{ "id": 3670328, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. Robert WILSON, Defendant-Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Wilson", "decision_date": "2006-08-08", "docket_number": "No. 29,484", "first_page": "218", "last_page": "223", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "140 N.M. 218" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "141 P.3d 1272" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2006-NMSC-037" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "2001-NMCA-025", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 352387 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 37" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/130/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 N.M. 478", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1586330 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479", "parenthetical": "holding that the competency of the accused to stand trial must be established by a preponderance of the evidence, and not beyond a reasonable doubt" }, { "page": "1144", "parenthetical": "holding that the competency of the accused to stand trial must be established by a preponderance of the evidence, and not beyond a reasonable doubt" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/101/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "716 F.Supp. 644", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7395207 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/716/0644-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 N.M. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1552727 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" }, { "page": "106" }, { "page": "145" }, { "page": "107" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/117/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMCA-013", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 17217 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/124/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMSC-021", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 142254 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 7" }, { "page": "\u00b6 7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/123/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMSC-035", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 2550981 ], "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/138/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMCA-110", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1224621 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/136/0295-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMSC-032", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 1224669 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/136/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 111", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566678 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" }, { "page": "1382" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMCA-130", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 2549023 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/138/0551-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 648, "char_count": 14240, "ocr_confidence": 0.697, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.204469563392538e-08, "percentile": 0.38420965855538297 }, "sha256": "3256cf81f34b5d9650b675087f84c738db488189e0d9e7ce9b0935f9befaab3f", "simhash": "1:698615207a489e83", "word_count": 2250 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:21:44.975087+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: RICHARD C. BOSSON, Chief Justice, PATRICIO M. SERNA, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, and EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justices." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. Robert WILSON, Defendant-Respondent." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nMINZNER, Justice.\n{1} We are called on in this appeal to determine the proper procedure to be followed by a district court reviewing a conviction from Metropolitan Court, which may involve domestic abuse under the Family Violence Protection Act (\u201cFVPA\u201d), NMSA 1978, Sections 40-13-1 through 40-13-10 (1987 as amended through 2005). While a district court generally holds a de novo trial in eases originating in the Metropolitan Court, cases involving domestic violence are heard on-record. NMSA 1978, \u00a7 34-8A-6(C) (1993). We note that Section 40-13-7(E) requires the Metropolitan Court to include in the judgment and sentence an indication when a conviction results from the commission of domestic abuse. We therefore conclude that a judgment and sentence issued by the Metropolitan Court which does not include such a statement reflects the Court\u2019s determination that the case did not involve domestic violence. This conclusion is subject to review by the district court. Reviewing de novo, we conclude that the undisputed facts in this case do not support the conclusion that the convictions from which Defendant, Robert Wilson, has appealed involved domestic violence. We therefore remand to the district court for a trial de novo.\nI. BACKGROUND\n{2} Defendant was convicted following a bench trial before the Bernalillo County Metropolitan Court of criminal trespass, contrary to NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-14-1 (1995), and harassment, contrary to NMSA 1978, \u00a7 SOSA-2 (1997). The case was originally assigned a \u201cDV\u201d docketing number, for domestic violence, and the trial before the Metropolitan Court judge was conducted on-record. The victim testified that she had known Defendant for a little over a week but repeatedly stated that she and Defendant were not boyfriend and girlfriend. The Metropolitan Court\u2019s judgment does not indicate whether Defendant\u2019s crimes involved domestic violence.\n{3} Defendant appealed his two convictions to district court and requested a trial de novo. After reviewing the victim\u2019s testimony before the Metropolitan Court regarding her relationship with Defendant, the district court concluded that victim and Defendant were involved in a continuing personal relationship, that victim was therefore a \u201chousehold member\u201d within the meaning of the FVPA, and denied the motion for a de novo hearing. The district court then affirmed Defendant\u2019s convictions following an on-record review. Defendant appealed, claiming that he was entitled to a de novo trial, and that the district court erred both in reviewing the record to determine whether Defendant and victim were involved in a continuing personal relationship and in denying him a trial de novo.