{ "id": 4243054, "name": "MARBOB ENERGY CORPORATION, a corporation, Petitioner-Petitioner, v. The NEW MEXICO OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION, Respondent-Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "Marbob Energy Corp. v. New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission", "decision_date": "2009-03-11", "docket_number": "No. 30,710", "first_page": "24", "last_page": "32", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "146 N.M. 24" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "206 P.3d 135" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2009-NMSC-013" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "2005-NMSC-023", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 2551225 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/138/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 N.M. 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2869988 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105" }, { "page": "169" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/90/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 N.M. 581", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1557232 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "584", "parenthetical": "\"It is the duty of the court, so far as practicable, to reconcile different provisions so as to make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible.\"" }, { "page": "184", "parenthetical": "\"It is the duty of the court, so far as practicable, to reconcile different provisions so as to make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/92/0581-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 N.M. 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 711367 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76", "parenthetical": "\"[This Court] read[s] the act in its entirety and construe[s] each part in connection with every other part in order to produce a harmonious whole.\"" }, { "page": "173", "parenthetical": "\"[This Court] read[s] the act in its entirety and construe[s] each part in connection with every other part in order to produce a harmonious whole.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/103/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 N.M. 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1598920 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518" }, { "page": "758" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/105/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMSC-050", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 827330 ], "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 5" }, { "page": "\u00b6 5" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMSC-001", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3671666 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b614", "parenthetical": "\"Unless ambiguity exists, this Court must adhere to the plain meaning of the language.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"Unless ambiguity exists, this Court must adhere to the plain meaning of the language.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"Unless ambiguity exists, this Court must adhere to the plain meaning of the language.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/140/0836-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 N.M. 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1552533 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "131", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "169" }, { "page": "131", "parenthetical": "\"Statutory language should be interpreted literally.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/117/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMSC-032", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3671055 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/140/0006-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMSC-039", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3671093 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/140/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 N.M. 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1558975 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583" }, { "page": "32" }, { "page": "583" }, { "page": "32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/120/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMSC-053", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3692262 ], "weight": 13, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 19" }, { "page": "\u00b6 19" }, { "page": "\u00b6 19" }, { "page": "\u00b6 20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/142/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 N.M. 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590328 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "351", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/109/0592-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 P.3d 763", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 N.M. 