{ "id": 4243581, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose CHAVARRIA, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Chavarria", "decision_date": "2009-04-28", "docket_number": "No. 30,486", "first_page": "251", "last_page": "256", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "146 N.M. 251" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "208 P.3d 896" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2009-NMSC-020" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "304 U.S. 458", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 10805 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/304/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 U.S. 725", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6237509 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "733", "parenthetical": "quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)" }, { "parenthetical": "quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)" }, { "parenthetical": "quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)" }, { "page": "733-34" }, { "page": "733" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/507/0725-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 N.M. 197", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1588704 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201" }, { "page": "317" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/100/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "2002-NMSC-005", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 183137 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/131/0709-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 N.M. 694", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1588669 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "695" }, { "page": "427" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/100/0694-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMSC-041", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3692623 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 9-11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/142/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 N.M. 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1577311 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321", "parenthetical": "\"It has long been recognized in this state that it is solely within the province of the Legislature to establish penalties for criminal behavior.\"" }, { "page": "273", "parenthetical": "\"It has long been recognized in this state that it is solely within the province of the Legislature to establish penalties for criminal behavior.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/96/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMSC-023", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 827451 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12", "parenthetical": "\"It has long been recognized in this state that it is solely within the province of the Legislature to establish penalties for criminal behavior.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"It has long been recognized in this state that it is solely within the province of the Legislature to establish penalties for criminal behavior.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"It has long been recognized in this state that it is solely within the province of the Legislature to establish penalties for criminal behavior.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0039-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 N.M. 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1558923 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138" }, { "page": "581" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/120/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008-NMSC-043", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4002479 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/144/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMSC-017", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3668259 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" }, { "page": "\u00b68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/141/0451-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563451 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414" }, { "page": "5" }, { "page": "416" }, { "page": "7", "parenthetical": "holding that conditional guilty pleas are valid when entered into in accordance with certain standards" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0410-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 901, "char_count": 19026, "ocr_confidence": 0.657, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.625607563204612e-07, "percentile": 0.6880457123175907 }, "sha256": "d1acfcbc91388c8774f5394321a3ce0b155f90650d52c64a0548d4f7b933a8a5", "simhash": "1:bb5bcd38df245bf4", "word_count": 3050 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:28:31.770781+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Chief Justice, PATRICIO M. SERNA, RICHARD C. BOSSON and CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justices." