{ "id": 4245434, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. NICK R., a child, Defendant-Petitioner", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Nick R.", "decision_date": "2009-09-28", "docket_number": "No. 30,657", "first_page": "182", "last_page": "193", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "147 N.M. 182" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2009-NMSC-050" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "218 P.3d 868" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "197 Ariz. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz.", "case_ids": [ 216936 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "en banc" }, { "page": "385", "parenthetical": "en banc" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/197/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 Idaho 271", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Idaho", "case_ids": [ 1359194 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/idaho/140/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.M. 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 731674 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80", "parenthetical": "stating that the Legislature is presumed to know about existing laws and cannot be inferred to have enacted a law inconsistent with an existing law" }, { "page": "78", "parenthetical": "stating that the Legislature is presumed to know about existing laws and cannot be inferred to have enacted a law inconsistent with an existing law" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/114/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 Wis.2d 718", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis. 2d", "case_ids": [ 11501552 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "dog" }, { "page": "333", "parenthetical": "dog" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/226/0718-01" ] }, { "cite": "242 S.W. 236", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "case_ids": [ 8257894 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw/242/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 Tex. Crim. 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Tex. Crim.", "case_ids": [ 5022760 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/tex-crim/92/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "964 S.W.2d 335", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 11843962 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/964/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 N.W.2d 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10595500 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/444/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 P.2d 744", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10506015 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "749" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/284/0744-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 P.2d 1015", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10500437 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1017" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/355/1015-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Misc.2d 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Misc. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1140439 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/misc2d/185/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 A.D.3d 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.3d", "case_ids": [ 3031539 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad3d/28/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 N.J. 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J.", "case_ids": [ 321291 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "carpet-cutting razor" }, { "page": "1292-93", "parenthetical": "carpet-cutting razor" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj/118/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 N.E.2d 932", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 11050140 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "936" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/455/0932-01" ] }, { "cite": "644 N.E.2d 1235", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 10943169 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1238-39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/644/1235-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 Colo. 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Colo.", "case_ids": [ 4633834 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "shoe as deadly weapon" }, { "page": "605", "parenthetical": "shoe as deadly weapon" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/colo/172/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 N.M. 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 322296 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/122/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.M. 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 731530 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674" }, { "page": "768" }, { "page": "673-74" }, { "page": "767-68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/114/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 N.M. 780", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 723308 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "786", "parenthetical": "determining that a trial court had not removed an essential element of an offense from a jury's consideration in a sex offense prosecution" }, { "page": "1152", "parenthetical": "determining that a trial court had not removed an essential element of an offense from a jury's consideration in a sex offense prosecution" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/113/0780-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 N.M. 780", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2774872 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "781" }, { "page": "1307" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/85/0780-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 N.M. 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8841505 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176", "parenthetical": "holding that it was for the jury to determine whether a knife with a two-inch blade was a deadly weapon as used by the defendant in the circumstances of the case" }, { "page": "792", "parenthetical": "holding that it was for the jury to determine whether a knife with a two-inch blade was a deadly weapon as used by the defendant in the circumstances of the case" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/57/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "43 N.M. 138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1568276 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1939, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139-40" }, { "page": "433" }, { "page": "140" }, { "page": "433" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/43/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "36 N.M. 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1586526 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1932, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255" }, { "page": "555" }, { "page": "254" }, { "page": "555" }, { "page": "255" }, { "page": "555" }, { "page": "255-56" }, { "page": "556" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/36/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "37 P. 1117", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "weight": 6, "year": 1894, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1118" }, { "page": "1117" }, { "page": "1118" }, { "page": "1118" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "7 N.M. 571", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 4659993 ], "year": 1894, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577-78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/7/0571-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 N.M. 