{ "id": 4242079, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Billy TALLEY, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Talley", "decision_date": "2008-07-30", "docket_number": "No. 27,480", "first_page": "127", "last_page": "134", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "145 N.M. 127" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2008-NMCA-148" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "194 P.3d 742" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "103 N.M. 623", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 711271 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "630" }, { "page": "907" }, { "page": "626" }, { "page": "903" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/103/0623-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 N.M. 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 716992 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" }, { "page": "284" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/110/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 40", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167951 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62", "parenthetical": "observing that the act of a suspect speaking with a number of known drug addicts was not a sufficient articulated reason for reasonably believing the suspect was armed and dangerous" }, { "parenthetical": "observing that the act of a suspect speaking with a number of known drug addicts was not a sufficient articulated reason for reasonably believing the suspect was armed and dangerous" }, { "parenthetical": "observing that the act of a suspect speaking with a number of known drug addicts was not a sufficient articulated reason for reasonably believing the suspect was armed and dangerous" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 F.3d 1228", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9322237 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1236" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/313/1228-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 N.M. 295", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1555107 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" }, { "page": "585" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/97/0295-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMCA-044", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 2543188 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 3" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/139/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 U.S. 106", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6180104 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/434/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMCA-022", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 827337 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b614" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMSC-034", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 2549752 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b637" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/138/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 N.M. 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1561231 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385" }, { "page": "1317" }, { "page": "388" }, { "page": "1320", "parenthetical": "allowing the detention of a driver while she produced her driver's license and proof of insurance" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/119/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMSC-016", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3669221 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 14, 19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/141/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 U.S. 621", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11320254 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "623, 626", "parenthetical": "holding that the suspect did not submit when he ran from a slowly approaching unmarked police cruiser" }, { "parenthetical": "holding that the suspect did not submit when he ran from a slowly approaching unmarked police cruiser" }, { "parenthetical": "holding that the suspect did not submit when he ran from a slowly approaching unmarked police cruiser" }, { "page": "626" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/499/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMCA-111", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3691099 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b641" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/142/0737-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" }, { "page": "17" }, { "page": "10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMCA-177", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 827437 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 5" }, { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0426-01" ] }, { "cite": "2000-NMSC-018", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 1217162 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" }, { "page": "\u00b6 15" }, { "page": "\u00b6 15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/129/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMSC-030", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 77174 ], "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 18" }, { "page": "\u00b6 19" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b621, 22" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b69, 