{ "id": 4244645, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert LaCOUTURE, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. LaCouture", "decision_date": "2009-04-21", "docket_number": "No. 27,357", "first_page": "649", "last_page": "654", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "146 N.M. 649" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "213 P.3d 799" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2009-NMCA-071" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "468 U.S. 420", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11338811 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/468/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "270 N.J.Super. 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Super.", "case_ids": [ 611624 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555, 557" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-super/270/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 Hawaii 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Haw.", "case_ids": [ 12264363 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1192, 1194" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/haw/85/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "569 A.2d 81", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 11935719 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/569/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 Neb. 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Neb.", "case_ids": [ 5230118 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that a hospital patient was not subjected to custodial interrogation" }, { "page": "845", "parenthetical": "holding that a hospital patient was not subjected to custodial interrogation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/neb/239/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "710 A.2d 1183", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 11844958 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1185-86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/710/1183-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 S.W.3d 895", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 9004985 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "901-02", "parenthetical": "holding that factors incident to medical treatment, not police, restrained the defendant" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw3d/178/0895-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 N.M. 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1558851 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502" }, { "page": "244" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/120/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 N.M. 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 715244 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236" }, { "page": "1055" }, { "page": "236" }, { "page": "1055" }, { "page": "235, 238" }, { "page": "1057", "parenthetical": "interrogation was custodial where a hospital patient was placed in handcuffs by police prior to questioning" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/111/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMSC-048", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 827394 ], "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 21" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "\u00b640" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0535-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 N.M. 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1558825 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" }, { "page": "716" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/120/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "2000-NMSC-031", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 1217178 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/129/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMSC-058", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 17186 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 25-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/124/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "2000-NMSC-018", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 1217162 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b610" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/129/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMCA-023", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 142168 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b68" }, { "page": "\u00b68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/123/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 925, "char_count": 18772, "ocr_confidence": 0.671, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14110089043801397 }, "sha256": "dc5dc1c5319156504cdb510eaf76886d4ec3bb4edbdd349b63d2cfaa6887fc41", "simhash": "1:796b9a02ebb39a42", "word_count": 2930 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:28:31.770781+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: JAMES J. WECHSLER and MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judges." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert LaCOUTURE, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nKENNEDY, Judge.\n{1} In this case, we consider constitutional issues surrounding a police interrogation of a hospital patient. Defendant-Appellant Robert LaCouture (LaCouture) pled no contest to possession of methamphetamine, use or possession of drug paraphernalia, and careless driving. A charge of negligent use of a deadly weapon was dropped. In his plea, LaCouture reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress certain inculpatory remarks he made to police as a hospital patient following a traffic accident. He argues that his statements should have been suppressed because he made them involuntarily and was not advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). We affirm the district court and hold that LaCouture\u2019s statements were voluntary and that, at the time he made them, he was not in police custody and therefore not entitled to a Miranda warning.