{ "id": 3668959, "name": "Leonard GRIEGO, Worker-Appellant, v. PATRIOT ERECTORS, INC. and Commerce and Industries Insurance Company, Employer/Insurer-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Griego v. Patriot Erectors, Inc.", "decision_date": "2007-02-27", "docket_number": "No. 26,378", "first_page": "844", "last_page": "848", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "141 N.M. 844" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "161 P.3d 889" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2007-NMCA-080" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "716 N.E.2d 372", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 11572030 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/716/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMCA-022", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 142220 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 13-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/123/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMSC-013", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 257601 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 29" }, { "page": "\u00b6 31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/127/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "564 N.E.2d 1222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1226", "parenthetical": "\"[Injuries inflicted intentionally upon an employee by a co-employee are 'accidental' within the meaning of the Act, since such injuries are unexpected and unforeseeable from the injured employee's point of view.\"" }, { "page": "1226", "parenthetical": "stating that intentional torts committed upon an employee by a co-employee are considered \"accidental\" from an employer's viewpoint, where the employer did not direct or authorize the co-employee to commit the tort" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 Ill.Dec. 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. Dec.", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"[Injuries inflicted intentionally upon an employee by a co-employee are 'accidental' within the meaning of the Act, since such injuries are unexpected and unforeseeable from the injured employee's point of view.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 Ill.2d 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5574428 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"[Injuries inflicted intentionally upon an employee by a co-employee are 'accidental' within the meaning of the Act, since such injuries are unexpected and unforeseeable from the injured employee's point of view.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/139/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 S.C. 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "S.C.", "case_ids": [ 2165785 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"The incident which led to the rape of appellant was certainly unexpected from her point of view and constitutes an accident within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation Act.\"" }, { "page": "654-55", "parenthetical": "\"The incident which led to the rape of appellant was certainly unexpected from her point of view and constitutes an accident within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation Act.\"" }, { "page": "654", "parenthetical": "\"An intentional assault upon an employee by a third person is an 'accident' because it is unexpected when viewed from the employee's perspective.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sc/285/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 S.E.2d 748", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "750", "parenthetical": "\"The mere fact ... that an injury is termed 'accidental' from the injured employee's viewpoint, requiring the employer to pay compensation under the Act, does not mean that the injury is accidental from the viewpoint of the intentional assailant.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 N.C.App. 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526858 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"The mere fact ... that an injury is termed 'accidental' from the injured employee's viewpoint, requiring the employer to pay compensation under the Act, does not mean that the injury is accidental from the viewpoint of the intentional assailant.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/55/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 N.M. 120", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5363696 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125" }, { "page": "415" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/81/0120-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 N.M. 452", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5335787 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453" }, { "page": "419" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/83/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 N.M. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1565158 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367" }, { "page": "350" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/45/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 N.M. 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1562302 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284" }, { "page": "336" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/47/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 N.M. 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8841687 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258" }, { "page": "870" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/49/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 N.M. 