{ "id": 3668977, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Art GRANADO, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Granado", "decision_date": "2007-03-27", "docket_number": "No. 26,469", "first_page": "575", "last_page": "582", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "141 N.M. 575" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "158 P.3d 1018" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2007-NMCA-058" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "13 Neb.App. 931", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Neb. Ct. App.", "case_ids": [ 3621625 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "stating that to effect an arrest, there must be a seizure or detention of the person arrested or his voluntary submission to custody" }, { "page": "281", "parenthetical": "stating that to effect an arrest, there must be a seizure or detention of the person arrested or his voluntary submission to custody" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/neb-app/13/0931-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMCA-019", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 827407 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0662-01" ] }, { "cite": "43 N.M. 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1568242 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1938, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/43/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 N.M. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1580159 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/102/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "2001-NMCA-108", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 183087 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/131/0390-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 N.M. 737", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1592866 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "741" }, { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/108/0737-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMCA-090", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3671240 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/140/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 N.M. 640", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590332 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "644", "parenthetical": "stating that a defendant does not have a duty to bring himself to trial" }, { "page": "592", "parenthetical": "stating that a defendant does not have a duty to bring himself to trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/109/0640-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMCA-051", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 15639 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/133/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMCA-097", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1224668 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/136/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMSC-014", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 15688 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" }, { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/133/0766-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMCA-147", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3671538 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 2" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/140/0788-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 901, "char_count": 25571, "ocr_confidence": 0.692, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2362248362904912e-07, "percentile": 0.6067610505477347 }, "sha256": "ba0674ec21217758e046645ee913afecfbbd2d68cda080619da86a9dc91907f7", "simhash": "1:d3dbd12248cb3d62", "word_count": 4283 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:58:03.770248+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: IRA ROBINSON and RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judges." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Art GRANADO, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nVIGIL, Judge.\n{1} The issue presented in this case is whether Defendant\u2019s trial in the metropolitan court commenced within the 182 days specified by Rule 7-506 NMRA. We hold that the trial did not commence within the time specified by the Rule, and reverse Defendant\u2019s conviction.\nFACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND\n{2} On September 12, 2004, Defendant was arrested by a New Mexico State Police officer and charged in the metropolitan court with aggravated driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DWI), second offense. NMSA 1978, \u00a7 66-8-102(D)(3) (2005). Defendant was arraigned on September 13, 2004, and trial was set for November 16, 2004. The State promptly notified the metropolitan court and defense counsel that it would call the two New Mexico State Police officers involved in Defendant\u2019s arrest as witnesses at the trial.