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2007-NMCERT-011", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCERT", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 N.M. 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 731622 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112" }, { "page": "828" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/114/0103-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 964, "char_count": 27538, "ocr_confidence": 0.698, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.02951719280587e-07, "percentile": 0.9366997844275863 }, "sha256": "fe20133cb2ce1a2595144c562c17f71db6b91b84dfbd36f19af3a36a2bee6458", "simhash": "1:24810e84beea63b1", "word_count": 4336 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:28:31.770781+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: PATRICIO M. SERNA, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, RICHARD C. BOSSON, and CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justices." ], "parties": [ "MARBOB ENERGY CORPORATION, a corporation, Petitioner-Petitioner, v. The NEW MEXICO OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION, Respondent-Respondent." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nCH\u00c1VEZ, Chief Justice.\n{1} The Oil Conservation Commission (the Commission) promulgated New Mexico Administrative Code regulation 19.15.14.1227 NMAC (12/1/08) (Rule 1227), giving itself and the Oil Conservation Division (the Division) the authority to assess civil penalties and impose other sanctions against any person who violates the Oil and Gas Act (the Act), NMSA 1978, Sections 70-2-1 to -38 (1935, as amended through 2004), or any rule, order, or regulation issued thereunder. Petitioner Marbob Energy Corporation (Marbob) appealed the Commission\u2019s order to the district court, arguing that the Commission exceeded its statutory authority when it implemented Rule 1227. The district court upheld the Commission\u2019s order, holding that the Legislature\u2019s broad grants of authority and jurisdiction to the Commission and the Division include the authority to assess the civil penalties authorized by the Act. We reverse and hold that the specific provisions of Section 70-2-28 require the Attorney General to bring an action in court to assess civil penalties for violations of the Act and rules, orders, and regulations issued thereunder.\nI. BACKGROUND\n{2} The Commission was created by Section 70-2-4 of the Act and has two primary duties regarding the conservation of oil and gas: prevention of waste and protection of correlative rights. Section 70-2-11(A); Santa Fe Exploration Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm\u2019n of N.M., 114 N.M. 103, 112, 835 P.2d 819, 828 (1992). The Commission may also make rules and regulations to implement and enforce the Act. See \u00a7 70-2-11(A) (granting the Division the authority to make and enforce rules, regulations, and orders); \u00a7 70-2-11(B) (granting the Commission concurrent jurisdiction with the Division \u201cto the extent necessary for the [CJommission to perform its duties as required by law\u201d). Marbob is an oil and gas producer subject to the authority of both the Commission and the Division.\n{3} In September 2005, the Division filed an application for rule adoption and amendment with the Commission, requesting that the Commission adopt or amend certain provisions of the New Mexico Administrative Code pertaining to the regulation of oil and gas. Among the requested changes, the Division asked the Commission to adopt Rule 1227, thereby establishing administrative \u201ccompliance proceedings.\u201d \u201cA compliance proceeding is an adjudicatory proceeding in which the [Division seeks an order imposing sanctions for violation of a provision of the Oil and Gas Act, or a provision of a rule or order issued pursuant to the [A]ct.\u201d 19.15.5.10(B) NMAC (citation omitted). Among the several sanctions available in Rule 1227, the Division and the Commission may assess civil penalties pursuant to Section 70-2-3KA) of the Act. 19.15.5.10(B)(2) NMAC. The Commission granted the Division\u2019s application with its Order No. R-12452 on November 10, 2005, implementing Rule 1227 upon its publication in the New Mexico Register.\n{4} Marbob timely filed an application for rehearing with the Commission under the Act. The Commission took no action on Marbob\u2019s application, automatically making Order No. R-12452 final ten days after Marbob\u2019s filing. See \u00a7 70-2-25(A). Mar-bob appealed the Commission\u2019s decision to the district court on several grounds, and the district court upheld the Commission\u2019s decision. Marbob petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of certiorari to the district court, which was denied. Marbob then petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted to determine whether the Division or the Commission has the statutory authority to assess civil penalties. Marbob Energy Corp. v. N.M. Oil Conservation Comm\u2019n, 2007-NMCERT-011, 143 N.M. 156, 173 P.3d 763.