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 720269 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79-80" }, { "page": "577-78" }, { "page": "82" }, { "page": "580", "parenthetical": "determining that a butterfly knife fit the statutory definition of a switchblade and therefore was a \"deadly weapon\" under the statute" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/112/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 N.M. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5319949 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115", "parenthetical": "applying the principle to a change in criminal sentencing statutes" }, { "page": "970", "parenthetical": "applying the principle to a change in criminal sentencing statutes" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/73/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "1855 WL 2214", "category": "reporters:specialty_west", "reporter": "WL", "weight": 6, "year": 1855, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "*1", "parenthetical": "holding that an indictment charging assault with intent to kill with an undeseribed knife was insufficient under the statute because of its failure to allege that the assault was committed with a deadly weapon" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1 N.M. 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8300665 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1855, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123", "parenthetical": "holding that an indictment charging assault with intent to kill with an undeseribed knife was insufficient under the statute because of its failure to allege that the assault was committed with a deadly weapon" }, { "page": "124" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/1/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 N.M. 747", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2770316 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "749-50", "parenthetical": "applying the concept to the scope of a permissible liquor license transfer" }, { "page": "71-72", "parenthetical": "applying the concept to the scope of a permissible liquor license transfer" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/85/0747-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 N.M. 267", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2776087 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269" }, { "page": "318-19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/63/0267-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 N.M. 788", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1561306 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "791" }, { "page": "1332" }, { "page": "790-91" }, { "page": "1331-32", "parenthetical": "declining to interpret a chainlink fence as a \"structure\" as meant in the burglary statute, which criminalizes unlawful entry into \"any vehicle, watercraft, aircraft, dwelling or other structure, movable or immovable\" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/119/0788-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMCA-035", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3669906 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 15" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 13, 15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/141/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMSC-033", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3692773 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/142/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-013", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4243054 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 N.M. 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1588696 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238-39" }, { "page": "1115-16" }, { "page": "239" }, { "page": "1116" }, { "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/100/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "2001-NMCA-027", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 352453 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 10, 14" }, { "page": "\u00b6 32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/130/0295-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMCA-076", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 15859 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 4, 9-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/133/0794-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMCA-091", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3692500 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 6, 8-9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/142/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "2001-NMSC-022", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 352435 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" }, { "page": "\u00b6 12" }, { "page": "\u00b6 14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/130/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMCA-043", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 142172 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 8, 10" }, { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/123/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.M. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1575595 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "591" }, { "page": "533" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/95/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMSC-010", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 1428059 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/135/0397-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMSC-046", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3691916 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/142/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMSC-022", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 77128 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMSC-001", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 77119 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0768-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1815, "char_count": 43849, "ocr_confidence": 0.689, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.441770946974335e-07, "percentile": 0.921169342305285 }, "sha256": "469b1d6ff3f9dbc4b5f0d93491e218147df3f5412e7487c761af888b2e2808c8", "simhash": "1:2930caa9b55972a1", "word_count": 7286 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:21:31.817470+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Chief Justice, PATRICIO M. SERNA, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, and RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justices." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. NICK R., a child, Defendant-Petitioner." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nDANIELS, Justice.\n{1} Petitioner Nick R., a sixteen-year-old student at Taos High School, was charged in Children\u2019s Court with possessing a deadly weapon on school premises, in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-7-2.1 (1994). The issue before us is whether the Legislature intended to make an ordinary pocketknife a per se deadly weapon in the Criminal Code\u2019s statutory definitions, without regard to either its actual use or a person\u2019s purpose for carrying it, and thereby preclude any right to a jury determination of its status as a deadly weapon in the circumstances of a particular ease.