\n{3} On November 16, 2004, Defendant appeared before the metropolitan court for trial. However, one of the arresting officers was not present. The State therefore requested, and was granted, a continuance of the trial. That same day, trial was reset for December 14, 2004. On December 14, 2004, Defendant again appeared for trial, and again, the prosecutor was unable to proceed, this time because neither of the arresting officers was present. The trial was therefore once again continued at the State\u2019s request and reset a third time for February 15, 2005, at 8:45 a.m.\n{4} On the morning of February 15, 2005, the arresting officers once again failed to appear. Defendant also was not present, and his attorney so advised the court when the case was called for trial. The judge thereupon announced, \u201cIssue a warrant.\u201d In his case notes for that day, the judge noted, \u201cDefendant absent court on 2-15-05 issue bench warrant, forfeit bond, new bond $2,000, cash only.\u201d\n{5} Later that day in the afternoon, the case was called again. Defendant, his attorney, and the prosecutor were present. The judge told Defendant: \u201cWe issued a bench warrant. Why weren\u2019t you here?\u201d Defendant explained that the fuel pump on his track had broken that morning on his way to court and that he had walked back home and called the metropolitan court judge\u2019s office to advise him of what had occurred. Defendant was told to be in the judge\u2019s courtroom at 1:00 p.m. that day and report to the clerk, which is what he did. He had also called the public defender\u2019s office that morning but was unable to get a response. Satisfied with Defendant\u2019s explanation, the judge announced in the presence of Defendant, his counsel, and the prosecutor, \u201c[ejancel the bench warrant we issued this morning. Defendant had car problems. Reset ... Defendant for trial.\u201d The judge\u2019s case notes of this hearing further confirm that his action was to cancel the bench warrant because Defendant had car problems and the trial was to be reset.\n{6} Trial was scheduled to commence a fourth time on March 16, 2005. At that time, Defendant moved to dismiss the charges because more than 182 days had passed since his arraignment in violation of Rule 7-506. The State did not dispute Defendant\u2019s calculation that more than 182 days had passed since the arraignment but asserted that because Defendant failed to appear for trial on the morning of February 15, 2005, the State was entitled to an additional 182 days to bring Defendant\u2019s ease to trial. Defense counsel argued that there was no failure to appear on Defendant\u2019s part; that he showed up late; and that the bench warrant was canceled. The judge responded:\n\u201cIt\u2019s the same thing isn\u2019t it, pretty much? ... The bench warrant is to assure that people show up for court on time. If you show up after the fact, whether we issued the bench warrant or not, the rationale is exactly the same.\nIf somebody is not available for trial and we have to issue a bench warrant because the State cannot proceed ... if we didn\u2019t count that as a bench warrant tolling the Rule, then the whole rationale behind ... that procedure would be negated.\u201d\nDefense counsel reminded the court that the State was not ready to proceed on the morning of February 15, 2005, because neither of the police officers were present. The judge answered, \u201cI understand, but that bench warrant had the effect of starting up the new six-month rule ... that\u2019s my ruling.\u201d The motion to dismiss was denied.\n{7} The judge thereupon ordered that trial would proceed as scheduled, but allowed a recess. After the recess, the parties advised the court that they had agreed to a conditional plea and disposition agreement. The judge approved the agreement under which Defendant made a conditional plea of guilty to first offense DWI. The agreement expressly states, \u201cI understand that the plea of guilty that I have entered is conditioned upon my appeal. If I file an appeal on the issue of the 182 day Rule and I win my appeal on this issue I may withdraw my plea.\u201d\n{8} The sentencing hearing took place on April 28, 2005. Defense counsel asked that an appeal bond be approved and the judge asked what the issue on appeal was going to be. Defense counsel responded the \u201cnew rule issue.\u201d After imposing sentence and allowing an appeal bond, the judge again asked what the issue reserved for appeal was. Defense counsel responded:\nIt was just an issue on the new rule. At the last setting the time had run. And there was a confusion as to whether the warrant was canceled or quashed. And whether it was canceled by him actually being here but the warrant still going out, whether it should have been quashed or canceled. \u2018Cause at that setting the time would have actually ran, but with the new rule at the issuance of the warrant then time stops.\nThe judge said, \u201cI ultimately think it ... doesn\u2019t matter____ Things stop. Whether you quash it or cancel it.\u201d Defense counsel replied, \u201cWe\u2019re pretty sure we agree with you on this one, but we\u2019re checking it out just in case.\u201d\n{9} Defendant appealed the metropolitan court\u2019s order denying his motion to dismiss to the district court. