{ "id": 3783502, "name": "Ollie W. GATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. State of NEW MEXICO, TAXATION AND REVENUE DEPARTMENT, Property Tax Division, Torrance County, a New Mexico County, Robert Rubin, Freddie Chavez, and Ray and Joyce Halderman, Defendants-Appellants, and Ray and Joyce Halderman, Counterclaimants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Gates v. State, Taxation & Revenue Department", "decision_date": "2007-12-17", "docket_number": "No. 26,726", "first_page": "446", "last_page": "452", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "143 N.M. 446" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "176 P.3d 1178" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2008-NMCA-023" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "2004-NMCA-058", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1427954 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/135/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 U.S. 220", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3276521 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1713" }, { "parenthetical": "holding that upon the return of an unclaimed notice of a tax sale, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the state to \"take additional reasonable steps to attempt to provide notice to the property owner before selling his property, if it is practicable to do so\"" }, { "page": "1718", "parenthetical": "\"[B]e-fore forcing a citizen to satisfy his [tax] debt by forfeiting his property, due process requires the government to provide adequate notice of the impending taking.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/547/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 N.M. 285", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 720253 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/112/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 F.R.D. 682", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "F.R.D.", "case_ids": [ 7852528 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "684" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/frd/151/0682-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 F.Supp.2d 122", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8952448 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "129" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/371/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "836 F.2d 515", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10544357 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/836/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "861 F.2d 1389", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10537961 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1392" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/861/1389-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 F.3d 122", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7649941 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/81/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 N.M. 535", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1584676 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "539", "parenthetical": "explaining that it is appropriate to look to judicial interpretations of corresponding federal rules when analyzing our rules of civil procedure" }, { "page": "1021", "parenthetical": "explaining that it is appropriate to look to judicial interpretations of corresponding federal rules when analyzing our rules of civil procedure" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/99/0535-01" ] }, { "cite": "2002-NMCA-076", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 260681 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/132/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMCA-091", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1224608 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/136/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMCA-126", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 834150 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/125/0705-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 N.M. 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 720225 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229", "parenthetical": "\"By its terms, the partial summary judgment order left unresolved ... claims and, thus, the ... order cannot be a final order from which appeal properly may be taken.\"" }, { "page": "97", "parenthetical": "\"By its terms, the partial summary judgment order left unresolved ... claims and, thus, the ... order cannot be a final order from which appeal properly may be taken.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/112/0226-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 985, "char_count": 20574, "ocr_confidence": 0.682, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.32550315581732e-08, "percentile": 0.439932791448459 }, "sha256": "d7197e7073194195691fa4bc94735292c1455b6fd1d8a12d5daf17cab1a4090a", "simhash": "1:4a42b15ed9a737a3", "word_count": 3322 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:34:50.796486+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: CELIA FOY CASTILLO and MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judges." ], "parties": [ "Ollie W. GATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. State of NEW MEXICO, TAXATION AND REVENUE DEPARTMENT, Property Tax Division, Torrance County, a New Mexico County, Robert Rubin, Freddie Chavez, and Ray and Joyce Halderman, Defendants-Appellants, and Ray and Joyce Halderman, Counterclaimants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nWECHSLER, Judge.