{ "id": 3669781, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William SCURRY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Scurry", "decision_date": "2007-04-16", "docket_number": "No. 26,197", "first_page": "591", "last_page": "595", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "141 N.M. 591" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "158 P.3d 1034" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2007-NMCA-064" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "2003-NMCA-108", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 77183 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 37" }, { "page": "\u00b6 37" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 P.3d 1039", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 N.M. 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2006-NMCERT-003", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCERT", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2006-NMCA-035", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 2543877 ], "weight": 19, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 5, 14" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 8, 14" }, { "page": "\u00b6 6" }, { "page": "\u00b6 8" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 6, 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/139/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMCA-078", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 929165 ], "weight": 15, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 8-9" }, { "page": "\u00b6 7" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 7-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/137/0713-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMCA-149", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 77116 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 18-19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0717-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMCA-088", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3670582 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 5, 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/140/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMCA-142", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3671224 ], "weight": 13, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 14" }, { "page": "\u00b6 14" }, { "page": "\u00b6 14" }, { "page": "\u00b6 17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/140/0705-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMCA-024", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 15566 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/133/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "2002-NMCA-016", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 183129 ], "weight": 19, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 16" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 13-16" }, { "page": "\u00b6 13" }, { "page": "\u00b6 17" }, { "page": "\u00b6 16" }, { "page": "\u00b6 15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/131/0530-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 652, "char_count": 17192, "ocr_confidence": 0.698, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.408170290649708e-08, "percentile": 0.516147852635424 }, "sha256": "3f438db57d088ea73912317ffd412c2cde5fbbc0e8d1ab63cd567af114a76be7", "simhash": "1:bfc4eb23ea9a0743", "word_count": 2763 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:58:03.770248+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: LYNN PICKARD and MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judges." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William SCURRY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nWECHSLER, Judge.\n{1} In this appeal, we again address the findings a district court must make in order to exercise its discretion to determine that a defendant committed a serious violent offense under the Earned Meritorious Deductions Act (EMDA), NMSA 1978, \u00a7 33-2-34 (2003) (amended 2006). The EMDA requires the district court, in determining in its discretion whether an offense is a serious violent offense enabling the district court to limit meritorious deductions available to the defendant when confined in a correctional facility, to consider \u201cthe nature of the offense and the resulting harm.\u201d Section 33-2-34(L)(4)(n) (current version at NMSA 1978, \u00a7 33-2-34(L)(4)(o) (2006)). In State v. Morales, 2002-NMCA-016, \u00b6 16, 131 N.M. 530, 39 P.3d 747, we held that, to make such a determination, the district court must conclude that the offense was \u201ccommitted in a physically violent manner either with an intent to do serious harm or with recklessness in the face of knowledge that one\u2019s acts are reasonably likely to result in serious harm.\u201d We hold, in this appeal, that findings that merely set forth facts, without connecting the facts to the EMDA requirements as stated in Morales, do not satisfy the statutory requirement, and therefore do not justify a determination that an offense is a serious violent offense under the EMDA. We reverse and remand to the district court to ascertain if its determination can be supported by appropriate findings.