\n{2} Although Section 30-7-2.1 does not refer to a pocketknife or define the term \u201cdeadly weapon\u201d in any other way, NMSA 1978, Section 30-l-12(B) (1963) provides that, \u201c[a]s used in the Criminal Code\u201d:\n\u201cdeadly weapon\u201d means any firearm, whether loaded or unloaded; or any weapon which is capable of producing death or great bodily harm, including but not restricted to any types of daggers, brass knuckles, switchblade knives, bowie knives, poniards, butcher knives, dirk knives and all such weapons with which dangerous cuts can be given, or with which dangerous thrusts can be inflicted, including sword-canes, and any kind of sharp pointed canes, also slingshots, slung shots, bludgeons; or any other weapons with which dangerous wounds can be inflicted[.]\n{3} The Court of Appeals affirmed rulings of the Children\u2019s Court that Petitioner was not entitled to have a jury decide whether he had the intent to possess a pocketknife as a weapon. State v. Nick R., No. 27,145, slip op. at 2 (N.M.Ct.App. Aug. 30, 2007). Our review of the definitional statute\u2019s language, its history, its purposes, its relationship with other statutes, and over one hundred years of New Mexico case law leads us to the opposite conclusion. We therefore reverse the contrary rulings of the lower courts.\nI. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW\n{4} The relevant facts were stipulated by the parties. Petitioner Nick R. worked after school hours for his father at a furniture store. His father supplied all store employees, including Nick, with pocketknives for opening boxes at work. One day in his math class, Nick felt something in his pocket and pulled it out to look at it. It was the pocketknife he had been using at work the evening before when he had been wearing the same pair of pants. His math teacher spotted him \u201cmessing around\u201d with the unopened poeketknife underneath his school desk, confiscated it, and turned it over to school authorities. Nothing in the record indicates that the poeketknife was ever used or intended to be used as a weapon.\n{5} Nick was suspended from school pending an administrative investigation, but he was reinstated after the superintendent of schools determined that he had not intentionally brought the poeketknife onto campus. Three months later, the State filed a delinquency petition in Children\u2019s Court, charging that Nick had committed a delinquent act under the Children\u2019s Code, on the theory that he had committed an offense that would have been a fourth-degree felony if committed by an adult.\n{6} Before trial, the State filed two motions in limine relevant to this appeal, both of which were heard as preliminary matters on the day the parties appeared for the scheduled jury trial. The first, \u201cState\u2019s Motion in Limine for Legal Determination that the Knife Is a Deadly Weapon,\u201d included as an exhibit a photograph of the poeketknife taken from Nick. The motion sought to have the court rule as a matter of law that the depicted item fit the statutory definition of \u201cdeadly weapon\u201d under Section 30-l-12(B) and rule that the jury could not be allowed to make that determination. In granting the motion and taking the issue from the jury, the court rejected defense counsel\u2019s argument that the jury should determine whether the statutory deadly weapon definition had been met, based on the nature of the object and its manner of actual or intended use in the circumstances.\n{7} A related motion was the \u201cState\u2019s Motion in Limine to Exclude Any Reference to a Use Requirement,\u201d which argued that not only should the court make a pretrial determination that the particular poeketknife was per se a deadly weapon under the statute, but that defense counsel should be prohibited from making any argument to the jury regarding Nick\u2019s actual or intended use of the poeketknife. In granting the State\u2019s motions, the Children\u2019s Court judge commented from the bench:\nSo, it\u2019s not the intended use of the instrument, it\u2019s just the fact that you have it and you shouldn\u2019t. Simple as that. So, I don\u2019t think the use of it or the intended use has any bearing in. this case. He either had it on him or carried it on school grounds or he didn\u2019t. I don\u2019t know what else \u2014 that\u2019s what the jury\u2019s got to hear.\nThey can\u2019t hear that he didn\u2019t intend to use it, he wasn\u2019t going to use it, because everybody could argue that, whether they intend to or not.\n{8} Following the court\u2019s rulings on the motions in limine, defense counsel moved that the issues be certified for an interlocutory appeal, given the fact that there were no other triable issues to submit to the jury. The court denied the request. The parties then conferred and arrived at a conditional plea agreement that preserved Petitioner\u2019s right to appellate review of the pretrial rulings in limine.\n{9} In an unpublished memorandum opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Children\u2019s Court rulings, holding that simple possession of a poeketknife on school premises constitutes criminal possession of a deadly weapon as a matter of law, regardless of the possessor\u2019s actual or intended use. Nick R., No. 27,145, slip op. at 2-3.\n{10} The case comes before us on certiorari to review the Court of Appeals\u2019 conclusion that \u201c[b]ecause Child was carrying a knife, which is defined as a deadly weapon, there is no requirement that the State show that he intended to use it as a weapon.\u201d Id. at 3.\nII. STANDARD OF REVIEW\n{11} Statutory construction is a matter of law we review de novo. State v. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, \u00b6 9, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939. Our primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. State v. Davis, 2003-NMSC-022, \u00b6 6, 134 N.M. 172, 74 P.3d 1064. In doing so, \u201cwe examine the plain language of the statute as well as the context in which it was promulgated, including the history of the statute and the object and purpose the Legislature sought to accomplish.\u201d Maes v. Audubon Indem. Ins. Group, 2007-NMSC-046, \u00b6 11, 142 N.M. 235, 164 P.3d 934; see Hovet v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2004-NMSC-010, \u00b6 10, 135 N.M. 397, 89 P.3d 69. We must take care to avoid adoption of a construction that would \u201crender the statute\u2019s application absurd or unreasonable\u201d or \u201clead to injustice or contradiction.\u201d N.M. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Educ., 95 N.M. 588, 591, 624 P.2d 530, 533 (1981).\nIII. DISCUSSION\n{12} Article 7 of the New Mexico Criminal Code, \u2018Weapons and Explosives,\u201d contains several statutes imposing criminal sanctions for unlawfully carrying deadly weapons. Section 30-7-1, provides with respect to all those statutes that \u2018\u201c[ejarrying a deadly weapon\u2019 means being armed with a deadly weapon ... or in close proximity thereto, so that the weapon is readily accessible for use.\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-7-1 (1963); see State v. Salazar, 1997-NMCA-043, \u00b6\u00b6 8, 10, 123 N.M. 347, 940 P.2d 195 (holding that the term \u201ccarrying\u201d does not have a broader meaning in connection with carrying a weapon on school grounds; whether the defendant was carrying a deadly weapon was a factual determination to be made by a jury in school ground cases, in the same manner as in prosecutions under other statutes criminalizing the carrying of a deadly weapon).