{ "id": 3784021, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Barry RAYBURNS, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Rayburns", "decision_date": "2008-02-05", "docket_number": "No. 26,797", "first_page": "803", "last_page": "811", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "143 N.M. 803" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "182 P.3d 786" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2008-NMCA-050" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "2006-NMCA-073", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 2541340 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/139/0719-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 N.M. 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1584608 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311" }, { "page": "638" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/99/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 N.M. 403", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1552578 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406" }, { "page": "379" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/117/0403-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 N.M. 214", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1558889 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217" }, { "page": "966" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/120/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 N.M. 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590270 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316", "parenthetical": "setting aside a literal application of the six-month rule if a plea agreement is not approved" }, { "page": "227", "parenthetical": "setting aside a literal application of the six-month rule if a plea agreement is not approved" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/109/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 N.M. 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1584637 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192-93" }, { "page": "242-43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/99/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.M. 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 731643 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433" }, { "page": "643" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/114/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 N.M. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5333038 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "627" }, { "page": "1074" }, { "page": "627" }, { "page": "1074" }, { "page": "627" }, { "page": "1074" }, { "page": "627" }, { "page": "1074" }, { "page": "627" }, { "page": "1074" }, { "page": "627" }, { "page": "1074" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/83/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMCA-116", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 106542 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 6, 7" }, { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/128/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 N.M. 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1592884 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "551" }, { "page": "753" }, { "page": "550-51" }, { "page": "752-53" }, { "page": "549" }, { "page": "751" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/108/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMCA-041", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1428018 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/135/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMCA-007", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 322321 ], "weight": 38, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 13" }, { "page": "\u00b6 11" }, { "page": "\u00b6 11" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 1, 8, 10-12" }, { "page": "\u00b6 11" }, { "page": "\u00b6 13" }, { "page": "\u00b6 11" }, { "page": "\u00b6 11" }, { "page": "\u00b6 9" }, { "page": "\u00b6 11" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 11, 13" }, { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/122/0831-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMCA-051", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 15639 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 4" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/133/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 P.3d 1090", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 N.M. 