\nBACKGROUND\n{2} Defendant William Scurry pleaded guilty to homicide by vehicle when driving while intoxicated, great bodily harm by vehicle while intoxicated, and other charges. One person was killed and another injured in the incident giving rise to the charges. In response to the State\u2019s supplemental information, Defendant admitted that he had a prior DWI conviction. At the sentencing hearing, the State argued that Defendant knew the consequences of his drinking and driving and requested the district court to find the homicide by vehicle and great bodily harm by vehicle offenses to be serious violent offenses under the EMDA. Defense counsel argued that although Defendant was under the influence of alcohol, he did not have the intent or knowledge necessary for a finding of serious violent offenses because he suffered from bipolar disorder that affected his actions in the incident.\n{3} The district court found the offenses to be serious violent offenses under the EMDA. It stated:\nI have ruled on a number of occasions that this kind of offense is a serious violent offense. And [defense counsel is] quite right,' the Court has to make the specific findings and the Court will find that the breath alcohol being nearly four times the legal limit is a finding upon which that can be based, and will do so.\nIn denying Defendant\u2019s motion to reconsider, the district court stated that it orally found at the sentencing hearing: \u201c1) that [Defendant's offenses resulted in death; 2) Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence on one other occasion; and 3) Defendant\u2019s breath alcohol level was four (4) times the legal limit when the offenses occurred.\u201d\nABSENCE OF REQUIRED EMDA FINDINGS\n{4} Defendant contends on appeal that the district court\u2019s findings were insufficient to support its conclusion that the offenses were serious violent offenses under the EMDA. Although the determination that a crime that falls within the district court\u2019s discretionary authority under the EMDA as a serious violent offense is a discretionary act, the district court will abuse its discretion if it acts contrary to law. See State v. Massengill, 2003-NMCA-024, \u00b6 50, 133 N.M. 263, 62 P.3d 354 (acknowledging that this Court applies de novo review when the district court\u2019s decision is \u201cbased on a misapprehension of the law\u201d). We begin by determining whether the district court\u2019s findings fulfill the statutory requirements, including notice to the defendant of the district court\u2019s analysis. State v. Loretto, 2006-NMCA-142, \u00b6 14, 140 N.M. 705, 147 P.3d 1138. If the findings comply with the EMDA, we then engage in a substantial evidence review in which we indulge all inferences in favor of the district court\u2019s determination to determine whether the evidence supports the district court\u2019s findings. See State v. Ayala, 2006-NMCA-088, \u00b6\u00b6 5, 8, 140 N.M. 126, 140 P.3d 547 (applying a deferential standard of review to the defendant\u2019s argument that the facts did not support a determination of serious violent offense). Because the district court\u2019s findings in this ease are insufficient as a matter of law, we need not review the evidence.\n{5} Morales provides the framework for our analysis. In Morales, we discussed the structure of the EMDA in order to ascertain the legislative intent supporting it. Morales, 2002-NMCA-016, \u00b6\u00b6 13-16, 131 N.M. 530, 39 P.3d 747. The EMDA characterizes thirteen listed offenses as serious violent offenses as a matter of law and lists thirteen additional offenses that the district court may determine to be serious violent offenses based on \u201cthe nature of the offense and the resulting harm.\u201d Section 33-2-34(L)(4)(n). After examining this statutory structure in Morales, we reached two conclusions. First, because the list of offenses for which the court must exercise its discretion to determine if they are serious violent offenses includes offenses that always result in death, the resulting harm could not be the only factor in a court\u2019s determination. Morales, 2002-NMCA-016, \u00b6 13, 131 N.M. 530, 39 P.3d 747. Rather, the nature of the offense must be considered in addition to resulting harm in a district court\u2019s discretionary determination of a serious violent offense. Id. Second, we observed that \u201cmany of the offenses\u201d within the court\u2019s discretionary authority \u201care characterized by multiple ways of committing the offense, some intentional and some not, and some utilizing physical force and some not.\u201d Id. \u00b6 15. By comparing the two lists of offenses of the EMDA, we concluded that the EMDA reserves \u201cthe serious violent offenses for those found by the trial judge to be committed in a physically violent manner either with an intent to do serious harm or with recklessness in the face of knowledge that one\u2019s acts are reasonably likely to result in serious harm.\u201d Id. \u00b6 16. We noted the relevancy of the statutory factor of actual \u201cresulting harm\u201d to the defendant\u2019s intent. Id.\n{6} Subsequent to Morales, we have held that Morales does not \u201crequire specific language from the district court,\u201d but only \u201cfindings consistent with the Morales standard.\u201d State v. Cooley, 2003-NMCA-149, \u00b6\u00b6 18-19, 134 N.M. 717, 82 P.3d 84. Although specific language is not required, the Morales standard nevertheless requires the district court to explain its conclusions. We recently stated that the district court\u2019s findings must describe the manner in which the offense was committed to qualify it as a \u201cserious violent offense.\u201d Loretto, 2006-NMCA-142, \u00b6 14, 140 N.M. 705, 147 P.3d 1138. In doing so, the district court is to consider the evidentiary facts about the commission of the crime, \u201cincluding circumstances showing violence and indicating the [defendant\u2019s] intent, knowledge, and reckless behavior.