{ "id": 4003742, "name": "Carroll G. BASSETT, Mary Bassett, Gordon R. Bassett, Joyce Bassett Schuebel, Sharon Bassett Atencio, and Sarah Bassett, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SHEEHAN, Sheehan & Stelzner, P.A., Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Bassett v. Sheehan", "decision_date": "2008-04-17", "docket_number": "No. 27,195", "first_page": "178", "last_page": "183", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "144 N.M. 178" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2008-NMCA-072" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "184 P.3d 1072" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "2006-NMCA-139", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3670206 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/140/0699-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 N.M. 664", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1594921 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "666" }, { "page": "343" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/104/0664-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 Or.App. 352", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Or. 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Rptr.", "weight": 4, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "183" }, { "page": "184" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "189 Cal.App.3d 1565", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2205823 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-3d/189/1565-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 Ga.App. 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga. App.", "case_ids": [ 689725 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/203/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Cal.Rptr.2d 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr. 2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "596" }, { "page": "601" }, { "page": "602" }, { "page": "598" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 Cal.App.4th 1457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 4th", "case_ids": [ 215780 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-4th/54/1457-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMCA-145", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 77197 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0699-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMCA-044", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 827349 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0766-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMCA-097", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3671148 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/140/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 N.M. 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 727713 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defining \"dictum\" as a statement that is unnecessary to a holding" }, { "parenthetical": "defining \"dictum\" as a statement that is unnecessary to a holding" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/116/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 N.M. 644", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 715097 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "649" }, { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/111/0644-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 N.M. 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 727639 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357", "parenthetical": "\"The duty owed - the exercise of ordinary care - thus remains constant, 'while the conduct necessary to fulfill it varies with the circumstances.'\"" }, { "page": "1216", "parenthetical": "\"The duty owed - the exercise of ordinary care - thus remains constant, 'while the conduct necessary to fulfill it varies with the circumstances.'\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/116/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 N.M. 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 727651 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388" }, { "page": "1247" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/116/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 P.3d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 N.M. 667", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2008-NMCERT-002", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCERT", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2007-NMCA-122", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3691625 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1127" }, { "page": "\u00b627" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/142/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMCA-132", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 2548992 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/138/0774-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMCA-104", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 2548363 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/138/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 P.3d 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 N.M. 