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 34-8A-6(C) (1993) (providing that the metropolitan court is a court of record for criminal actions involving DWI and that a party aggrieved by a judgment rendered by the metropolitan court in a criminal action involving DWI may appeal to the district court); Rules 7-703 to 7-709 NMRA (setting forth the manner and method of an appeal from the metropolitan court to the district court). The appeal was based on the record of the metropolitan court proceedings. Section 34-8A-6(C). Defendant pointed out that no warrant for Defendant\u2019s arrest was ever actually issued notwithstanding that the metropolitan court judge had said he was going to issue a warrant when Defendant was not present on the morning of February 15, 2005, and subsequently said later that afternoon that the bench warrant was going to be canceled after Defendant appeared as instructed. Defendant therefore asserted that the time to commence trial under Rule 7-506 was limited to 182 days after his arraignment, which had expired at the time of trial. The State responded that Defendant had not argued to the metropolitan court that a warrant for his arrest was never actually issued. Accordingly, the State contended that Defendant\u2019s legal argument premised on this fact was not preserved for appellate review by the district court. The district court agreed with Defendant that an arrest warrant was never issued by the metropolitan court. However, the district court also agreed with the State that Defendant\u2019s appellate argument that was based on this factual premise was not preserved, and issued its judgment affirming the judgment of the metropolitan court.\n{10} Defendant appeals from the judgment of the district court. See Rule 7-703(R) NMRA (\u201cAn aggrieved party may appeal from a judgment of the district court to the New Mexico Supreme Court or New Mexico Court of Appeals, as authorized by law, in accordance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure.\u201d).\nSTANDARD OF REVIEW\n{11} The question presented in this case is whether Defendant\u2019s trial commenced within the time prescribed by Rule 7-506. Our review is therefore de novo. See State v. Donahoo, 2006-NMCA-147, \u00b6 2, 140 N.M. 788, 149 P.3d 104 (\u201cWe review the district court\u2019s interpretation of a [metropolitan court] rule de novo.\u201d); Walker v. Walton, 2003-NMSC-014, \u00b6 8, 133 N.M. 766, 70 P.3d 756 (interpreting metropolitan court rules, and concluding that in construing rules of procedure adopted by the Supreme Court, appellate review is de novo).\nANALYSIS\n{12} The Rules of Criminal Procedure for the Metropolitan Courts were adopted by the Supreme Court to govern the procedure in the metropolitan court, and the Supreme Court has directed, \u201c[t]hese rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every metropolitan court' action.\u201d Rule 7-101(B) NMRA. Consistent with these purposes, Rule 7-506 specifies when the trial of a criminal action must commence, and the consequence of failing to comply with its requirement is clear: \u201cIn the event the trial of any person does not commence within the time specified in Paragraph [B] of this rule or within the period of any extension provided in this rule, the complaint or citation filed against such person shall be dismissed with prejudice.\u201d Rule 7-506(E).\n{13} The structure of Rule 7-506 is straightforward. The base line for commencing trial is 182 days after arraignment or waiver of arraignment. Rule 7-506(B)(l). However, various contingencies, including having to determine whether a defendant is competent to stand trial, the declaration of a mistrial, an appeal, a defendant\u2019s fugitive status, and terminating a defendant from a preprosecution diversion program because of a failure to comply with the terms, conditions, or requirements of the program may require a trial to commence at a later time. These additional triggering events are codified at Rule 7-506(B)(2)-(7). The Rule therefore requires a trial to commence within 182 days of the last triggering event to occur. Rule 7-506CB).\n{14} The State has the burden of bringing a defendant to trial within the time required by the rule. See State v. Guzman, 2004-NMCA-097, \u00b6 11, 136 N.M. 253, 96 P.3d 1173 (stating that the prosecutor, not the defendant had the duty to take appropriate action to bring the case to trial); State v. Cardenas, 2003-NMCA-051, \u00b6 11, 133 N.M. 516, 64 P.3d 543 (stating it is a \u201cwell-reeognized principle that the State is primarily responsible for bringing a criminal defendant to trial\u201d); Zurla v. State, 109 N.M. 640, 644, 789 P.2d 588, 592 (1990) (stating that a defendant does not have a duty to bring himself to trial). The Committee Commentary to Rule 7-506 explicitly recognizes this obligation on the State\u2019s part by stating, \u201cIt is the continuing duty of the prosecutor to seek the commencement of trial within the time specified in this rule.