\n{1} In this case, involving the New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department\u2019s (TRD) tax sale of a private landowner\u2019s real property in response to his failure to pay property taxes for several years, two distinct issues have arisen. First, we must decide whether Rule l-041(A)(l)(b) NMRA permits litigants to stipulate to dismiss undecided claims remaining after a partial summary judgment in order to have a final order for appeal. Second, we consider the lengths to which TRD must go in order to comply with the requirements of constitutional due process when attempting to provide notice to deficient taxpayers before initiating public sales of their real property. We conclude that (1) although Rule 1-041 (A) only allows for the voluntary dismissal of entire actions, the stipulated dismissal of two of four individual claims in this case was permissible under Rule 1-015(A) NMRA and (2) the State was not reasonably diligent in attempting to locate the reasonably ascertainable contact information of the deficient taxpayer before selling his real property at auction. We affirm.\nFACTUAL BACKGROUND\n{2} Plaintiff Ollie Gates is a long-time resident of Kansas City, Missouri, who owns dozens of pieces of property in the Kansas City metropolitan area, including a chain of barbeque restaurants. In 1977, Plaintiff purchased a parcel of rural land (the Property) located in Torrance County, New Mexico. After purchasing the Property, Plaintiff remained a Missouri resident and never relocated to New Mexico. In 1996, Plaintiff began to lease the Property to Joe and Mary Jane Chavez for the purpose of livestock grazing. They did not record the lease. After entering into the lease agreement, the Chavezes contacted the Torrance County Electric Cooperative and set up electrical service on the Property. The Chavezes\u2019 lease agreement with Plaintiff was in effect until Defendants Ray and Joyce Halderman purchased the Property from TRD in the August 2002 tax sale at issue in this case.\n{3} In May 1997, Plaintiffs primary mailing address in Missouri changed, but he failed to effectively relay his new contact information to Torrance County officials. Each year from 1998 to 2002 the Torrance County Treasurer mailed property tax bills to Plaintiffs pre-May 1997 mailing address, and each year the bills were marked as \u201cforwarding order expired\u201d and returned by the postal service. During that period of time, Plaintiff failed to pay any taxes owed on the Property because he did not realize that any money was due.\n{4} In July 2001, officials in Torrance County forwarded to TRD a list of delinquent property tax accounts, which included Plaintiffs account. In early 2002, a TRD employee was assigned the task of locating Plaintiff in order to collect the back taxes. The TRD employee\u2019s first attempt failed when he was unable to find Plaintiffs contact information in the Torrance County property records. Next, he attempted to physically access the Property in order to either personally notify Plaintiff or to provide him with notice by placing a \u201cred tag\u201d warning of the tax deficiency in a conspicuous place. During that attempt, he encountered a locked gate that denied access to the Property and, because he was unsure if the gate belonged to Plaintiff, opted not to affix the \u201cred tag.\u201d Shortly after, the TRD employee learned that Defendants owned a home on the land adjacent to the Property. He eventually contacted Defendant Ray Halderman by telephone and asked if he knew Plaintiff. Mr. Halderman indicated that he had never met Plaintiff and did not know his contact information. Next, the TRD employee called telephone operators in New Mexico and Missouri. The operators in New Mexico had no record of Plaintiff, but the operators in Missouri informed him that there were unpublished Missouri telephone numbers under Plaintiffs name. The TRD employee\u2019s final effort in attempting to locate Plaintiff was to enter Plaintiffs name into two Internet databases that provide published telephone and address listings of people living in the United States. The two databases did not provide him with any useful information. The TRD employee had previously used a free Internet search engine to locate deficient taxpayers when it was absolutely necessary, but he did not know whether he conducted such a search in this case.\n{5} On July 31, 2002, after the TRD employee had given up his efforts to locate Plaintiff, TRD mailed a certified letter to the address that it had on record for Plaintiff, warning him that his property would be sold at a public auction in order to pay his tax debts. The letter was returned to TRD by the postal service marked with the words \u201cforwarding order expired.\u201d TRD then advertised the sale of the Property in a regional newspaper in a final attempt to notify Plaintiff of the impending public auction. After the publication, Defendants learned that the Property was on the market. The auction took place on August 28, 2002, and Defendants made the winning bid of $22,000. Plaintiff did not receive actual notice of the sale of the Property until his tenant, Mary Jane Chavez, informed him that Defendants had purchased it at the tax sale.