{ "id": 4246355, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Anthony ARAGON, Defendant-Petitioner", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Aragon", "decision_date": "2010-02-12", "docket_number": "No. 31,187", "first_page": "474", "last_page": "486", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "147 N.M. 474" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2010-NMSC-008" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "225 P.3d 1280" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "1997-NMCA-075", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 142225 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/123/0599-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 N.M. 682", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1552643 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "685" }, { "page": "1116" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/117/0682-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-028", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4244456 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-024", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4244082 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0301-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 U.S. 140", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3500367 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146", "parenthetical": "\"We rejected that [indicia of reliability] argument ... in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004" }, { "parenthetical": "\"We rejected that [indicia of reliability] argument ... in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004" }, { "parenthetical": "\"We rejected that [indicia of reliability] argument ... in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/548/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 N.M. 776", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1561271 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "783" }, { "page": "683" }, { "page": "782" }, { "page": "682", "parenthetical": "\"The confrontation clause places two conditions on the admission of hearsay evidence: necessity and reliability.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/119/0776-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 Vt. 241", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Vt.", "case_ids": [ 2398017 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that admission of non-testifying expert's opinion through testifying expert's testimony precluded cross-examination and violated Confrontation Clause" }, { "page": "1135", "parenthetical": "holding that admission of non-testifying expert's opinion through testifying expert's testimony precluded cross-examination and violated Confrontation Clause" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/vt/142/0241-01" ] }, { "cite": "653 F.2d 299", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1465858 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302", "parenthetical": "footnotes omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/653/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 F.2d 54", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 818768 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/445/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 N.M. 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1586375 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "489" }, { "page": "1154" }, { "page": "490" }, { "page": "1154", "parenthetical": "holding that hearsay opinion letter of non-testifying expert was improperly admitted through testimony of expert because it was \"opinion\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/101/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 N.M. 74", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1573198 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77" }, { "page": "615" }, { "page": "76" }, { "page": "614" }, { "page": "77" }, { "page": "615", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/94/0074-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 N.M. 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2770008 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "1001", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "311" }, { "page": "1001" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/84/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 U.S. 109", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 364179 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" }, { "page": "113" }, { "page": "114" }, { "page": "114" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/318/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 U.S. 56", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1787607 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/448/0056-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 U.S. 149", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168934 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/399/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 U.S. 813", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3275498 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "821", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "826" }, { "page": "826" }, { "page": "2276", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/547/0813-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 U.S. 36", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5873383 ], "weight": 30, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68-69" }, { "page": "50" }, { "page": "51" }, { "page": "51-52, 68" }, { "page": "53-54, 68" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "68" }, { "page": "66" }, { "page": "61" }, { "page": "61-62" }, { "page": "59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/541/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-001", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4241923 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 23", "parenthetical": "citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004)" }, { "parenthetical": "citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004)" }, { "parenthetical": "citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/145/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "2010-NMSC-007", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4246502 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b625" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/147/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 S.Ct. 2527", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 3657952 ], "weight": 26, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "2532", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" }, { "page": "2533" }, { "page": "2532", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "2543", "parenthetical": "Thomas, J., concurring" }, { "page": "2534" }, { "page": "2536", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "2533", "parenthetical": "noting that the Roberts theory \"that unconfronted testimony was admissible as long as it bore indicia of reliability\" was rejected" }, { "page": "2538" }, { "page": "2538", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "2538" }, { "page": "2539-40", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "2551", "parenthetical": "Kennedy, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "2552", "parenthetical": "Kennedy, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "2535" }, { "parenthetical": "\"The Framers were no more willing to exempt from cross-examination volunteered testimony or answers to open-ended questions than they were to exempt answers to detailed interrogation.