\u201d Therefore, when a defendant asserts that his trial did not commence within the time required by the rule, it is the State\u2019s burden to demonstrate that trial has commenced within the 182-day base period or that a subsequent triggering event is applicable and that trial commenced within 182 days of that triggering event.\nA. Preservation of Error\n{15} On appeal to the district court, there was no dispute that the record on appeal established that a bench warrant to arrest Defendant for failure to appear was never issued by the metropolitan court. We first address the State\u2019s argument, made to the district court, and repeated here, that because Defendant did not argue in the metropolitan court that a bench warrant for his arrest was never issued, he waived his right to argue the legal consequence of that fact on appeal. We hold that the issue was adequately preserved and reverse the district court.\n{16} The metropolitan court judge announced, \u201c[ijssue a warrant,\u201d when defense counsel advised that Defendant was not present the morning that trial was scheduled. When Defendant appeared before the judge that afternoon as instructed, and the judge accepted his explanation that his truck broke down while he was on his way to court, the judge announced, \u201c[ejancel the bench warrant we issued this morning.\u201d At the subsequent trial setting when defense counsel argued that the rule had expired, the judge first expressed the opinion that when Defendant did not appear for the scheduled trial, it did not matter either whether Defendant\u2019s absence was excused, or whether a bench warrant was issued; that Defendant\u2019s failure to appear by itself caused the 182 days to start running again because the State was unable to proceed with the trial. Defense counsel reminded the judge that trial could not have started anyway because neither of the arresting officers was present, and the judge replied, \u201cthat bench warrant had the effect of starting up the new six-month rule.\u201d Defense counsel had no reason to question the repeated assertions of the metropolitan court judge that a bench warrant for Defendant\u2019s arrest had been issued.\n{17} Defendant subsequently made a conditional plea, which the metropolitan court approved. The plea and disposition agreement approved by the metropolitan court judge states, \u201cI understand that the plea of guilty that I have entered is conditioned upon my appeal. If I file an appeal on the issue of_ (describe pre-trial motion upon which appeal will be based) and I win my appeal on this issue I may withdraw my plea.\u201d Handwritten on the blank line of the form describing the \u201cpre-trial motion upon which [the] appeal will be based \u201d is the handwritten notation \u201cthe 182 Day Rule.\u201d This notation clearly reserved Defendant\u2019s right to appeal whether his trial commenced within the period required by Rule 7-506. Believing that a bench warrant had actually been issued, defense counsel subsequently advised the metropolitan court prior to sentencing that the appellate issue was going to be whether the State is afforded an additional 182 days to bring a defendant to trial depends on whether an issued bench warrant is \u201ccanceled\u201d or \u201cquashed\u201d when a defendant appears before the court and provides a valid reason for not appearing for the scheduled trial. The metropolitan court expressed its opinion that it did not matter; that a new 182-day period commenced whether a warrant was \u201ccanceled\u201d or \u201cquashed.\u201d These remarks understandably reinforce why defense counsel had no reason to argue to the metropolitan court that it never actually issued a bench warrant to arrest Defendant for failure to appear.\n{18} Under the circumstances, we disagree with the State that defense counsel had an obligation to argue a fact he was not aware of or to confront the judge and question whether the judge actually did what he said he did. In fact, it was the State\u2019s obligation, not Defendant\u2019s, to establish that a bench warrant was actually issued if it intended to rely on its assertion that the last triggering event under Rule 7-506(B) was a bench warrant being issued for failure to appear.\n{19} Defendant properly preserved for appellate review in the district court and in this Court the argument that his trial in the metropolitan court did not commence in the time required by Rule 7-506. See Rule 7-707 NMRA (stating that to preserve a question for review by the district court in an appeal on the record, it must appear that a ruling or decision by the metropolitan court was fairly invoked; that if a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it is made, the absence of an objection does not thereafter prejudice the party; and that the rule shall not preclude the district court from considering jurisdictional questions or, in its discretion, questions involving general public interest or fundamental error or fundamental rights of a party); Rule 12-216 NMRA (containing identical provisions concerning our appellate review of a district court ruling or decision).