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2007-NMCERT-008", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCERT", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2006-NMCA-145", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3670224 ], "weight": 12, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 5" }, { "page": "\u00b6 6" }, { "page": "\u00b6 7" }, { "page": "\u00b6 5" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/140/0779-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMSC-035", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 2550981 ], "weight": 26, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 26" }, { "parenthetical": "\"New Mexico courts have been reluctant to hold that filing a nolle prosequi always results in a new six-month period.\"" }, { "page": "\u00b6 26" }, { "page": "\u00b6 25" }, { "page": "\u00b6 1, 27" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 25-26" }, { "page": "\u00b6 25" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 25-26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/138/0441-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 889, "char_count": 27093, "ocr_confidence": 0.677, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.14070225255244e-08, "percentile": 0.5075732214503625 }, "sha256": "4412169feca6dff154a122915e00df216d586a70346f213f03107019ce101172", "simhash": "1:970ed7d05eac97e1", "word_count": 4399 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:34:50.796486+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: JAMES J. WECHSLER and CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judges." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Barry RAYBURNS, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nCASTILLO, Judge.\n{1} In this case, we examine the scope of our Supreme Court\u2019s decision in State v. Heinsen, 2005-NMSC-035, 138 N.M. 441, 121 P.3d 1040, to determine if Heinsen permits the State to benefit from a new six-month period under Rule 5-604 NMRA when the State dismisses a magistrate court proceeding and refiles the same case in district court after the magistrate court\u2019s exclusion of evidence as a discovery sanction. We conclude that Heinsen does not apply to the facts currently before us; therefore, we affirm the district court\u2019s dismissal of the criminal charges against Defendant.\nI. BACKGROUND\n{2} On August 6, 2005, Defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI), failure to use a signal properly, and violation of the open container law. He was arraigned in magistrate court on August 16, 2005. After a number of hearings and resettings, Defendant\u2019s magistrate court bench trial was scheduled to take place on February 8, 2006.\n{3} On the day of trial, Defendant made an oral motion in limine, arguing that the results of his breath test should not be admitted into evidence because of the State\u2019s failure to provide the relevant certification for the machine used to test Defendant. The State asserted that it had provided a certification but conceded that the certification related to the wrong time period. Finding that the State had failed to timely disclose the appropriate certification, the magistrate court granted Defendant\u2019s motion and excluded the breath test results. Following this ruling, the State orally announced its intent to dismiss the charges pending in magistrate court.\n{4} The next day, the State refiled the same charges in district court but did not file a written notice of dismissal until a month later, on March 9, 2006. Defendant was arraigned in district court on April 17, 2006. Shortly after his arraignment, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on a violation of the six-month rule, Rule 5-604, and his right to a speedy trial, N.M. Const, art. II, \u00a7 14. Defendant contended that the State did not file its notice of dismissal in magistrate court until day 205 of the 182-day time period and that the State was not entitled to a new six-month period, since it lacked a good and sufficient reason for dismissing the case and refiling it in district court. The district court granted Defendant\u2019s motion and dismissed the charges.\n{5} In its order, the district court made the following findings: (1) the time period to take Defendant to trial would have been February 14, 2006, which was 182 days from the date of arraignment in magistrate court; (2) the State filed its written dismissal of the magistrate court charges 205 days after the arraignment; (3) the State maintained that Defendant\u2019s oral motion was a motion to suppress evidence; (4) no new evidence or facts had been discovered by the State subsequent to its oral dismissal; and (5) the State had not demonstrated a reasonable basis for dismissing the magistrate court charges and refiling in district court under Heinsen. It is from this order of dismissal that the State appeals.\nII. DISCUSSION\n{6} The State\u2019s main contention is that the district court erred in not reading Heinsen to allow refiling in district court and the running of a new six-month period after arraignment. . The State also argues that the district court incorrectly interpreted and applied Rule 5-604 to dismiss Defendant\u2019s case. Finally, the State contends that Defendant failed to preserve his right to raise potential speedy trial violations on appeal. We address each of these arguments below.