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/557/0305-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMSC-037", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 1224659 ], "weight": 22, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 30" }, { "page": "\u00b6 24" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 24, 30" }, { "page": "\u00b6 24" }, { "page": "\u00b6 24" }, { "page": "\u00b6 24" }, { "page": "\u00b6 30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/136/0561-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1488, "char_count": 45245, "ocr_confidence": 0.658, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0356283629530816e-07, "percentile": 0.7471514748543255 }, "sha256": "2be50879760543c44f1a1e71facb57bcf7dbdf67b9bee91244e5185d0388efe9", "simhash": "1:dcf3ff501b05904a", "word_count": 6997 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:21:31.817470+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: PATRICIO M. SERNA, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, RICHARD C. BOSSON, and CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justices." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Anthony ARAGON, Defendant-Petitioner." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nCH\u00c1VEZ, Chief Justice.\n{1} Anthony Aragon (\u201cDefendant\u201d) appeals his conviction for possession of methamphetamine, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him was violated when a chemical forensic report was admitted into evidence based on testimony from an analyst who had not prepared the report. The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, holding that admission of the report did not implicate Defendant\u2019s confrontation rights because the report is non-testimonial hearsay under State v. Dedman, 2004-NMSC-037, \u00b6 30, 136 N.M. 561, 102 P.3d 628. State v. Aragon, No. 26, 185, slip op. at 9 (N.M. Ct.App. June 4, 2008).\n{2} In light of the recent Supreme Court opinion in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009) and this Court\u2019s opinion in State v. Bullcoming, 2010-NMSC-007, 147 N.M. 487, 226 P.3d 1 (2010), in which we overruled Dedman, we hold that the report prepared by the non-testifying forensic scientist and the trial testimony regarding that report were inadmissible and violated Defendant\u2019s right of confrontation. Nonetheless, we determine that the errors of admission were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and affirm the conviction.\nI. BACKGROUND\n{3} On November 8, 2003, Roswell police executed a narcotic search warrant at a home in Roswell. Upon arrival, police found Defendant hiding under a tarp in the basement, and he was taken outside with the other occupants of the residence. Police found a \u201clittle clear plastic bag of a whitish, crystal substance\u201d in the basement, \u201cright where [Defendant\u2019s] hands were\u201d when the officer located him. A second officer found a larger clear plastic bag in the pocket of a jacket located in an upstairs bedroom that also contained a whitish crystal-like substance. The officer took the jacket outside and asked the occupants who owned it. Defendant initially confirmed that the jacket was his, but immediately changed his response, denying ownership.\n{4} Both plastic bags were sent to the New Mexico Department of Public Safety\u2019s Las Cruces Forensics Laboratory (\u201cSouthern Crime Laboratory\u201d) for analysis. Southern Crime Laboratory forensic chemist Eric D. Young (\u201cYoung\u201d) analyzed the larger bag that was found in the jacket pocket and prepared a report that was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 12, describing the chemical makeup of the bag\u2019s contents. Young concluded that it contained 64 percent pure methamphetamine and weighed 6.93 grams. Andrea Champagne (\u201cChampagne\u201d), also at that time a forensic chemist at the Southern Crime Laboratory, conducted an analysis and prepared a similar report on the contents of the smaller bag that was found near Defendant in the basement. She concluded that it was 64.3 percent pure methamphetamine and weighed 1.05 grams. Her report was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 13.\n{5} Young testified at trial regarding the results of his analysis, the associated report, the laboratory procedure for preparing such reports, and the fact that Champagne did the analysis and prepared a similar report on the contents of the smaller bag. Young also testified regarding the contents and conclusion contained in Champagne\u2019s report. Champagne\u2019s report was admitted into evidence over defense counsel\u2019s objection that admission of the report would violate Defendant\u2019s right of confrontation because the report is inadmissible testimonial hearsay. The district court admitted both reports under the \u201c[r]ecords of regularly conducted activity\u201d and \u201c[p]ublic records and reports\u201d exceptions to the rule against hearsay, Rules 11-803(F) and (H) NMRA, respectively. Although the district court found that Champagne\u2019s chemical analysis report was \u201ctestimonial\u201d for purposes of the Confrontation Clause, U.S. Const, amend. VI, it allowed Young to testify regarding Champagne\u2019s analysis and opinion, even though Young did not observe, supervise, or participate in either the analysis or the preparation of the report. The jury convicted Defendant on one count of possession of a controlled substance.\nII. DISCUSSION\nA. ADMISSION OF THE FORENSIC CHEMIST\u2019S REPORT PREPARED BY A NON TESTIFYING ANALYST VIOLATED DEFENDANT\u2019S RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION.\n{6} Defendant contends that admission of Champagne\u2019s forensic report, identifying the white, crystal-like substance in the smaller bag as methamphetamine, violated his confrontation rights because the report is testimonial in nature, and he did not have an opportunity to cross-examine her.\n\u201cIn all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.... \u201d U.S. Const, amend. VI. Out-of-court testimonial statements are barred under the Confrontation Clause, unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness, regardless of whether such statements are deemed reliable by the court.\nState v. Zamarripa, 2009-NMSC-001, \u00b6 23, 145 N.M. 402, 199 P.3d 846 (2008) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004)). Questions of admissibility under the Confrontation Clause are questions of law, which we review de novo. Id. \u00b6 22. In Crawford, the Supreme Court \u201conce again rejected] the view that the Confrontation Clause applies of its own force only to in-eourt testimony[.]\u201d 541 U.S. at 50, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Rather, Crawford held that \u201c[i]t applies to witnesses against the accused \u2014 in other words, those who bear testimony,\u201d \u2014 where \u201ctestimony\u201d is a \u201csolemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.