\nB. Violation of Rule 7-506\n{20} The provisions of Rule 7-506(B) that are applicable to this case state:\nB. Time limits for commencement of trial. The trial of a criminal citation or complaint shall be commenced within one hundred eighty-two (182) days after whichever of the following events occurs latest:\n(1) the date of arraignment or the filing of a waiver of arraignment of the defendant;\n(5) if the defendant is arrested for failure to appear or surrenders in this state for failure to appear, the date of arrest or surrender of the defendant]}]\n{21} Defendant argues the latest triggering event was his arraignment on September 13, 2004, and that trial had to commence 182 days after that date under Rule 7-506(B)(l), and the State argues that the latest triggering event was when Defendant failed to appear for trial on the morning of February 15, 2005, and that trial could therefore commence 182 days after that date under Rule 7-506(B)(5). It is undisputed that Defendant\u2019s trial did not commence within 182 days of his arraignment. We therefore proceed to determine in what way Rule 7-506(B)(5) is applicable.\n{22} Rule 7-506(B)(5), by its explicit terms, requires trial to commence within 182 days after a defendant \u201cis arrested for failure to appear\u201d or within 182 days after a defendant \u201csurrenders in this state for failure to appear.\u201d When construing rules of procedure, we apply the same rules that are applicable to statutory construction. See Walker, 2003-NMSC-014, \u00b6 8, 133 N.M. 766, 70 P.3d 756. We therefore look first to the plain meaning of the rule and refrain from further interpretation when the language is clear and unambiguous. State v. Gutierrez, 2006-NMCA-090, \u00b6 7, 140 N.M. 157, 140 P.3d 1106. When the language of the rule is not defined in the rule, it is given its ordinary meaning. State v. Eden, 108 N.M. 737, 741, 779 P.2d 114, 118 (Ct.App.1989).\n{23} The authority of a metropolitan court to issue a bench warrant when a defendant fails to appear or act as directed by the court is described in Rule 7-207 NMRA. The rule states that if among other things, a defendant \u201cfails to appear\u201d for trial as ordered, the metropolitan court judge \u201cmay issue a warrant for the person\u2019s arrest.\u201d Rule 7-207(A). Clearly, the judge has authority to issue a bench warrant to arrest a defendant for failure to appear at trial. On the other hand, the rule does not require the judge to issue a bench warrant. The rule leaves it to the discretion of the judge whether to issue a bench warrant in the first place, and it also gives the judge authority to \u201cwithdraw\u201d a bench warrant. Rule 7-207(D) (\u201cIf the court withdraws the warrant, the court shall cause the warrant to be removed from the warrant information system.\u201d). A metropolitan court judge typically schedules dozens of cases for trial in a single morning or afternoon session. Due to the sheer volume of cases and numbers of persons involved, it is predictable that on any given day, some of those persons, be they defendants, witnesses, police officers, attorneys, jurors, or court staff, may be late, or fail to appear. Some, as Defendant in this case, will have legitimate reasons, some will have an invalid excuse, and some defendants may even be fugitives. As structured, Rule 7-207 allows the metropolitan court judge to deal with these contingencies. Upon learning that a defendant is not present for trial, the judge may announce he intends to issue a bench warrant and write a case note to issue a bench warrant. However, he may not actually issue the warrant at that time. If a defendant subsequently appears and has a legitimate reason, acceptable to the judge, the bench warrant is simply not issued. If a bench warrant has actually been issued already, and a defendant subsequently appears and provides an excuse that the judge accepts, he can then \u201cwithdraw\u201d the issued bench warrant. Such a process clearly results in conserving valuable resources of the court and the State.\n{24} Failing to appear for trial may also result in a separate, additional criminal charge being filed. NMSA 1978, Section 31-3-9 (1999) is entitled, \u201cFailure to appear,\u201d and provides:\nA person released pending any proceeding related to the prosecution or appeal of a criminal offense or a probation revocation proceeding who willfully fails to appear before any court or judicial officer as required:\nA. is guilty of a fourth degree felony, if he was released in connection with a felony proceeding; or\nB. is guilty of a petty misdemeanor, if he was released in connection with a misdemeanor or a petty misdemeanor proceeding.\nIf a defendant is charged with failure to appear under this statute, a warrant for his arrest may be issued, Rule 7-204 NMRA, and \u201c[t]he warrant shall be executed by the arrest of the defendant.\u201d Rule 7-206(B) NMRA. Should a defendant be \u201carrested without a warrant,\u201d the applicable rule provides that \u201ca criminal complaint shall be prepared and given to the defendant prior to transferring the defendant to the custody of the detention facility.