\nA. Standard of Review\n{7} We conduct a de novo review of the district court\u2019s application of the six-month rule. See State v. Carreon, 2006-NMCA-145, \u00b6 5, 140 N.M. 779, 149 P.3d 95 (\u201cWe review a district court\u2019s application of Rule 6-506 [NMRA] de novo.\u201d), cert. quashed, 2007-NMCERT-008, 142 N.M. 436, 166 P.3d 1090; State v. Cardenas, 2003-NMCA-051, \u00b6 4, 133 N.M. 516, 64 P.3d 543 (\u201cThe district court\u2019s application of Rule 5-604 is subject to de novo review.\u201d). However, we review the district court\u2019s determination regarding questions of historical fact with the deference of the substantial evidence standard. See State v. Bolton, 1997-NMCA-007, \u00b6 13, 122 N.M. 831, 932 P.2d 1075. Questions of historical fact include questions regarding \u201cwhat really motivated the prosecutor in dismissing the case and whether his actions were taken in subjective good faith.\u201d Id. \u201cOn the other hand, a de novo standard is applied to determine the type of reasons that will justify a dismissal ... or the type of analysis that should be utilized in these cases.\u201d Id.\nB. The Six-Month Rule\n{8} Because the heart of this appeal deals with the six-month rule, we provide a short review of how this rule functions. The rules of criminal procedure for both magistrate and district courts contain limits regarding the time for commencement of a defendant\u2019s criminal trial. See Rule 6-506; Rule 5-604. The magistrate rule, Rule 6-506, \u201crequires a defendant\u2019s trial to commence within one-hundred eighty-two days of a triggering event.\u201d Carreon, 2006-NMCA-145, \u00b6 6, 140 N.M. 779, 149 P.3d 95 (citing Rule 6-506(B)-(E)). Similarly, the district court rule, Rule 5-604, requires \u201ctrial to commence within six months of various [triggering] events.\u201d State v. Jaramillo, 2004-NMCA-041, \u00b6 9, 135 N.M. 322, 88 P.3d 264 (citing Rule 5-604(F)). The purpose of these rules \u201cis to encourage the orderly and prompt disposition of criminal cases,\u201d State v. Lucero, 108 N.M. 548, 551, 775 P.2d 750, 753 (Ct.App.1989), and to guard against lack of preparedness on the part of the state. Bolton, 1997-NMCA-007, \u00b6 11, 122 N.M. 831, 932 P.2d 1075.\n{9} Typically, these rules require the dismissal of criminal charges, with prejudice, if the defendant\u2019s trial has not commenced within 182 days or six months from a triggering event, such as arraignment. See Rule 6-506(E); Rule 5-604(F). However, there are exceptions to the literal application of the six-month rule. For example, the state may dismiss a complaint filed in magistrate court and refile the charges in district court, a process that often results in an adjustment of the six-month rule deadline. See Heinsen, 2005-NMSC-035, \u00b6 26, 138 N.M. 441, 121 P.3d 1040 (\u201cOrdinarily, ... filing a nolle prosequi ends the previous proceeding and allows a new six-month period to run[.]\u201d). However, while the refiling of charges in district court may result in an adjustment of the six-month rule, this is not universally the ease. See id. (\u201cNew Mexico courts have been reluctant to hold that filing a nolle prosequi always results in a new six-month period.\u201d). Instead, the district court supervises the state\u2019s discretion to dismiss magistrate court proceedings and to refile in district court \u201cby inquiring into the reasons for dismissal to ensure that the six-month rule and the defendant\u2019s due process rights are not unduly infringed.\u201d Id. \u00b6 25 (citing State v. Gardea, 1999-NMCA-116, \u00b6\u00b6 6, 7, 128 N.M. 64, 989 P.2d 439). The state will not receive the benefit of a new six-month period in district court if the state\u2019s basis for dismissing the magistrate court proceedings is improper. See Heinsen, 2005-NMSC-035, \u00b6 26, 138 N.M. 441, 121 P.3d 1040 (\u201c \u2018Prosecutors may ordinarily do what they wish\u2014 unless there is a bad reason for what they do[.]\u2019 \u201d (quoting Bolton, 1997-NMCA-007, \u00b6 11, 122 N.M. 831, 932 P.2d 1075)).\n{10} If a defendant challenges the state\u2019s refiling of charges in district court on a six-month rule violation, the state bears the burden of demonstrating that its actions were legitimate. This requires the state to demonstrate that its actions were not done for bad reasons or an improper purpose. See State ex rel. Delgado v. Stanley, 83 N.M. 626, 627, 495 P.2d 1073, 1074 (1972) (holding that if a defendant asserts that the state\u2019s action was to delay or otherwise circumvent the rule, \u201cthe [s]tate must be prepared to demonstrate by proof the bona fides of the procedure it has utilized and that it has not been followed to delay [the] defendant\u2019s trial beyond the six-month period ... or to circumvent the operation of the rule\u201d); see also Bolton, 1997-NMCA-007, \u00b6\u00b6 1, 8, 10-12, 122 N.M. 831, 932 P.2d 1075 (determining that the general rule of prosecutorial discretion includes the commensurate rule that when a defendant asserts that the state\u2019s actions were done to circumvent the six-month rule or for another bad reason, the court can dismiss the case where the state fails to satisfy its burden to demonstrate that its actions were not done for bad reasons).