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose CHAVARRIA, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nMAES, Justice.\n{1} Jose Chavarria (Defendant) pleaded guilty to one count of murder in the first degree with a firearm contrary to NMSA 1978, Sections 30-2-1 (1994) and 31-18-16 (1993). The trial court accepted Defendant\u2019s guilty plea, entered a judgment of conviction, and sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment, the maximum penalty for a serious youthful offender. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 31-18-14(A) (1993). On appeal, Defendant claims that his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and Article II, Section 13 of the New Mexico Constitution. We dismiss Defendant\u2019s appeal and conclude that Defendant waived his right to challenge the constitutionality of his sentence on appeal.\nFACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY\n{2} The record reflects the following facts. Defendant, Thomas Aragon, Jeff Goebel, and Ray Vargas decided to murder Tomasa Robles (Victim) because \u201cthe word[] on the street[]\u201d was that \u201cshe was a rat.\u201d On March 2, 2005, approximately three months prior to Defendant\u2019s eighteenth birthday, Goebel, Defendant, and Aragon took Victim \u201cfor a cruise.\u201d They parked their vehicles on the side of Darby Road in Roswell, New Mexico where Defendant and Goebel fatally shot Victim in the neck and head with a .38 special snub-nosed revolver.\n{3} Defendant subsequently confessed to his involvement in the murder, and a grand jury indicted Defendant on the following charges: (1) murder in the first degree with a firearm contrary to Sections 30-2-1, 31-18-16, and NMSA, Section 30-1-13 (1972); (2) kidnapping in the first degree contrary to NMSA 1978, Sections 30-4-1 (2003) and 30-1-13; (3) conspiracy to commit murder and/or kidnapping contrary to NMSA 1978, Sections 30-28-2 (1979), 30-2-1, and 30-4-1; and (4) tampering with evidence contrary to NMSA 1978, Sections 30-22-5 (2003) and 30-1-13. Defendant and the State subsequently entered into a plea and disposition agreement, whereby Defendant agreed to plead guilty to the crime of murder in the first degree with a firearm, and the State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts of the indictment. The plea and disposition agreement contained \u201cno agreements as to sentencing\u201d and explicitly stated that the maximum penalty for murder in the first degree as a serious youthful offender is life imprisonment. Pursuant to the plea and disposition agreement, Defendant expressly waived\nany and all motions, defenses, objections or requests which he has made or raised, or could assert hereafter, to the court\u2019s entry of judgment against him and imposition of a sentence upon him consistent with this agreement. The defendant waives the right to appeal the conviction that results from the entry of this plea agreement.\n{4} The trial court canvassed Defendant to ensure that his guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. With respect to Defendant\u2019s potential sentence, the record reflects the following colloquy:\nTHE COURT: Mr. Chavarria, do you understand that the law provides a range of sentence potentials in regard to the charge of murder in the first degree with a firearm?\n[Defendant]: Yes, your Honor.\nTHE COURT: I understand that this [plea and disposition agreement] anticipates that you \u2014 anticipates treating you as a serious youthful offender in regard to first degree murder a capital felony; do you understand?\n[Defendant]: Yes, your Honor. I sure do. THE COURT: So you understand that the potential could be anything from probation to life in prison?\n[Defendant]: Yes, your Honor.\nTHE COURT: Okay. Do you understand that the law provides that that range is the least possible thing that can happen that is probation the least consequential thing to the most severe that\u2019s life in prison; do you understand that?\n[Defendant] Yes, sir, your Honor, I do.\nTHE COURT: So Mr. Chavarria, do you understand that there is this range of things that can happen in regard to sentencing?\n[Defendant]: Yes, sir, your Honor, I do.\nTHE COURT: You do understand that?\n[Defendant]: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: Have you talked about that with [your counsel]?\n[Defendant]: Yes, sir, I have.\nTHE COURT: Okay. Mr. Chavarria, have you thought about the fact that in regard to this plea and disposition agreement, there is no promise, there is no guarantee, there is no indication at all what the court might do in terms of the sentence?\n[Defendant]: No, sir. Excuse me?\nTHE COURT: Do you understand that the sentence could be \u2014 I could sentence you anywhere in that range from probation all the way to life in prison?\n[Defendant]: Yes, your Honor, I understand.\nThereafter, the trial court accepted Defendant\u2019s guilty plea.