\u201d Rule 7-201(D) NMRA. We note that for criminal liability to attach for failure to appear, willful behavior by the defendant is required. State v. Elliott, 2001-NMCA-108, 131 N.M. 390, 37 P.3d 107; In re Stout, 102 N.M. 159, 692 P.2d 545 (Ct.App.1984); Andrews v. McMahan, 43 N.M. 87, 85 P.2d 743 (1938). We therefore assume without deciding that a failure to appear may be justified or excused.\n{25} In this case, Defendant was never \u201carrested for failure to appear.\u201d While Defendant failed to appear for trial on the morning of February 15, 2005, a bench warrant was not issued to arrest him for failure to appear, and Defendant was never seized or taken into custody by a police officer because of his failure to appear at that time. The most that can be said in this case is that the metropolitan court judge announced he intended to issue a bench warrant and made a case note to do so. However, a bench warrant was never actually issued. When the judge later announced he was going to \u201ccancel\u201d the bench warrant, there was nothing to cancel. His ease note to \u201ccancel the bench warrant\u201d was nothing more than a note to his chambers not to issue the bench warrant he had earlier said he had intended to issue. We therefore do not address whether there is a distinction between \u201ccancelling\u201d and \u201cquashing\u201d a bench warrant, and what the effect of doing either has on the time limits imposed by Rule 7-506. Further, Defendant was never seized or taken into custody by a police officer to be prosecuted for committing the criminal offense of failure to appear. We have previously stated that the ordinary meaning of an \u201carrest\u201d is \u201c \u2018to seize or take into custody by authority of the law.\u2019\u201d State v. Solano, 1999-NMCA-019, \u00b6 11, 126 N.M. 662, 974 P.2d 156 (quoting Webster\u2019s New World Dictionary 76 (3d ed.1991)). Here, Defendant voluntarily appeared in court later on the afternoon of February 15, 2005, as directed, after he called the judge\u2019s office and advised that his truck had broken down on his way to court. This was not an \u201carrest\u201d as the term is commonly understood.\n{26} We next consider whether Defendant \u201csurrendered] ... for failure to appear\u201d to determine if the second alternative of Rule 5 \u2014 506(B)(5) applies. The ordinary meaning of \u201csurrender\u201d is \u201cto give oneself up to another\u2019s power or control.\u201d Webster\u2019s New World Dictionary 1348 (3d ed.1994). To surrender in this context therefore simply means that a person voluntarily submits to the legal authority that authorizes or directs him to be taken into custody. Cf. State v. Ellingson, 13 Neb.App. 931, 703 N.W.2d 273, 281 (2005) (stating that to effect an arrest, there must be a seizure or detention of the person arrested or his voluntary submission to custody). In this case, any legal authority authorizing or directing Defendant to be taken into custody had to be \u201cfor failure to appear.\u201d Defendant had promptly contacted the court, and had been told to come in to explain himself. When Defendant appeared before the metropolitan court judge on the afternoon of February 15, 2005, no bench warrant was outstanding to arrest Defendant for failure to appear, and Defendant was not charged with committing the criminal offense of failure to appear. There was no legal authority authorizing or directing that Defendant be taken into custody, so there was nothing that Defendant could \u201csurrender\u201d for.\n{27} We therefore reject the State\u2019s argument that the latest triggering event was when Defendant failed to appear for trial on the morning of February 15, 2005, under Rule 7-506(B)(5), and that trial could commence 182 days later. Since no triggering event other than Defendant\u2019s arraignment is applicable, and Defendant\u2019s trial did not commence within 182 days after his arraignment, Rule 7-506(E) mandates that the complaint filed against Defendant be dismissed with prejudice.\nCONCLUSION\n{28} The judgment of the district court is reversed. This cause is remanded to the district court with instructions to remand this matter to the metropolitan court and direct the metropolitan court to dismiss the complaint with prejudice.\n{29} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: IRA ROBINSON and RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judges.", "type": "majority", "author": "VIGIL, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Gary K. King, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, M. Anne Kelly, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.", "John Bigelow, Chief Public Defender, Santa Fe, NM, Linda Yen, Assistant Public Defender, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2007-NMCA-058\n158 P.3d 1018\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Art GRANADO, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 26,469.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nMarch 27, 2007.\nGary K. King, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, M. Anne Kelly, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.\nJohn Bigelow, Chief Public Defender, Santa Fe, NM, Linda Yen, Assistant Public Defender, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant." }, "file_name": "0575-01", "first_page_order": 625, "last_page_order": 632 }