\nBACKGROUND\n{2} Late in the evening of April 13, 2005, LaCouture was driving from Roswell to Ruidoso on U.S. 70 when his pickup truck collided with a semi-truck. Severely injured, La-Couture was transported to the Lincoln County Medical Center where he received treatment. LaCouture\u2019s injuries included a damaged hip and spine, fractured leg bones (both tibia and fibula), four broken ribs, and a bruised lung. Officer Roberto Diaz conducted an initial investigation at the scene and then traveled to the hospital to speak with LaCouture. Officer Diaz testified that such questioning was standard procedure for the New Mexico State Police.\n{3} At the hospital, Officer Diaz made contact with LaCouture, questioned him about the accident and the events which preceded it, and made an audio recording of the interview. During the interview, as the audio recording indicates, LaCouture was in pain and often moaned and mumbled. Despite whatever pain or discomfort he experienced, however, LaCouture was responsive to Officer Diaz\u2019s questions and gave coherent answers. No evidence in the record indicates that Officer Diaz did anything to restrain LaCouture or to prevent him from terminating the interview. LaCouture, likewise, indicates none.\n{4} During this approximately seven-minute interview, LaCouture made several inculpatory statements in response to questions. When asked, \u201cDo you carry a weapon,\u201d La-Couture replied, \u201cYes sir.\u201d He then proceeded to identify the type of weapon he carried. Moments later, the following exchange took place:\nQ: Are you under the influence of anything?\nA: No, sir.\nQ: If I were to give you a blood test would it come back positive or negative? A: Probably come back positive, man.\nQ: For what?\nA: For amphetamine.\nQ: When did you take amphetamine?\nA: Ah shit, it was earlier today, man.\nQ: Earlier today? How much did you take?\nA: Oh shit, man, it was not much, we smoked a little bit.\nStill later, Officer Diaz asked LaCouture if he had taken any other drugs, and LaCouture replied, \u201cThis morning I was getting a bad migraine so I took a Loratab.\u201d When asked if it was prescribed, LaCouture indicated that it was not.\n{5} LaCouture was charged with possession of methamphetamine, use or possession of drug paraphernalia, aggravated DWI, negligent use of a deadly weapon, and reckless driving. He filed a pretrial motion to suppress the statements he made in the hospital, and the matter came before the Lincoln County District Court on January 27, 2006. LaCouture argued that his statements were involuntary and that their admission would violate Miranda.\n{6} After hearing evidence and the arguments of counsel, the district court denied LaCouture\u2019s motion. It found that LaCouture\u2019s statement was voluntary because he was \u201cconscious and knew what he was saying!,] \u2022 \u2022 \u2022 was quite coherent!,] and [had] asked and answered questions appropriately.\u201d The court concluded that \u201cunder the circumstances, I do not believe it was necessary to read Miranda [to LaCouture] prior to [Officer Diaz] asking questions about the accident.\u201d\n{7} After the denial of his motion to suppress, LaCouture entered a plea agreement with the State. In return for the dismissal of his charges for aggravated DWI, negligent use of a deadly weapon, and reckless driving, LaCouture entered a plea of no contest to the charges of possession of methamphetamine, use or possession of drug paraphernalia, and careless driving. As a result, he was sentenced to almost three years of probation.\n{8} LaCouture asks this Court to reverse the district court\u2019s denial of his motion to suppress. He claims that his inculpatory statements to Officer Diaz should have been suppressed because they were involuntary' and because he was not issued a Miranda warning prior to making them. We consider each of his arguments in turn.\nDISCUSSION\n1. Standard of Review\n{9} When reviewing a district court\u2019s denial of a motion to suppress, we consider its findings of fact for substantial evidence, State v. Leyba, 1997-NMCA-023, \u00b68, 123 N.M. 159, 935 P.2d 1171, and view them in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. State v. Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, \u00b610, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856. We then consider the district court\u2019s legal conclusions de novo. Leyba, 1997-NMCA-023, \u00b68, 123 N.M. 159, 935 P.2d 1171. In this way, we analyze de novo the questions of whether a defendant\u2019s statement was voluntary and whether the defendant was subject to a custodial interrogation. State v. Cooper, 1997-NMSC-058, \u00b6\u00b6 25-28, 124 N.M. 277, 949 P.2d 660 (providing the standard of review to determine voluntariness); State v. Nieto, 2000-NMSC-031, \u00b6 19, 129 N.M. 688, 12 P.3d 442 (providing the standard of review to establish custodial interrogation).\n2. LaCouture\u2019s Claim That His Statements Were Involuntary\n{10} LaCouture first asserts that his confession to Officer Diaz was involuntary and should have been suppressed by the district court. In arguing against a motion to suppress, the prosecution must prove that the defendant\u2019s statement was voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Fekete, 120 N.M. 290, 298, 901 P.2d 708, 716 (1995). On appeal, we determine the voluntariness of a statement by analyzing the entire record and the circumstances under which the statement was made. Id. The \u201ctotality of the circumstances\u201d provides our guiding light in such an analysis. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\n{11} New Mexico defines voluntariness as \u201cfreedom from official coercion.\u201d State v. Munoz, 1998-NMSC-048, \u00b6 21, 126 N.M. 535, 972 P.2d 847 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As stated above, we analyze the totality of the circumstances, but an involuntary statement must also have been made in response to some \u201celement of official overreaching\u201d by the police. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Examples of official overreaching include \u201cintimidation, coercion, deception, assurances, or other police misconduct that constitutes overreaching.\u201d Id. \u00b6 23. Looking at the totality of the circumstances may require considering the physical and mental state of the Defendant as a context affecting what might be coercive and overreaching. What techniques that may be coercive when employed with an injured or medicated subject may not be when dealing with a healthy and unmedicated defendant.