\n{13} The basic crime of unlawful carrying of a deadly weapon is contained in NMSA 1978, Section 30-7-2(A) (2001), which imposes a petty misdemeanor criminal penalty of up to six months in jail, and NMSA 1978, \u00a7 31-19-1(B) (1984), for carrying \u201ca concealed loaded firearm or any other type of deadly weapon anywhere, except\u201d in one\u2019s automobile for personal protection, on one\u2019s real property, with a concealed firearms permit, or by a peace officer.\n{14} In addition to this generally applicable weapons-carrying crime, Article 7 also contains statutes providing heightened criminal penalties for carrying deadly weapons in particular contexts, such as authorizing a full misdemeanor jail sentence of up to a year, NMSA 1978, \u00a7 31 \u2014 19\u20141(A) (1984), for carrying any deadly weapon on a bus, NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-7-13 (1979), and a felony prison sentence of up to eighteen months for carrying any deadly weapon on school grounds, \u00a7 30-7-2.1, the criminal charge involved in this case. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 31-18-15(A)(10) (2005, prior to 2007 amendment).\n{15} Although neither Section 30-7-2.1 nor any other statute in Article 7 contains any further definition of what is meant by the recurring term \u201cdeadly weapon,\u201d the courts below and the parties have recognized that the definition applicable to those statutes is contained in Section 30-l-12(B), the Criminal Code\u2019s uniform definition of the term, applicable to a broad range of offenses involving both use and possession of deadly weapons. See State v. Traeger, 2001-NMSC-022, \u00b6 10, 130 N.M. 618, 29 P.3d 518 (interpreting Section 30-l-12(B) in the context of a charge of aggravated battery with a baseball bat as a deadly weapon); State v. Fernandez, 2007-NMCA-091, \u00b6\u00b6 6, 8-9, 142 N.M. 231, 164 P.3d 112 (interpreting Section 30-l-12(B) in the context of a charge of armed robbery with a BB gun as a deadly weapon); State v. Galaz, 2003-NMCA-076, \u00b6\u00b6 4, 9-10, 133 N.M. 794, 70 P.3d 784 (interpreting Section 30-l-12(B) in the context of a probation revocation for possession of bullets as deadly weapons); State v. Anderson, 2001-NMCA-027, \u00b6\u00b6 10, 14, 130 N.M. 295, 24 P.3d 327 (interpreting Section 30-l-12(B) in the context of a charge of aggravated stalking with a stick as a deadly weapon); State v. Blea, 100 N.M. 237, 238-39, 668 P.2d 1114, 1115-16 (Ct.App.1983) (interpreting a similar city ordinance in the context of a charge of unlawful carrying of a voltage tester as a deadly weapon). We therefore must analyze the proper interpretation of this uniform statutory definition of deadly weapons in light of its multiple intended applications.\nA. Statutory Language Analysis\n{16} The first step in any statutory construction is to try \u201cto determine and give effect to the Legislature\u2019s intent\u201d by analyzing the language of the statute. Marbob Energy Corp. v. N.M. Oil Conservation Comm\u2019n, 2009-NMSC-013, \u00b6 9, 146 N.M. 24, 206 P.3d 135. The \u201cdeadly weapons\u201d definitional statute, which includes specifically named weapons and several generic catchalls, neither refers to a pocketknife in particular nor to all knives in general. While it includes \u201cany firearm, whether loaded or unloaded,\u201d it does not include \u201cany knife.\u201d See \u00a7 30-l-12(B). Instead, Section 30-l-12(B) clearly designates by name a number of specific kinds of knives as included within its definition of deadly weapon: \u201cdaggers ... switchblade knives, bowie knives, poniards, butcher knives, dirk knives ... swordcanes, and any kind of sharp pointed canes.\u201d\n{17} Because a common pocketknife is not mentioned in the statute, we consider whether the Legislature intended to give it the same status as the specifically named weapons through application of the three general catchall clauses in the statute: (1) \u201cany weapon which is capable of producing death or great bodily harm,\u201d (2) \u201cand all such weapons with which dangerous cuts can be given, or with which dangerous thrusts can be inflicted,\u201d and (3) \u201cor any other weapons with which dangerous wounds can be inflicted.\u201d Section 30-l-12(B). The State argues that the Court of Appeals was correct in interpreting the phrase \u201cand all such weapons with which dangerous cuts can be given, or with which dangerous thrusts can be inflicted\u201d as reflecting a legislative intent to include pocketknives as per se deadly weapons.\n{18} Because all of the catchalls relate specifically to \u201cweapons\u201d rather than a more inclusive term such as \u201citems\u201d or \u201cinstruments,\u201d we must address what the Legislature meant by its use of the term \u201cweapons.\u201d That term is not defined separately in the statutes, and we therefore must consider the ordinary meaning most likely to have been in the minds of the enacting legislators. See State v. Gutierrez, 2007-NMSC-033, \u00b6 30, 142 N.M. 1, 162 P.3d 156 (interpreting the intended meaning of words used by the Legislature by consulting dictionaries to ascertain their \u201cordinary meaning\u201d). The dictionary definitions of \u201cweapon\u201d focus on an object\u2019s use or intended use against another. See, e.g., Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 2589 (1976) (\u201can instrument of offensive or defensive combat\u201d); Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1624 (8th ed. 2004) (\u201cAn instrument used or designed to be used to injure or kill someone\u201d). The Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed the applicability of this mode of interpretation in State v. Neatherlin, 2007-NMCA-035, \u00b6 15, 141 N.M. 328, 154 P.3d 703: \u201cThis Court has previously relied on the definition of \u2018weapon\u2019 from Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1593 (6th ed. 1990): \u2018An instrument of offensive or defensive combat, or anything used, or designed to be used, in destroying, defeating, threatening, or injuring a person.\u2019 \u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\n{19} The definitions of the specific items named in the statute emphasize that the Legislature must have had in mind instruments used or carried for use in injuring or killing people when it repeatedly used the term \u201cweapons.\u201d See, e.g., 8 Oxford English Dictionary 95 (2d ed.1989) (defining \u201cponiard\u201d as \u201c[a] short stabbing weapon\u201d); 4 Oxford English Dictionary, supra, at 214 (defining \u201cdagger\u201d as \u201c[a] short stout edged and pointed weapon, like a small sword, used for thrusting and stabbing\u201d); Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary, supra, at 642 (defining \u201cdirk\u201d as \u201ca long straight-bladed dagger\u201d); id. at 2314 (defining \u201csword cane\u201d as \u201ca cane or walking stick that conceals the blade of a sword or dagger\u201d); id. at 2314 (defining \u201csword\u201d as \u201ca weapon with a long blade for cutting and thrusting\u201d); id. at 262 (defining \u201cbowie knife\u201d as \u201ca large hunting knife adapted esp. for knife-fighting and common in western frontier regions\u201d).\n{20} The striking characteristic of all the inherently dangerous items identified by name in the statute is that they are generally carried on one\u2019s person for their utility as offensive or defensive weapons. In contrast, no definition of \u201cpocketknife\u201d we have found refers to it as a \u201cweapon\u201d or refers to its having a purpose of use against other human beings. See id. at 1747 (defining \u201cpocketknife\u201d simply as \u201ca knife with a blade folding into the handle to fit it for being carried in the pocket\u201d).