\nPROCEDURAL BACKGROUND\n{6} Plaintiff filed a civil complaint against Defendants on September 20, 2002, alleging four claims: (I) \u201cavoid conveyance and void sale,\u201d (II) quiet title, (III) unjust enrichment, and (IV) prima facie tort. Each claim stems from the assertion that the Property was wrongfully conveyed to Defendants. In January 2004, Plaintiff and Defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment in the district court, which were both denied. On May 24, 2004, Plaintiff and Defendants filed a joint motion to reconsider their respective cross-motions for summary judgment. The motion included a list of stipulated facts and asked the district court to make a definitive ruling only with respect to Claims I and II, which alleged that Plaintiff was not afforded adequate notice before the Property was sold at auction. In response, the district court issued a memorandum decision granting partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff and declaring him to be the \u201clawful owner of the Property\u201d because \u201cthe State\u2019s efforts to notify [him] were constitutionally inadequate.\u201d The memorandum decision settled the first two claims of the complaint in Plaintiff\u2019s favor but left his unjust enrichment and prima facie tort claims undecided.\n{7} Unhappy with the district court\u2019s decision, Defendants submitted an application for leave to file an interlocutory appeal to this Court, which was denied on September 9, 2004. Plaintiff and Defendants then continued preparing for trial on Claims III and IV. On March 31, 2006, Plaintiff and Defendants filed a \u201cstipulation of dismissal without prejudice\u201d under Rule 1 \u2014 041(A)(1)(b), which indicated that the parties had reached an agreement to dismiss the remaining two claims. Defendants filed their notice of appeal with the district court on April 27, 2006.\nTHE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE\n{8} Generally, a civil action may only be appealed to this Court if a \u201cfinal order\u201d or a \u201cfinal judgment\u201d has been entered by the district court. NMSA 1978, \u00a7 39-3-2 (1966); see also Rule 12-201(A) NMRA. In certain circumstances, this Court may also grant an interlocutory appeal after the district court enters an order that \u201cpractically disposes of the merits of the action.\u201d Section 39-3-2; see also Rule 12-203 NMRA. As such, partial summary judgment orders are not appeal-able final orders when other claims are left unresolved but, rather, can only be heard by this Court in an interlocutory appeal. See Govich v. N. Am. Sys., Inc., 112 N.M. 226, 229, 814 P.2d 94, 97 (1991) (\u201cBy its terms, the partial summary judgment order left unresolved ... claims and, thus, the ... order cannot be a final order from which appeal properly may be taken.\u201d) (footnote omitted). In this case, Defendants argue, and Plaintiff agrees, that the district court\u2019s partial summary judgment order became a \u201cfinal order,\u201d and therefore appealable to this Court, the moment they filed the stipulation of dismissal without prejudice regarding the remaining undecided claims under Rule l-041(A)(l)(b). We disagree with Plaintiffs and Defendants\u2019 interpretation of Rule 1 \u2014 041(A)(1)(b) but agree that their written agreement to dismiss Claims III and IV finalized the district court\u2019s order of partial summary judgment and that we have jurisdiction to decide the merits of this ease.\nVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS\n{9} Although neither party in this case advanced the issue of finality, we are able to raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte. Masterman v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep\u2019t, 1998-NMCA-126, \u00b6 9, 125 N.M. 705, 964 P.2d 869. The resolution of the jurisdictional issue in this case requires us to interpret our rules of civil procedure. We do so under de novo review. Becenti v. Becenti, 2004-NMCA-091, \u00b6 6, 136 N.M. 124, 94 P.3d 867.\n{10} In interpreting a Supreme Court rule of procedure, we look first to the rule\u2019s plain language. In re Michael L., 2002-NMCA-076, \u00b6 9, 132 N.M. 479, 50 P.3d 574. \u201cIf the rule is unambiguous, we give effect to its language and refrain from further interpretation.\u201d Id. The plain language of Rule 1-041(A)(1)(b) indicates that a plaintiff may dismiss \u201can action ... without order of the court ... by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared generally in the action.\u201d (Emphasis added.) We must determine whether the word \u201caction\u201d in this context may be interpreted to allow for the dismissal of individual claims.\n{11} There appears to be no New Mexico case law that is applicable to our discrete issue. As such, because Rule 1 \u2014 041(A)(1)(b) is virtually identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(l)(ii), we turn to the interpretations of federal courts for guidance. See Benavidez v. Benavidez, 99 N.M. 535, 539, 660 P.2d 1017, 1021 (1983) (explaining that it is appropriate to look to judicial interpretations of corresponding federal rules when analyzing our rules of civil procedure).\n{12} The general rule among the federal courts is that Rule 41(a) does not allow plaintiffs to dismiss individual claims. See, e.g., Gobbo Farms & Orchards v. Poole Chem. Co., 81 F.3d 122, 123 (10th Cir.1996) (\u201c[The appellant] offers no authority, and we have found none, to support its contention that Rule 41(a) applies to dismissal of less than all claims in an action.