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2007-NMCERT-007", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCERT", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2007-NMCA-088", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3692064 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/142/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "2001-NMCA-077", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 183088 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/131/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMSC-009", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 929168 ], "weight": 12, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b626", "parenthetical": "defining \"dictum\" as a statement that is unnecessary to a holding" }, { "parenthetical": "defining \"dictum\" as a statement that is unnecessary to a holding" }, { "parenthetical": "defining \"dictum\" as a statement that is unnecessary to a holding" }, { "page": "\u00b6 25" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 1, 24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/137/0381-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 857, "char_count": 17724, "ocr_confidence": 0.691, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.518933943796874e-08, "percentile": 0.40053725139959895 }, "sha256": "73e1b12f4c98d60d44d36ea050147e182a384a4cc4b88a3c67c24e0c4c23e0ce", "simhash": "1:0b1f5dd27e47e240", "word_count": 2890 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:37:29.378104+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: JAMES J. WECHSLER and IRA ROBINSON, Judges." ], "parties": [ "Carroll G. BASSETT, Mary Bassett, Gordon R. Bassett, Joyce Bassett Schuebel, Sharon Bassett Atencio, and Sarah Bassett, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SHEEHAN, Sheehan & Stelzner, P.A., Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nCASTILLO, Judge.\n{1} The Bassett family (Bassetts) appeal the trial court\u2019s order granting summary judgment in a legal malpractice claim against Sheehan, Sheehan & Stelzner, P.A. (Sheehan). Because we conclude that the Bassetts\u2019 claim presented no genuine issue of material fact, we affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\n{2} In 1984, the Bassetts sold a parcel of real estate to a buyer, William Turner (Turner). Clifford Atkinson (Atkinson) drafted the conveyance documents. Fourteen years later, Turner sued the Bassetts and claimed that he had retained the water rights appurtenant to the land because the deed did not properly sever them. The Bassetts employed Sheehan to defend the suit, and the Bassetts ultimately prevailed at the Supreme Court of New Mexico in Turner v. Bassett, 2005-NMSC-009, 137 N.M. 381, 111 P.3d 701.\n{3} Soon after the victory, the Bassetts filed suit against Sheehan and Atkinson for legal malpractice. The Bassetts first alleged that Atkinson\u2019s preparation of the conveyance documents fell below the standard of care because the documents did not expressly exclude a transfer of water rights and, further, that Atkinson failed to warn the Bassetts that the documents should contain such an exclusion. Second, the Bassetts claimed that Sheehan incorrectly advised them of the applicable statute of limitations on their claim against Atkinson. He filed a motion to dismiss on August 30, 2005, and argued that the Bassetts\u2019 claim against him was barred because the statute of limitations had run two years prior to the filing of the complaint. The trial court granted Atkinson\u2019s motion, and he is no longer a party to this suit.\n{4} Sheehan filed a motion for summary judgment and argued that \u201c[i]f ... Atkinson did not commit any legal error in the way he drafted the deed, as the statute then provided and as the Supreme Court ... confirmed [in Turner ], then it follows that he could not have been negligent [ ]or breached any duty to his client.\u201d According to Sheehan, if Atkinson were not liable for negligence, then the Bassetts could not pursue their malpractice claim against Sheehan because the allegedly incorrect advice about the statute of limitations would have caused the Bassetts no harm. The trial court agreed with Sheehan and entered summary judgment in Sheehan\u2019s favor. The Bassetts appeal the order to this Court.\nII. DISCUSSION\n{5} We review the trial court\u2019s order granting summary judgment de novo. See Barbeau v. Hoppenrath, 2001-NMCA-077, \u00b6 6, 131 N.M. 124, 33 P.3d 675. \u201cSummary judgment is proper when the material facts are undisputed and the only remaining issues are questions of law.\u201d Bird v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2007-NMCA-088, \u00b6 7, 142 N.M. 346, 165 P.3d 343, cert, denied, 2007-NMCERT-007, 142 N.M. 329, 165 P.3d 326. \u201cA defendant seeking summary judgment ... bears the initial burden of negating at least one of the essential elements upon which the plaintiffs claims are grounded.\u201d S. Farm Bureau Cas. Co. v. Hiner, 2005-NMCA-104, \u00b6 9, 138 N.M. 154, 117 P.3d 960 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). \u201cOnce such a showing is made, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to come forward with admissible evidence to establish each required element of the claim.