29, 30" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b68-9, 29-30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0566-01" ] }, { "cite": "2002-NMSC-023", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 260742 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/132/0592-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 908, "char_count": 20023, "ocr_confidence": 0.682, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.025646725075047e-08, "percentile": 0.37337331249814176 }, "sha256": "b6c230060aee8e8fef8559d0367f1a62e51b712f371eb9862bf38622c402c334", "simhash": "1:190b9ee2f456c3d9", "word_count": 3261 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:53:47.998828+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: IRA ROBINSON and RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judges." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Billy TALLEY, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nCASTILLO, Judge.\n{1} The State appeals the district court\u2019s grant of Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress items pulled from Defendant\u2019s pocket after a police officer took hold of Defendant\u2019s wrist to control the removal of Defendant\u2019s hand from the pocket. We determine that the officer\u2019s action was a seizure but that it was based on reasonable suspicion that Defendant was armed and dangerous. We thus reverse the district court\u2019s grant of the motion to suppress the evidence.\nI. BACKGROUND\n{2} On August 31, 2005, Officers Nelson and Feist were on bike patrol. At approximately 7:00 p.m., the officers were notified via radio that an anonymous caller had reported heavy foot traffic at a nearby residence, which the caller believed to be the result of possible drug activity. Both officers were dispatched to the residence and responded within minutes of the radio notice. Upon arriving, Officer Nelson went to the front door, while Officer Feist took up a position at a corner of the house in order to observe the back door and windows of the home.\n{3} Officer Nelson knocked on the door, and Defendant answered. Defendant was on the other side of a screen door that was difficult to see through, Officer Nelson recognized Defendant from past interactions and also observed that Defendant\u2019s hand was in his pocket. Officer Nelson asked Defendant if he would step outside. Defendant kept his hand in his pocket as he began to open the door. Officer Nelson ordered him to take his hand out of his pocket. Defendant did not comply but did step completely outside, within arm\u2019s length of Officer Nelson. Officer Nelson again ordered Defendant to take his hand out of his pocket, and again he did not comply.\n{4} Officer Feist observed the second refusal to comply with Officer Nelson\u2019s order, grabbed the wrist of the hand that was in Defendant\u2019s pants pocket, and secured Defendant\u2019s hand to his hip, thereby controlling Defendant\u2019s hand. Officer Feist then ordered Defendant to remove his hand from his pocket, which Defendant did while Officer Feist continued to hold on to Defendant\u2019s wrist. Once the hand was removed from the pocket, the officers observed a bag containing a crack pipe and two rocks of crack cocaine in Defendant\u2019s hand. At that point, Defendant was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance, contrary to NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-31-23 (2005), and possession of drug paraphernalia, contrary to NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-31-25.1(A) (2001).\n{5} After pleading not guilty to the charges, Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from his pocket. Rule 5-212 NMRA. The district court granted the motion and determined that although the officers\u2019 initial encounter with Defendant was consensual, Officer Feist did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the physical seizure of Defendant\u2019s arm. This appeal followed.\nII. STANDARD OF REVIEW\n{6} Our review of a district court\u2019s granting of a motion to suppress involves a mixed question of fact and law. State v. Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023, \u00b6 6, 132 N.M. 592, 52 P.3d 964. With respect to the facts, we adopt the view that is most favorable to the prevailing party as long as the facts are supported by substantial evidence. State v. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, \u00b6 18, 134 N.M. 566, 81 P.3d 19. We do not sit as a trier of fact because the district court is in the best position to resolve questions of fact. Id. Therefore, we draw all reasonable inferences in the evidence in favor of the district court\u2019s findings. State v. Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, \u00b6 9, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856. We review the district court\u2019s application of the law to the facts de novo. See State v. Ingram, 1998-NMCA-177, \u00b6 5, 126 N.M. 426, 970 P.2d 1151. The reasonableness of the law enforcement officers\u2019 course of conduct is evaluated de novo and is done by examining the totality of the circumstances. See Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, \u00b6 19.