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590366 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106-07" }, { "page": "996" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/60/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 N.M. 788", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1597180 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "791" }, { "page": "764" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/107/0788-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMCA-179", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 827375 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 4" }, { "page": "\u00b613" }, { "page": "\u00b6 17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMCA-098", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1224625 ], "weight": 18, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 7" }, { "page": "\u00b6 7" }, { "page": "\u00b6 7" }, { "page": "\u00b6 8" }, { "page": "\u00b67" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 7-8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/136/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "2001-NMSC-034", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 183113 ], "weight": 21, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 13" }, { "page": "\u00b614" }, { "page": "\u00b626" }, { "page": "\u00b6 14" }, { "page": "\u00b6 30" }, { "page": "\u00b6 26" }, { "page": "\u00b6 1" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/131/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 P.3d 565", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.M. 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2005-NMCERT-011", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCERT", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2005-NMCA-127", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 2550431 ], "weight": 22, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 4" }, { "page": "\u00b6 6" }, { "page": "\u00b6 6" }, { "page": "\u00b6 6" }, { "page": "\u00b6 6" }, { "parenthetical": "\"The incident which led to the rape of appellant was certainly unexpected from her point of view and constitutes an accident within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation Act.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"The incident which led to the rape of appellant was certainly unexpected from her point of view and constitutes an accident within the meaning of 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"batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE and RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judges." ], "parties": [ "Leonard GRIEGO, Worker-Appellant, v. PATRIOT ERECTORS, INC. and Commerce and Industries Insurance Company, Employer/Insurer-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nPICKARD, Judge.\n{1} Leonard Griego (Worker) appeals from a Workers\u2019 Compensation Administration order granting summary judgment in favor of Patriot Erectors, Inc. and Commerce and Industries Insurance Company (collectively, Employer). The question presented by this case is whether Worker, who was punched by his supervisor while complaining about the supervisor to their mutual construction superintendent, may recover workers\u2019 compensation benefits. The workers\u2019 compensation judge (WCJ) granted summary judgment in favor of Employer on the basis that the supervisor intentionally punched Worker, thus making Worker\u2019s injuries non-accidental and therefore outside the scope of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (the Act), NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 52-1-1 to -70 (1929, as amended through 2005). Worker appeals, and we reverse. We hold that the fact that the punch was intentionally delivered does not as a matter of law preclude the recovery of workers\u2019 compensation benefits.\nFACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW\n{2} On December 4, 2004, Worker, an iron worker, was working on a construction site when Darryl Honeycutt, a supervisor, told Worker to \u201cget [his] tools and get off the project.\u201d Worker then sought out their mutual construction superintendent, Don Price, to complain about Honeycutt\u2019s actions. As Worker was speaking to Price, Honeycutt approached Worker and the two began arguing about whether Worker committed a safety violation while working on the construction site. After Worker disputed Honeycutt\u2019s version of events, Honeycutt \u201csucker-punched\u201d Worker in the jaw. Price and another employee subsequently jumped between Worker and Honeycutt and stopped the altercation.\n{3} As a result of the incident, Worker suffered injuries to his jaw and temporomandibular joint (TMJ). Worker subsequently sought workers\u2019 compensation benefits for his injuries. Employer filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Honeycutt\u2019s actions were intentional, not accidental, and therefore Worker could not recover under the Act. Worker argued that from his perspective, being punched by Honeycutt was unexpected and therefore accidental. The WCJ concluded that Worker did not suffer an accident as defined in the Act and granted summary judgment in favor of Employer. Worker appealed.\nSTANDARD OF REVIEW\n{4} \u201cSummary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact and where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u201d Gurule v. Dicaperl Minerals Corp., 2006-NMCA-054, \u00b6 4, 139 N.M. 521, 134 P.3d 808; see also Rule 1-056(C) NMRA. In the present case, where the material facts do not appear to be disputed, we \u201creview the disposition of the summary judgment motion[] de novo.\u201d State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Barker, 2004-NMCA-105, \u00b6 4, 136 N.M. 211, 96 P.3d 336; see also Salazar v. Torres, 2005-NMCA-127, \u00b6 4, 138 N.M. 510, 122 P.3d 1279, cert. granted, 2005-NMCERT-011, 138 N.M. 587, 124 P.3d 565.\nDISCUSSION\n{5} The sole issue on appeal is whether a co-worker\u2019s intentional tort against another worker constitutes an \u201caccident\u201d'for the purposes of workers\u2019 compensation benefits. After examining relevant statutory law, as well as case law from New Mexico and other jurisdictions, we conclude that Worker\u2019s injuries are within the scope of the Act, and accordingly we reverse.