\u201d Id.\n{6} The Bassetts essentially argue that Sheehan provided no evidence to negate the elements of legal malpractice and that, instead, the trial court and Sheehan relied solely on the Turner decision to conclude that there was no question of fact as to duty or breach of duty. Sheehan counters that the Bassetts failed to rebut Sheehan\u2019s prima facie case by producing evidence of a genuine issue of material fact that supported the claim against Atkinson. We agree with Sheehan and consider (1) whether Sheehan made a prima facie case for summary judgment and (2) whether in response to Sheehan\u2019s motion, the Bassetts came forward with evidence to support the elements of their claim.\nA. Sheehan\u2019s Prima Facie Case\n{7} The elements of legal malpractice are' (1) the employment of the defendant attorney, (2) the defendant attorney\u2019s neglect of a reasonable duty, and (3) a loss to the plaintiff proximately caused by the defense attorney\u2019s neglect. Akutagawa v. Laflin, Pick & Heer, P.A., 2005-NMCA-132, \u00b6 11, 138 N.M. 774, 126 P.3d 1138. Because only the second element is at issue in the present case, we limit our analysis to Atkinson\u2019s duty to the Bassetts and whether that duty was breached.\n1. Duty\n{8} The Bassetts argue that the trial court erroneously determined that Atkinson owed no duty of care in this case. Whether or not a person has a duty is a question of law. Lessard v. Coronado Paint & Decorating Ctr., Inc., 2007-NMCA-122, 1127, 142 N.M. 583, 168 P.3d 155, cert, quashed, 2008-NMCERT-002, 143 N.M. 667, 180 P.3d 674. An attorney\u2019s duty to a client is \u201cto exercise the degree of knowledge or skill ordinarily possessed by others in his or her profession similarly situated.\u201d Resolution Trust Corp. v. Barnhart, 116 N.M. 384, 388, 862 P.2d 1243, 1247 (Ct.App.1993). According to the Bassetts, Atkinson\u2019s duty of care required him \u201cto include an appropriate exclusion of water rights in the conveyance or to warn the client about the possible consequences if [the exclusion was] not included.\u201d The Bassetts conflate an attorney\u2019s duty to his client with the breach of that duty. The Bassetts\u2019 claim is more properly analyzed in the following manner: Was Atkinson\u2019s omission of an express exclusion of water rights from the deed a failure to \u201cexercise the degree of knowledge or skill ordinarily possessed by others in his or her profession similarly situated\u201d? Id.; see also Dunleavy v. Miller, 116 N.M. 353, 357, 862 P.2d 1212, 1216 (1993) (\u201cThe duty owed \u2014 the exercise of ordinary care \u2014 thus remains constant, \u2018while the conduct necessary to fulfill it varies with the circumstances.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Bober v. N.M. State Fair, 111 N.M. 644, 649, 808 P.2d 614, 619 (1991)).\n2. Breach\n{9} Breach of duty is generally a question to be decided by the fact-finder. Lessard, 2007-NMCA-122, \u00b627, 142 N.M. 583, 168 P.3d 155. However, the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers \u00a7 52 cmt. b (2000) notes that \u201c[i]n appropriate circumstances, a tribunal passing on a motion for summary judgment ... may determine whether a lawyer has satisfied the duty.\u201d In the present ease, our Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Turner directly addresses the legal efficacy of the actions taken by Atkinson. The Bassetts contend that Turner \u201cruled that an appropriate reservation of rights should have been included [in the deed],\u201d and the Bassetts rely on the following quote from Turner. \u201c[T]he safer course for the prudent seller is to expressly reserve any such water rights in the conveyance documents.\u201d 2005-NMSC-009, \u00b626, 137 N.M. 381, 111 P.3d 701. We consider this phrase to be dictum. See Ruggles v. Ruggles, 116 N.M. 52, 59 n. 8, 860 P.2d 182, 189 n. 8 (1993) (defining \u201cdictum\u201d as a statement that is unnecessary to a holding). Accordingly, we do not conclude that this comment in Turner was intended to establish breach of duty by Atkinson. See Montoya v. Pearson, 2006-NMCA-097, \u00b6 11, 140 N.M. 243, 142 P.3d 11.\n{10} On the contrary, the Turner Court held that \u201c[{Individuals who hold water rights, like the Bassetts, and follow the statutory and administrative procedures to effect a severance and initiate a transfer, may convey the underlying land severed from its former water rights, without necessarily reserving those water rights to the seller in the conveyance documents.\u201d 2005-NMSC-009, \u00b6 25, 137 N.M. 381, 111 P.3d 701. The Bassetts argue that this language does not specifically hold that Atkinson did not breach his duty, and they are correct. In Turner, however, the claim against the Bassetts was based on the contention that the deed, as drafted by Atkinson, conveyed water rights that the Bassetts did not intend to convey. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 6-7. The Supreme Court concluded that the deed did not convey the water rights to Turner. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 25-28. \u201c[T]he conveyor of title to the land who has acquired a permit need not express in the conveyance documents that which is already presumed as a matter of law: the land passes without water.