\nIII. DISCUSSION\n{7} The State challenges the grant of Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress on two bases. The State first contends that the officer\u2019s physical touching of Defendant\u2019s arm was such a minimal seizure that it should be considered a de minimis restriction. In its second argument, the State asserts that Officer Feist had reasonable suspicion to believe that Defendant was armed and dangerous. Defendant\u2019s position is that Officer Feist did not have reasonable suspicion when he grabbed Defendant\u2019s wrist. Additionally, Defendant raises two other arguments: (1) that Officer Nelson\u2019s request that Defendant step outside constituted a seizure, and (2) that the repeated orders from Officer Nelson to Defendant to remove his hand from his pocket also constituted a seizure. We address the arguments in chronological order, beginning with Defendant\u2019s arguments regarding when the seizure occurred.\nA. Initial Interactions With Officer Nelson\n{8} A seizure occurs \u201cwhenever a police officer ... restrains [an individual\u2019s] freedom to walk away.\u201d Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The test to determine if such a seizure occurred is whether a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not able to leave. Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, \u00b6 15. Specific situations which can indicate a reasonable person would feel restrained include the following: \u201cthe threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the [suspect], or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer\u2019s request might be compelled.\u201d Id. \u00b6 16 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We review Officer Nelson\u2019s actions in light of this standard.\n1. Request to Step Outside\n{9} The first interaction took place when Officer Nelson asked Defendant to step outside of the home after recognizing him through the screen door. Defendant disagrees with the district court\u2019s conclusion that this encounter was consensual. He contends that given the totality of the circumstances, including his history of prior interaction with Officer Nelson, it was reasonable for Defendant to believe he was not free to refuse this request. Based on this characterization of the encounter, Defendant argues that he was seized at the moment of compliance \u2014 when he stepped out of the house. Defendant maintains that since this request and the subsequent compliance is considered a seizure, Officer Nelson was required to have reasonable suspicion at the moment of the request.\n{10} We are unpersuaded. The district court found that this interaction was a consensual encounter, not an illegal detention. We agree with the district court that there is evidence to support this conclusion. The request from Officer Nelson was not an order which required compliance. Instead, the record shows that Officer Nelson asked Defendant to step outside. While the officers did not inform Defendant that he had the right to refuse the request, there is no evidence indicating that the request was an order or was said in such a way as to indicate that compliance was essential. Further, the record does not indicate that the two uniformed officers could have been or were considered a threatening presence, and there is no evidence that either officer displayed a weapon.\n{11} Even though there was a history between Defendant and Officers Nelson and Feist, Defendant fails to explain why this history would lead to the reasonable belief that Officer Nelson\u2019s request required compliance. Without supporting cases or illustrative facts from former interactions with the officers, there is no basis to support the conclusion that a reasonable person would have believed he or she was compelled to comply in this circumstance. See State v. Wilson, 2007-NMCA-111, \u00b641, 142 N.M. 737, 169 P.3d 1184 (refraining from addressing an underdeveloped argument).\n{12} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a reasonable person in Defendant\u2019s situation would have believed that he was free to either comply with or refuse the request of Officer Nelson to step outside, and that this request therefore did not constitute a seizure.\n2. Order to Remove Hand From Pocket\n{13} According to Defendant, the second interaction \u2014 when Officer Nelson ordered Defendant to remove his hand from his pocket \u2014 constitutes a seizure as well. The district court did not separately consider whether the second interaction was a seizure. We conclude that while the consensual nature of the interaction is questionable because Defendant did not follow the officer\u2019s order, the district court was correct to hold that the order was not a seizure for another reason\u2014 because Defendant did not comply with the order.\n{14} Restraint on a person\u2019s freedom to walk away is shown either by the application of physical force or by a show of authority. Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, \u00b6 15. Officer Nelson\u2019s ordering Defendant to remove his hand from his pocket constitutes a showing of authority. However, Defendant did not comply with the orders. A showing of authority is a restraint only if a suspect submits to the showing of authority; if a suspect has not yet submitted to the showing of authority, he has not yet been seized. See Cal. v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 623, 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (holding that the suspect did not submit when he ran from a slowly approaching unmarked police cruiser); see also State v. Harbison, 2007-NMSC-016, \u00b6\u00b6 14, 19, 141 N.M. 392, 156 P.3d 30 (deciding that a suspect had not submitted to the show of authority when a uniformed officer ordered the suspect not to move and he responded by running). Therefore, Officer Nelson\u2019s order was not a seizure because Defendant\u2019s failure to submit to the show of authority by Officer Nelson is determinative that the order did not constitute a seizure. See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547.