{ "id": 3783380, "name": "Esther HALL, Worker-Appellee, v. CARLSBAD SUPERMARKET/IGA, and Food Industry Self Insurance Fund of New Mexico, Employer/Insurer-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Hall v. Carlsbad Supermarket/IGA", "decision_date": "2007-12-06", "docket_number": "No. 26,538", "first_page": "479", "last_page": "485", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "143 N.M. 479" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "177 P.3d 530" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2008-NMCA-026" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "109 N.M. 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590307 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "143" }, { "page": "396" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/109/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 N.M. 199", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1561356 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203" }, { "page": "238" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/119/0199-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMSC-016", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 929202 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/137/0734-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 N.M. 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1573243 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329" }, { "page": "216" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/94/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMSC-028", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 2549579 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 2" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/138/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMCA-058", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 15792 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/133/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "2000-NMCA-043", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1217171 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/129/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 N.M. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1561309 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" }, { "page": "1016" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/119/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 N.M. 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 708805 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "245-46" }, { "page": "1366-67" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/106/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 N.M. 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 723247 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" }, { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/113/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 S.W.2d 402", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10149917 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404-05" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/467/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMCA-138", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3671915 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" }, { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/140/0637-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 N.M. 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 720184 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "620-21" }, { "page": "1262-63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/112/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 N.M. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2720008 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321" }, { "page": "726" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/68/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMSC-026", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 77148 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMSC-003", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 322271 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 7" }, { "page": "\u00b6 7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/122/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMCA-097", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 77135 ], "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 5" }, { "page": "\u00b6 5" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0202-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 871, "char_count": 19182, "ocr_confidence": 0.688, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0912769009628444e-07, "percentile": 0.5656854897717976 }, "sha256": "a43260bf8cc8571d1c578e683de1ed80bf1d7222f20f09c8cf441311367297a0", "simhash": "1:395da7f4bccc5543", "word_count": 3020 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:34:50.796486+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: CYNTHIA A. FRY and IRA ROBINSON, Judges." ], "parties": [ "Esther HALL, Worker-Appellee, v. CARLSBAD SUPERMARKET/IGA, and Food Industry Self Insurance Fund of New Mexico, Employer/Insurer-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nVIGIL, Judge.