\nII. DISCUSSION\nA. STANDARD OF REVIEW\n{5} We are asked to determine whether Rule 1227 granted the Division and the Commission authority not provided by the Act. It is well settled that \u201c[a]n agency may not create a regulation that exceeds its statutory authority.\u201d Gonzales v. N.M. Educ. Ret. Bd., 109 N.M. 592, 595, 788 P.2d 348, 351 (1990) (citation omitted). To determine whether Rule 1227 complies with the Act, we must look to the Act to determine whether the Legislature granted the Division or the Commission the authority to impose civil penalties. As a result, our analysis is one of statutory construction, and we review the district court\u2019s decision upholding Rule 1227 de novo. See N.M. Indus. Energy Consumers v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm\u2019n, 2007-NMSC-053, \u00b6 19, 142 N.M. 533, 168 P.3d 105 (\u201cStatutory interpretation is ... reviewed] de novo.\u201d).\n{6} In construing the Act, the Commission encourages us to defer to its interpretation of the Act\u2019s provisions that it contends authorize the Division to assess civil penalties. We decline to afford the Commission such deference. When an agency construes a statute that governs it, the court will accord some deference to the agency\u2019s interpretation. Morningstar Water Users Ass\u2019n v. N.M. Pub. Util. Comm\u2019n, 120 N.M. 579, 583, 904 P.2d 28, 32 (1995). In addition, the court will confer a heightened degree of deference to the agency on legal questions that determine fundamental policies within the scope of the agency\u2019s statutory function. Id. These two principles suggest that we should defer to the Commission\u2019s construction of the Act because the Commission is construing its governing statute and the legal question before us is whether the Commission or the Division may achieve its statutory function of conserving oil and gas by enforcing the Act through the assessment of civil penalties. However, these principles are not the only guideposts we observe in determining whether an agency\u2019s interpretation of its governing statute should be accorded deference.\n{7} Statutory construction is a question of law. State v. Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, \u00b6 6, 140 N.M. 299, 142 P.3d 887. As such, \u201cthe court is not bound by the agency\u2019s interpretation [of its own statute] and may substitute its own independent judgment for that of the agency because it is the function of the courts to interpret the law.\u201d Momingstar, 120 N.M. at 583, 904 P.2d at 32. Moreover, we are less likely to defer to an agency\u2019s interpretation of the relevant statute if the statute is clear and unambiguous, as it is in this case. See Do\u00f1a Ana Mut. Domestic Water Consumers Ass\u2019n v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm\u2019n, 2006-NMSC-032, \u00b6 10, 140 N.M. 6, 139 P.3d 166. Also, if statutory construction is not within the agency\u2019s expertise, this Court should afford little, if any, deference to the agency on issues of statutory construction. N.M. Indus. Energy Consumers, 2007-NMSC-053, \u00b6 19, 142 N.M. 533, 168 P.3d 105. The Commission\u2019s specialized expertise pertains to the regulation and conservation of oil and gas. See \u00a7 70-2^1 (stating that the commissioners \u201cshall be persons who have expertise in the regulation of petroleum production by virtue of education or training.\u201d). Nothing in the Act requires the Commissioners to be trained in matters of statutory interpretation. Thus, we conclude that statutory construction is not within the Commission\u2019s specialized expertise. Cf. N.M. Indus. Energy Consumers, 2007-NMSC-053, \u00b6 19, 142 N.M. 533, 168 P.3d 105 (holding that statutory construction is not a matter within the Public Regulation Commission\u2019s expertise). For these reasons, whether the Legislature intended to bestow upon the Commission or the Division the authority to assess civil penalties as part of the Act\u2019s overall compliance regime is a question of law, and we accord the Commission little deference on this matter.\nB. SECTION 70-2-28 REQUIRES THAT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BRING AN ACTION TO ESTABLISH LIABILITY AND ASSESS PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE ACT OR RELATED RULES OR ORDERS\n{8} The parties\u2019 dispute essentially amounts to conflicting interpretations of Sections 70-2-28 and -31 of the Act. Marbob argues that Section 70-2-28 mandates that the Attorney General bring suit to assess the penalties authorized by Section 70-2-31 for violations of the Act or related rules or orders. The Commission argues that Sections 70-2-28 and -31 are silent about who may assess penalties and that the Division and the Commission may therefore assess penalties by virtue of the broad statutory authority granted to them in Sections 70-2-6 and -11 to enforce the Act. The Commission further specifically contends that regarding civil penalties, the Attorney General\u2019s role is limited in Section 70-2-31 to collecting the penalties previously assessed by the Division. We agree with Marbob that it is the role of the Attorney General to establish liability and assess the civil penalties authorized under the Act.