\n{11} In this context, \u201cfluctuations in the stories of witnesses, the unavailability and subsequent reappearance of witnesses,\u201d or \u201cnewly discovered evidence\u201d may constitute a good and sufficient reason for the termination and reinstitution of a criminal prosecution. Delgado, 83 N.M. at 627, 495 P.2d at 1074; see also State v. Vigil, 114 N.M. 431, 433, 839 P.2d 641, 643 (Ct.App.1992) (permitting a new six-month period when the amended complaint contained significant change); State v. Aragon, 99 N.M. 190, 192-93, 656 P.2d 240, 242-43 (Ct.App.1982) (permitting a new six-month period due to newly discovered facts). New Mexico appellate courts also allow the application of a new six-month period in other circumstances, such as when the trial court rejects a plea bargain, when the defendant is in a pre-prosecution diversion program, and when an event is to the mutual benefit of the parties. See, e.g., State v. Sanchez, 109 N.M. 313, 316, 785 P.2d 224, 227 (1989) (setting aside a literal application of the six-month rule if a plea agreement is not approved); State v. Coburn, 120 N.M. 214, 217, 900 P.2d 963, 966 (Ct.App.1995) (setting aside a literal application of the six-month rule when an event extending pre-trial activity is to the mutual benefit of parties); State v. Altherr, 117 N.M. 403, 406, 872 P.2d 376, 379 (Ct.App.1994) (setting aside a literal application of the six-month rule when a defendant is participating in a pre-prosecution diversion program).\n{12} However, lack of preparedness, delay, and circumvention of the six-month rule or other rules of procedure are improper purposes, for which the state does not receive the benefit of a new six-month period in district court. See, e.g., Heinsen, 2005-NMSC-035, \u00b6 25, 138 N.M. 441, 121 P.3d 1040 (explaining that the six-month period does not recommence running if dismissal and refiling are done for the purpose of delay); Carreon, 2006-NMCA-145, \u00b6 7, 140 N.M. 779, 149 P.3d 95 (noting that it is improper to use a dismissal to circumvent the six-month rule); Gardea, 1999-NMCA-116, \u00b6 6, 128 N.M. 64, 989 P.2d 439 (holding that the state cannot use dismissal to circumvent rules of procedure); Bolton, 1997-NMCA-007, \u00b6 11, 122 N.M. 831, 932 P.2d 1075 (stating that lack of preparedness is \u201cprima facie a bad reason\u201d).\nC. Heinsen\n{13} Recently, in Heinsen, our Supreme Court addressed the application of the six-month rule under circumstances somewhat similar to those presented here. Confronted with the state\u2019s dismissal of magistrate court proceedings and the state\u2019s refiling in district court after a suppression order, the Supreme Court held that the suppression of evidence is a sufficient basis for dismissing charges filed in magistrate court and for refiling in district court, provided that the suppressed evidence was substantial proof of a material fact in the proceedings and that the dismissal and refiling of charges was not done for the purpose of delay but was done to preserve the state\u2019s right to appeal. Heinsen, 2005-NMSC-035, \u00b6 1, 27, 138 N.M. 441, 121 P.3d 1040. In reaching this holding, the Supreme Court stated that \u201c[i]n light of the [s]tate\u2019s strong interest in enforcing its statutes and managing criminal prosecutions,\u201d a new six-month period should begin to run when the state files a nolle prosequi after a magistrate\u2019s suppression order. Id. \u00b6 27.\nD. The State\u2019s Arguments Based on Heinsen\n{14} Here, the State makes three arguments based on Heinsen. The first argument is as follows. Defendant\u2019s motion in limine was tantamount to a motion to suppress. Once the magistrate suppressed the breath test results, the State had no right to appeal; therefore, the State\u2019s only available remedy was to dismiss the magistrate court charges and refile them in district court. Heinsen then allows the State a new six-month period for the State to try the case again. Consequently, the district court erred in dismissing the refiled charges.\n{15} While we acknowledge that the Supreme Court in Heinsen stated, as a general proposition, that \u201ca new six-month rule period should begin to run when the [sjtate files a nolle prosequi following a suppression order by a magistrate court and refiles in district court,\u201d id., the application of that general proposition to the facts of the present case requires additional analysis. Heinsen explicitly qualifies this general proposition by still requiring the state to demonstrate a reasonable basis for its procedural choices. Beyond the mere existence of a suppression order by the magistrate, Heinsen requires the state to show (1) that it acted in order to preserve its right to appeal and (2) that it did not do so for purposes of delay. Id.