\n{1} This case presents an issue of first impression under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (the Act), NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 52-1-1 to -70 (1929, as amended through 2007): Does a doctor who performs an independent medical examination (IME) under Section 52-1-51, pursuant to the parties\u2019 agreement, exceed the scope of his authority when he diagnoses injuries not specifically identified in the agreement and concludes they were caused by the on-the-job accident? We hold that the doctor did not exceed the scope of the IME and that the worker\u2019s compensation judge (WCJ) did not err by considering the information in awarding benefits. We also consider whether the parties\u2019 agreement precluded Worker from raising the newly diagnosed injuries in an amended workers\u2019 compensation claim, and hold that Worker was not precluded from seeking compensation for her newly diagnosed work injuries. We therefore affirm the WCJ\u2019s compensation order.\nI. BACKGROUND\n{2} Worker is an elderly woman who worked at Carlsbad Supermarket (Employer) in the deli section of the store. She injured her knee and back when she fell while carrying supplies to the deli. Worker was diagnosed with a fracture to her patella and lower back lumbar strain, and Employer paid the costs of her medical care and provided disability benefits with respect to these injuries. Worker also complained of middle back thoracic back pain to Dr. Baca, her authorized healthcare provider. Dr. Baca diagnosed Worker\u2019s back pain as resulting from a compression fracture of Worker\u2019s T12 vertebra, and attributed the subtle wedging of Worker\u2019s T12 vertebra to Worker\u2019s on-the-job accident. Dr. Baca also determined that, as of February 4, 2004, Worker had reached maximum medical improvement.\n{3} Employer denied Worker\u2019s request for benefits for the T12 compression fracture, disputing that the injury was causally related to the workplace accident. Worker filed a workers\u2019 compensation complaint and then a first amended complaint. After the first amended complaint was filed, the parties attended mediation and a recommended resolution was issued by the mediator and agreed to by the parties. In pertinent part the recommended resolution states, \u201c[t]he primary issue in this case is whether Worker\u2019s T12 compression fracture is related to the on-the-job accidental injury[,]\u201d and \u201cas a compromise, interim resolution\u201d provides (1) that the parties agreed that Worker had reached maximum medical improvement as of February 4, 2004, and (2) that Worker will receive an IME to be performed by Dr. Nieves \u201cto obtain an independent opinion of whether the T12 compression fracture is related to the on-the-job accidental injury.\u201d The recommended resolution also contains a provision providing that \u201c[bjoth parties reserve and retain all rights and defenses regarding the claim for additional permanent partial disability benefits.\u201d\n{4} On February 7, 2005, Dr. Nieves performed the IME of Worker and concluded that, while Worker had a T12 compression fracture, it was not causally related to her workplace accident because it predated the accident. However, in the course of his examination, Dr. Nieves identified injuries to Worker\u2019s sacrum, and diagnosed Worker with sacroiliac joint dysfunction and radiculitis as a result of her on-the-job injury. Dr. Nieves further concluded that Worker had not reached maximum medical improvement from her injuries.\n{5} Worker then filed a second amended complaint based on the IME, seeking temporary total disability and permanent partial disability benefits, in addition to medical benefits and attorney fees. Another recommended resolution was proposed, which Worker rejected, and the case proceeded to a compensation hearing before the WCJ.\n{6} At the compensation hearing, Employer objected to Dr. Nieves\u2019s opinions as exceeding the scope of the IME agreed to in the recommended resolution. Employer also contended that Worker was precluded from raising new injuries by the recommended resolution which, according to Employer, limited the issues in dispute to the causal relation of the T12 compression fracture to Worker\u2019s workplace accident. The WCJ determined that, based on the language contained in the recommended resolution, Worker was not limited to the issue of the T12 fracture. Accordingly, the WCJ considered Dr. Nieves\u2019s opinions about the newly diagnosed injuries in determining his compensation award to Worker. This appeal followed.\nII. DISCUSSION\n{7} The issues Employer raises on appeal require us to interpret several provisions of the Act. In interpreting a statute, our review is de novo. Smith v. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 2003-NMCA-097, \u00b6 5, 134 N.M. 202, 75 P.3d 418. \u201cOur main goal in statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature.\u201d Archer v. Roadrunner Trucking, Inc., 1997-NMSC-003, \u00b6 7, 122 N.M. 703, 930 P.2d 1155. \u201cWe look first to the plain meaning of the statute\u2019s words, and we construe the provisions of the Act together to produce a harmonious whole.\u201d Smith, 2003-NMCA-097, \u00b6 5, 134 N.M. 202, 75 P.3d 418. After we determine the meaning of the statutes, \u201cwe review the whole record to determine whether the WCJ\u2019s findings and award are supported by substantial evidence.\u201d Id.\nA. Testimony of Independent Medical Examiner\n{8} Employer argues on appeal that the WCJ erred by considering Dr. Nieves\u2019s testimony to the extent it went beyond the causal relationship between Worker\u2019s T12 compression fracture and the on-the-job accident. Employer also challenges the WCJ\u2019s determination, based on Dr. Nieves\u2019s testimony, that Worker was suffering from a sacral fracture, aggravation of bulging discs, and sacroiliac joint dysfunction, as a result of her on-the-job injury.\n{9} To determine whether or not the WCJ erred by considering Dr. Nieves\u2019s testimony regarding injuries other than the T12 compression fracture, we must determine if Dr. Nieves was authorized to provide the testimony pursuant to the Act. We conclude that Dr. Nieves was authorized to provide the challenged testimony and therefore hold that the WCJ did not err by considering Dr. Nieves\u2019s opinions on issues other than Worker\u2019s T12 compression fracture.\n{10} The Act limits the testimony that can be provided by medical experts at a workers\u2019 compensation hearing to testimony by \u201ca treating physician or a health care provider who has provided an independent medical examination pursuant to the Act.\u201d Banks v. IMC Kalium Carlsbad Potash Co., 2003-NMSC-026, \u00b6 28, 134 N.M. 421, 77 P.3d 1014; see also \u00a7 52-l-51(C). The provision of the Act dealing with IMEs provides that, \u201c[i]n the event of a dispute between the parties concerning any medical issue, if the parties cannot agree upon the use of a specific independent medical examiner, either party may petition a workers\u2019 compensation judge for permission to have the worker undergo an independent medical examination.\u201d \u00a7 52-l-51(A). This provision provides two means by which an IME may be obtained: (1) by the agreement of the parties or (2) by order of the WCJ. Id.\n{11} In this case, the parties agreed as part of the recommended resolution for an IME to be performed by Dr. Nieves in order to \u201cobtain an independent opinion of whether the T12 compression fracture [was] related to the on-the-job accidental injury.\u201d Employer argues that, although the parties agreed that Dr. Nieves would conduct an IME of Worker, Dr. Nieves exceeded the scope of the authority conveyed to him by not limiting his examination or opinions to the T12 compression fracture. According to Employer, the above-quoted language of the recommended resolution operated to limit the scope of the IME solely to the causal relationship between the T12 compression fracture and Worker\u2019s accidental on-the-job injury, and Dr. Nieves\u2019s opinions regarding other back-related injuries caused by Worker\u2019s accident were outside the scope of the parties\u2019 agreement.\n{12} Neither this Court nor our Supreme Court have had the occasion to consider whether and how the parties may limit the authority of an independent medical examiner when an IME is conducted pursuant to the agreement of the parties. Although Section 52-1-51 appears to contemplate circumstances in which parties may enter into agreements to have an IME conducted, the Act provides no provisions specifically addressing what must be contained in the agreement. Nor does Rule 1-035 NMRA, governing IMEs in civil proceedings before the district courts, provide us with guidance for resolving the matter before us, as Rule 1-035 only applies in circumstances where a court has ordered an IME be conducted. See State ex rel. Miller v. Tackett, 68 N.M. 318, 321, 361 P.2d 724, 726 (1961).\n{13} Employer argues that we should rely on principles of contractual interpretation to determine the extent of the authority the parties bestowed on Dr. Nieves through the agreed upon recommended resolution. Worker disagrees, arguing that a recommended resolution is not a contract but an informal order that becomes binding if not contested, and thus principles of contractual interpretation are inapplicable. We previously held in Norman v. Lockheed Engineering & Science Co., 112 N.M. 618, 620-21, 817 P.2d 1260, 1262-63 (Ct.App.1991), that a conclusively binding recommended resolution was tantamount to a compensation order. We also recently stated in Benavidez v. Benavidez, 2006-NMCA-138, \u00b6 8, 140 N.M. 637, 145 P.3d 117 (quoting Lone Star Cement Corp. v. Fair, 467 S.W.2d 402, 404-05 (Tex.1971)), that \u201c[t]he \u2018same rules of interpretation apply in construing the meaning of a court order or judgment as in ascertaining the meaning of other written instruments.\u2019 \u201d In construing a court order or judgment, \u201c[t]he plain meaning of the language used is the primary indicator of intent.