriff information required under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 29-11A-1 to -10 (1995, as amended through 2005), and it gave the sheriff the discretion to process the information. Because the district court did not have the authority to require registration or to give the sheriff the discretion to process the information, we reverse this condition of probation and affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment and sentence in all other respects.\nBACKGROUND\n{2} Defendant was charged with six counts of criminal sexual contact of a minor and two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. By virtue of a plea and disposition agreement, Defendant entered a plea of no contest to one count of child abuse and one count of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Among the provisions of the plea and disposition agreement, the State agreed not to object to probation with a suspended or deferred sentence, and the State and Defendant agreed to certain special conditions of probation. There was no mention of SORNA. The district court accepted the agreement. It sentenced Defendant to a total of four and one-half years\u2019 imprisonment, suspended the sentence, and placed Defendant on supervised probation for the period of the sentence. It imposed the special conditions of probation stated in the plea and disposition agreement and added the condition that Defendant \u201csubmit all paperwork which would have been required upon a conviction enumerated in the sex offender registration act pursuant to [S]ection 29-11A-1, through [Sjection 29-11A-8, of the NMSA to the Bernalillo County Sheriffs office for the Sheriffs office to process at their discretion.\u201d Defendant appeals the district court\u2019s judgment and sentence with respect to the legality of this probation condition.\nSTANDARD OF REVIEW\n{3} The grant of probation is a discretionary act of the sentencing court. State v. Garcia, 2005-NMCA-065, \u00b6 11, 137 N.M. 583, 113 P.3d 406; State v. Donaldson, 100 N.M. 111, 119, 666 P.2d 1258, 1266 (Ct.App.1983). We therefore review probation terms and conditions that the sentencing court has imposed for abuse of discretion. Garcia, 2005-NMCA-065, \u00b6 10. Specifically, in deferring to a sentencing court\u2019s discretion in setting such terms and conditions, we will not set it aside unless they \u201c(1) have no reasonable relationship to the offense for which [the] defendant was convicted, (2) relate to activity which is not itself criminal in nature and (3) require or forbid conduct which is not reasonably related to deterring future criminality.\u201d Donaldson, 100 N.M. at 120, 666 P.2d at 1267.\n{4} However, a sentencing court may not impose an illegal sentence. See, e.g., State v. Dominguez, 115 N.M. 445, 456, 853 P.2d 147, 158 (Ct.App.1993) (\u201cConditions of probation that are not authorized by law are void.\u201d). Thus, it does not have the discretion to impose a probation term or condition that is contrary to law. We review the legality of a sentence under the de novo standard of review. See State v. Brown, 1999-NMSC-004, \u00b6 8, 126 N.M. 642, 974 P.2d 136.\nLEGALITY OF PROBATION CONDITION\n{5} SORNA classifies certain specified crimes as \u201csex offense[s]\u201d and defines a New Mexico resident convicted of a sex offense in New Mexico as a \u201csex offender.\u201d Section 29-llA-3(D), (E). It requires sex offenders to register with the county sheriff of the county of the offender\u2019s residence, providing information concerning the offender\u2019s name, date of birth, social security number, address, place of employment, and the sex offenses of which the offender was convicted. Section 29-11A-4(B). The willful or knowing failure to register is a felony. Section 29-11A-4(N). SORNA further requires certain sex offenders to renew their registration annually for ten years and others to renew at least every ninety-day period for life. Section 29-11A-4(L). It mandates that the county sheriff maintain a local registry of sex offenders required to register under SORNA and forward registration information to the department of public safety, which must maintain a central registry and participate in the national sex offender registry. Section 29-11A-5(A), (B), (C). It also subjects certain specified sex offenders to its notification provisions. Section 29-11A-5.1(A); State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, \u00b6 23, 135 N.M. 223, 86 P.3d 1050. These provisions provide means for the public to access some of the registration information about the specified sex offenders. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, \u00b6 24.\n{6} The legislature enacted SORNA to protect communities through the registration of and dissemination of information about sex offenders. Section 29-11A-2. It is a remedial statute, designed for public safety, not punishment. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, \u00b6 32; State v. Moore, 2004-NMCA-035, \u00b6\u00b6 21-25, 135 N.M. 210, 86 P.3d 635.\n{7} The district court ordered Defendant to fulfill the registration requirements of SORNA during the period of his probation. It did so both for purposes of community protection and Defendant\u2019s rehabilitation. We recognize the district court\u2019s discretion to impose a probation condition that it intends for rehabilitation. See State v. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, \u00b6 21, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939 (noting that the district court has \u201cthe broad power to ensure that the goal of rehabilitation is indeed being achieved\u201d). However, in this instance, the condition does not comport with the provision or the intent of SORNA, and, therefore, the district court did not have the authority to impose the condition.\n{8} In imposing its condition, the district court required Defendant to submit the paperwork for registration as a sex offender under SORNA. It did not merely require Defendant to provide the sheriff with Defendant\u2019s personal information and information concerning his offenses. The mere requirement of the provision of such information for the court\u2019s stated purpose of community protection and Defendant\u2019s rehabilitation would presumably be reasonably related to the court\u2019s interest to \u201cprotect the public against the commission of other offenses\u201d and deter Defendant from \u201cfuture misconduct\u201d and would therefore be permissible. Donaldson, 100 N.M. at 119, 666 P.2d at 1266; see Garcia, 2005-NMCA-065, \u00b6 11.