\u201d); Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389, 1392 (9th Cir.1988) (refusing to allow a plaintiff to \u201cdelete one claim among several from his complaint\u201d using Rule 41(a)); Gronholz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 836 F.2d 515, 518 (Fed.Cir.1987) (agreeing with the conclusions of other jurisdictions that Rule 41(a) does not allow for the dismissal of individual claims within an action); see also 8 James W. Moore, Moore\u2019s Federal Practice \u00a7 41.21[1], at 41-30 (3d ed. 2007) (\u201cRule 41(a) may not be employed to dismiss fewer than all of the claims against any particular defendant.\u201d). Such a reading has become the predominant interpretation because the plain language of Rule 41(a) permits the voluntary dismissal of \u201can action, meaning the totality of all component claims asserted against a single defendant.\u201d Vogel v. Am. Kiosk Mgmt., 371 F.Supp.2d 122, 129 (D.Conn.2005) (emphasis added).\n{13} We also note that our rule, in language that is identical to the corresponding federal rule, tends to indicate that an \u201caction\u201d and a \u201cclaim\u201d cannot be considered one in the same. For example, Rule 1-041(B) states, \u201cFor failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against the defendant.\u201d (Emphasis added.) The differentiation between dismissing an action \u201cor\u201d a claim in this subsection intimates that the rule was drafted with the intention of avoiding the interchangeable use of the words. See Campbell v. Hoffman, 151 F.R.D. 682, 684 (D.Kan.1993)(\u201cThe language of Rules 41(a)(1), 41(b), and 41(d) refer to both actions and claims, indicating that the drafters of Rule 41 drew a distinction between those two terms and intended them to have different meanings.\u201d); see also 8 Moore, supra, \u00a7 41.21[1], at 41-31 (\u201cHad the drafters intended to authorize the ... dismissal of individual claims instead of the entire action, they could have clearly said so.\u201d).\n{14} Because of the plain language of Rule 1-041(A), we conclude that it allows for the voluntary dismissal of actions without the approval of the district court but that it does not allow for the voluntary dismissal of individual claims that make up an action. Our conclusion, however, does not suggest that our rules of civil procedure do not allow for the dismissal of individual claims. On the contrary, Rule 1-015(A) explicitly provides that \u201ca party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Following the requirements of this rule, parties may consent in writing to remove claims from a complaint. In the present case, even though Plaintiff and Defendants erroneously indicated that their March 31, 2006 \u201cstipulation of dismissal\u201d was permissible under Rule l-041(A)(l)(b), the practical effect of the agreement was equivalent to producing the \u201cwritten consent of the adverse party\u201d required by Rule 1-015(A).\n{15} We see no legitimate reason to punish Plaintiff and Defendants for improperly, but inconsequentially, citing Rule l-041(A)(l)(b) in their stipulation of dismissal as the appropriate authority under which to dismiss Plaintiffs remaining individual undecided claims. By creating a written agreement that indicated Defendants\u2019 consent, they effectively dismissed Claims III and IV pursuant to Rule 1-015(A). As a consequence, the district court\u2019s grant of partial summary judgment constitutes a final order, and we have jurisdiction to address the constitutional due process issue raised by Defendants.\nNOTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS\n{16} As to the merits, Defendants argue that the district court erred in granting partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff and ruling that he is the rightful owner of the Property. Specifically, they assert that (1) TRD\u2019s efforts in attempting to locate Plaintiff \u201cexceeded constitutional due process requirements,\u201d (2) Plaintiffs post-1997 contact information was not reasonably ascertainable, and (3) Defendants\u2019 purchase of the Property at the tax sale was valid and legally conveyed title to them. We disagree.\n{17} In considering this case, we are guided by the precedent set in Patrick v. Rice, 112 N.M. 285, 814 P.2d 463 (Ct.App.1991), which was reinforced by a recent holding of the United States Supreme Court. See Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 126 S.Ct. 1708, 1713, 164 L.Ed.2d 415 (2006) (holding that upon the return of an unclaimed notice of a tax sale, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the state to \u201ctake additional reasonable steps to attempt to provide notice to the property owner before selling his property, if it is practicable to do so\u201d). In Patrick, we clarified the general rule that constitutional due process requires the state to exercise \u201creasonable diligence\u201d in attempting to notify deficient taxpayers before selling their real property in order to collect compensation for back taxes. Patrick, 112 N.M. at 289, 814 P.2d at 467. In determining whether specific efforts are \u201creasonably diligent,\u201d the inquiry becomes \u201cwhether the identity and location of a party entitled to notice [is] reasonably ascertainable.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\n{18} Although the issue of \u201creasonable aseertainability\u201d is highly dependent on the specific facts of a particular case, it is ultimately a question of law. Id. at 289-90, 814 P.2d at 467-68. Our standard of review is therefore de novo. See id. at 290, 814 P.2d at 468; see also State v. Johnson, 2004-NMCA-058, \u00b6 12, 135 N.M. 567, 92 P.3d 13 (\u201cBecause the trial court\u2019s ultimate conclusion drawn from the facts was a legal determination, ... we review it de novo.