\n{12} Despite his physical condition, La-Couture was responsive to Officer Diaz\u2019s questions and was able to answer them coherently. At the time Officer Diaz interviewed him, LaCouture had suffered an automobile crash that caused him various injuries, including damage to his hip and spine, broken ribs, fractured leg bones (both tibia and fibula), and internal bruising. Despite these injuries, LaCouture was able to respond coherently to all of Officer Diaz\u2019s questions, more often than not providing the required information and occasionally stating that he did not remember. For instance, LaCouture was able to state his vehicle\u2019s direction of travel, the highway on which he was driving, his destination, and the city from which he departed. He was able to remember and communicate the events of the crash: first, that he saw a semi-truck, and second, that he tried to steer clear of it \u201c[b]efore the impact.\u201d He was able to remember that he carried a gun, that he had taken amphetamines, and that he had taken a Lora-tab. Interestingly, he refused to give the name of the person from whose house he had departed, stating, \u201cI can\u2019t tell you that, man. [That\u2019s my boy, man.] I\u2019m sorry.\u201d And when asked about where and with whom he had taken amphetamines, LaCouture stated that he smoked them at this same \u201cfriend\u2019s house\u201d and remained silent about the person\u2019s identity. Throughout the interview, LaCouture said \u201cyes, sir\u201d or \u201cno, sir\u201d several times and cooperated fully with Officer Diaz. Finally, near the end of the interview, after Officer Diaz read the Implied Consent Act, La-Couture even asked, \u201cCould you repeat all that stuff?\u201d These aspects of the taped conversation between Officer Diaz and La-Couture provides substantial evidence supporting the district court\u2019s findings of fact.\n{13} We turn now to the behavior of Officer Diaz. For example, at no time during the interview did he threaten LaCouture, promise special treatment in return for La-Couture\u2019s cooperation, physically abuse La-Couture, or engage in coercion of any type. Most of his questions were benign, revolving around the facts of the accident. And although LaCouture never explicitly consented to the questioning, when Officer Diaz stated, \u201cI\u2019m here ... to ask you a couple of questions, OK,\u201d LaCouture did not resist. Officer Diaz also repeatedly made sure that LaCouture understood, and on multiple occasions during the interview he asked, \u201cDo you understand?\u201d The entire exchange between LaCouture and Officer Diaz lasted approximately seven minutes.\n{14} We conclude that LaCouture\u2019s mental state, though certainly not that of an uninjured, healthy person, was not so impaired as to transform Officer Diaz\u2019s questions into official overreaching. A review of the taped interview therefore demonstrates that La-Couture was responsive and capable of coherently answering Officer Diaz\u2019s questions. Our review likewise indicates that Officer Diaz\u2019s conduct shows no traces of \u201cofficial overreaching\u201d due to LaCouture\u2019s mental state or Officer Diaz\u2019s own actions as that term is defined in this state or in federal jurisprudence. The record thus provides substantial evidence for the district court\u2019s findings of fact.\n3. LaCouture\u2019s Claim That He Should Have Received a Miranda Warning\n{15} LaCouture next contends that his confession should have been suppressed because he was subjected to a custodial interrogation without first being issued a Miranda warning. In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment requires the exclusion of certain confessions when the police fail to notify a defendant of his rights. State v. Ybarra, 111 N.M. 234, 236, 804 P.2d 1053, 1055 (1990). Such a warning is required only when police subject a defendant to a \u201ccustodial interrogation.\u201d State v. Juarez, 120 N.M. 499, 502, 903 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct.App.1995). Police meet the \u201cinterrogation\u201d requirement whenever they expressly question a defendant or expose him to the functional equivalent of questioning. Ybarra, 111 N.M. at 236, 804 P.2d at 1055. Police meet the \u201ccustodial\u201d requirement in one of two ways: either the defendant\u2019s \u201cfreedom of movement [was] restrained to a degree associated with a formal arrest\u201d or the defendant was restrained in such a way that a reasonable person would feel \u201cnot free to leave the scene.\u201d Munoz, 1998-NMSC-048, \u00b640, 126 N.M. 535, 972 P.2d 847 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The test is an objective one, and the \u201csubjective beliefs of the defendant and the interviewing officer ... are irrelevant.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\n{16} Our appellate courts have never considered whether the interrogation of a hospital patient constitutes a custodial interrogation. We therefore look to other state authority that has dealt with the issue. Based on the out-of-state authority the determination that a defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation most often turns on the distinction between circumstantial restraints and direct police-imposed limitations on a defendant\u2019s freedom. See Yarborough v. State, 178 S.W.3d 895, 901-02 (Tex.App. 2005) (holding that factors incident to medical treatment, not police, restrained the defendant); Commonwealth v. Perry, 710 A.2d 1183, 1185-86 (Pa.Super.Ct.1998) (holding that a defendant who was wearing a neck brace, attached intravenously to tubes, and lying on a hospital gurney was not in custody); see also State v. Melton, 239 Neb. 506, 476 N.W.2d 842, 845 (1991) (holding that a hospital patient was not subjected to custodial interrogation); Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81, 94 (Del.1989) (where an emergency room patient was restrained not by police but by his condition); but cf. Ybarra, 111 N.M. at 235, 238, 804 P.2d at 1057 (interrogation was custodial where a hospital patient was placed in handcuffs by police prior to questioning); State v. Pebria, 85 Hawaii 171, 938 P.2d 1190, 1192, 1194 (Ct.App.1997) (interrogation was custodial where defendant was detained by hospital security guards prior to and during questioning); State v. O\u2019Loughlin, 270 N.J.Super. 