\n{9} In construing a statute, our charge is to determine and give effect to the Legislature\u2019s intent. N.M. Indus. Energy Consumers, 2007-NMSC-053, \u00b6 20, 142 N.M. 533, 168 P.3d 105. In discerning the Legislature\u2019s intent, we are aided by classic canons of statutory construction, and \u201c[w]e look first to the plain language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning, unless the Legislature indicates a different one was intended.\u201d Id. \u201cWhen statutory language is clear and unambiguous, [this Court] must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.\u201d Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Baca, 117 N.M. 167, 169, 870 P.2d 129, 131 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Only if an ambiguity exists will we proceed further in our statutory construction analysis. See State v. Maestas, 2007-NMSC-001, \u00b614, 140 N.M. 836, 149 P.3d 933 (2006) (\u201cUnless ambiguity exists, this Court must adhere to the plain meaning of the language.\u201d). Therefore, we begin our analysis with the plain language of the Act\u2019s relevant provisions to determine whether their ordinary meaning results in an ambiguity.\n{10} The plain language of Section 70-2-28 requires the Attorney General to bring an action for penalties when those penalties are applicable. It states, in pertinent part:\nWhenever it shall appear that any person is violating, or threatening to violate, any statute of this state with respect to the conservation of oil or gas, or both, or any provision of this act, or any rule, regulation or order made thereunder, the division through the [AJttomey [GJeneral shall bring suit against such person in the county of the residence of the defendant, or in the county of the residence of any defendant if there be more than one defendant, or in the county where the violation is alleged to have occurred, for penalties, if any are applicable, and to restrain such person from continuing such violation or from carrying out the threat of violation.\nId. (emphasis added). An ordinary reading of this section affirmatively requires that the Attorney General bring suit on the Division\u2019s behalf to impose penalties when those penalties are applicable. However, Section 70-2-28 does not state when penalties are applicable. We must look elsewhere in the Act to make that determination.\n{11} Sections 70-2-22, -31, and -36 of the Act authorize penalties. Of these sections, the only penalty provision that directly concerns us in this case is Section 70-2-31(A), which provides that \u201c[a]ny person who knowingly and willfully violates any provision of the Oil and Gas Act ... or any provision of any rule or order issued pursuant to that act shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each violation.\u201d However, we must read all three of these penalty provisions together with Section 70-2-28 to determine how the Legislature envisioned that these penalties be assessed. See High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-050, \u00b6 5, 126 N.M. 413, 970 P.2d 599 (\u201c[Wjhere several sections of a statute are involved, they must be read together so that all parts are given effect.\u201d).\n{12} Reading these provisions together, we conclude that the \u201cfor penalties, if any are applicable\u201d language in Section 70-2-28 refers to the various penalties authorized by the Act, which may be applicable as a tool to enforce the Act in response to a particular violation. For example, Section 70-2-22(B) states that \u201c[pjenalties shall be imposed\u201d for each transaction involving illegal gas or oil products when the person committing that transaction \u201cknows that illegal oil or illegal oil product, or illegal gas or illegal gas product, is involved in such transaction.\u201d Similarly, Section 70-2-31 authorizes civil penalties for knowing and willful violations of the Act or related rules or orders. Finally, Section 70-2-36 makes it a misdemeanor to alter or remove any identification mark of any kind from any tool, construction item, or oil field equipment with the intent to deprive its lawful owner of positive identification. Reading these four sections together, we conclude that the Legislature intended to require the Attorney General to bring an action to impose the penalties authorized by the Act\u2019s various sections, including the civil penalties authorized by Section 70-2-31. Such an action would determine whether a person is liable for an alleged violation and, if so, the amount of penalties to be imposed.\n{13} The Commission offers several arguments to support its position that the Legislature intended the Division or the Commission to assess civil penalties for violations of the Act, or related rules or orders, and the Attorney General to only collect them. The Commission first argues that Sections 70-2-6 and -11, when read together, expressly grant the Division and the Commission the authority to impose civil penalties. Section 70-2-6(A) grants the Division \u201cjurisdiction and authority over all matters relating to the conservation of oil and gas.