\u201d Id. In this way, the district court ultimately determines under the Morales standard whether the crime was \u201ccommitted in a physically violent manner either with an intent to do serious harm or with recklessness in the face of knowledge that one\u2019s acts are reasonably likely to result in serious harm.\u201d Loretto, 2006-NMCA-142, \u00b6 14, 140 N.M. 705, 147 P.3d 1138 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Stated another way, the district court\u2019s findings must demonstrate how the defendant\u2019s acts \u201camounted to an offense committed in a \u2018physically violent manner.\u2019 \u201d Id. \u00b6 17. By making specific findings of fact directed to these issues, the district court is required to explain its conclusions and findings and \u201cnot leave it up to the appellate court either to speculate as to what the court relied on or to itself engage in judicial fact finding.\u201d Id. \u00b6 14.\n{7} In Morales and Loretto, we held that the district court\u2019s findings were insufficient as a matter of law to justify a determination of serious violent offense. In Morales, we held that the district court\u2019s findings, which \u201crelated to [the defendant's past violence and ... drinking habits, not to his intent or knowledge in regard to this offense,\u201d were insufficient because they did not relate to intent or knowledge. Morales, 2002-NMCA-016, \u00b6 17, 131 N.M. 530, 39 P.3d 747. In Loretto, we likewise found insufficient the district court\u2019s findings because the district court found only intoxication and lack of enticement and \u201cfailed to tie these circumstances and [the defendant's conduct in any manner to the intent or recklessness in the face of knowledge standard.\u201d Loretto, 2006-NMCA-142, \u00b6 17, 140 N.M. 705, 147 P.3d 1138. Similarly, in this case, the district court found that Defendant was extremely intoxicated but failed to point to any connection between Defendant\u2019s intoxication and intent or knowledge.\n{8} The State argues that State v. Montoya, 2005-NMCA-078, 137 N.M. 713, 114 P.3d 393, and State v. Worrick, 2006-NMCA-035, 139 N.M. 247, 131 P.3d 97, cert. granted, 2006-NMCERT-003, 139 N.M. 353, 132 P.3d 1039, permit the district court to designate an offense a serious violent offense based on facts like those in this case. In both Montoya and Worrick, this Court engaged in a substantial evidence standard of review and determined that the evidence was sufficient to justify a serious violent offense designation. See Montoya, 2005-NMCA-078, \u00b6 8, 137 N.M. 713, 114 P.3d 393; Worrick, 2006-NMCA-035, \u00b6\u00b6 5, 14, 139 N.M. 247, 131 P.3d 97. In Montoya, the defendant apparently did not argue that the district court\u2019s findings did not sufficiently inform him of the rationale underlying the serious violent offense designation. Rather, the defendant seems to have argued that the facts were not egregious enough to support such a designation. See Montoya, 2005-NMCA-078, \u00b6\u00b6 8-9, 137 N.M. 713, 114 P.3d 393. We affirmed, focusing on the sufficiency of the facts rather than on the sufficiency of the district court\u2019s findings. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 9-10. As for Worrick, while the case briefly did address the sufficiency of the findings, Worrick, 2006-NMCA-035, \u00b6\u00b6 8, 14, 139 N.M. 247, 131 P.3d 97, it mainly addressed the sufficiency of the evidence before the district court, id. \u00b6\u00b6 9-11. But Defendant in the case before us does not argue that the evidence was insufficient. Rather, Defendant argues that the findings were insufficient. Because Montoya and Worrick focus on a different argument, we are not persuaded that they govern our analysis.\n{9} We nonetheless conclude that both Montoya and Worrick provide a helpful comparison for the findings in this case. Although, as we have stated, Montoya and, to a lesser extent, Worrick do not significantly consider whether the findings in those cases are sufficient, the holdings presuppose that the findings are sufficient. When we compare the findings in this case to those in Montoya and Worrick, the insufficiency of the findings in this case becomes more clear.\n{10} In Montoya, the district court supported its determination of a serious violent offense by finding that the defendant had not availed himself of treatment or controlled his drinking problem in fifteen years, making himself a danger to others that ultimately resulted in the death for which he was convicted. Montoya, 2005-NMCA-078, \u00b6 7, 137 N.M. 713, 114 P.3d 393. The district court\u2019s findings, although not using the specific language concerning intent and recklessness used in Morales, explained the district court\u2019s determination of a serious violent offense by connecting the defendant\u2019s past acts and practices to the vehicular homicide offense before the court to establish an awareness on the part of the defendant of the recklessness of the defendant\u2019s acts. Id.; see also State v. Wildgrube, 2003-NMCA-108, \u00b6 37, 134 N.M. 262, 75 P.3d 862 (noting the district court\u2019s finding that the defendant engaged in a practice of continuing to drive while intoxicated after three arrests and two convictions for driving while intoxicated, resulting in the victim\u2019s death).