\n{21} New Mexico courts have long recognized the ejusdem generis principle of statutory construction, that where general words follow words of a more specific meaning, \u201cthe general words are not construed in their widest extent but are instead construed as applying to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.\u201d State v. Foulenfont, 119 N.M. 788, 791, 895 P.2d 1329, 1332 (Ct.App.1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see id. at 790-91, 895 P.2d at 1331-32 (declining to interpret a chainlink fence as a \u201cstructure\u201d as meant in the burglary statute, which criminalizes unlawful entry into \u201cany vehicle, watercraft, aircraft, dwelling or other structure, movable or immovable\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also State ex rel. Murphy v. Morley, 63 N.M. 267, 269, 317 P.2d 317, 318-19 (1957) (applying the principle to hold that \u201clewdness,\u201d as meant by a statute defining a sanctionable nuisance as \u201cany place upon which lewdness, assignation or prostitution, is conducted,\u201d did not include the showing of pornographic films or other acts \u201cnot connected with assignation or prostitution\u201d) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The meaning of \u201cweapons\u201d in the catchall phrases thus would necessarily share the attributes of the items specifically named, that is, inherently dangerous items that either are carried for use or are actually used to inflict injuries on people.\n{22} The application of this concept of statutory construction to this case is made inescapable by the Legislature\u2019s use of the adjective \u201csuch\u201d before \u201cweapons\u201d in the generic phrase relied on by the State, which is found immediately after the itemization of prohibited kinds of knives: \u201cand all such weapons with which dangerous cuts can be given, or with which dangerous thrusts can be inflicted.\u201d Section 30-1-12(B). The word \u201csuch\u201d has the same meaning in legal analysis as it does in other linguistic applications. See 17 Oxford English Dictionary, supra, at 102 (defining \u201csuch\u201d as \u201c[o]f the same kind or class as something mentioned or referred to; of that ldnd; similar, the like\u201d); Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modem Legal Usage 849 (2d ed. 1995) (\u201cSuch is properly used as an adjective when reference has previously been made to a category of persons or things: thus such = of this kind, not this, these or those.\u201d). The use of the word \u201csuch\u201d in this definitional statute underscores that the generic catchall is directed to the same kind of things specifically named, instruments carried for use, or actually used, to injure or kill people.\n{23} Significantly, the statute names only one kind of knife that folds for carrying in a pocket, the weapon known as a \u201cswitchblade,\u201d which is commonly defined as \u201ca poeketknife having the blade spring-operated so that pressure on a release catch causes it to fly open,\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary, supra, at 2314, and which is defined further in our statutes as a\nknife which has a blade which opens automatically by hand pressure applied to a button, spring or other device in the handle of the knife, or any knife having a blade which opens or falls or is ejected into position by the force of gravity or by any outward or centrifugal thrust or movement.\nNMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-7-8 (1963). It is difficult to imagine that the Legislature could have meant to include all pocketknives when it not only did not name them but at the same time expressly named only one narrowly specialized type of folding poeketknife that is designed for quick use in a knife fight. \u201cThe age-old Latin phrase inclusio unius est ex-clusio alterius is applicable here. It means the inclusion of one thing is the exclusion of the other. The legislature did not see fit to include it in the statute, therefore it is excluded.\u201d City of Santa Rosa v. Jaramillo, 85 N.M. 747, 749-50, 517 P.2d 69, 71-72 (1973) (applying the concept to the scope of a permissible liquor license transfer).\n{24} Even though we can find nothing in the plain wording of the statute that reflects any expression of legislative intent to criminalize the carrying of a common poeketknife, out of caution we also have traced the statute\u2019s long history in New Mexico law.\nB. Statutory History\n{25} To understand fully the intended meaning of a statute describing what the State in its briefing understandably refers to as a \u201cquaint collection\u201d of nineteenth century weapons such as poniards and dirk knives and swordcanes, it is important to trace the statute\u2019s origins and development.\n{26} The statutory use of the term \u201cdeadly weapon\u201d in New Mexico law dates back to the earliest territorial days, and it began with concerns about the actual use, rather than mere possession, of deadly weapons. The rather sparse collection of criminal statutes first set forth in Territorial New Mexico\u2019s 1846 Kearny Code provided no definition of the term \u201cdeadly weapon,\u201d although it did contain one deadly weapon offense, assault with a deadly weapon. Kearny Code of Laws (1846), Crimes and Punishments, art. Ill, \u00a7 7; see Territory v. Sevailles, 1 N.M. 119, 123, 1855 WL 2214, at *1 (1855) (holding that an indictment charging assault with intent to kill with an undeseribed knife was insufficient under the statute because of its failure to allege that the assault was committed with a deadly weapon).\n{27} In 1869, the New Mexico Territorial Legislative Assembly enacted the comprehensive statutory definition of the term \u201cdeadly weapons\u201d that formed the basic framework of the modern definition. 1868-69 N.M. Laws, ch. 32, \u00a7\u00a7 1-16. The Act made it a crime for people \u201cto carry deadly weapons, either concealed or otherwise, on or about their persons within any of the settlements of this Territory,\u201d other than on their own real property, id. \u00a7 1, or while traveling between settlements or towns. Id. \u00a7 11. Hotels, boarding houses, and saloons were required to post notices that travelers were required to divest themselves of their deadly weapons within one hour of their arrival in a town. Id. \u00a7 12. Section 7 provided that \u201cwhere the words \u2018weapons\u2019 or \u2018deadly weapons\u2019 are used in this act, such word or words shall be construed to mean the weapons described in section two of this act.\u201d Id. \u00a7 7. Section 2 contained the first statutory articulation of the definition that has been carried forward with little change for almost a century and a half into New Mexico\u2019s current criminal code:\nDeadly weapons, in the meaning of this act, shall be construed to mean all kinds and classes of pistols whether the same be a revolver, repeater, derringer, or any other kind or class of pistol; any and all kinds of bowie knives, daggers, poniards, butcher knives, dirk knives, and all such weapons with which cuts can be given, or by which wounds can be inflicted by thrusting, including sword canes and such sharp pointed canes with which deadly thrusts can be given, and all kinds of slung shots, and any other kinds of deadly weapon, by whatever name it may be called, by which a dangerous wound can be inflicted.\nId. \u00a7 2.