\n{5} At his sentencing hearing, Defendant submitted evidence in mitigation of his sentence. Defendant proffered expert testimony from Dr. George Edwin Davis, a child adolescent psychiatrist, and Dr. Christine Johnson, a forensic psychologist, with respect to adolescent brain development. Dr. Davis testified that the frontal lobe of the brain, which controls executive functions such as judgment, planning and impulse control, is not fully developed in adolescents. This underdevelopment leads to \u201cnormal adolescent behavior,\u201d such as impulsivity, bad judgment, moodiness, mood liability, changeability, thrill seeking, and a susceptibility to peer pressure. Dr. Davis explained that the \u201cdecisions that adolescents make and behaviors that they exhibit are not very fixed or permanent and are still quite open to adjustment to the change in the treatment and to simple development actually.\u201d Accordingly, Dr. Davis testified that, in his opinion, adolescents \u201cshould not be punished the same as an adult\u201d for criminal behavior. Dr. Johnson agreed with Dr. Davis\u2019 opinion, explaining that \u201cadolescents are not in their final capacity for decision making\u201d and that this lack of finality should be treated \u201cas a mitigating factor in sentencing.\u201d\n{6} Both Drs. Davis and Johnson testified as to other mitigating factors unique to Defendant that could have impaired Defendant\u2019s judgment and impulse control. These factors included: (1) the physical abuse and neglect that Defendant suffered as a child, including repeated head trauma; (2) Defendant\u2019s learning disabilities and low intelligence quotient; and (3) Defendant\u2019s history of drug and alcohol abuse. Additionally, both Drs. Davis and Johnson testified that, since his commitment to the Youth Diagnostic and Detention Center (YDDC), Defendant has responded well to treatment and has shown positive behavioral changes.\n{7} At the conclusion of the hearing, Defendant asked the trial court to impose a fifteen-year sentence, the first year to run concurrent with his detention as a juvenile offender at the YDDC, followed by fourteen years of incarceration as an adult. The State asked the trial court to treat Defendant as an adult offender and to impose the maximum sentence of life imprisonment. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment in the adult correctional system, stating,\nI have heard today about the adolescent mind. I\u2019ve heard about a lot of drugs, use and trafficking as well, by the defendant.\nI\u2019ve heard, [defense counsel,] what you say when you say that he was a puppet in the hands of Jeff Goebel and Ray Vargas. But the fact is that [Defendant] killed a young woman in cold blood. And I have to think that Mr. Goebel and Mr. Vargas may well not have done that. That it took [Defendant] to carry out the cold-blooded murder.\nWhen I heard [Defendant] testify, I realized that this man knows exactly what he\u2019s doing. He has a very good grasp. I believe that Dr. Davis was right when he said that [Defendant] understands the consequences of his behavior and his presentment.\nI believe that I owe it to the victim\u2019s family, to this community, to see that a cold-blooded killer is placed behind bars for the rest of his life.\n{8} Defendant is now before this Court on direct appeal. See N.M. Const, art. VI, \u00a7 2 (\u201cAppeals from a judgment of the district court imposing a sentence of death or life imprisonment shall be taken directly to the supreme court.\u201d); accord Rule 12-102(A)(1) NMRA. Defendant claims that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, a sentence of life imprisonment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation to the Eighth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and Article II, Section 13 of the New Mexico Constitution. The State\u2019s response is twofold: first, the State claims that Defendant waived his right to appeal, and second, the State claims that Defendant\u2019s sentence is proportional to the crime committed and, therefore, does not violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.\nDISCUSSION\n{9} We first address whether Defendant waived his right to challenge the constitutionality of his sentence on appeal. Article VI, Section 2 of the New Mexico Constitution provides that \u201can aggrieved party shall have an absolute right to one appeal.\u201d \u201cHowever, a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, when voluntarily made after advice of counsel and with full understanding of the consequences, waives objections to prior defects in the proceedings and also operates as a waiver of statutory or constitutional rights, including the right to appeal.\u201d State v. Hodge, 118 N.M. 410, 414, 882 P.2d 1, 5 (1994). \u201cThus, a voluntary guilty plea ordinarily constitutes a waiver of the defendant\u2019s right to appeal his conviction on other than jurisdictional grounds.\u201d Id.; see also State v. Trujillo, 2007-NMSC-017, \u00b6 8, 141 N.M. 451, 157 P.3d 16 (\u201c[A] plea of guilty does not waive jurisdictional errors.\u201d); Rule 12-216(B) NMRA (providing that appellate courts may review jurisdictional questions raised for the first time on appeal).