\n{4} The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that \u201cthe parties\u2019 status as household members is a necessary element in proving that the crimes are domestic violence under the Family Violence Protection Act,\u201d State v. Wilson, 2005-NMCA-130, \u00b6 8, 138 N.M. 551, 123 P.3d 784, and looked to the Metropolitan Court judgment, rather than the district court\u2019s legal analysis, to determine whether Defendant was entitled to a trial de novo. Id. \u00b6 13. Because the judgment stated that Defendant was convicted of harassment and trespass and did not indicate that victim was a household member, or that the convictions involved domestic violence, the Court of Appeals concluded that the conviction did not fall within the FVPA and that Defendant was therefore entitled to a trial de novo. The State petitioned this Court for certiorari to address the proper procedure to be followed by a district court when a Metropolitan Court judgment and sentence does not indicate whether a victim is a household member.\n{5} We conclude that \u00e1 judgment and sentence issued by the Metropolitan Court reflects, implicitly or explicitly, whether the conviction involved domestic violence. This legal conclusion is subject to review by the district court. Reviewing that determination de novo, we conclude that the undisputed facts in this case do not support the conclusion that Defendant\u2019s convictions involved domestic violence and therefore remand to the district court for a trial de novo.\nII. DISCUSSION\n{6} The proper procedure to be followed by a district court when reviewing a Metropolitan Court\u2019s conviction is a question of statutory interpretation which we review de novo. See State v. Rowell, 121 N.M. 111, 114, 908 P.2d 1379, 1382 (1995). When interpreting a statute, our primary goal is to give effect to the Legislature\u2019s intent. State v. Smith, 2004-NMSC-032, \u00b6 8, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022.\n{7} Our Constitution grants district courts \u201cappellate jurisdiction of all cases originating in inferior courts.\u201d N.M. CONST. art. VI, \u00a7 13. These trials \u201cshall be had de novo unless otherwise provided by law.\u201d N.M. CONST. art. VI, \u00a7 27; see also State v. Heinsen, 2004-NMCA-110, \u00b6 11, 136 N.M. 295, 97 P.3d 627, aff'd 2005-NMSC-035, 138 N.M. 441, 121 P.3d 1040. We conclude that the Legislature has \u201cotherwise provided\u201d because the FVPA and Section 34-8A-6(C) ere-ate an exception to the general rule mandating de novo hearings. Section 34^8A-6(C) defines which cases are heard on-record by the Metropolitan Court.\nThe metropolitan court is a court of record for criminal actions involving ... domestic violence. A criminal action involving domestic violence means an assault or battery under any state law or municipal or county ordinance in which the alleged victim is a household member as defined in the Family Violence Protection Act.\nId.\n{8} The FVPA in turn defines domestic abuse as \u201cany incident by a household member against another household member resulting in\u201d among other things, criminal trespass or harassment. Section 40-13-2(C).\n\u201c[H]ousehold member\u201d means a spouse, former spouse, family member, including a relative, parent, present or former stepparent, present or former in-law, child or co-parent of a child, or a person with whom the petitioner has had a continuing personal relationship. Cohabitation is not necessary to be deemed a household member for purposes of this section.\nSection 40-13-2(D). We have previously recognized that Section 34-8A-6(C) \u201cmust be read in pari materia with the definition of domestic abuse in the Family Violence Protection Act,\u201d and it follows that \u201call domestic abuse actions, as defined in the Family Violence Protection Act, should be tried on-record.\u201d State ex rel. Schwartz v. Sanchez, 1997-NMSC-021, \u00b6 7, 123 N.M. 165, 936 P.2d 334.\n{9} This case presents a question less clearly addressed by either statute; how should a district court go about determining whether a particular case is one \u201cinvolving domestic violence\u201d under the FVPA? The starting point for this inquiry must be the Metropolitan Court\u2019s judgment and sentence because this document must include a statement if the case involves domestic violence. Section 40-13-7(E) (\u201cA statement shall be included in a judgment and sentence document to indicate when a conviction results from the commission of domestic abuse.\u201d); see also State v. Krause, 1998-NMCA-013, \u00b6 8, 124 N.M. 415, 951 P.2d 1076 (\u201cIn determining what kind of appeal a defendant is entitled to, we must view the conviction, not the charging document.\u201d). Where the judgment does not include such a statement, the Metropolitan Court has implicitly concluded that the conviction was not based on the commission of domestic abuse.\n{10} This ruling by the Metropolitan Court, whether explicit or implied, is subject to review by the district court. Rules 7-706, 7-707 NMRA 2006. The Metropolitan Court\u2019s determination that a case does or does not involve domestic violence is based on its view of the facts presented and interpretation of the FVPA. The district court should therefore review the Metropolitan Court\u2019s factual conclusions with some deference, considering whether they are supported by substantial evidence in the record. State v. Attaway, 117 N.M. 141, 144, 870 P.2d 103, 106 (1994). The Metropolitan Court\u2019s application of law to these facts, however, is properly reviewed de novo. Id. at 145, 870 P.2d at 107.\n{11} On-record Metropolitan Court proceedings are an exception to the general rule that defendants are entitled to a de novo trial in district court, see Section 34-8A-6(D) (\u201cThe metropolitan court is not a court of record for criminal actions other than driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquors or drugs or domestic violence actions.