\n{6} The Act provides that, subject to a few exceptions, \u201ceach employer in New Mexico \u2018shall become liable to and shall pay to any such worker injured by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment ... compensation in the manner and amount at the times required in the ... Act.\u2019 \u201d Salazar, 2005-NMCA-127, \u00b6 6, 138 N.M. 510, 122 P.3d 1279 (quoting Section 52-1-2). Notably, a worker may obtain compensation under the Act only when he or she is \u201cinjured by accident,\u201d as \u201cnon-accidental injuries are not compensable under the Act.\u201d Id.; see also Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 2001-NMSC-034, \u00b6 13, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148; Morales v. Reynolds, 2004-NMCA-098, \u00b6 7, 136 N.M. 280, 97 P.3d 612; Martin-Martinez v. 6001, Inc., 1998-NMCA-179, \u00b6 4, 126 N.M. 319, 968 P.2d 1182.\n{7} \u201cActions on the part of the employer or the worker can render the injuring event non-accidental.\u201d Morales, 2004-NMCA-098, \u00b6 7, 136 N.M. 280, 97 P.3d 612. For example, Section 52-1-11 provides that if a worker\u2019s injuries result from the worker\u2019s \u201cintoxication, wilfulness, or intentional self-infliction,\u201d the injuries will be considered non-accidental, and the worker will lose any right to benefits. Morales, 2004-NMCA-098, \u00b6 7, 136 N.M. 280, 97 P.3d 612; see also Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034, \u00b614, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148. Additionally, under Delgado, when an employer\u2019s intentional or willful conduct causes injury to a worker, the injury will be considered non-accidental, and the employer will no longer enjoy immunity from tort liability. 2001-NMSC-034, \u00b626, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148; see also Morales, 2004-NMCA-098, \u00b6 8, 136 N.M. 280, 97 P.3d 612. In the present case, Employer does not allege that Worker\u2019s injuries were caused by his own \u201cintoxication, wilfulness, or intentional self-infliction.\u201d Nor does Employer argue that it intentionally or wilfully engaged in conduct that led to Worker\u2019s injuries. Rather, Employer argues that a co-worker\u2019s intentional conduct renders Worker\u2019s injuries non-accidental and therefore Worker is not entitled to compensation under the Act. We disagree.\n{8} Although the word \u201caccident\u201d is not defined in the Act, our courts have long recognized that \u201can \u2018accidental injury\u2019 is an \u2018unlooked-for mishap or some untoward event that is not expected or designed.\u2019\u201d Salazar, 2005-NMCA-127, \u00b6 6, 138 N.M. 510, 122 P.3d 1279 (quoting Cisneros v. Molycorp, Inc., 107 N.M. 788, 791, 765 P.2d 761, 764 (Ct.App.1988)); see also Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034, \u00b6 14, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148; Gilbert v. E.B. Law & Son, Inc., 60 N.M. 101, 106-07, 287 P.2d 992, 996 (1955); Aranbula v. Banner Mining Co., 49 N.M. 253, 258, 161 P.2d 867, 870 (1945); Webb v. New Mexico Publ\u2019g Co., 47 N.M. 279, 284, 141 P.2d 333, 336 (1943); Stevenson v. Lee Moor Contracting Co., 45 N.M. 354, 367, 115 P.2d 342, 350 (1941); Ortiz v. Ortiz & Torres Dri-Wall Co., 83 N.M. 452, 453, 493 P.2d 418, 419 (Ct.App.1972); Lyon v. Catron County Comm\u2019rs, 81 N.M. 120, 125, 464 P.2d 410, 415 (Ct.App. 1969). Whether an injury can be considered accidental is \u201cdetermined from the perspective of the injured worker.\u201d Salazar, 2005-NMCA-127, \u00b6 6, 138 N.M. 510, 122 P.3d 1279. Thus, \u201cif a worker does not expect or design the untoward event that leads to his injury, he has suffered an accidental injury for the purposes of the Act.\u201d Id.\n{9} In the present case, Worker alleges that he was injured when Honeycutt, a coworker, sucker-punched him in the jaw. Employer argues that because Worker testified that he believed that Honeycutt acted intentionally when he struck Worker, Worker\u2019s injury cannot be accidental. We believe that Employer misstates the rule. See Andrews v. Peters, 55 N.C.App. 124, 284 S.E.2d 748, 750 (1981) (\u201cThe mere fact ... that an injury is termed \u2018accidental\u2019 from the injured employee\u2019s viewpoint, requiring the employer to pay compensation under the Act, does not mean that the injury is accidental from the viewpoint of the intentional assailant.\u201d). The pertinent question is not whether Worker believed that Honeycutt acted intentionally, but rather, whether Worker expected or designed Honeycutt\u2019s actions. Salazar, 2005-NMCA-127, \u00b6 6, 138 N.M. 510, 122 P.3d 1279; see also Doe v. S.C. State Hosp., 285 S.C. 183, 328 S.E.2d 652, 654-55 (Ct.App. 1985) (\u201cThe incident which led to the rape of appellant was certainly unexpected from her point of view and constitutes an accident within the meaning of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\u201d). Thus, the fact that Worker believed that Honeycutt did not accidentally sucker-punch him is immaterial to our analysis.\n{10} Although Worker testified that he believed that Honeycutt punched him intentionally with the intent to injure him, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that Worker expected or otherwise intended for Honeycutt to punch him. Indeed, Worker stated that he did not expect or anticipate that Honeycutt was going to hit him. Thus, \u201c[f]rom Worker\u2019s perspective, the injury was unexpected and, therefore, accidental.\u201d Salazar, 2005-NMCA-127, \u00b67, 138 N.M. 510, 122 P.3d 1279; see also Meerbrey v. Marshall Field & Co., 139 Ill.2d 455, 151 Ill.Dec. 560, 564 N.E.2d 1222, 1226 (1990) (\u201c[Injuries inflicted intentionally upon an employee by a co-employee are \u2018accidental\u2019 within the meaning of the Act, since such injuries are unexpected and unforeseeable from the injured employee\u2019s point of view.