\u201d Benavidez, 2006-NMCA-138, \u00b6 8, 140 N.M. 637, 145 P.3d 117.\n{14} We see nothing ambiguous about the language used in the resolution. The resolution states that the \u201cprimary issue\u201d is whether the T12 compression fracture is related to the on-the-job accident. The word \u201cprimary\u201d indicates that there are other issues as well. The resolution then makes a recommendation for an \u201cinterim resolution\u201d of the case. \u201cInterim\u201d means \u201cbetween more\u201d according to Webster\u2019s New Collegiate Dictionary (1977), thus indicating that more proceedings are anticipated to occur in the case. The resolution also expressly states that \u201c[b]oth parties reserve and retain all rights and defenses.\u201d\n{15} Reading the resolution as a whole, it constitutes a recommendation that Worker should obtain an IME from Dr. Nieves in order to attempt to resolve the parties\u2019 differences regarding the T12 issue, with the expectation that there will be further proceedings after the IME to establish a final resolution. The parties accepted this recommendation. No one \u2014 neither the parties nor the mediator \u2014 had any way of knowing that Dr. Nieves might discover additional work-related injuries during his examination. But the resolution did not say anything about Worker giving up her right to pursue additional injuries that might come to light. There is nothing in the Employer\u2019s brief or references to the record to convince us that the language contained in the recommended resolution reflects an intent or agreement by both parties to limit the IME to the solitary issue of whether Worker\u2019s T12 compression fracture was causally related to her workplace accident. Consequently, the parties\u2019 agreement did not prohibit Dr. Nieves from performing a differential diagnosis to determine the cause of Worker\u2019s back pain.\n{16} Pursuant to Section 52-1-51, the testimony of the physician conducting an IME may be provided at a compensation hearing. \u00a7 52-l-51(C). Because we hold that Dr. Nieves possessed the authority to conduct an IME and to provide testimony regarding information other than the causal relationship between Worker\u2019s on-the-job injury and the T12 compression fracture, we hold that the WCJ did not err in considering Dr. Nieves\u2019s testimony regarding Worker\u2019s other injuries. We further hold that there was sufficient evidence for the WCJ to determine that Worker suffered from a sacral fracture, aggravation of bulging discs, and sacroiliac joint dysfunction as a result of her workplace accident. See Garcia v. Homestake Mining Co., 113 N.M. 508, 510, 828 P.2d 420, 422 (Ct.App.1992) (\u201c \u2018Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u2019 \u201d (quoting Register v. Roberson Constr. Co., 106 N.M. 243, 245-46, 741 P.2d 1364, 1366-67 (1987))).\n{17} Employer argues that the WCJ\u2019s decision, if not reversed, will result in the decreased \u201ceffectiveness of both IMEs and recommended resolutions as tools in helping to resolve disputes under the Act.\u201d Employer contends that the use of recommended resolutions and IMEs in the workers\u2019 compensation context are designed to further the goals of the Act by assuring the speedy provision of benefits and resolution of controversies, and that allowing health care providers \u201ca roving commission to opine on all issues in a case, or to inject new issues into a case,\u201d will eliminate IMEs as a tool to assist the parties in narrowing the question to be determined. Because we hold that the language contained in the recommended resolution was not sufficiently explicit to limit the physician\u2019s authority to conduct the IME, and that Employer did not demonstrate an agreement by the parties to limit the physician\u2019s authority, we do not reach the larger issue of whether or not parties involved in a workers\u2019 compensation dispute may, by agreement, limit the scope of an IME to a specific issue. Accordingly, we do not discuss the policy considerations raised by Employer or determine whether and to what extent parties may limit the scope of an IME.\nB. New Issues Raised by Worker\u2019s Second Amended Complaint\n{18} Employer also challenges the WCJ\u2019s determination that Worker was not restricted from raising the new injuries in the second amended complaint or from requesting temporary total disability benefits in light of Dr. Nieves\u2019s opinion that Worker had not reached maximum medical improvement. Employer argues that the parties stipulated that Worker had reached maximum medical improvement as of February 4, 2004, and that the WCJ had no authority to modify the recommended resolution since Worker did not seek to have the recommended resolution set aside within the applicable time limit.