\n{28} The only material alteration of the definition of \u201cdeadly weapons\u201d since territorial days was the addition of two more modern weapons, switchblade knives and brass knuckles, in 1953. NMSA 1953, \u00a7 40A-1-13(B) (Vol.6, 2d Repl.). The specific addition of the switchblade in a later statutory amendment is of particular significance to the issues in this case. If folding pocketknives already had been included in the catchall language that had existed for over half a century, the amendment that added the switchblade, a very specialized folding poeketknife, would have been superfluous. This Court has long held that we must avoid constructions of statutory amendments that \u201cwould render the change unnecessary and meaningless.\u201d State v. Romero, 73 N.M. 109, 115, 385 P.2d 967, 970 (1963) (applying the principle to a change in criminal sentencing statutes). Indeed, if the statute made all pocketknives prohibited weapons without regard to their actual or intended use, the Court of Appeals need not have gone to the effort of trying to determine whether a quick-release butterfly knife qualified as a switchblade in State v. Riddall, 112 N.M. 78, 79-80, 811 P.2d 576, 577-78 (Ct.App.1991). See id. at 82, 811 P.2d at 580 (determining that a butterfly knife fit the statutory definition of a switchblade and therefore was a \u201cdeadly weapon\u201d under the statute).\nC. Judicial Interpretations\n{29} The first reported appellate opinion to construe the statutory definition of \u201cdeadly weapon,\u201d interestingly in the context of its application to a poeketknife, was Territory v. Armijo, 7 N.M. 571, 577-78, 37 P. 1117, 1118 (1894). By that time, the definition had been slightly amended by the Deadly Weapon Act of 1887 to resemble even more closely the current wording, primarily by adding the adjective \u201cdangerous\u201d before the nouns \u201ccuts\u201d and \u201cthrusts\u201d:\nDeadly weapons, within the meaning of this act, shall be construed to mean all kinds and classes of pistols, whether the same be a revolver, repeater, derringer, or any kind or class of pistol or gun; any and all kinds of daggers, bowie knives, poniards, butcher knives, dirk knives, and all such weapons with which dangerous cuts can be given, or with which dangerous thrusts can be inflicted, including sword canes, and any kind of sharp pointed canes; as also slung shots, bludgeons or any other deadly weapons with which dangerous wounds can be inflicted.\n1887 N.M. Laws, ch. 30, \u00a7 8.\n{30} In Armijo, the defendant was charged with assault with a deadly weapon and was alleged to have used a poeketknife to \u201ccut, stab, and wound\u201d the victim. Id. at 574, 37 P. at 1117. Our Territorial Supreme Court held that the indictment was fatally flawed because it failed to set forth how \u201cthe kind or character of the knife\u201d was a deadly weapon as defined in the statute. Id. at 577, 37 P. at 1118. The Court concluded that while many ordinary knives may become deadly weapons by virtue of their use in a particular case, not all knives are automatically \u201cdeadly weapons\u201d as a matter of law. Id. Of particular relevance to the issue before us, the Court addressed whether a pocketknife could be considered a per se deadly weapon under the statutory definition:\nIt is evident that the kind and character of the knife should be described as one of the class therein mentioned. The word \u201csuch\u201d qualifies the kind of knives, and the knife used, to bring the offense within the act, must belong to that class. It was never intended by the legislature to include in the class named ordinary pocket knives as deadly weapons.\nId. at 578, 37 P. at 1118. No ease has ever overruled or even criticized Armijo\u2019s substantially contemporaneous holding that \u201c[i]t was never intended by the legislature to include ... ordinary pocket knives as deadly weapons.\u201d Id.\n{31} It should not be surprising that the Armijo Court would find unacceptable the notion that the Legislature had intended to criminalize possession of an ordinary pocketknife in the same manner as firearms or knives commonly carried for their usefulness as deadly weapons. Apparently, penknives and other folding pocketknives were commonly possessed by persons of all ages in the era when the statute was enacted. See, e.g., Semilles, 1 N.M. at 124, 1855 WL at *3 (Brocchus, J., dissenting) (referring to knives \u201ccommonly in use\u201d which \u201ca gentleman would carry in his pocket for the harmless purpose of making pens\u201d).\n{32} Mark Twain, America\u2019s popular chronicler of nineteenth century frontier life, repeatedly mentioned the ubiquitous Barlow pocketknives in his classic Tom Sawyer and Huckleberry Finn books. See Mark Twain, The Adventures of Tom Sawyer 30-31 (Harper & Brothers 1920) (1875) (\u201cMary gave [Tom] a brand-new \u2018Barlow\u2019 knife worth twelve and a half cents; and the convulsion of delight that swept his system shook him to his foundations. True, the knife would not cut anything, but it was a \u2018sure-enough\u2019 Barlow, and there was inconceivable grandeur in that ....\u201d); id. at 276 (looking for buried treasure, \u201cTom\u2019s \u2018real Barlow1 was out at once, and he had not dug four inches before he struck wood\u201d); Mark Twain, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn 70 (Harper & Brothers 1912) (1884) (stocking their canoe for a river trip, Tom and Huck \u201cgot an old tin lantern, and a butcher-knife without any handle, and a bran-new Barlow knife worth two bits in any store\u201d); id. at 193 (\u201cThere was empty dry-goods boxes under the awnings, and loafers roosting on them all day long, whittling them with their Barlow knives.... \u201d).\n{33} For over a century since Armijo was decided, numerous other cases have illuminated the issues before us in the course of construing the definition in a variety of contexts, most often in cases where the object was actually used as a weapon. In State v. Conwell, 36 N.M. 253, 255, 13 P.2d 554, 555 (1932), the defendant was convicted by a jury of actual assault with a deadly weapon, not its mere possession. The alleged weapon used to beat the victim was a four-inch-long rock. Id. at 254, 13 P.2d at 555. The defendant argued before this Court that there was insufficient evidence to support a jury finding that the rock used on the victim\u2019s face was a deadly weapon, as defined in the statutory catchall of \u201cbludgeons or any other deadly weapons with which dangerous wounds can be inflicted.\u201d Id. at 255, 13 P.2d at 555. In language that is instructive here, Conwell held that \u201c[w]here the instrument used is not one declared by the statute to be a deadly weapon, it is ordinarily a question for the jury to determine whether it is so, considering the character of the instrument and the manner of its use.\u201d Id. The Court noted with approval that the rock had been passed among the jurors, \u201cenabling them to know its dimensions, weight, sharpness of its edges, and potentiality for infliction of dangerous wounds from the manner in which it was claimed to have been used.\u201d Id. at 255-56, 13 P.2d at 556.\n{34} In State v. Mitchell, 43 N.M. 138, 139-40, 87 P.2d 432, 433 (1939), the defendant was charged with assaulting a victim \u201cwith a certain deadly weapon, to-wit: a certain knife, with which dangerous cuts could be given, and with which dangerous wounds and thrusts could be inflicted.\u201d Mitchell endorsed Conwell\u2019s application of the \u201cwell settled rule\u201d that where an instrument is not specifically named in the statute as a deadly weapon, whether it is an unlawful deadly weapon is a fact question for the jury to resolve by considering the instrument\u2019s use by an accused and the other circumstances of a particular case. Id. at 140, 87 P.2d at 433.