\n{11} Worrick is closer to the line because the district court\u2019s explanation in its findings did not clearly connect the defendant\u2019s past or present actions to the crime at issue. In that case, the district court supported its serious violent offense determination with findings that the defendant\u2019s breath alcohol level was three times the presumptive intoxication level and the defendant\u2019s repeated insistence, contrary to expert testimony from both the state and the defense, that the victim\u2019s vehicle did not have its headlights on causing the collision. Worrick, 2006-NMCA-035, \u00b6 6, 139 N.M. 247, 131 P.3d 97. From the latter finding, the district court concluded that the defendant \u201cwas either too intoxicated to notice the headlights ... or ... is being deliberately untruthful.\u201d Id. In affirming, this Court stated that the district court\u2019s findings demonstrated \u201ca consciousness of guilt that would allow the district court to find a level of awareness\u201d that the defendant\u2019s actions \u201cwere likely to cause harm.\u201d Id. \u00b6 9. Thus, while the district court\u2019s findings did not explicitly state their connection to the district court\u2019s conclusion that the Morales standard was met, this Court nonetheless concluded that the district court\u2019s reasoning was clear. Worrick, 2006-NMCA-035, \u00b6 8, 139 N.M. 247, 131 P.3d 97.\n{12} In the present case, none of the district court\u2019s findings clearly indicates the basis for the district court\u2019s conclusion that Defendant acted with intent or recklessness in the face of knowledge. The district court found only that the offenses resulted in death, Defendant had a prior DWI conviction, and Defendant\u2019s breath alcohol level was four times the legal limit. Although these facts state the resulting harm required for vehicular homicide and may bear on the nature of the offense, we cannot ascertain from them Defendant\u2019s intent or degree of recklessness without considerable inference. See Morales, 2002-NMCA-016, \u00b6 16, 131 N.M. 530, 39 P.3d 747.\n{13} While, as we have noted, we need not address the sufficiency of the evidence in this case, we nonetheless note that the facts before the district court in this case are not as indicative of intent or recklessness in the face of knowledge as the facts in either Montoya or Worrick. In Morales, to explain the multiple ways in which a crime can be committed, such that some acts can be serious violent offenses while other acts in violation of the same statute are not, we distinguished between vehicular homicide in which the defendant \u201chad only one drink but is thereby less able to drive safely\u201d and one who \u201cintentionally and habitually gets drunk to the point of being several times over the legal limit, knowing that he or she must drive in a crowded area and is in no shape to do so, but does so nevertheless.\u201d Morales, 2002-NMCA-016, \u00b6 15, 131 N.M. 530, 39 P.3d 747. In keeping with this standard, the past conduct in Montoya was chronic and habitual. Montoya, 2005-NMCA-078, \u00b6\u00b6 7-10, 137 N.M. 713, 114 P.3d 393. The facts in this appeal are not as indicative of recklessness as those in Montoya. Defendant had a single DWI conviction; without additional facts, we do not know whether he fits the habitual circumstances of Montoya. See Wildgrube, 2003-NMCA-108, \u00b6 37, 134 N.M. 262, 75 P.3d 862 (affirming a serious violent offense determination when the district court relied on three prior arrests and two prior convictions for driving while intoxicated). Moreover, the district court made no finding similar to the finding in Worrick that addresses Defendant\u2019s inability to see what was plain to be seen or his attempt to disguise his culpability. Worrick, 2006-NMCA-035, \u00b6\u00b6 6, 11, 139 N.M. 247, 131 P.3d 97. While we acknowledge that the district court\u2019s findings are relevant to the district court\u2019s conclusion, they do not sufficiently illustrate the way in which Defendant\u2019s conduct rises to the level of a serious violent offense.\nCONCLUSION\n{14} Because the district court did not connect Defendant\u2019s prior DWI conviction or level of intoxication to the offense or state the reasons why these facts established a knowledge on Defendant\u2019s part that his acts would result in serious harm, the district court did not complete its responsibility to provide sufficient findings under Morales. We remand to the district court for further proceedings because the facts may justify a conclusion of serious violent offenses depending on the district court\u2019s findings.\n{15} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: LYNN PICKARD and MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judges.", "type": "majority", "author": "WECHSLER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Gary K. King, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, M. Anne Kelly, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.", "Pickett & Murphy, Lawrence M. Pickett, Las Cruces, NM, for Appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2007-NMCA-064\n158 P.3d 1034\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William SCURRY, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 26,197.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nApril 16, 2007.\nGary K. King, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, M. Anne Kelly, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.\nPickett & Murphy, Lawrence M. Pickett, Las Cruces, NM, for Appellant." }, "file_name": "0591-01", "first_page_order": 641, "last_page_order": 645 }