\n{16} We do not believe that the State in the case at hand may simply point to any adverse magistrate ruling as providing a reasonable basis for a new six-month rule period under Heinsen. Instead, we believe Heinsen continues to require a reviewing court to look at the reasonableness of the State\u2019s basis for its chosen procedure, which would include a review of the particular order entered by the magistrate court. The State makes its second argument based on this recognition. According to the State, the reasonable basis for the dismissal of the magistrate court proceedings was the State\u2019s inability to prosecute the charges after the magistrate suppressed the results of Defendant\u2019s breath test, due to the State\u2019s alleged failure to provide material evidence to Defendant. However, Defendant contends that the State\u2019s intent in dismissing the magistrate court charges and refiling in district court was to circumvent the rules by avoiding the discovery sanction placed on the State by the magistrate court for failure to disclose.\n{17} We agree with Defendant. The district court found that the State failed to meet its burden under Heinsen because the State did not demonstrate a reasonable basis for dismissing and reinstituting the same criminal charges. We hold that the district court\u2019s determination was supported by substantial evidence. See Bolton, 1997-NMCA-007, \u00b6 13, 122 N.M. 831, 932 P.2d 1075 (stating that questions of historical fact, such as what motivated the prosecutor, are subject to the deference of the substantial evidence standard).\n{18} The magistrate court suppressed the results of the breath test administered to Defendant because the State had failed to timely disclose the appropriate machine certification. This ruling was entered on the day of trial, shortly before the six-month rule was set to expire. The State argues that as a consequence of the suppression order, it was unable to proceed. Furthermore, according to the State, it could not obtain an additional continuance without running afoul of the six-month rule. The State therefore elected to dismiss the magistrate court proceedings and refile the charges in district court. We view these circumstances \u2014 failure to produce the correct certification documentation \u2014 as similar to those in Lucero, a case in which the state\u2019s lack of preparedness resulted in the effective dismissal of magistrate court charges.\n{19} We held in Lucero that where a prima facie bad reason exists, the state must demonstrate a good reason for refiling the charges in district court; otherwise, \u201cthe original complaint is not superseded,\u201d and the second complaint has \u201cno effect on the running of the six-month rule,\u201d unless the subsequent complaint contains new charges or is based on new facts or information regarding the prior charges. Lucero, 108 N.M. at 550-51, 775 P.2d at 752-53; see also Bolton, 1997-NMCA-007, \u00b6 11, 122 N.M. 831, 932 P.2d 1075. In Lucero, the prima facie bad reason was a lack of preparedness \u2014 the failure of an essential witness to appear for the purpose of testifying. See Lucero, 108 N.M. at 549, 775 P.2d at 751; see also Bolton, 1997-NMCA-007, \u00b6 11, 122 N.M. 831, 932 P.2d 1075. Similarly, in the matter presently before us, the reason for dismissal was the State\u2019s failure to produce essential documentation. In light of the circumstances, which evidence the prima facie bad reason of a lack of preparedness, the State had the burden of demonstrating that there was a good reason for its procedural decision. Appeal or avoidance of a discovery sanction prohibiting material evidence from being introduced does not provide a reasonable basis or good reason for dismissing the magistrate court proceedings and refiling in district court.\n{20} Furthermore, the district court found and the parties do not contest that the complaint filed in district court was identical to that originally filed in magistrate court and that no new evidence or facts had been discovered by the State subsequent to the dismissal of the magistrate court proceedings. In light of the analysis in Lucero, there was sufficient evidence before the district court here to determine that the State had not demonstrated a reasonable basis for reinitiating the charges in district court.