\nB. Officer Feist\u2019s Physical Touching\n{15} Physical touching is an application of physical force and constitutes a seizure under Terry. 392 U.S. at 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868. The State and Defendant do not dispute that Officer Feist seized Defendant when he grabbed Defendant\u2019s wrist. The State, however, counters with the following: (1) the seizure was a de minimis restriction, or, in the alternative, (2) Officer Feist had sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify the seizure.\n1. De Minimis Restriction\n{16} Certain seizures have been held to be de minimus restrictions. To determine whether a seizure is de minimis, we must balance the benefits to the officer in completing the action with the burden on a suspect\u2019s freedom of movement. State v. Reynolds, 119 N.M. 383, 385, 890 P.2d 1315, 1317 (1995).\n{17} The State relies on a number of New Mexico cases to support its contention that the seizure was de minimis. State v. Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, \u00b637, 138 N.M. 414, 120 P.3d 836 (permitting the detention of a driver and passenger for expanded questioning asked by the officer related to the nature of the stop); Reynolds, 119 N.M. at 388, 890 P.2d at 1320 (allowing the detention of a driver while she produced her driver\u2019s license and proof of insurance); State v. Taylor, 1999-NMCA-022, \u00b614, 126 N.M. 569, 973 P.2d 246 (allowing detention of a driver while the officer ran a wants and warrants check). The State also relies on Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977), a case that held that compliance with an officer\u2019s request to step out of a vehicle to speak to the officer during a routine traffic stop is a de minimis restriction.\n{18} The State attempts to differentiate between the type of physical touching that constitutes the full pat down described in Terry from what the State characterizes as \u201cbrief ... touching\u201d in the case before us. Physical touching a person\u2019s body without consent \u201cis a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.\u201d Terry, 392 U.S. at 17, 88 S.Ct. 1868. The State cites no authority for the proposition that physical touching by a police officer is de minimis under any circumstance. See State v. Ryan, 2006-NMCA-044, \u00b6 3, 139 N.M. 354, 132 P.3d 1040 (holding that arguments not supported by authority will not be considered by the court). Accordingly, under the facts of this case, we are unwilling to expand the scope of a de minimis restriction to include a minor physical intrusion upon a suspect. We now turn to the issue of whether Officer Feist had reasonable suspicion to believe that Defendant was armed and dangerous.\n2. Reasonable Suspicion\n{19} The purpose of a protective frisk for weapons is to allow an officer to conduct an investigation without fear of violence. Ingram, 1998-NMCA-177, \u00b6 6. A protective frisk seizure is justified if an officer has a sufficient degree of articulable and reasonable suspicion that the person being seized is both armed and dangerous. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, \u00b6\u00b621, 22. The objective standard applied is whether a reasonable, well-trained officer would fear for his or her safety based on the belief that the suspect may be armed and dangerous. Id. \u00b6 23. \u201c[T]he officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent [officer] in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.\u201d Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If it could be found that reasonable people might differ, the courts have deferred in favor of \u201cthe officer\u2019s good judgment.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In suppressing the evidence, the district court determined that the State did not meet its burden of showing reasonable suspicion. We disagree and hold that Officer Feist did have reasonable suspicion that Defendant was armed and dangerous.\n{20} Under Terry, there are two grounds upon which an officer may base reasonable suspicion: (1) that the suspect may be armed and dangerous and (2) that the suspect may have committed or is committing a crime. See 392 U.S. at 10, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Defendant argues that the officers had no reasonable suspicion that Defendant had committed or was committing a crime. This argument was not preserved below and therefore will not be considered on appeal. State v. Keener, 97 N.M. 295, 298, 639 P.2d 582, 585 (Ct.App.1981) (holding that an issue not raised in the district court level could not be considered on appeal).\n{21} We now turn to Vandenberg, in which the officer testified in detail about the suspect\u2019s movements \u2014 from the drumming of his fingers, to the constant looking at the officer through his rear-view mirror, to the suspect\u2019s emotional response when the officer announced the intent to protectively frisk him. 2003-NMSC-030, \u00b6\u00b69, 29, 30. The officer further testified how each of these actions led him to become more and more suspicious that the suspect was armed and dangerous. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 29-30. Accordingly, our Supreme Court held that an officer\u2019s specific observations of a suspect, along with specific and substantial safety concerns based on those observations, were sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion. Id. \u00b6 30.