\n{9} But the district court required more. It specifically tied the information to registration under SORNA, and it allowed the sheriff the discretion to process Defendant as a sex offender under SORNA. Defendant is not a sex offender under SORNA. He was not convicted of any of the sex offenses listed in SORNA. Section 29-UA-3(E). He was not required to register upon his conviction. The district court could not have forced him to register as punishment for his crimes. Indeed, we have questioned whether the district court even has the authority to order a defendant to register when the defendant has been convicted of a sex offense. See State v. Brothers, 2002-NMCA-110, \u00b6\u00b6 22, 23, 133 N.M. 36, 59 P.3d 1268 (noting that while the district court may not have had the authority to require a convicted sex offender to register, it had the authority to notify the defendant of the registration requirement).\n{10} Not only does the statutory scheme of SORNA not contemplate Defendant\u2019s registration, it also does not contemplate any action upon the receipt of the registration information. SORNA mandates that upon receiving registration information the sheriff include the information in the local registry and forward it to the department of public safety. But the sheriff has no authority under SORNA to take any action with regard to someone who was not convicted of a sex offense. Section 29-llA-5(A), (B) (providing that the \u201csheriff shall maintain a local registry of sex offenders\u201d and that the \u201csheriff shall forward\u201d information and DNA samples \u201cobtained from sex offenders\u201d). Nor does the department of public safety have any authority to include registration information of a non-sex offender in the central registry or to forward it to the national registry. Section 29-llA-5(C) (providing that \u201c[t]he department of public safety shall maintain a central registry of sex offenders\u201d and \u201cshall send conviction information and fingerprints for all sex offenders ... to the national sex offender registry\u201d). Based on the district court\u2019s oral ruling at the sentencing hearing, it is clear that the paperwork it ordered Defendant to file is registration information. See State v. Roybal, 2006-NMCA-043, \u00b6 9, 139 N.M. 341, 132 P.3d 598 (noting that the court\u2019s oral comments may be \u201cused to clarify [its] ruling\u201d).\n{11} Although the sheriff has the mandatory responsibility to include sex offender registration information in the local registry and to forward it to the department of public safety, the sheriff has no authority under SORNA to take any action with regard to someone who was not convicted of a sex offense. See \u00a7 29-11A-5(A), (B). This important distinction is magnified by the district court\u2019s grant of discretion to the sheriff to process Defendant\u2019s registration information. With the mandatory language of SOR-NA as to a sheriffs responsibilities, we do not believe that the legislature intended to encumber sheriffs with the burden of deciding what action to take with registration information, particularly when SORNA does not even give the sheriff the authority to receive the information. Indeed, such discretion would undermine the reliability of the registry system.\n{12} Further, because the district court could not statutorily require Defendant to register under SORNA, since he was not convicted of a sex offense, the district court could not use SORNA as a punishment tool in its sentence. See, e.g., State v. Michael V., 107 N.M. 305, 306, 756 P.2d 585, 586 (Ct.App. 1988) (\u201cThe fixing of penalties is a legislative function and the trial court has authority to impose only what has been authorized by the legislature.\u201d). Indeed, SORNA is a remedial statute, not designed as a form of punishment, although it may have such an indirect effect. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032. We have so held despite the potential that registration may bring detrimental consequences to the sex offender and the sex offender\u2019s family. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 32-34. SORNA is nevertheless remedial because the legislative goal of public safety overrides any such individual detriment. See id. \u00b6 34. The legislature, however, has not conducted any balance between the potential public safety benefit and the individual detriment for someone, such as Defendant, who has not been convicted of a sex offense. By including the probation condition at issue, the district court has substituted its judgment for that of the legislature. It may not make this determination.\n{13} We thus reach the conclusion that SORNA does not afford any authority for the district court to require Defendant to file SORNA registration information as ordered in the probation condition, and, as a consequence, the district court lacked the authority to order the condition. We understand the district court\u2019s desire to protect the public and to deter Defendant from further misconduct by placing Defendant within the SORNA system. Although the district court has discretion to fashion conditions of probation reasonably designed to rehabilitate the defendant, it may not abridge statutory authority to accomplish its purpose.\nCONCLUSION\n{14} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the imposition of registration under SORNA as a condition of Defendant\u2019s probation. We affirm the remainder of the district court\u2019s judgment and sentence.\n{15} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: JONATHAN B. SUTIN and CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Judges.", "type": "majority", "author": "WECHSLER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, Ralph E. Trujillo, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.", "Gorence & Oliveros, P.C., Robert J. Gorence, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2006-NMCA-092 141 P.3d 538\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Timothy WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 25,958.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nJune 29, 2006.\nPatricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, Ralph E. Trujillo, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.\nGorence & Oliveros, P.C., Robert J. Gorence, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant." }, "file_name": "0194-01", "first_page_order": 230, "last_page_order": 234 }