\u201d It further gives the Division \u201cjurisdiction, authority and control of and over all persons, matters or things necessary or proper to enforce effectively the provisions of this act.\u201d Id. Section 70-2-11(A) empowers the Division to prevent waste and protect correlative rights and \u201cto make and enforce rules, regulations and orders, and to do whatever may be reasonably necessary to carry out the purpose of this act, whether or not indicated or specified in any section hereof.\u201d The Commission is granted \u201cconcurrent jurisdiction and authority with the [Division to the extent necessary for the [Cjommission to perform its duties as required by law.\u201d Sections 70-2-6(B), - 11(B). The Commission argues that the broad jurisdiction and authority given the Division in these sections to do whatever is reasonably necessary to enforce the Act \u201cis a clear and explicit delegation of jurisdiction of penalty assessment cases.\u201d We disagree.\n{14} The Commission\u2019s reading of Sections 70-2-6 and -11 ignores the specific requirement in Section 70-2-28 that the Attorney General bring suit \u201cfor penalties, if any are applicable.\u201d Indeed, without more, the Commission\u2019s construction of Sections 70-2-6 and -11 creates a contradiction in the statute. If the Commission\u2019s interpretation is correct, then the Legislature would have granted the Division jurisdiction to assess civil penalties in Section 70-2-11 while simultaneously requiring the Attorney General to bring suit in district court to accomplish the same thing. The Legislature cannot have intended both. We resolve this ambiguity by giving effect to Section 70-2-28, which is the more specific statutory provision.\n{15} \u201cAs a general rule of statutory construction, ... general language in a statute is limited by specific language.\u201d Lubbock Steel & Supply, Inc. v. Gomez, 105 N.M. 516, 518, 734 P.2d 756, 758 (1987). Section 70-2-28 specifically requires the Attorney General to \u201cbring suit ... for penalties, if any are applicable.\u201d In contrast, Section 70-2-11 empowers the Commission and the Division to do \u201cwhatever may be reasonably necessary\u201d to enforce the Act. The Attorney General\u2019s specific obligation under Section 70-2-28 to bring suit in district court for penalties, when applicable, governs over the general grants of authority and jurisdiction to the Division and the Commission in Sections 70-2-6 and -11. Therefore, Sections 70-2-6 and -11 do not grant the Division and the Commission express authority to assess civil penalties.\n{16} The Commission\u2019s next argument encourages us to construe a suit to \u201crecover\u201d penalties as a suit to \u201ccollect\u201d them. In this way, the Commission argues, when the Legislature authorized civil penalties that \u201cshall be recoverable by a civil suit filed by the [Attorney [G]eneral in the name and on behalf of the [C]ommission or the [Division in the district court,\u201d Section 70-2-31(A) (emphasis added), it only intended the Attorney General to bring a suit to collect the penalties that the Division had already assessed pursuant to its broad enforcement authority in Sections 70-2-6 and -11. The Commission relies on a definition of \u201crecover\u201d to mean only \u201ccollect.\u201d In light of the Act\u2019s other, related provisions, we do not believe the Legislature intended that term to be given such a restrictive meaning.\n{17} Black\u2019s Law Dictionary defines \u201crecover\u201d broadly, meaning \u201c[t]o obtain by a judgment or other legal process.\u201d Id. at 1302 (8th ed.2004). We recognize, however, that an action to recover could also be an action to collect what has previously been determined to be due, such as an action to recover a judgment previously entered. See Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1440 (4th ed.1968) (defining \u201crecover\u201d as \u201c[t]o get or obtain again, to collect\u201d). Thus, the meaning of the term is ambiguous, and we will look to the Act\u2019s related provisions to determine what the Legislature intended. See Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Anaya, 103 N.M. 72, 76, 703 P.2d 169, 173 (1985) (\u201c[This Court] read[s] the act in its entirety and construe[s] each part in connection with every other part in order to produce a harmonious whole.\u201d) (citation omitted).\n{18} Giving the term \u201crecoverable\u201d in Section 70-2-31 the more limited meaning of an action solely to collect penalties already assessed would create an inconsistency between Sections 70-2-28 and -31. Section 70-2-28 requires the Attorney General to bring an action to impose liability and assess penalties when they may be applicable. Following the Commission\u2019s definition of \u201crecover,\u201d Section 70-2-31 would attempt to limit that authority to collections actions. We are disinclined to construe a statute to create conflicts between its provisions rather than resolve them. See El Paso Elec. Co. v. Real Estate Mart, Inc., 92 N.M. 581, 584, 592 P.2d 181, 184 (1979) (\u201cIt is the duty of the court, so far as practicable, to reconcile different provisions so as to make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible.\u201d) Therefore, we reject the Commission\u2019s argument that Section 70-2-31 limits the Attorney General\u2019s authority with respect to civil penalties to actions to collect penalties previously assessed by the Division or the Commission.\n{19} In support of its construction of the Act, the Commission next argues that Section 70-2-28, which requires the Attorney General to bring suit in district court, is solely an injunction provision and its \u201cpenalties\u201d language applies only when the Commission or the Division has not previously assessed civil penalties for a violation of the Act, \u201cas this [structure] would obviate the necessity for a separate proceeding before the Commission.\u201d The Commission argues that a provision authorizing the Attorney General to seek the judicial remedy of an injunction is necessary because the Commission does not have contempt powers. Thus, according to the Commission, the Attorney General could bring an action to impose liability and assess penalties when it was seeking an injunction and the Division had not already assessed penalties for the same violation; otherwise, penalty assessment authority is reserved exclusively to the Division and the Commission. We are not persuaded by this argument.\n{20} In support of this contention, the Commission relies on language in the first sentence of Section 70-2-28 to claim that the Legislature intended to limit the Attorney General\u2019s authority to bring actions only for present or future violations. See id. (\u201cWhenever it shall appear that any person is violating, or threatening to violate, any statute of this state with respect to the conservation of oil or gas, ... the [Djivision through the [Attorney [Gjeneral shall bring suit against such person ... for penalties, if any are applicable, and to restrain such person from continuing such violation or from carrying out the threat of violation.\u201d) (emphasis added). Although the Commission contends that this language renders Section 70-2-28 solely an injunction provision, its construction of Section 70-2-28 gives the Attorney General authority to assess penalties in certain situations as well. In spite of its argument that Section 70-2-28 is an injunction provision, the Commission\u2019s construction would allow the Attorney General to seek assessment of penalties when two conditions are met: first, when the Attorney General is seeking an injunction; and second, when the Division or the Commission has not previously assessed penalties for the same violation. The Commission\u2019s interpretation of Section 70-2-28 would have us read into the statute language that is not there, which we will not do if the provision makes sense as written. See High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture, 1998-NMSC-050, \u00b6 5, 126 N.M. 413, 970 P.2d 599. There is no indication anywhere in the Act that the Legislature intended this conditional, if-then approach to penalty assessment, and the plain language of Section 70-2-28 does not impose such a scheme. Accordingly, we will not read this language into the Act.\n{21} Furthermore, the Commission\u2019s argument requires that we construe the language in Section 70-2-28 that \u201cthe [Ajttorney [G]eneral shall bring suit ... for penalties, if any are applicable\u201d to mean that civil penalties are only \u201capplicable\u201d (in the sense that the Attorney General may assess them) when the Division has not previously assessed them and when the Attorney General is simultaneously seeking injunctive relief for the same violation of the Act or related rules or orders. The Commission\u2019s construction of the Act would give itself the first chance to adjudicate civil liability and assess penalties. In light of the Act\u2019s other penalty provisions, see, e.g., Sections 70-2-22, -36, and the language of Section 70-2-28 requiring the Attorney General to bring suit for penalties, when applicable, the Commission\u2019s interpretation cannot be what the Legislature intended. The Legislature\u2019s use of the word \u201capplicable\u201d in Section 70-2-28 is a reference to the other statutory penalty provisions, which would be applicable depending on the type and nature of the alleged violation. Rather than construing the word \u201capplicable\u201d to\nmean \u201cwhen the Division has not previously assessed civil penalties,\u201d we conclude that Section 70-2-28 makes sense as written and requires the Attorney General to bring suit in court to establish liability and to assess whatever penalties are authorized by the Act. Therefore, we reject this argument as well.