\u201d Id. \u00b6 24. We therefore conclude that the deed prepared by Atkinson was legally sufficient to convey the property without water rights. This leads us to the issue of breach of duty.\n{11} In determining whether an attorney has breached a duty, this Court has considered the facts of the underlying dispute in order to determine whether an attorney\u2019s failure to act could have been negligent. In Selby v. Roggow, 1999-NMCA-044, 126 N.M. 766, 975 P.2d 379, the plaintiffs contended that the defendants \u201ccommitted malpractice by failing to raise several compulsory counterclaims which, if filed, would have resulted in [the plaintiffs, prevailing in the foreclosure action.\u201d Id. \u00b6 3. The trial court granted summary judgment. Id. After considerable analysis, id. \u00b6\u00b6 12-20, this Court determined that \u201ca counterclaim.....based upon [the plaintiffs\u2019] theory[,] even if it had been filed, would have failed.\u201d Id. \u00b6 21. As a result, the Selby Court held that the plaintiffs raised no issues of material fact, id. \u00b6 4, and that the \u201c[defendants\u2019 failure to raise such a counterclaim ... as a matter of law did not constitute legal malpractice.\u201d Id. \u00b6 21; cf. Meiboom v. Carmody, 2003-NMCA-145, \u00b6 27, 134 N.M. 699, 82 P.3d 66 (\u201cWe decide only that ... there are genuine issues of material fact concerning whether [the plaintiffs might have prevailed in the underlying case[.]\u201d). Under the facts of the present case, Turner established that a claim against the Bassetts could not survive summary judgment if the claim were based on Atkinson\u2019s failure to include the reservation language in the deeds. See 2005-NMSC-009, \u00b6\u00b6 1, 24, 137 N.M. 381, 111 P.3d 701. Consequently, we conclude that Sheehan\u2019s prima facie case successfully negated the element of breach of duty. The Bassetts were therefore required to rebut Sheehan\u2019s case; accordingly, we review the evidence provided by the Bassetts.\nB. The Bassetts\u2019 Evidence\n{12} In response to Sheehan\u2019s prima facie case, the B\u00e1ssetts rely on a number of cases from other jurisdictions for the proposition that \u201cdespite an advantageous final result in a matter, an attorney will not be immune from responsibility for the costs and damages resulting from mistakes made and departures from the standard of care.\u201d After reviewing these cases, we consider them to be distinguishable from the present dispute.\n{13} In Sindell v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, 54 Cal.App.4th 1457, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 594 (1997), the defendant attorneys negligently failed to obtain a necessary consent from the client\u2019s wife. Id. at 596. The California Court of Appeal pointed out that \u201cwhen [the] defendants failed to obtain that consent, their negligence made possible litigation asserting a community property claim which could not have otherwise been raised.\u201d Id. at 601. The court thus held that the client could properly claim the attorney fees resulting from the litigation as damages that flowed from the attorneys\u2019 negligence. Id. at 602. Similarly, Rogers v. Hurt, Richardson, Garner, Todd & Cadenhead, 203 Ga.App. 412, 417 S.E.2d 29 (1992), held that a trial judge improperly granted summary judgment because even though the plaintiffs suffered no actual judgment against them because of the attorneys\u2019 legal advice, the plaintiffs provided evidence that they suffered damages as a result of the defendant attorneys\u2019 allegedly negligent advice. Id. at 33. Both Sindell and Rogers focus on whether the plaintiffs suffered damages as a result of negligent advice and do not consider the question of breach. In Sindell, there was no question about the attorneys\u2019 negligence in the affair; the court assumed the attorneys\u2019 negligence. See 63 Cal.Rptr.2d at 598. The trial court in Rogers granted summary judgment based on a failure of the plaintiffs to show damages resulting from the legal advice. 417 S.E.2d at 32. There is no discussion in Rogers regarding breach of duty. In the present case, Sheehan does not argue that the Bassetts incurred no expense. Instead, Sheehan contends that the Bassetts did not provide any evidence to establish that Atkinson was negligent. Sindell and Rogers do not provide direction on that issue.\n{14} In John B. Gunn Law Corp. v. Maynard, 189 Cal.App.3d 1565, 235 Cal.Rptr. 180 (1987), the trial court refused a jury instruction on causation tendered by the plaintiff. Id. at 183. The California Court of Appeal reversed and held that the client was entitled to a jury instruction based on her theory of causation. Id. at 184. Maynard stands for the proposition that a jury should be instructed on conflicting theories of causation, id., and does not address breach of duty.\n{15} Mieras v. DeBona, 452 Mich. 278, 550 N.W.2d 202 (1996), is equally unhelpful. That court held that an attorney drafting a will owes a duty of care to the third-party beneficiaries of the will. Id. at 214-15. While we agree that attorneys owe a duty of care to their clients, any duty to third parties is not an issue in the present case.