\u201d); Doe, 328 S.E.2d at 654 (\u201cAn intentional assault upon an employee by a third person is an \u2018accident\u2019 because it is unexpected when viewed from the employee\u2019s perspective.\u201d).\n{11} Employer argues that because intentional torts are not within the scope of the Act, Worker\u2019s injury cannot be considered accidental. See, e.g., Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034, \u00b6 30, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148 (\u201c[W]e do not believe that the Act was ever intended to immunize employers from liability for intentional torts.\u201d). According to Delgado,\n[W]illfulness renders a worker\u2019s injury non-accidental, and therefore outside the scope of the Act, when: (1) the worker or employer engages in an intentional act or omission, without just cause or excuse, that is reasonably expected to result in the injury suffered by the worker; (2) the worker or employer expects the intentional act or omission to result in the injury, or has utterly disregarded the consequences; and (3) the intentional act or omission proximately causes the injury.\n2001-NMSC-034, \u00b6 26, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148. Although the above quoted language certainly suggests that intentional torts are outside the scope of the Act, it is also apparent that only a worker\u2019s or an employer\u2019s intentional or willful conduct will bring an incident outside the scope of the Act. See Morales, 2004-NMCA-098, \u00b67, 136 N.M. 280, 97 P.3d 612 (stating that \u201c[ajctions on the part of the employer or the worker can render the injuring event non-accidental\u201d (emphasis added)). In most instances, however, \u201cthe intentional conduct of an employee injuring another employee is not the intentional conduct of the employer.\u201d Martin-Martinez, 1998-NMCA-179, \u00b613, 126 N.M. 319, 968 P.2d 1182. Rather, our case law indicates that when a co-worker commits an intentional tort against another worker, such an incident will be considered accidental, and therefore within the scope of the Act, (1) where the employer did not intentionally or willfully engage in conduct leading to the incident resulting in the worker\u2019s injury, or (2) where the co-worker\u2019s intentional conduct cannot be imputed to the employer under an alter ego theory. See id.; see also Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034, \u00b6 1, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148; Coates v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1999-NMSC-013, \u00b6 29, 127 N.M. 47, 976 P.2d 999; Morales, 2004-NMCA-098, \u00b6\u00b6 7-8, 136 N.M. 280, 97 P.3d 612; Eldridge v. Circle K Corp., 1997-NMCA-022, \u00b6\u00b6 13-16, 123 N.M. 145, 934 P.2d 1074; accord Tippmann v. Hensler, 716 N.E.2d 372, 376 (Ind.1999) (explaining in a hypothetical that where a co-employee repeatedly stabs another employee, the incident will be considered \u201caccidental\u201d from the employer\u2019s perspective, where the employer did not intend or expect the injury); Meerbrey, 151 Ill.Dec. 560, 564 N.E.2d at 1226 (stating that intentional torts committed upon an employee by a co-employee are considered \u201caccidental\u201d from an employer\u2019s viewpoint, where the employer did not direct or authorize the co-employee to commit the tort).\n{12} In the present case, neither party alleges that Employer engaged in willful or intentional conduct that would result in the incident being considered non-accidental from Employer\u2019s perspective. See Coates, 1999-NMSC-013, \u00b6 31, 127 N.M. 47, 976 P.2d 999 (concluding that the employer acted intentionally when it had notice of an employee\u2019s sexual harassment of others and failed to take any action). Nor is there any allegation that Honeycutt is an alter ego of Employer. See Martin-Martinez, 1998-NMCA-179, \u00b6 17, 126 N.M. 319, 968 P.2d 1182 (concluding that two managerial employees were not alter egos of the employer where there was no evidence that either employee had \u201cany ownership interest or confidential relationship with the shareholders of [the company]\u201d). Thus, because Worker\u2019s injuries are accidental from both Worker\u2019s and Employer\u2019s perspective, Worker\u2019s claims fall within the scope of the Act.\n{13} Finally, we observe that Worker\u2019s brief-in-ehief focuses primarily on the idea, based on the holding in Salazar, that even if Worker\u2019s injuries are non-accidental, he may recover both workers\u2019 compensation benefits and tort damages. See Salazar, 2005-NMCA-127, \u00b6 11, 138 N.M. 510, 122 P.3d 1279. The issue of tort damages is not before us in this appeal from the Workers\u2019 Compensation Administration. Because of this and because we conclude that Worker\u2019s injuries were caused by accident, and are therefore clearly within the scope of the Act, we decline to address this argument.\nCONCLUSION\n{14} We reverse the WCJ\u2019s order granting summary judgment in favor of Employer and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\n{15} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE and RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judges.", "type": "majority", "author": "PICKARD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "David S. Proffit, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.", "Butt Thornton & Baehr PC, Emily A. Franke, Carlos G. Martinez, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2007-NMCA-080\n161 P.3d 889\nLeonard GRIEGO, Worker-Appellant, v. PATRIOT ERECTORS, INC. and Commerce and Industries Insurance Company, Employer/Insurer-Appellees.\nNo. 26,378.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nFeb. 27, 2007.\nCertiorari Denied, No. 30,295, April 30, 2007.\nDavid S. Proffit, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.\nButt Thornton & Baehr PC, Emily A. Franke, Carlos G. Martinez, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellees." }, "file_name": "0844-01", "first_page_order": 894, "last_page_order": 898 }