\n{35} This approach has been recognized and applied repeatedly over the years in a long line of opinions by the courts of this State up to the present day. See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 57 N.M. 174, 176, 256 P.2d 791, 792 (1953) (holding that it was for the jury to determine whether a knife with a two-inch blade was a deadly weapon as used by the defendant in the circumstances of the case); State v. Gonzales, 85 N.M. 780, 781, 517 P.2d 1306, 1307 (Ct.App.1973) (concluding that because the statute does not specifically define a tire tool as a deadly weapon, the determination whether the tool was a deadly weapon in the context of a robbery prosecution was for the jury).\n{36} Although fewer in number than the actual use cases, the simple possession cases follow a similar approach, holding the jury must determine whether the accused had the \u201cintent to carry or to use the [unlisted] object as a weapon.\u201d Blea, 100 N.M. at 239, 668 P.2d at 1116. In Blea, the Court of Appeals reversed a conviction for simple possession of a voltage tester, even though it could have been used to stab someone:\nA voltage tester, or other utilitarian tool or object is not per se a weapon; it may, however, become a weapon by its actual use ... or by the purpose for which it is carried. Hence, a factual finding as to defendant\u2019s intent or purpose in carrying the object is necessary to determine guilt or innocence of an accused charged with carrying a concealed article not expressly listed as a deadly weapon....\nId. (internal citations omitted); see also Anderson, 2001-NMCA-027, \u00b6 32 (reversing a conviction for carrying a stick as a deadly weapon and thereby committing the offense of aggravated stalking).\n[W]hen the object or instrument in question is an unlisted one that falls within the catchall language of Section 30-l-12(B), the jury must be instructed (1) that the defendant must have possessed the object or instrument with the intent to use it as a weapon, and (2) the object or instrument is one that, if so used, could inflict dangerous wounds.\nId.\n{37} In short, our cases hold that in an actual use case involving an unlisted weapon, the jury must find, among other elements, that an object was actually used as a weapon and that it was capable of causing the wounds described in the statute. In a simple possession case, the jury must find that the object was possessed with intent to carry it as a weapon and that it was capable of causing the wounds described in the statute. These are determinations that cannot be ruled on by a trial court as a matter of law and taken from the jury\u2019s consideration, no matter how obvious the existence of any essential element of an offense may seem. It is impermissible to enter a \u201cpartial directed verdict\u201d against a defendant because it is \u201cthe fundamental right of a criminal defendant to have the jury determine whether each element of the charged offense has been proved by the state beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d State v. Orosco, 113 N.M. 780, 786, 833 P.2d 1146, 1152 (1992) (determining that a trial court had not removed an essential element of an offense from a jury\u2019s consideration in a sex offense prosecution).\n{38} We have found no New Mexico case that has ever interpreted the \u201cdeadly weapons\u201d definitional statute inconsistently with this large body of precedent. Neither court below ever addressed the statutory history or the relevant New Mexico case law interpreting and applying the \u201cdeadly weapon\u201d definition. Instead, the Court of Appeals cited this Court\u2019s opinion in State v. Baca, 114 N.M. 668, 674, 845 P.2d 762, 768 (1992), in support of its position that the public policy of ensuring safety for certain segments of the population eliminated any \u201cuse requirement\u201d in certain weapons possession crimes. Nick R., No. 27,145, slip op. at 4. Neither Baca nor any other precedent has stood for that proposition. The issue in Baca had nothing to do with the statutory definition of \u201cdeadly weapon\u201d or its proof requirements. The only issue in Baca was whether a defendant could avail himself of a duress defense against a charge of intentional possession of a conceded deadly weapon, a purposeful weapon known as a \u201cshank,\u201d by a prison inmate who claimed he needed to arm himself for self-defense. 114 N.M. at 673-74, 845 P.2d at 767-68.\n{39} Similarly, State v. Padilla, 1996\u2014 NMCA-072, 122 N.M. 92, 920 P.2d 1046, did not analyze the statutory definition of \u201cdeadly weapon.\u201d Instead, it specifically addressed whether stealing and carrying away a deadly weapon constituted \u201carming\u201d oneself during a burglary. Id. \u00b6 1. The opinion therefore never had occasion to address what proof would have been necessary if there had been an issue as to whether the item possessed met the statutory definition of a deadly weapon.\n{40} New Mexico\u2019s case law is consistent with that of other jurisdictions, which roufinely distinguish between legislatively designated per se deadly weapons and a vast array of tools and other ordinary items that could become deadly weapons if used offensively. See, e.g., Grass v. People, 172 Colo. 223, 471 P.2d 602, 605 (1970) (shoe as deadly weapon); Timm v. State, 644 N.E.2d 1235, 1238-39 (Ind.1994) (plastic flashlight); Johnson v. State, 455 N.E.2d 932, 936 (Ind.1983) (automobile); State v. Kelly, 118 N.J. 370, 571 A.2d 1286, 1292-93 (1990) (carpet-cutting razor); People v. Elijah B., 28 A.D.3d 312, 813 N.Y.S.2d 405, 406 (N.Y.App.Div.2006) (work boots); People v. Buhagiar, 185 Misc.2d 203, 713 N.Y.S.2d 114, 115 (App.Div.2000) (pestle); Bald Eagle v. State, 355 P.2d 1015, 1017 (Okla.Crim.App.1960) (beer bottle); Strahan v. State, 284 P.2d 744, 749 (Okla.Crim.App.1955) (metal automobile window crank); State v. Barrientos, 444 N.W.2d 374, 377 (S.D.1989) (race car); Bui v. State, 964 S.W.2d 335, 342 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (Duraflame log); Broom v. State, 92 Tex. Crim. 65, 242 S.W. 236, 238 (App.1922) (breast yoke of a wagon); State v. Bodoh, 226 Wis.2d 718, 595 N.W.2d 330, 333 (1999) (dog). Our own actual use cases have included such situational deadly weapons as a human mouth, a trivet, a brick wall, and a screwdriver. See Neatherlin, 2007-NMCA-035, \u00b6\u00b6 13, 15 (reviewing precedents and concluding that the statutory catchall language \u201cis broad enough to include an individual\u2019s mouth\u201d in the factual context of a particular ease).\n{41} This Court recently reaffirmed the long-standing approach of New Mexico case law \u201cthat it effectuates the legislative intent to give Section 30-l-12(B) a narrow construction.\u201d Traeger, 2001-NMSC-022, \u00b6 12. In Traeger, we held that because a baseball bat was not specifically named in the statute as a deadly weapon per se, it was for the jury to decide whether a baseball bat was sufficiently dangerous to be a \u201cdeadly weapon\u201d when used in an aggravated battery. Id.; see also \u00b6 26 (\u201c[W]e retain the rule that if the item is not specifically listed in Section 30-1-12(B), then a jury should make that determination considering the character of the instrument and manner of its use.\u201d).\n{42} Of particular significance to the case at bar, Traeger cautioned that if this Court were to make a baseball bat a per se deadly weapon under the general definitional statute in the Criminal Code, it would have far-reaching implications for other statutes and would criminalize the mere carrying of a bat in a variety of situations. Id. \u00b6 15. \u201cWe believe that to criminalize the carrying of a baseball bat, without a jury finding that the baseball bat was a deadly weapon and that the baseball bat was in fact being carried because it could be used as a weapon, is incongruent with New Mexico law.