472, 637 A.2d 553, 555, 557 (Ct.App.Div.1994) (interrogation was custodial where defendant was detained by police at a hospital).\n{17} On the record before us, we find little evidence to support the notion that LaCouture was subjected to a custodial interrogation. His inculpatory statements were made prior to being placed under formal arrest. And though he had experienced serious physical injuries and was apparently in a great deal of pain, LaCouture was never placed in handcuffs, and the record indicates no time at which he and Officer Diaz engaged in physical contact of any kind. Officer Diaz questioned LaCouture in a public place, as indicated by the ambient noise on the interview tape. Finally, Officer Diaz never antagonized LaCouture or applied aggressive tactics to elicit the confession.\n{18} Nevertheless, LaCouture asserts that despite the absence of any police-imposed restraint on his freedom, he was still subjected to a custodial interrogation because his injuries confined him to the bed and rendered him unfree to leave, he was surrounded by \u201cantagonistic forces\u201d and \u201ctechniques of persuasion,\u201d and he asked for a lawyer and was told that he did not need one. These arguments fail to persuade us. First, as outlined in the cases above, the fact that LaCouture was restrained by injuries and medical accoutrements warrants little consideration. LaCouture was exposed only to circumstantial restraints, and, as stated above, the record indicates no action by Officer Diaz to restrain him. Second, Officer Diaz\u2019s conduct can hardly be interpreted as \u201cantagonistic.\u201d Throughout the interview, Officer Diaz conducted himself in a professional manner, thanked LaCouture repeatedly, and asked him if he understood on several occasions. As to LaCouture\u2019s alleged \u201ctechniques of persuasion,\u201d we remain unclear on exactly what that means. LaCouture provides no examples, and we reject it.\n{19} Third, that LaCouture requested and was denied a lawyer does not transform his non-custodial interrogation into a custodial interrogation. After making the inculpatory remarks that form the subject of this appeal, LaCouture asked, \u201cAm I going to need a lawyer?\u201d Officer Diaz answered, \u201cNot yet.\u201d LaCouture asserts that this exchange reflects a custodial interrogation. We disagree. A person has a right to an attorney only after being exposed to custodial interrogation, which occurs \u201cas soon as [the person\u2019s] freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest.\u201d Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). La-Couture misapprehends the interrelationship between Miranda, custodial interrogation, and his constitutional right to counsel. His inquiry of Officer Diaz about whether he needed legal representation neither renders his interrogation custodial nor creates a right to legal representation.\n{20} LaCouture\u2019s request for an attorney after his arrest constitutes another matter entirely, but it has no operative legal effect on the outcome of this appeal, and we consider it only in the interest of clarity. After making various incriminating remarks to Officer Diaz, LaCouture was placed under arrest. Shortly after being placed under arrest, he invoked his right to counsel, but the record fails to indicate whether the request was honored. Of course, once Officer Diaz placed LaCouture under arrest, a custodial relationship was created. But we note that LaCouture made no inculpatory statements after this event, and his request for an attorney, even if denied, was therefore immaterial.\n{21} Based on the analysis above, we affirm the district court\u2019s denial of LaCouture\u2019s motion to suppress his statements to Officer Diaz and hold that he was not subjected to a custodial interrogation. Because he was not subjected to a custodial interrogation at the time his incriminating statements were made, a warning under Miranda was unnecessary. His statements were admissible.\nCONCLUSION\n{22} For the reasons stated above, we hold that LaCouture\u2019s admission was voluntary and that he was not subjected to a custodial interrogation. The district court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record, and its conclusions of law were accurately applied. We affirm.\n{23} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: JAMES J. WECHSLER and MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judges.\n. Based on a comparison of the transcript contained in LaCouture\u2019s brief in chief and the audio recording made by Officer Diaz, we note that one of very few discrepancies concerns LaCouture's responses of \"yes sir\u201d and \"no sir\u201d to Officer Diaz\u2019s questions. Several of these are absent from LaCouture\u2019s transcript. We also note that when asked to identify his friend, LaCouture\u2019s statement, \"That\u2019s my boy, man,\u201d is absent from the transcript. In this opinion, we primarily rely on the transcript, using Officer Diaz\u2019s recording when appropriate.", "type": "majority", "author": "KENNEDY, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Gary K. King, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, Ralph E. Trujillo, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.", "Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender, Susan Roth, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2009-NMCA-071\n213 P.3d 799\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert LaCOUTURE, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 27,357.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nApril 21, 2009.\nCertiorari Denied, No. 31,704, June 10, 2009.\nGary K. King, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, Ralph E. Trujillo, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.\nHugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender, Susan Roth, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant." }, "file_name": "0649-01", "first_page_order": 679, "last_page_order": 684 }