\u201d).\n{19} In Patrick, we recognized that \u201c[w]hen [TRD] holds a tax sale, that is a taking of property by the government, [and] the notice of such taking must comply with minimum due process standards under the United States and New Mexico Constitutions.\u201d Patrick, 112 N.M. at 288, 814 P.2d at 466; accord Jones, 126 S.Ct. at 1718 (\u201c[B]e-fore forcing a citizen to satisfy his [tax] debt by forfeiting his property, due process requires the government to provide adequate notice of the impending taking.\u201d). In Patrick, we determined that TRD\u2019s sale of the plaintiffs\u2019 real property for tax delinquency was \u201cconstitutionally inadequate\u201d after carefully considering the \u201cmany ways the division could have ascertained [the] plaintiffs\u2019 current address.\u201d Patrick, 112 N.M. at 290, 814 P.2d at 468. The combination of the following factors in Patrick convinced us that TRD\u2019s failure to provide actual notice and use only of notice by publication denied the plaintiffs their right to due process: (1) failing to locate the plaintiffs\u2019 correct address information, which was somewhere in TRD\u2019s files; (2) failing to notice the correct address information on the top of a personal check sent to the county; (3) failing to contact the electric company in order to inquire about the contact information that it had on record for the plaintiffs; and (4) failing to physically tag the property to provide actual notice. Id.\n{20} While we agree with Defendants\u2019 assertion that due process \u201cdoes not require that every stone be unturned,\u201d considering the facts presented in this case in conjunction, similar to our analysis of the facts in Patrick, leads to the conclusion that TRD\u2019s efforts in attempting to locate Plaintiff fell short of the \u201creasonable diligence\u201d standard. See id. at 289-90, 814 P.2d at 467-68. The combination of methods by which Plaintiffs current contact information could have been discovered indicates that it was reasonably ascertainable. First, TRD failed to contact the Torrance County Electric Cooperative, which would have given TRD contact information for the Chavezes, who knew how to get in touch with Plaintiff. Second, TRD failed to tag any part of the Property, which would have alerted the Chavezes to the tax deficiency. Third, TRD was reasonably certain that Plaintiff resided in Kansas City, Missouri, but it failed to follow up by attempting to access any public records from Missouri that could have revealed Plaintiffs current contact information. Fourth, TRD only accessed two Internet websites, both of which were databases that contained published telephone and address information, knowing that all of the Missouri contact information listed under Plaintiffs name was unpublished. Fifth, although Plaintiff is a prominent businessman and property owner whose contact information is readily available on a number of Internet websites that can be easily accessed by utilizing free search engines and databases, the TRD employee charged with locating Plaintiff \u201cdoes not know\u201d if any simple search of this type was ever conducted.\n{21} Any method listed above could have led TRD directly to Plaintiffs contact information. Considered together, we conclude that Plaintiffs contact information was reasonably ascertainable and that TRD was not reasonably diligent in attempting to contact him before taking the drastic step of auctioning the Property to pay for his tax debts.\nCONCLUSION\n{22} We affirm the district court\u2019s decision to grant partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff.\n{23} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: CELIA FOY CASTILLO and MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judges.", "type": "majority", "author": "WECHSLER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Miller Stratvert P.A., Deron B. Knoner, Albuquerque, NM for Appellee.", "Gary K. King, Attorney General, David A. Stevens, Special Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant NM Taxation and Revenue Department.", "Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A., Timothy R. Van Valen, Alex C. Walker, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellants Ray and Joyce Halderman." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2008-NMCA-023\n176 P.3d 1178\nOllie W. GATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. State of NEW MEXICO, TAXATION AND REVENUE DEPARTMENT, Property Tax Division, Torrance County, a New Mexico County, Robert Rubin, Freddie Chavez, and Ray and Joyce Halderman, Defendants-Appellants, and Ray and Joyce Halderman, Counterclaimants-Appellants.\nNo. 26,726.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nDec. 17, 2007.\nMiller Stratvert P.A., Deron B. Knoner, Albuquerque, NM for Appellee.\nGary K. King, Attorney General, David A. Stevens, Special Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant NM Taxation and Revenue Department.\nModrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A., Timothy R. Van Valen, Alex C. Walker, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellants Ray and Joyce Halderman." }, "file_name": "0446-01", "first_page_order": 482, "last_page_order": 488 }