\n{16} First Interstate Bank of Denver v. Berenbaum, 872 P.2d 1297 (Colo.Ct.App. 1993), appears to address the Bassetts\u2019 contentions directly, but it does not advance the Bassetts\u2019 position. In Berenbaum, the Colorado Court of Appeals identified that Colorado attorneys owe their clients a duty to anticipate \u201creasonably foreseeable risks.\u201d Id. at 1300. Then the court explained that \u201c[i]f language included within a document because of the acts or omissions of an attorney results in litigation, even if the language is ultimately construed in favor of the client, then the question remains whether reasonably prudent attorneys should have foreseen that the likely result of its inclusion would be litigation.\u201d Id. We reject this proposition for two reasons. First, in New Mexico, \u201ca mere error of judgment or mistake in point of law that has not been settled by the highest court of law and upon which reasonable lawyers may differ, will not subject an attorney to liability.\u201d First Nat\u2019l Bank of Clovis v. Diane, Inc., 102 N.M. 548, 552, 698 P.2d 5, 9 (Ct.App.1985). Second, after Sheehan made a prima facie case and negated the element of breach, the Bassetts came forward with no admissible evidence to show that Atkinson\u2019s drafting resulted in a foreseeable risk of litigation. Therefore, we do not consider Berenbaum to be instructive.\n{17} In Sizemore v. Swift, 79 Or.App. 352, 719 P.2d 500 (1986), the Court of Appeals of Oregon determined that because there was a question of fact about the reasonableness of the attorneys\u2019 conduct, a trial court improperly granted summary judgment in a legal malpractice ease. Id. at 504. The attorneys drafted a trust, which was later the subject of litigation. Id. at 501-02. The client was successful in the litigation but then brought suit against the drafting attorneys. Id. The client provided evidence, in the form of an affidavit, that the trust created by the attorneys was \u201cnot reasonable under Oregon practice.\u201d Id. at 504. The court noted that \u201c[jjust as the fact of litigation does not in itself prove negligence, so ultimate success in the litigation does not in itself disprove it.\u201d Id. (citation omitted).\n{18} In the present case, the Bassetts provided no evidence to establish the element of breach after the burden shifted from Sheehan. Where the Sizemore plaintiff provided an affidavit regarding the standard of care in Oregon, id., the Bassetts responded to Sheehan\u2019s motion with dictum from Turner and citations to several cases from out-of-state jurisdictions. The Bassetts did not provide affidavits or expert testimony about the reasonableness of Aktinson\u2019s actions at the time the deeds were drawn. Instead, the Bassetts pointed to statements made by Sheehan before the Turner opinion was issued, when Sheehan examined the feasibility of a claim against Atkinson for the Bassetts. This deposition testimony does not establish that at the time Atkinson drew the deeds, an attorney exercising reasonable care would have included the express severance language in the deeds. The Bassetts provided no evidence tending to show a breach of duty by Atkinson, and they provided no additional facts that would forestall summary judgment.\n{19} It is well established that \u201c[i]f the facts are not in dispute, but only the legal effect of the facts is presented for determination, then summary judgment may properly be granted.\u201d Koenig v. Perez, 104 N.M. 664, 666, 726 P.2d 341, 343 (1986). The facts in the present case are not in dispute. There is no question that Atkinson prepared the deed and that the deed did not include language that would have expressly severed the water rights from the property. Turner determined the legal effect of these undisputed facts. The Bassetts did not raise additional facts. We therefore hold that there are no material facts in dispute and that summary judgment was properly granted for Sheehan. See Wood v. Cunningham, 2006-NMCA-139, \u00b6 6, 140 N.M. 699, 147 P.3d 1132.\nIII. CONCLUSION\n{20} We affirm the trial court.\n{21} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: JAMES J. WECHSLER and IRA ROBINSON, Judges.", "type": "majority", "author": "CASTILLO, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "William G. Gilstrap P.C., William G. Gil-strap, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellants.", "Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., John M. Brant, Charles K. Purcell, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2008-NMCA-072\n184 P.3d 1072\nCarroll G. BASSETT, Mary Bassett, Gordon R. Bassett, Joyce Bassett Schuebel, Sharon Bassett Atencio, and Sarah Bassett, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SHEEHAN, Sheehan & Stelzner, P.A., Defendant-Appellee.\nNo. 27,195.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nApril 17, 2008.\nWilliam G. Gilstrap P.C., William G. Gil-strap, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellants.\nRodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., John M. Brant, Charles K. Purcell, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee." }, "file_name": "0178-01", "first_page_order": 210, "last_page_order": 215 }