{ "id": 3669085, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. Donald MOYA, Defendant-Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Moya", "decision_date": "2007-05-14", "docket_number": "No. 29,919", "first_page": "817", "last_page": "824", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "141 N.M. 817" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "161 P.3d 862" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2007-NMSC-027" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "2001-NMCA-050", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 352304 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/130/0638-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 N.M. 654", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 720198 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658" }, { "page": "859" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/112/0654-01" ] }, { "cite": "Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 40-35", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Tenn. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 33, \u00a7 3044", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "P.R. Laws Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Lexis Nexis Supp.1975" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Iowa Code \u00a7 902.9", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Iowa Code", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-401", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Iowa Code \u00a7 701.7", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Iowa Code", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Idaho Code Ann. \u00a7 18-111", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Idaho Code Ann.", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3581", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2004-NMSC-001", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 77119 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0768-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563429 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242" }, { "page": "853" }, { "page": "242" }, { "page": "243" }, { "page": "853" }, { "page": "242" }, { "page": "853", "parenthetical": "\"The rule of lenity counsels that criminal statutes should be interpreted in the defendant's favor when insurmountable ambiguity persists regarding the intended scope of a criminal statute.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 N.M. 707", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 711420 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "708" }, { "page": "1370" }, { "page": "708" }, { "page": "1370" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/103/0707-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 N.M. 39", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2806707 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46" }, { "page": "247" }, { "page": "46" }, { "page": "247" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/77/0039-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 N.M. 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1552772 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" }, { "page": "1359" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/117/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMSC-023", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 827451 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0039-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMSC-022", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 77128 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 N.M. 12", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1586361 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19" }, { "page": "632", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/101/0012-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMSC-032", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 1224669 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" }, { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/136/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMCA-103", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3669941 ], "weight": 11, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" }, { "page": "\u00b6 6" }, { "page": "\u00b6 5" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/140/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "2000-NMCA-101", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1217119 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/129/0738-01" ] }, { "cite": "2001-NMCA-108", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 183087 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/131/0390-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMCA-046", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1428012 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/135/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 N.M. 654", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 720198 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656" }, { "page": "857", "parenthetical": "\"There is no dispute that a valid judgment of a conviction for a felony punishable by imprisonment of more than one year was entered against defendant. ... That is all that is necessary under our statute.