\u201d). Thus, the party seeking to establish that a conviction is a domestic violence action will have the burden of showing that a defendant is not entitled to a de novo trial. We anticipate that the State will generally bear the burden of proof, but recognize that this may not be the case in all situations. In many cases, including this one, proof that the victim was a \u201chousehold member\u201d is not an element of the crime charged. See \u00a7 30-14-1 (criminal trespass); \u00a7 30-3A-2 (harassment). Therefore, this fact need not be proven \u201cbeyond a reasonable doubt,\u201d but may be established by a preponderance of the evidence. Cf. United States v. North, 716 F.Supp. 644, 648 and n. 3 (D.D.C.1989) (collecting eases holding that the government has the burden to establish proper venue by a preponderance of the evidence); State v. Chapman, 101 N.M. 478, 479, 684 P.2d 1143, 1144 (1984) (holding that the competency of the accused to stand trial must be established by a preponderance of the evidence, and not beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. Gonzales, 2001-NMCA-025, \u00b6 37, 130 N.M. 341, 24 P.3d 776 (concluding that findings relating to child\u2019s amenability to treatment as a juvenile need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt). Furthermore, because the character of the victim\u2019s relationship need not be proven as an element of the crime, either party may appeal the Metropolitan Court\u2019s conclusion to the district court.\n{12} Forced to make a decision without explicit guidance regarding the procedure it should follow, the district court closely approximated the procedure we have outlined in this opinion. The Court reviewed the record from the Metropolitan Court\u2019s hearing, noted the facts established by the victim\u2019s testimony and determined, primarily as a matter of law, that the uncontroverted facts established that Defendant and victim were involved in a continuing personal relationship. While we conclude that the district court adopted an acceptable procedure for determining whether a case should be characterized as involving domestic abuse, we have a different view of the relevant law.\n{13} Reviewing the definition of \u201chousehold member,\u201d in the FVPA, we note that all of the relationships described, \u201cspouse, former spouse, family member, including a relative, parent, present or former stepparent, present or former in-law, child or co-parent of a child\u201d involve some present or former connection, by blood or by marriage. These relationships involve a connection often thought of as enduring over years. We believe that the Legislature\u2019s reference to a \u201ccontinuing personal relationship\u201d in this context was intended to encompass similarly enduring relationships between persons who are not related, co-habiting or jointly raising a child. We are not persuaded that the term \u201chousehold member\u201d was intended to reach every romantic relationship, however brief. We do not at this time attempt to define with precision the outer boundaries of the \u201ccontinuing personal relationship,\u201d but conclude that the relationship described by the victim in this case does not lie within those bounds.\n{14} The basic facts presented to the Metropolitan Court do not appear to be in dispute. The victim testified that she had known Defendant for a little over a week, and that they had \u201cformed a sort of relationship\u201d in that period. The victim stated repeatedly that she and Defendant were not boyfriend and girlfriend, but that they had kissed. We conclude that two factors, the very brief time that Defendant and victim knew each other, and the victim\u2019s equivocal description of their relationship, show that this was not a \u201ccontinuing personal relationship\u201d of the type described by the FVPA.\n{15} We do not with this opinion minimize the seriousness of criminal harassment or trespass in cases where the victim is not a household member. The Legislature has recognized the seriousness of this activity by making this activity criminal. Nonetheless, we believe that the Legislature recognized that violence in the context of genuinely long-term relationships was particularly serious, and that victims of violence in this context were in need of greater protection than victims of other crimes. See \u00a7 40-13-1.1 (\u201cThe legislature finds that domestic abuse incidents are complex and require special training on the part of law enforcement officers to respond appropriately to domestic abuse incidents.\u201d). The FVPA is intended to address the unique needs of this group of victims.\nIII. CONCLUSION\n{16} Because the victim in this case was not in a continuing personal relationship with Defendant, we conclude that she was not a \u201chousehold member\u201d under the FVPA. Defendant was therefore not convicted of domestic abuse, and he was entitled to a trial de novo before the district court.\n{17} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: RICHARD C. BOSSON, Chief Justice, PATRICIO M. SERNA, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, and EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justices.\n. Section 34-8A-6(C) discusses the proper procedure for cases \"involving domestic violence,\u201d while the Family Violence Protection Act defines \"domestic abuse.\" Although the language in these two statutes is not identical, the same definition is employed to identify both domestic violence and domestic abuse. See State ex rel. Schwartz v. Sanchez, 1997-NMSC-021, \u00b6 7, 123 N.M. 165, 936 P.2d 334. In the interest of clarity we refer primarily to domestic violence in this opinion.", "type": "majority", "author": "MINZNER, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Joel Jacobsen, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.", "John Bigelow, Chief Public Defender, Linda Yen, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2006-NMSC-037 141 P.3d 1272\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. Robert WILSON, Defendant-Respondent.\nNo. 29,484.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nAug. 8, 2006.\nAs Revised Sept. 5, 2006.\nPatricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Joel Jacobsen, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.\nJohn Bigelow, Chief Public Defender, Linda Yen, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent." }, "file_name": "0218-01", "first_page_order": 254, "last_page_order": 259 }