\u201d Id.\n{43} Traeger\u2019s concerns apply with equal force here. If we were to hold that a pocketknife is a per se deadly weapon, it would mean a person who carried one at work, on a fishing trip, or virtually anywhere else would commit the criminal offense of carrying a deadly weapon, in violation of Section 30-7-2. It would increase that statute\u2019s potential six-month penalty to a potential jail sentence of up to a year if the defendant took a bus to work while carrying the pocketknife, under the provisions of Section 30-7-13. And in this case, if Nick\u2019s father had gone to pick his son up at school or had gone to a parent-teacher conference with his own utilitarian work knife in his pocket, he could have been imprisoned and lost his civil rights for the felony of carrying a deadly weapon on school premises, under the terms of the same statute that was applied to Nick below. Indeed, the same far-reaching theory could result in criminal liability for innocently possessing any of the tools, other objects, and even body parts that have been found to constitute deadly weapons when used offensively. We simply cannot attribute to the Legislature any such unexpressed objectives in enacting New Mexico\u2019s deadly weapons statutes.\nD. School Security Concerns\n{44} In 1994, when the Legislature enacted the statute making it a felony to possess deadly weapons on school grounds, it neither created a new definition of \u201cdeadly weapons\u201d for use in school cases nor amended in any way the existing general definition in the Criminal Code. Cf. State v. Salazar, 1997-NMCA-043, \u00b6 9, 123 N.M. 347, 940 P.2d 195 (\u201cWe believe the legislature intended [in Section 30-7-1] that its definition of carrying a deadly weapon would apply to all statutes making it a crime to carry a deadly weapon, whether concealed or on school premises.\u201d) Doe v. State ex rel. Governor\u2019s Organized Crime Prevention Comm\u2019n, 114 N.M. 78, 80, 835 P.2d 76, 78 (1992) (stating that the Legislature is presumed to know about existing laws and cannot be inferred to have enacted a law inconsistent with an existing law). The Legislature simply expanded the existing criminal consequences for carrying a deadly weapon, from petty misdemeanor to fourth-degree felony penalties, if the crime was committed on school grounds. It expressed no intention whatsoever to change the definition of a deadly weapon.\n{45} We are sensitive to the concern expressed by the State that \u201cthe social problem of deadly weapons in the schools is certainly more formidable and intractable than it was in 1855.\u201d This Court, however, must be careful not to intrude on the exclusive legislative prerogative to take those kinds of arguments into account in deciding whether an existing statute should be changed. Whether or not concerns of security arguably might now justify criminalizing the simple possession of potentially dangerous utilitarian tools on school grounds, \u201cthis Court is not the entity charged with the modernization of the relevant statute.\u201d Traeger, 2001-NMSC-022, \u00b6 14 (declining to add a baseball bat as a modern expansion of the historical bludgeon included in the definition).\n{46} Nor is anything in this opinion intended to impair the existing authority of school authorities to promulgate and enforce administrative security measures of the kind the Taos School Superintendent expeditiously employed in this case before the District Attorney filed charges under the criminal statutes. See, e.g., Taos High School, Student Behavior Policy, in Handbook \u00a7\u00a7 IV(A)-(B)(1), VI(A)(2)(p)-(q) (2008) (listing both possession of a weapon of any kind and possession of a pocketknife among specific examples of behavior that may result in school disciplinary action); Santa Fe Public Schools, Board of Education Policy Manual \u00a7\u00a7 336-3 to -4, 347-1 (2002) (prohibiting possession of \u201cany firearm, knife ... or other object, even if manufactured for a nonviolent purpose, that has a potentially violent use, or any \u2018look-a-like\u2019 object that resembles an object that has a potentially violent use, if, under the surrounding circumstances, the purpose of keeping or carrying the object is for use, or threat of use, as a weapon\u201d); Albuquerque Public Schools, Student Behavior Handbook: 2008-2009 11, 25 (2008) (prohibiting possession of, among other items, \u201ca firearm, any type of gun, knife, club ... that may cause or is intended to cause injury or death\u201d). The Legislature has specifically mandated minimum one-year expulsions of students who knowingly bring to school any firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices. NMSA 1978, \u00a7 22-5-4.7 (1995).\n{47} \u201c[Pjublic school officials [have] an effective means of disciplining unruly or disruptive pupils in an administrative fashion.\u201d State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 92 P.3d 521, 525 (2004); see also In re Julio L., 197 Ariz. 1, 3 P.3d 383, 385 (2000) (en banc) (\u201c[N]ot every violation of public decorum or of school rules gives legal cause for criminal adjudication. ...\u201d).\n{48} Whatever the Legislature or school officials may choose to do in defining and sanctioning weapons violations in their respective spheres of authority, the courts are simply not invested with substantive policy-making authority to create those policies. It is the duty of the judicial branch to enforce the lawful policies established by the political branches as they are written and intended. In this case, we follow a long and consistent interpretation of legislative intent in reaffirming that our Legislature has not chosen to define an ordinary pocketknife as a per se deadly weapon, without regard to either its actual or its intended use.\nIV. CONCLUSION\n{49} The Children\u2019s Court erred in denying Petitioner a jury determination of whether he intended to carry his pocketknife as a deadly weapon, as that term is defined in the applicable New Mexico statutes, and the Court of Appeals erred in holding that he had no right to such a jury resolution. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand to the Children\u2019s Court for further proceedings in accordance with this Opinion.\n{50} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Chief Justice, PATRICIO M. SERNA, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, and RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justices.", "type": "majority", "author": "DANIELS, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender, Nancy M. Hewitt, Appellate Defender, J.K. Theodosia Johnson, Assistant Public Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.", "Gary King, Attorney General, Andrew S. Montgomery, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2009-NMSC-050\n218 P.3d 868\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. NICK R., a child, Defendant-Petitioner.\nNo. 30,657.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nSept. 28, 2009.\nHugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender, Nancy M. Hewitt, Appellate Defender, J.K. Theodosia Johnson, Assistant Public Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.\nGary King, Attorney General, Andrew S. Montgomery, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent." }, "file_name": "0182-01", "first_page_order": 218, "last_page_order": 229 }