\n{22} We also look to United States v. Harris, a Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ease. The facts in Harris are similar to those before us. The defendant had his hands in the pockets of his jeans and was acting nervously. 313 F.3d 1228, 1236 (10th Cir.2002). Fearing that the defendant might be concealing a weapon, the police officer requested the defendant to remove his hands from his pockets. Id. The defendant refused and the officer seized him for a protective frisk. Id. The Tenth Circuit determined that the officer was reasonably justified in believing that the defendant was armed and dangerous. Id. Along these lines, the State argues that Officer Feist had reasonable suspicion because (1) Defendant had a history of cooperation with law enforcement and yet was resistant in this case, (2) Defendant refused to remove his hand from his pocket while he was in close proximity to Officer Nelson, and (3) both officers testified in detail about Defendant\u2019s actions and their resulting concerns.\n{23} In response, Defendant contends that the State failed to establish that Officer Feist had reasonable suspicion that Defendant was armed and dangerous. To support this argument, Defendant points out that (1) he had no history of violence toward the officers and (2) no facts established in the trial court support an articulable belief that Defendant was violent or dangerous at the time of the incident. Defendant argues that the State\u2019s contentions about officer safety are too broad and general and that rather than justifying Officer Feist\u2019s physical touching of Defendant, the safety concerns are merely inarticulate hunches, which do not provide a basis for reasonable suspicion. For support, Defendant cites cases holding that officers need to articulate facts which establish potential danger. See Sibron v. N.Y., 392 U.S. 40, 62, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (observing that the act of a suspect speaking with a number of known drug addicts was not a sufficient articulated reason for reasonably believing the suspect was armed and dangerous); Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, \u00b6\u00b68-9, 29-30 (finding that reasonable suspicion existed when the suspect acted nervously, drummed his fingers on the roof of the ear, looked in his rear view mirror at the officer constantly, repeatedly rolling his windows down and up, and became more nervous when asked if he had any weapons in the car); State v. Haddenham, 110 N.M. 149, 154, 793 P.2d 279, 284 (Ct.App.1990) (holding that reasonable suspicion did exist when the suspect was severely intoxicated, had harassed a store clerk, was acting hostile towards the officer, and had a previous record of causing disturbances).\n{24} We conclude that given the totality of the circumstances, Officer Feist was justified in his seizure of Defendant\u2019s hand. Both officers testified explicitly as to their nervousness for their safety because Defendant had complied with their requests in the past and yet was not compliant in this instance and because he was in close proximity to Officer Nelson. Further, the officers were aware that Defendant was known to maybe carry a poeketknife, a weapon that Defendant could have used to cause serious injury to the officer. Taken together, these facts provide a reasonable basis for Officer Feist\u2019s belief that Defendant may have been armed and dangerous. The preciseness of the testimony given refutes Defendant\u2019s argument that the officers had only an inarticulate hunch and could not articulate their specific safety concerns regarding Defendant.\n{25} Defendant also cites State v. Cobbs, 103 N.M. 623, 630, 711 P.2d 900, 907 (Ct.App.1985), contending that the State bears a heavier burden to show articulated facts because Defendant was suspected of a nonviolent offense.\n{26} We agree with the holding in Cobbs that the nature of the suspected crime is considered as a factor in order to determine reasonable suspicion. Id. at 626, 711 P.2d at 903. Nevertheless, the officers provided sufficient facts to establish reasonable suspicion, regardless of the nature of the suspected crime. As a result, we need not consider this argument further.\nIY. CONCLUSION\n{27} We reverse the district court\u2019s grant of Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\n{28} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: IRA ROBINSON and RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judges.", "type": "majority", "author": "CASTILLO, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Gary K. King, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, M. Victoria Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.", "Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender, Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2008-NMCA-148\n194 P.3d 742\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Billy TALLEY, Defendant-Appellee.\nNo. 27,480.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nJuly 30, 2008.\nCertiorari Denied, No. 31,289, Sept. 18, 2008.\nGary K. King, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, M. Victoria Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.\nHugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender, Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee." }, "file_name": "0127-01", "first_page_order": 161, "last_page_order": 168 }