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/112/0654-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 N.M. 12", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1586361 ], "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19" }, { "page": "632" }, { "page": "19" }, { "page": "632", "parenthetical": "\"The statute clearly requires the prior conviction to have been a conviction of a felony. ...\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/101/0012-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMCA-103", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3669941 ], "weight": 13, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 1" }, { "page": "\u00b6 5-6" }, { "page": "\u00b6 6" }, { "page": "\u00b67" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/140/0275-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 889, "char_count": 27961, "ocr_confidence": 0.692, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6545909895648174e-07, "percentile": 0.6933097257793794 }, "sha256": "67ecb33d04f325174b15754b86839631907bda4ba149574b08fd66ce893ac76d", "simhash": "1:4ebe97b8406c085d", "word_count": 4703 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:58:03.770248+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: PATRICIO M. SERNA, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, and RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justices." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. Donald MOYA, Defendant-Respondent." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nCH\u00c1VEZ, Chief Justice.\n{1} The issue in this case is whether an out-of-state misdemeanor conviction, which would have been classified as a felony in New Mexico, can be used to enhance a defendant\u2019s basic sentence under the Habitual Offender Act, NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 31-18-17 to -20 (2003). Defendant Donald Moya pled guilty to two felonies in New Mexico and also admitted that he had been previously convicted of attempted forgery in Utah. Defendant agreed to a one-year sentence enhancement if the district court determined that his previous conviction, a misdemeanor in Utah, but classified as a felony in New Mexico, could be used as an enhancement felony under Section 31-18-17(D)(2). Concluding that the Habitual Offender Act did not permit the enhancement of a sentence based on an out-of-state misdemeanor conviction, the district court granted Defendant\u2019s motion to preclude the use of the Utah attempted forgery conviction. The State appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Section 31-18-17(D)(2) allows \u201csentence enhancement only for convictions that were felonies in the state in which they were committed.\u201d State v. Moya, 2006-NMCA-103, \u00b6 10, 140 N.M. 275, 142 P.3d 43. Construing Section 31-18-17(D)(2) according to its obvious spirit or reason, we hold that prior out-of-state misdemeanor convictions can be used to enhance a sentence if the offense would have been classified as a felony in New Mexico at the time of conviction. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals.\nI. DISCUSSION\n{2} Under the Habitual Offender Act, if a defendant is convicted of a noncapital felony in New Mexico, and has one \u201cprior felony conviction,\u201d the defendant\u2019s sentence shall be increased by one year. \u00a7 31-18-17(A). In this case, we must determine whether a conviction of a crime classified in another jurisdiction as a misdemeanor qualifies as a \u201cprior felony conviction.\u201d \u201cWe review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.\u201d State v. Smith, 2004-NMSC-032, \u00b6 8, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022.\n{3} The definition of a \u201cprior felony conviction\u201d depends on whether the prior conviction occurred within the jurisdiction of New Mexico or outside of New Mexico. Paragraph (D)(1) of Section 31-18-17 pertains to convictions within the jurisdiction of New Mexico and defines \u201cprior felony conviction\u201d as:\na conviction ... for a prior felony committed within New Mexico whether within the Criminal Code or not, but not including a conviction for a felony pursuant to the provisions of Section 66-8-102 NMSA 1978....\n\u00a7 31 \u2014 18\u201417(D)(1). Paragraph (D)(2) pertains to convictions in other jurisdictions and defines \u201cprior felony conviction\u201d as:\na prior felony ... if:\n(a) the conviction was rendered by a court of another state, the United States, a territory of the United States or the commonwealth of Puerto Rico;\n(b) the offense was punishable, at the time of conviction, by death or a maximum term of imprisonment of more than one year; or\n(c) the offense would have been classified as a felony in this state at the time of conviction.\n\u00a7 31-18-17(D)(2). Because the conviction at issue in this case occurred in another state, the provision we must construe is Paragraph (D)(2).