\n{21} In Bolton, we noted that the rule stated in Lucero differs from the general rule permitting a new six-month period, unless a bad or improper reason for dismissal exists. Bolton, 1997-NMCA-007, \u00b6 9, 122 N.M. 831, 932 P.2d 1075 (clarifying Lucero). In so noting, we drew a distinction between circumstances in which the reason for dismissal is a prima facie bad reason, such as the lack of preparedness present in Lucero, and other circumstances surrounding the refiling of charges in district court after the dismissal of magistrate court proceedings. We stated the following:\nWhen the reason for dismissal is a lack of preparedness, which is the precise thing the six-month rule is supposed to guard against, then Lucero\u2019s analysis will apply and the case should be dismissed unless the prosecutor can offer a good reason for taking the action. Under any other circumstances, however, Delgado\u2019s analysis will apply and the case should be dismissed only when the prosecutor cannot demonstrate that the reason for dismissing was not a bad one.\nBolton, 1997-NMCA-007, \u00b6 11, 122 N.M. 831, 932 P.2d 1075.\n{22} Although we believe that the rule stated in Lucero is the appropriate analysis to apply, we would reach the same conclusion if we were to apply the general rule established in Delgado. Applying Delgado, we would determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the State had an improper purpose for dismissing the magistrate court proceedings. See Delgado, 83 N.M. at 627, 495 P.2d at 1074; see also Bolton, 1997-NMCA-007, \u00b6\u00b6 11, 13, 122 N.M. 831, 932 P.2d 1075. Under the circumstances described above, there was substantial evidence from which the district court could conclude that the State was attempting to delay the running of the six-month period until the State could remedy its failure to disclose the appropriate certification and escape the consequences of a lack of preparedness. Dismissal of magistrate court proceedings to circumvent the six-month rule and to avoid the consequences of the State\u2019s lack of preparedness are improper purposes and do not entitle the State to the benefit of a new six-month rule period. See Heinsen, 2005-NMSC-035, \u00b6\u00b6 25-26, 138 N.M. 441, 121 P.3d 1040; Delgado, 83 N.M. at 627, 495 P.2d at 1074; Bolton, 1997-NMCA-007, \u00b6 11, 122 N.M. 831, 932 P.2d 1075. We thus hold that the district court did not err in dismissing the criminal charges against Defendant for a violation of the six-month rule. Allowing the State a new six-month period after a sanction for the State\u2019s discovery violations would create a situation susceptible to manipulation by the State and would result in the encouragement of continued discovery violations and disregard for other rules of criminal procedure. We do not believe that the State should be permitted to benefit from its failure to follow the requirements of discovery or rules of criminal procedure.\n{23} In the third argument, the State contends that the magistrate and district courts had concurrent jurisdiction, pending the filing of the notice of dismissal in magistrate court. We read this to address Defendant\u2019s argument below that the State was not in compliance with Heinsen in that the State did not actually file its dismissal in magistrate court until March 6, 2005, outside of the 182-day period for the six-month rule set forth in Rule 6-506. Although Defendant, in his answer brief, points out that the magistrate court case was not dismissed until 205 days after the arraignment, he makes no specific argument in this regard. Therefore, we assume that the State had the right to refile the charges in district court. This, however, is not the critical inquiry. The key question is whether the six-month rule commenced anew at the district court level, and as explained above, we have concluded that no new six-month period began once the case was refiled in district court.\nE. The State\u2019s Remaining Arguments\n{24} We briefly address the remaining arguments included in the State\u2019s brief in chief. The State argues that the district court erred by applying the magistrate six-month rule, Rule 6-506, and not the district court six-month rule, Rule 5-604. According to the State, if the district court had applied the correct rule \u2014 the district court rule \u2014 it would have calculated the six-month period from the date of Defendant\u2019s arraignment in district court. While it is unclear as to whether the State is arguing that Rule 5-604 was the only applicable six-month rule because jurisdiction had transferred to the district court or because Heinsen provides that Rule 5-604 applies, we find neither argument persuasive. The State cites Heinsen as supporting the proposition that the only applicable six-month rule is the district court rule, Rule 5-604. However, Heinsen contains no indication that only Rule 5-604 is applicable in this circumstance; Heinsen merely applies Rule 5-604 to calculate a new six-month period. The district court here, in its supervisory capacity, determined that the State had not met its burden under Heinsen, and since no new six-month period was permitted, the district court looked to Rule 6-506 to