\n{10} In the present ease, Defendant entered an unconditional plea of guilty and, therefore, he did not reserve the right to raise his cruel and unusual punishment claim on appeal. Moreover, Defendant does not challenge the validity of his guilty plea. Accordingly, our review is limited to jurisdictional errors.\n{11} Questions regarding subject matter jurisdiction \u201care questions of law which are subject to de novo review.\u201d State v. Montoya, 2008-NMSC-043, \u00b6 9, 144 N.M. 458,188 P.3d 1209. \u201cSubject matter jurisdiction is the power to adjudicate the general questions involved ... and is not dependent upon the state of facts which may appear in a particular case____\u201d Gonzales v. Surgidev Corp., 120 N.M. 133, 138, 899 P.2d 576, 581 (1995). \u201cThe only relevant inquiry in determining whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction is to ask whether [the matter before the court] falls within the general scope of authority conferred upon such court by the constitution or statute.\u201d /\u00bf.(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\n{12} \u201cA trial court\u2019s power to sentence is derived exclusively from statute.\u201d State v. Martinez, 1998-NMSC-023, \u00b6 12, 126 N.M. 39, 966 P.2d 747; accord State v. Mabry, 96 N.M. 317, 321, 630 P.2d 269, 273 (1981) (\u201cIt has long been recognized in this state that it is solely within the province of the Legislature to establish penalties for criminal behavior.\u201d). The Criminal Sentencing Act (the Act), NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 31-18-12 to -26 (1977, as amended through 2003), confers authority on the trial court to impose a criminal sentence in accordance with its provisions. See, e.g., State v. Lucero, 2007-NMSC-041, \u00b6\u00b6 9-11, 142 N.M. 102, 163 P.3d 489; Trujillo, 2007-NMSC-017, \u00b68, 141 N.M. 451, 157 P.3d 16; see also \u00a7 31-18-13(A) (\u201cUnless otherwise provided in this section, all persons convicted of a crime under the laws of New Mexico shall be sentenced in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Sentencing Act____\u201d). Accordingly, we must determine whether Defendant\u2019s sentence of life imprisonment was authorized by the Act.\n{13} Defendant was seventeen-years old at the time of the murder and, therefore, he qualified as a \u201cserious youthful offender.\u201d See \u00a7 31-18-15.2(A); see also swpra footnote 1. When a serious youthful offender is found guilty of the crime of first degree murder, the trial court \u201cmay sentence the offender to less than, but not exceeding, the mandatory term for an adult.\u201d NMSA 1978, Section 31-18-15.3(D); see also \u00a7 31-18-13(A) (providing that \u201ca person sentenced as a serious youthful offender ... may be sentenced to less than the basic or mandatory sentence prescribed by the Criminal Sentencing Act.\u201d). The mandatory sentence for murder in the first degree with a firearm, a capital felony, is \u201clife imprisonment or death,\u201d provided that if the defendant was under the age of eighteen at the time of the murder, \u201che may be sentenced to life imprisonment but shall not be punished by death.\u201d Section 31-18-14(A). Because Defendant\u2019s sentence of life imprisonment was expressly authorized by the Act, we conclude that the trial court did not exceed its sentencing jurisdiction.\n{14} Defendant claims, however, that pursuant to State v. Sinyard, 100 N.M. 694, 695, 675 P.2d 426, 427 (Ct.App.1983), an unconstitutional sentence is an illegal sentence that may be challenged for the first time on appeal. We conclude that Sinyard is distinguishable from the present ease because, in Sinyard, the defendant did not claim that his sentence was a violation of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, but, rather, claimed only that his sentence was not authorized by the applicable statute. Id.; see also State v. Trujillo, 2002-NMSC-005, \u00b6 64, 131 N.M. 709, 42 P.3d 814 (distinguishing Sinyard on this basis). In Trujillo, we expressly held that a sentence authorized by statute, but claimed to be cruel and unusual punishment under the state and federal constitutions, does not implicate the jurisdiction of the sentencing court and, therefore, may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Trujillo, 2002-NMSC-005, \u00b664 n. 4, 131 N.M. 709, 42 P.3d 814; see also State v. Burdex, 100 N.M. 197, 201, 668 P.2d 313, 317 (Ct.App.1983) (holding that a cruel and unusual punishment claim is not jurisdictional and, therefore, may not be raised for the first time on appeal). Because Defendant\u2019s sentence was authorized by statute, Defendant\u2019s cruel and unusual punishment claim may not be raised for the first time on appeal.\n{15} Lastly, Defendant argues that we should review the merits of his unpreserved cruel and unusual punishment claim under the fundamental error doctrine. Fundamental error is an exception to the general rule requiring error to be preserved. See Rule 12-216. Although we occasionally have equated failure to preserve error, also known as forfeiture, and waiver of error, \u201c[w]aiver is different from forfeiture. Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the \u2018intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.\u2019 \u201d United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). As the United States Supreme Court observed in Olano, when examining the \u201cplain error\u201d doctrine under Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,\n[deviation from a legal rule is \u201cerror\u201d unless the rule has been waived. For example, a defendant who knowingly and voluntarily pleads guilty in conformity with the requirements of Rule 11 cannot have his conviction vacated by court of appeals on the grounds that he ought to have had a trial. Because the right to trial is waivable, and because the defendant who enters a valid guilty plea waives that right, his conviction without a trial is not \u201cerror.\u201d\nId. at 732-33, 113 S.Ct. 1770; see also id. at 733-34, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (\u201cIf a legal rule was violated during the district court proceedings, and if the defendant did not waive the rule, then there has been an \u201cerror\u201d within the meaning of Rule 52(b) despite the absence of a timely objection.\u201d). Likewise, we conclude that there is no fundamental error if the defendant has affirmatively waived, as opposed to simply forfeited, the constitutional right at issue. We caution, however, that, \u201c[w]hether a particular right is waivable; whether the defendant must participate personally in the waiver; whether certain procedures are required for waiver; and whether the defendant\u2019s choice must be particularly informed or voluntary, all depend on the right at stake.\u201d Olano, 507 U.S. at 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770.\n{16} As previously explained, the constitutional right to appeal is waivable, and a defendant who knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily pleads guilty, waives the right to appeal his conviction and sentence. Because Defendant does not challenge the validity of his guilty plea, we conclude that Defendant waived his right to challenge the constitutionality of his sentence on appeal. Accordingly, there is no fundamental error necessitating reversal of Defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence. We therefore do not reach the merits of Defendant\u2019s cruel and unusual punishment claim.\n{17} We note that a defendant can enter a conditional plea of guilty and reserve the right to challenge the constitutionality of his sentence on appeal. See Rule 5-304(A)(2) NMRA; Hodge, 118 N.M. at 416, 882 P.2d at 7 (holding that conditional guilty pleas are valid when entered into in accordance with certain standards). Alternatively, following the imposition of sentence, a defendant may be eligible to file: (1) a post-judgment motion in the trial court seeking to correct or modify an allegedly illegal sentence, see Rule 5-801 NMRA; (2) a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that his sentence is \u201cillegal or in excess of the maximum authorized by law,\u201d see Rule 5-802(A) NMRA; (3) or a post-conviction motion on the grounds that \u201cthe sentence was imposed in violation of the constitution of the United States, or of the constitution or laws of New Mexico.\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 31-11-6 (1966). Defendant, however, did not pursue any of these alternative avenues of relief.\nCONCLUSION\n{18} We conclude that Defendant waived his right to challenge the constitutionality of his sentence on appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss Defendant\u2019s appeal.\n{19} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Chief Justice, PATRICIO M. SERNA, RICHARD C. BOSSON and CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justices.\n. A \"serious youthful offender\u201d is \"an individual fifteen to eighteen years of age who is charged with and indicted or bound over for trial for first degree murder.\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 31-18-15.2(A) (1996).\n. Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in relevant part, that \"[a] plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the court\u2019s attention.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "MAES, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender, William A. O\u2019Connell, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Pe, NM, for Appellant.", "Gary K. King, Attorney General, Andrew S. Montgomery, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2009-NMSC-020\n208 P.3d 896\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose CHAVARRIA, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 30,486.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nApril 28, 2009.\nHugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender, William A. O\u2019Connell, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Pe, NM, for Appellant.\nGary K. King, Attorney General, Andrew S. Montgomery, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee." }, "file_name": "0251-01", "first_page_order": 281, "last_page_order": 286 }