\n{4} The basis for the Court of Appeals\u2019s conclusion that the plain language of Section 31-18-17(D)(2) does not allow for enhancement unless the out-of-state conviction was first classified as a felony in the state in which it was committed, was the Legislature\u2019s use of the term \u201cprior felony\u201d at the beginning of Paragraph (D)(2). See Moya, 2006-NMCA-103, \u00b6 6, 140 N.M. 275, 142 P.3d 43. Concluding that the term could not be ignored, the court held that the words \u201cconviction\u201d and \u201coffense\u201d in Subparagraphs (D)(2)(a), (b), and (c) referred to the term \u201cprior felony.\u201d Id. The court also concluded that Paragraph (D)(2) required a \u201cprior felony\u201d that met the conditions of Subparagraph (D)(2)(a) and either Subparagraph (D)(2)(b) or (c). Id. Because Defendant\u2019s conviction for attempted forgery was a misdemeanor in Utah, his conviction was not a \u201cprior felony,\u201d and it was unnecessary for the court to analyze whether Subparagraphs (D)(2)(a), (b) or (c) were satisfied.\n{5} As support for its holding, the Court of Appeals relied on State v. Harris, 101 N.M. 12, 677 P.2d 625 (Ct.App.1984), a case in which the Court of Appeals interpreted a previous, but nearly identical, version of current Paragraph (D)(2). See Moya, 2006-NMCA-103, \u00b6 5, 140 N.M. 275, 142 P.3d 43. Although not specifically addressing whether an out-of-state conviction must be classified as a felony in the state in which it was committed, the court in Harris interpreted what is now Paragraph (D)(2) in the same way that the Court of Appeals did in this case. The court in Harris stated that \u201c[t]he statute clearly requires the prior conviction to have been a conviction of a felony, and this felony conviction must have occurred in one of the courts named in (2)(a).\u201d 101 N.M. at 19, 677 P.2d at 632 (emphasis added). The court went on to say that \u201c[t]he use of the semicolon at the end of (2) (a) indicates that (2)(b) is also a requirement,\u201d and that \u201cor\u201d at the end of (2)(b) indicated that (2)(c) could be used instead of (2)(b). Id.\n{6} In analyzing Section 31-18-17(D)(2), our primary goal is to effectuate the Legislature\u2019s intent. See State v. Davis, 2003-NMSC-022, \u00b6 6, 134 N.M. 172, 74 P.3d 1064. We do so by looking first to the words the Legislature chose and the plain meaning of the language. State v. Martinez, 1998-NMSC-023, \u00b6 8, 126 N.M. 39, 966 P.2d 747. However, we must be cautious in applying the plain meaning rule. State ex rel. Holman v. Gallegos, 117 N.M. 346, 353, 871 P.2d 1352, 1359 (1994). \u201c[W]hen the results would be absurd, unreasonable, or contrary to the spirit of the statute,\u201d we will not employ a \u201cformalistic and mechanical statutory construction.\u201d Smith, 2004-NMSC-032, \u00b6 10, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022. Instead, we give effect to the Legislature\u2019s intent by \u201cadopting a construction which will not render the statute\u2019s application absurd or unreasonable,\u201d and we construe the statute \u201caccording to its obvious spirit or reason.\u201d State v. Nance, 77 N.M. 39, 46, 419 P.2d 242, 247 (1966). When construing a statute according to its obvious spirit, \u201ccourts may substitute, disregard or eliminate, or insert or add words to a statute.\u201d Nat\u2019l Council on Comp. Ins. v. N.M. State Corp. Comm\u2019n, 103 N.M. 707, 708, 712 P.2d 1369, 1370 (1986). We must also keep in mind that \u201c[statutes authorizing more severe punishment should be strictly construed because they are highly penal.\u201d State v. Ogden, 118 N.M. 234, 242, 880 P.2d 845, 853 (1994). However, strict construction \u201cshould not be used to defeat the policy and purposes of a statute.\u201d Id.\n{7} Looking first to the language chosen by the Legislature to define \u201cprior felony conviction,\u201d there is a notable difference between the language in Paragraph (D)(1), relating to convictions within the jurisdiction of New Mexico, and Paragraph (D)(2), relating to convictions in other jurisdictions. Paragraph (D)(1) defines a \u2018\u201cprior felony conviction\u2019 \u201d as \u201ca conviction ... for a prior felony,\u201d whereas in Paragraph (D)(2), \u201cprior felony conviction\u201d is defined as a \u201cprior felony \u201d with three additional criteria. Had the Legislature chosen to say \u201ca conviction\u201d in Paragraph (D)(2), as some states do, there would be no question that prior out-of-state misdemeanor convictions could be used to enhance a sentence so long as either Sub-paragraphs (D)(2)(b) or (c) were satisfied. See, e.g., Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. \u00a7 532.080(3) (LexisNexis Supp.2006) (defining \u201cprevious felony conviction\u201d as \u201ca conviction of a felony in this state or conviction of a crime in any other jurisdiction provided\u201d certain requirements are met) (emphasis added). Thus, the plain meaning of \u201cprior felony\u201d in Paragraph (D)(2) indicates that only prior out-of-state felonies can be us\u00e9d to enhance a sentence.\n{8} However, a survey of the criminal laws in the United States reveals that if Paragraph (D)(2) could be applied at all, in the vast majority of cases, Subparagraphs (D)(2)(b) or (c) would be rendered superfluous. As an example, if we interpret \u201cprior felony\u201d in Paragraph (D)(2) to require that the prior out-of-jurisdiction conviction first be classified as a felony in the state in which it was committed, prior convictions in both Maine and New Jersey could never be used to enhance a sentence in New Mexico. That is because Maine and New Jersey do not classify crimes as felonies or misdemeanors. In those states, crimes are classified by classes or degrees, and punishment is based on that classification. Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, \u00a7 4(1) (1983) (classes); N.J. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 2C:43-1 (West 2005) (degrees). Therefore, construing \u201cprior felony\u201d in Paragraph (D)(2) to mean out-of-state convictions must have been classified as a felony in that state, leads to the unreasonable result of precluding the use of crimes committed in states which do not classify crimes as felonies. We do not believe the Legislature intended such a result under a statute enacted to reduce recidivism. See State v. Chorney, 2001-NMCA-050, \u00b6 13, 130 N.M. 638, 29 P.3d 538 (\u201cThe habitual offender statute has as its primary purpose to deter recidivism.\u201d).\n{9} Furthermore, we must construe Section 31-18-17(D)(2) in its entirety, so that each part of the statute is given meaning and no part is superfluous. State v. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, \u00b6 18, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939. If we were to interpret the statute to require a prior out-of-state conviction to be a felony, then Subparagraph (D)(2)(b) would allow enhancement only if the prior felony was punishable by a \u201cmaximum term of imprisonment of more than one year.\u201d In such a case, the only way Subparagraph (D)(2)(b) would not be superfluous is if other jurisdictions punish felonies by a maximum of one year of imprisonment or less. In other words, if an out-of-state conviction must be a prior felony, and all states define a felony as a crime punishable by a maximum of more than one year of imprisonment, Subparagraph (D)(2)(b) would be redundant because \u201cprior felony\u201d in Paragraph (D)(2) would already encompass every conviction that is punishable by a maximum of more than one year of imprisonment.\n{10} A survey of other jurisdictions, including the federal system, the fifty states, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, shows a divergence in the maximum terms of imprisonment for crimes classified as felonies. Yet, in most cases, felonies are punishable by more than one year. In the federal system, felonies are divided by classes and the lowest class of felony is punishable by a maximum of not more than three years. See 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3581 (2000). In some states, a felony is explicitly defined as a crime punishable by death or more than one year imprisonment. See, e.g., Ga.Code. Ann. \u00a7 16-1-3(5) (West 1998); Minn.Stat. \u00a7 609.02 (2006). Other states define a felony as a crime punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary or the state prison. See, e.g., Idaho Code Ann. \u00a7 18-111 (2004). Although not explicitly stated, the effect of these statutes \u201cis usually such that these statutes indirectly state what the statutes in almost all other jurisdictions expressly declare: that any crime punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one year ... is a felony.\u201d 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law \u00a7 1.6(a), at 48 (2d ed.2003).\n{11} Still other states define a felony as a crime designated a felony by statute, in which case each criminal statute indicates whether a crime is classified as a felony or misdemeanor. See, e.g., Ark.Code Ann. \u00a7 5-1-106 (2006); Iowa Code \u00a7 701.7 (2003). Many of these states also incorporate a sentencing statute that specifies the amount of punishment associated with a felony, and in almost all cases, this is a maximum of more than one year imprisonment. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-401 (2006); Iowa Code \u00a7 902.9 (2003). Some states do not provide a definition of a felony, but classify each crime as a felony or misdemeanor and designate the punishment for each crime within each criminal statute. See, e.g., Md.Code Ann., Crim. Law \u00a7 2-204(b) (LexisNexis 2002) (\u201cA person who commits a murder in the second degree is guilty of a felony and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 30 years.\u201d). The practical effect of these variations of the definition of felony is that in most of these jurisdictions, felonies are punishable by more than a maximum of one year of imprisonment.\n{12} In fact, our research did not reveal a jurisdiction which actually punishes a felony by less than one year imprisonment. However, it did show that Puerto Rico defines a felony as all crimes punishable by a term of imprisonment that exceeds six months and then designates the punishment for a crime within each criminal statute. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 33, \u00a7 3044 (Lexis Nexis Supp.1975). In addition, there are a few states, including New Mexico, that define a felony as a crime punishable by one year or more imprisonment. See 720 111. Comp. Stat. 5/2-7 (2004); Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. \u00a7 500.080(5) (LexisNexis Supp.2006); NMSA1978, \u00a7 30-l-6(A) (1963); Tenn.Code Ann. \u00a7 39-11-110 (1997). Therefore, in these states, and in Puerto Rico, it is possible to have a crime classified as a felony that does not satisfy Section 31-18-17(D)(2)(b) because the maximum punishment for conviction of such felony could be either limited to one year, or, in Puerto Rico\u2019s case, more than six months, but less than one year.\n{13} Even so, it is extremely unlikely that a prior out-of-state felony would be punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of one year or less in those jurisdictions. Several of the states that punish a felony by one year or more of imprisonment divide felonies into degrees or classes, and even the lowest degree or class of felony punishes the crime by more than one year. In New Mexico, the minimum basic punishment for the lowest degree of felony, a fourth-degree felony, is eighteen months imprisonment, so the maximum punishment cannot be limited to exactly one year. See NMSA1978, \u00a7 31-18-15(A)(9) (2005). In Kentucky, the maximum punishment for its lowest class of felony is five years imprisonment. Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. \u00a7 532.020 (1999). And, in Tennessee, the lowest class of felony is punishable by a maximum of more than six years. Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 40-35-lll(b)(5) (1997).\n{14} While it is possible that some states could punish a felony by a maximum of one year imprisonment or less, there is only one state, Arizona, that has a statute in place that clearly does so. In Arizona, the definition of a felony is a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment in the custody of the state\u2019s department of corrections. Ariz.Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 13-105(16) (2001). Under its sentencing scheme, felonies are defined by classes, and the lowest class of felony, a class six felony, is punishable by a term of imprisonment of exactly one year. Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. \u00a7 13-701(C)(5) (2001). Therefore, although Subparagraph (D)(2)(b) is technically not superfluous, our research shows that it would most likely apply only in a situation in which a defendant was previously convicted of a class six felony in Arizona.\n{15} Similarly, while there is an argument to be made that Subparagraph (D)(2)(c) is not superfluous, it too would have very limited application. Subparagraph (D)(2)(c) serves a purpose only when a defendant was previously convicted of a felony in a state which punishes that felony by a maximum term of imprisonment of one year or less, thus not meeting Subparagraph (D)(2)(b), and where the out-of-state felony is not classified as a felony in New Mexico. Because our research shows that Arizona is one of the only states, if not the sole state, that actually punishes a felony by a maximum of imprisonment for one year or less, we see no legitimate reason why the Legislature would have tailored the statute to cover such a remote possibility.\n{16} Therefore, considering both the Legislature\u2019s use of \u201cprior felony\u201d in Paragraph (D)(2) and the language in Subparagraphs (D)(2)(b) and (c), we are left with an unreasonable application of the statute. A literal reading of Paragraph (D)(2), requiring the prior out-of-state conviction to be a felony, would prevent enhancement of a sentence predicated on convictions from states that do not classify crimes as felonies. Additionally, although Subparagraphs (D)(2)(b) and (c) may not be superfluous in certain limited situations, in reality, their reach would be extremely limited because most jurisdictions punish a felony by a maximum of more than one year of imprisonment. We do not believe that the Legislature intended to preclude the use of convictions from states that do not classify crimes as felonies, or that it intended to give Subparagraphs (D)(2)(b) and (c) such limited significance. Furthermore, while giving effect to \u201cprior felony\u201d in Paragraph (D)(2) would adhere to the rule that penal statutes should be strictly construed, \u201cstrict construction is only one factor influencing interpretation of punitive legislation.\u201d Ogden, 118 N.M. at 242, 880 P.2d at at 853. \u201c[T]he language of penal statutes should be given a reasonable or common sense construction consonant with the objects of the legislation, and the evils sought to be overcome should be given special attention.\u201d Id. at 243, 880 P.2d at 853.\n{17} It seems clear that the Legislature intended for Subparagraphs (D)(2)(b) and (c) to have more significance. Reading Paragraph (D)(2) as defining a \u201cprior felony\u201d to be any conviction that satisfies Subparagraph (D)(2)(a), plus the elements of either Subparagraph (D)(2)(b) or (c), avoids an unreasonable application of the statute and furthers the legitimate legislative goal of reducing recidivism. Under this interpretation, Sub-paragraph (D)(2)(b) allows enhancement for a prior out-of-state conviction when the conviction is punishable by a maximum of more than one year of imprisonment in the state in which it was committed, even if a misdemeanor in New Mexico. Further, by employing such a reading, Subparagraph (D)(2)(c) would be satisfied when a prior out-of-state conviction is classified as a felony in New Mexico. The classification, or lack of classification of the crime in the state in which it was committed, would make no difference. Subparagraph (D)(2)(e) would permit enhancement for crimes that our Legislature has determined are worthy of harsher punishment, even though other states classify the crime differently.