determine whether or not the original six-month period, commencing with Defendant\u2019s arraignment in magistrate court, had expired. See Delgado, 83 N.M. at 627, 495 P.2d at 1074 (indicating that when the state is unable \u201cto demonstrate by proof the bona tides of the procedure it has utilized and that it has not been followed to delay [the] defendant\u2019s trial beyond the six-month period ... or to circumvent the operation of the rule,\u201d the court calculates the six-month rule period based on the original indictment or information). If the district court had found that a new six-month period was warranted, the court would have applied Rule 5-604, as was done in Heinsen, to determine when that period would expire. In this instance, the district court\u2019s finding that no new six-month period was warranted precluded reliance on Rule 5-604 in order to calculate the remaining time the State had to bring Defendant to trial.\n{25} If, on the other hand, the State is arguing that once jurisdiction transferred to district court, the court could only apply the district court rule, Rule 5-604, and calculate the six-month period from the date of Defendant\u2019s arraignment in district court, we find the argument contrary to our Supreme Court\u2019s decisions in Delgado and Heinsen. See State v. Travarez, 99 N.M. 309, 311, 657 P.2d 636, 638 (Ct.App.1983) (\u201cThe Court of Appeals must follow applicable precedents of our Supreme Court[.]\u201d). Both Delgado and Heinsen provide that the courts must supervise the state\u2019s use of its power to dismiss and reinstitute criminal charges in order for the courts to protect against due process and six-month rule infringements. See Heinsen, 2005-NMSC-035, \u00b6 25, 138 N.M. 441, 121 P.3d 1040; Delgado, 83 N.M. at 627, 495 P.2d at 1074. District courts are vested with the responsibility of determining whether the state has a reasonable basis for dismissing magistrate court proceedings and refiling in district court or whether the state has done so for an improper reason. See Heinsen, 2005-NMSC-035, \u00b6\u00b6 25-26, 138 N.M. 441, 121 P.3d 1040. To hold as the State requests \u2014 i.e., once the district court\u2019s jurisdiction was invoked, only Rule 5-604 could be applied \u2014 would be contrary to the precedents of both this Court and our Supreme Court and would undermine the district court\u2019s supervisory authority by not permitting it to find a six-month violation \u2014 since, according to the State, once jurisdiction transferred, the district court was only permitted to calculate the six-month period from the date of arraignment in district court. We thus hold that under these circumstances, the district court\u2019s application of Rule 6-506 was appropriate. See Carreon, 2006-NMCA-145, \u00b6 5, 140 N.M. 779, 149 P.3d 95 (stating that the district court\u2019s application of Rule 6-506 is subject to de novo review).\n{26} The State also argues that although Defendant filed a motion titled Motion to Dismiss \u2014 Speedy Trial, any argument regarding a violation of Defendant\u2019s right to a speedy trial was not preserved for appeal, since the only argument that Defendant presented in the motion or at the hearing before the district court was that the six-month rule was violated. We acknowledge the following: \u201cA six-month rule issue is analytically separate from a constitutional speedy trial issue, and the two are distinct in their operation and reach.\u201d State v. Stefani 2006-NMCA-073, \u00b6 18, 139 N.M. 719, 137 P.3d 659 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, we understand Defendant to concede this point by agreeing that no specific speedy trial argument was presented in the motion or the argument below. We therefore do not address the merits of a speedy trial claim in this matter.\nIII. CONCLUSION\n{27} Based on the foregoing analysis, we hereby affirm the judgment of the district court.\n{28} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: JAMES J. WECHSLER and CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judges.", "type": "majority", "author": "CASTILLO, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Gary K. King, Attorn\u00e9y General, Margaret McLean, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.", "John Bigelow, Chief Public Defender, Karl Erich Martell, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2008-NMCA-050\n182 P.3d 786\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Barry RAYBURNS, Defendant-Appellee.\nNo. 26,797.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nFeb. 5, 2008.\nCertiorari Granted, No. 31,021, April 18,2008.\nGary K. King, Attorn\u00e9y General, Margaret McLean, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.\nJohn Bigelow, Chief Public Defender, Karl Erich Martell, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee." }, "file_name": "0803-01", "first_page_order": 839, "last_page_order": 847 }