\n{22} Finally, the Commission argues that the Legislature\u2019s use of the phrase \u201cthe [Attorney [G]eneral shall bring suit\u201d in Section 70-2-28 is only meant to emphasize the Commission\u2019s duty to enforce the Act and should be read in conjunction with the Act\u2019s next section, which grants private citizens the right to enforce the Act when the Commission and the Division do not. See \u00a7 70-2-29 (\u201cActions for damages; institution of actions for injunctions by private parties.\u201d). We disagree. It is widely accepted that when construing statutes, \u201cshall\u201d indicates that the provision is mandatory, and we must assume that the Legislature intended the provision to be mandatory absent an clear indication to the contrary. See State v. Lujan, 90 N.M. 103, 105, 560 P.2d 167, 169 (1977). The plain reading of Section 70-2-28 requires, among other things, that the Attorney General bring suit for penalties when those penalties are applicable. To read the phrase \u201cthe [A]ttorney [G]eneral shall bring suit\u201d in Section 70-2-28 to mean that the Commission or the Division have the responsibility and the authority to enforce the Act and related rules and orders violates the plain meaning rule. We believe that the Legislature\u2019s directive that the Attorney General shall bring suit should be read to require the Attorney General to bring an action, not as a reminder that the Commission should enforce the Act. See Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 117 N.M. at 169, 870 P.2d at 131 (\u201cStatutory language should be interpreted literally.\u201d) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Cf. Cerrillos Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm\u2019rs of Santa Fe County, 2005-NMSC-023, \u00b6 21, 138 N.M. 126, 117 P.3d 932 (holding that county had implied statutory authority to suspend a mining permit because of zoning violations and was not limited to seeking statutory penalties through the district attorney in court). Therefore, we reject this final argument of the Commission as well.\nIII. CONCLUSION\n{23} While not unsympathetic to the Commission\u2019s professed need for greater enforcement authority, we defer, as we must, to the Legislature for the grant of that authority, and so too must the Commission. The Commission\u2019s enabling statutes are undeniably dated, and perhaps inadequate to face the contemporary challenges the Commission appears to claim. However, any enhancements to the Commission\u2019s authority must come from the same legislative body that created the Commission in the first instance.\n{24} For the reasons stated above, we hold that Section 70-2-28 requires the Attorney General to bring suit on behalf of the Division in court to impose civil penalties authorized by Section 70-2-31. We therefore reverse the district court and invalidate Section 19.15.5.10(B)(2) NMAC pertaining to the Commission\u2019s and the Division\u2019s authority to impose penalties.\n{25} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: PATRICIO M. SERNA, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, RICHARD C. BOSSON, and CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justices.\n. Rule 1227 was originally codified at 19.15.14.1227 NMAC. Apparently either the New Mexico Energy, Minerals and Natural Resources Department, the Commission, or the Division repealed that section of the Administrative Code and replaced it with 19.15.5.10 NMAC, although we could not find any record of the agency or the Commission making this change effective. Section 19.15.5.10 NMAC is identical in all material respects to former Rule 1227. For the sake of consistency on appeal, we refer to the disputed section of 19.15.5.10 as Rule 1227, recognizing that our holding affects the validity of 19.15.5.10(B)(2).\n. The parties agree that Rule 1227 empowers both the Commission and the Division to assess civil penalties. Thus, our holding is applicable to both the Commission\u2019s and the Division\u2019s authority in this regard.", "type": "majority", "author": "CH\u00c1VEZ, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Holland & Hart, L.L.P., William F. Carr, Larry J. Montano, Ocean Munds-Dry, Kristina Elena Martinez, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.", "Gary K. King, Attorney General, David K. Brooks, Special Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent.", "Belin & Sugarman, Alletta D. Belin, Santa Fe, NM, for Amicus Curiae New Mexico Citizens for Clean Air & Water, Inc." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2009-NMSC-013\n206 P.3d 135\nMARBOB ENERGY CORPORATION, a corporation, Petitioner-Petitioner, v. The NEW MEXICO OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION, Respondent-Respondent.\nNo. 30,710.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nMarch 11, 2009.\nHolland & Hart, L.L.P., William F. Carr, Larry J. Montano, Ocean Munds-Dry, Kristina Elena Martinez, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.\nGary K. King, Attorney General, David K. Brooks, Special Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent.\nBelin & Sugarman, Alletta D. Belin, Santa Fe, NM, for Amicus Curiae New Mexico Citizens for Clean Air & Water, Inc." }, "file_name": "0024-01", "first_page_order": 54, "last_page_order": 62 }