\n{18} It is worth emphasizing that our interpretation of the statute conforms to the obvious spirit of the Habitual Offender Act. The two chief purposes served by the Habitual Offender Act are: \u201c(1) the deterrent/rehabilitative purpose of discouraging those who have previously committed serious crimes from engaging in similar conduct within New Mexico; and (2) the punitive/protective purpose of incarcerating for a longer period of time those who have shown a repeated inclination to commit serious offenses.\u201d State v. Edmondson, 112 N.M. 654, 658, 818 P.2d 855, 859 (Ct.App.1991). It serves the goal of reducing recidivism in our state to construe Section 31-18-17(D)(2) to allow any prior out-of-state conviction to enhance a sentence, provided that either the punishment or classification satisfy Subparagraphs (D)(2)(b) or (c).\n{19} Accordingly, because adhering to the plain meaning of Paragraph (D)(2) leads to an unreasonable application, we stray from the plain meaning to interpret the statute according to its obvious spirit and the Legislature\u2019s intent. See Nance, 77 N.M. at 46, 419 P.2d at 247. In doing so, we may disregard words and substitute others. Nat\u2019l Council, 103 N.M. at 708, 712 P.2d at 1370. In this case, we define \u201cprior felony,\u201d as used in Paragraph (D)(2), to mean a conviction from a jurisdiction in Subparagraph (D)(2)(a), which satisfies the elements of either Subparagraph (D)(2)(b) or (c) We hold that a prior out-of-state misdemeanor conviction can be used to enhance a sentence under Section 31-18-17(D)(2) when the conviction was either punishable by a maximum of more than one year imprisonment in the state in which it was committed, as provided by Sub-paragraph (D)(2)(b), or classified as a felony in New Mexico at the time of conviction, as provided by Subparagraph (D)(2)(c). As a result, there is not insurmountable ambiguity within this statute, and the rule of lenity does not apply. See Ogden, 118 N.M. at 242, 880 P.2d at 853 (\u201cThe rule of lenity counsels that criminal statutes should be interpreted in the defendant\u2019s favor when insurmountable ambiguity persists regarding the intended scope of a criminal statute.\u201d).\nIII. CONCLUSION\n{20} We hold that, in accordance with legislative intent, a prior out-of-state misdemeanor conviction can be used to increase a basic sentence under the Habitual Offender Act when either Subparagraphs (D)(2)(b) or (c) are satisfied. The Court of Appeals is reversed.\n{21} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: PATRICIO M. SERNA, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, and RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justices.", "type": "majority", "author": "CH\u00c1VEZ, Chief Justice." }, { "text": "MINZNER, Justice\n(dissenting).\n{22} I respectfully dissent. I agree with Judge Wechsler, writing for the Court of Appeals, that the Habitual Offender Act, NMSA 1978, Section 31-18-17(D) (2003), (the Act) does not include as an enhancement felony a conviction classified as a misdemean- or in another state even if that conviction would have been classified as a felony in New Mexico. State v. Moya, 2006-NMCA-103, \u00b6 1, 140 N.M. 275, 142 P.3d 43.\n{23} The Act states that \u201cprior felony conviction\u201d means:\n(1) a conviction, when less than ten years have passed prior to the instant felony conviction since the person completed serving his sentence or period of probation or parole for the prior felony, whichever is later, for a prior felony committed within New Mexico whether within the Criminal Code or not, but not including a conviction for a felony pursuant to the provisions of Section 66-8-102 NMSA 1978; or\n(2) a prior felony, when less than ten years have passed prior to the instant felony conviction since the person completed serving his sentence or period of probation or parole for the prior felony, whichever is later, for which the person was convicted other than an offense triable by court martial if:\n(a) the conviction was rendered by a court of another state, the United States, a territory of the United States or the commonwealth of Puerto Rico;\n(b) the offense was punishable, at the time of conviction, by death or maximum term of imprisonment of more than one year; or\n(c) the offense would have been classified as a felony in this state at the time of conviction.\nSection 31-18-17(D) (emphasis added). The term \u201cfelony\u201d pervades the text of Section 31-18-17(D), and I find this helpful in reaching my conclusion.\n{24} I think, as did the Court of Appeals, that Section 31-18-17(D) mandates that a sentence enhancement may only be premised on a felony conviction. Moya, 2006-NMCA-103, \u00b6 5-6, 140 N.M. 275, 142 P.3d 43. Section 31-18-17(D)(1), discussing prior convictions in New Mexico that may be used for the purposes of sentence enhancement, requires those convictions to be felonies. Subsections (a), (b), and (c) modify Section 31-18-17(D)(2), which clearly states that the conviction must be a felony. In fact, Section (D)(2) uses the term \u201cprior felony\u201d twice. This is an indication of the Legislature\u2019s intent to allow sentence enhancements based only on prior felony convictions, not misdemeanor convictions.