\n{19} The recommended resolution in this case was not a final resolution of all of the issues in dispute, but was merely an interim resolution. The interim resolution reserved \u201call rights and defenses\u201d of both parties \u201cregarding the claim for additional permanent partial disability benefits\u201d; deferred the claim for additional permanent partial disability benefits; and left medical benefits open. The parties did not enter into a formal settlement agreement and no releases were signed. Cf. Fasso v. Sierra Healthcare Ctr., 119 N.M. 132, 134, 888 P.2d 1014, 1016 (Ct.App.1994) (holding that a worker should be permitted to set aside a recommended resolution on the grounds of \u201cchange in condition\u201d where there was no approved settlement agreement or releases executed). Thus, the recommended resolution did not resolve Worker\u2019s claim or lead the parties to believe that the litigation had ended, and contrary to Employer\u2019s suggestion, NMSA 1978, Section 52-5-5(C) (1993) (providing that if a party fails to make a timely objection to a recommended resolution of the case, the party is conclusively bound by the recommended resolution), and NMSA 1978, Section 52-5-9 (1989) (providing that upon application, a WCJ may modify a previous compensation order on specified grounds) do not apply in this case.\n{20} We must also bear in mind that the Act is the exclusive remedy for workers seeking compensation for on-the-job injuries. \u00a7 52-l-6(E); Peterson v. Wells Fargo Armored Servs. Corp., 2000-NMCA-043, \u00b6 10, 129 N.M. 158, 3 P.3d 135. The Act was intended to provide \u201cquick and efficient delivery of indemnity and medical benefits to injured and disabled workers\u201d in return for workers\u2019 renunciation of their common law rights. See Breen v. Carlsbad Mun. Schs., 2003-NMCA-058, \u00b6 18, 133 N.M. 618, 67 P.3d 908 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), rev\u2019d on other grounds by 2005-NMSC-028, \u00b6 2, 138 N.M. 331, 120 P.3d 413. This purpose is not fulfilled by permitting employers to rely on technical, circuitous routes to avoid their responsibilities. See Perea v. Gorby, 94 N.M. 325, 329, 610 P.2d 212, 216 (Ct.App.1980) (stating that \u201cthe spirit of [the Act] flows in the direction of workman and toward his protection. The compensation carrier should not seek technical, circuitous routes to avoid its responsibilities\u201d). To give binding and conclusive effect to the recommended resolution would prohibit Worker\u2019s recovery of temporary total disability benefits or permanent partial disability benefits resulting from her back injury, and would not further the purposes of the Act to \u201cmaximizfe] the limited recovery available to injured workers,\u201d Wagner v. AGW Consultants, 2005-NMSC-016, \u00b6 25, 137 N.M. 734, 114 P.3d 1050, or \u201c \u2018to make industry bear the burden of workers\u2019 injuries.\u2019\u201d Archer v. Roadrunner Trucking, Inc., 1997-NMSC-003, \u00b6 7, 122 N.M. 703, 930 P.2d 1155 (quoting Corn v. N.M. Educators Fed. Credit Union, 119 N.M. 199, 203, 889 P.2d 234, 238 (Ct.App.1994)).\n{21} The WCJ therefore was not bound to the parties\u2019 stipulation concerning the date of maximum medical improvement and it was permissible for him to consider Dr. Nieves\u2019s opinion that Worker had not yet reached maximum medical improvement.\nIII. CONCLUSION\n{22} We hold that Dr. Nieves was authorized to provide testimony regarding Worker\u2019s other back injuries arising from Worker\u2019s workplace accident and that the WCJ did not err in considering all of Dr. Nieves\u2019 testimony and opinions. We further hold that the WCJ did not err by allowing Worker to seek compensation for the additional injuries identified by Dr. Nieves in the IME. The WCJ\u2019s compensation order is affirmed.\n{23} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: CYNTHIA A. FRY and IRA ROBINSON, Judges.\n. The Act, including Section 52-1-51, was revised by amendment effective July 1, 2005. This Court only applies revised provisions of the Act prospectively, including procedural provisions, absent an express mandate by the legislature to apply the provision retroactively or a compelling reason for doing so. See Jojola v. Aetna Life & Cos., 109 N.M. 142, 143, 782 P.2d 395, 396 (Ct.App.1989). Since Worker\u2019s claim accrued prior to the effective date of the 2005 amendment, we apply the pre-amendment version of the Act to the issues before us.", "type": "majority", "author": "VIGIL, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Jeff Diamond Law Firm, Jeffrey B. Diamond, Greta Fischer, Carlsbad, NM, for Appellee.", "Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A., Max J. Madrid, Emil J. Kiehne, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2008-NMCA-026\n177 P.3d 530\nEsther HALL, Worker-Appellee, v. CARLSBAD SUPERMARKET/IGA, and Food Industry Self Insurance Fund of New Mexico, Employer/Insurer-Appellants.\nNo. 26,538.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nDec. 6, 2007.\nJeff Diamond Law Firm, Jeffrey B. Diamond, Greta Fischer, Carlsbad, NM, for Appellee.\nModrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A., Max J. Madrid, Emil J. Kiehne, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellants." }, "file_name": "0479-01", "first_page_order": 515, "last_page_order": 521 }