\n{25} In State v. Harris, the Court of Appeals held the semicolon at the end of Section 31-18-17(D)(2)(a) meant that its requirement of a felony conviction applied to both of the requirements of Subsections (b) and (c). 101 N.M. 12, 19, 677 P.2d 625, 632 (Ct.App.1984). The court also held that the Legislature\u2019s use of \u201cor\u201d between Subsections (b) and (c) meant that either a punishment of death or a maximum term of at least a one-year imprisonment or the fact the offense would have been classified as a felony in New Mexico was sufficient to trigger a sentence enhancement if the requirement of Subsection (a) was met. Id. As the Court of Appeals noted in Moya, Subsection (a) and either Subsection (b) or (c) must be met. Moya, 2006-NMCA-103, \u00b6 6, 140 N.M. 275, 142 P.3d 43. Section (D)(2) explicitly requires the prior conviction to be a felony conviction. The court held that the terms \u201cconviction\u201d and \u201coffense\u201d in Subsections (b) and (e) refer to \u201cprior felony\u201d in Subsection (D)(2). Id. Thus, for the purposes of the Act, the requirement of Section (D)(2) must be met: the prior conviction must have been classified as a felony.\n{26} Further, our published opinions from the Court of Appeals seem consistent with its holding in Moya applying Section 31-18-17(D)(2). See State v. Sandoval, 2004-NMCA-046, 135 N.M. 420, 89 P.3d 92; State v. Elliott, 2001-NMCA-108, 131 N.M. 390, 37 P.3d 107; State v. Smith, 2000-NMCA-101, 129 N.M. 738, 13 P.3d 470; State v. Edmondson, 112 N.M. 654, 818 P.2d 855 (Ct.App.1991); Harris, 101 N.M. 12, 677 P.2d 625. While these cases did not expressly deal with the issue before us today, they all dealt with convictions that were classified as felonies in the foreign jurisdiction, and the language of these cases indicates that the Court of Appeals has been consistent in requiring that the foreign conviction be a felony conviction. See Edmondson, 112 N.M. at 656, 818 P.2d at 857 (\u201cThere is no dispute that a valid judgment of a conviction for a felony punishable by imprisonment of more than one year was entered against defendant. ... That is all that is necessary under our statute.\u201d) (emphasis added); Harris, 101 N.M. at 19, 677 P.2d at 632 (\u201cThe statute clearly requires the prior conviction to have been a conviction of a felony. ...\u201d) (emphasis added). I think this consistency deserves our deference.\n{27} I agree with the Court of Appeals\u2019 analysis that:\nOur legislature did not intend the legislature of another jurisdiction to control the Habitual Offender Act. It designed the consistency of the statute, not as the State argues, but by making a felony of another state applicable only if it is the equivalent of a New Mexico felony at the time of conviction in the other state, either because of its punishment or of its classification as a felony in New Mexico.... [T]he plain statutory language of the Habitual Offender Act reflects the legislative intent that only prior felony convictions be used for enhancement.\nMoya, 2006-NMCA-103, \u00b67, 140 N.M. 275, 142 P.3d 43. The State contends the use of the word \u201coffense\u201d in Subsection (D)(2)(c) clearly indicates a legislative intent to permit the use of any offense, irrespective of the punishment for or the nomenclature used in the foreign jurisdiction if the offense would have been classified as a felony in New Mexico. The majority opinion reasons the Legislature did not intend for the Act to be as limited as the Court of Appeals held. Maj. Op. \u00b6\u00b6 16-17. I believe, however, that there is sufficient support within the text of the statute and the Court of Appeals\u2019 ease law that the Legislature intended to limit the Act\u2019s application to out-of-jurisdiction convictions.\n{28} I would affirm the Court of Appeals and conclude that the Act does not include a conviction from another jurisdiction that is classified as a misdemeanor even if that conviction would have been classified as a felony conviction in New Mexico for the purposes of sentence enhancement. My colleagues being of a different view, I respectfully dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "MINZNER, Justice" } ], "attorneys": [ "Gary K. King, Attorney General, Steven S. Suttle, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.", "Robert E. Tangora, L.L.C., Robert E. Tangora, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2007-NMSC-027\n161 P.3d 862\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. Donald MOYA, Defendant-Respondent.\nNo. 29,919.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nMay 14, 2007.\nGary K. King, Attorney General, Steven S. Suttle, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.\nRobert E. Tangora, L.L.C., Robert E. Tangora, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent." }, "file_name": "0817-01", "first_page_order": 867, "last_page_order": 874 }