\u201d Id. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, only testimonial statements \u201ccause the declarant to be a witness within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause.\u201d Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Although it did not offer a comprehensive definition of \u201ctestimonial,\u201d the Court identified a \u201ccore class of testimonial statements\u201d:\nex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent ... that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially[;] ... extrajudicial statements ... contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions!;] ... statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial!;] and to police interrogations.\nCrawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Such testimonial hearsay is barred by the Sixth Amendment unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Id. at 53-54, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Crawford also reiterated the Court\u2019s prior holding in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970), that \u201cwhen the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements____The Clause does not bar admission of a statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it.\u201d Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (citation omitted). \u201cThe Clause also does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.\u201d Id. (citation omitted). Once it has been established that the Confrontation Clause does not bar admission of the statement, the rules of evidence govern whether the statement is admissible.\n{7} Eight months after the United States Supreme Court filed its opinion in Crawford, we issued our opinion in Dedman, and held that blood-alcohol reports prepared by the New Mexico Department of Public Health\u2019s Scientific Laboratory Division are admissible hearsay under the \u201cpublic record\u201d exception of Rule 11-803(H). 2004-NMSC-037, \u00b6 24, 136 N.M. 561, 102 P.3d 628. We determined that the reports were non-testimonial because although they are \u201cprepared for trial, the process is routine, non-adversarial, and made to ensure an accurate measurement.\u201d Id. \u00b6 30. We were persuaded that laboratory personnel are \u201cnot law enforcement, and the report is not investigative or prosecutorial.\u201d Id. Ultimately, we concluded that such forensic reports were \u201cvery different from the other examples of testimonial hearsay evidence: \u2018prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and ... police interrogations.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354).\n{8} Since we decided Dedman, the United States Supreme Court has issued its fractured opinion in Melendez-Diaz. In Melendez-Diaz, the Court held that affidavit reports prepared and sworn to by analysts at a state crime laboratory identifying a substance as cocaine \u201care functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing precisely what a witness does on direct examination,\u201d and so \u201cfall within the core class of testimonial statements}.]\u201d 557 U.S. at-, 129 S.Ct. at 2532 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Analysts are witnesses against defendants because, in the case of narcotics, they prove a fact necessary for conviction: that the substance in question is the contraband the prosecution alleges it to be. See id. at-, 129 S.Ct. at 2533. In essence, a person is a witness for Confrontation Clause purposes when that person\u2019s statements go to an issue of guilt or innocence. See id. at-n. 8, 129 S.Ct. at 2539 n. 8. Therefore, \u201c[a]bsent a showing that the analysts were unavailable to testify at trial and that petitioner had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them, petitioner was entitled to be confronted with the analysts at trial.\u201d Id. at-, 129 S.Ct. at 2532 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\n{9} The State urges us to adhere to our opinion in Dedman and limit the application of Melendez-Diaz. The State\u2019s arguments can be categorized as follows: (1) Justice Thomas\u2019s narrow concurring opinion is controlling because his vote resulted in a majority opinion and limited testimonial evidence to matters under oath, (2) the analyst\u2019s report is inherently reliable and should therefore be admissible as a business or public record, (3) forensic witnesses are not ordinary witnesses in that they do not observe the crime or any human activity related to the crime, and (4) because Defendant could cross-examine Young, who testified about the report, Defendant\u2019s confrontation rights were not violated. We reject the State\u2019s arguments because we believe that in Davis a clear majority of the United States Supreme Court rejected Justice Thomas\u2019s limitation, Melendez-Diaz directly answers the State\u2019s second and third arguments, and Defendant could not effectively cross-examine Young, because Young did not express an opinion independent from the opinion in Champagne\u2019s forensic report.\n1. JUSTICE THOMAS\u2019S POSITION IN HIS CONCURRENCE WAS REJECTED IN THE DAVIS EIGHT JUSTICE MAJORITY OPINION.\n{10} The report in this case, State\u2019s Exhibit 13, a copy of which is attached to this opinion, is a single-page report that identifies the item received by the evidence custodian, the examination requested, and the result. The forensic chemist signed the report and certified that the \u201creport is a record of New Mexico Department of Public Safety Southern Crime Laboratory, and the contents of the report is [sic] true and correct to the best of my knowledge.\u201d The State contends that because the report is not an affidavit, it is distinguishable from the reports held to be testimonial in Melendez-Diaz, and thus it does not \u201cimplieate[] the core class of testimonial statements protected by the Confrontation Clause[.]\u201d\n{11} The State relies on Justice Thomas\u2019s narrow concurring opinion and argues that his concurring opinion severely limits the Melendez-Diaz holding to only \u201cformalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.\u201d 557 U.S. at-, 129 S.Ct. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We disagree and find it significant that in Davis, the United States Supreme Court noted that it would not make sense to allow the recitation of informal notes to be admitted into evidence against an accused without confrontation, while excluding affidavits simply because they are more formal.\n[W]e do not think it conceivable that the protections of the Confrontation Clause can readily be evaded by having a note-taking policeman recite the unsworn hearsay testimony of the declarant, instead of having the declarant sign a deposition. Indeed, if there is one point for which no case-English or early American, state or federal-can be cited, that is it.\nDavis, 547 U.S. at 826, 126 S.Ct. 2266. The formal affidavits in Melendez-Diaz \u201care incontrovertibly a solemn declaration of affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact[,]\u201d Davis, 547 U.S. at 826, 126 S.Ct. at 2276 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), and represent the \u201cparadigmatic case\u201d implicating the \u201ccore of the right to confrontation,\u201d but do not demarcate \u201cits limits.\u201d Id. at-, 129 S.Ct. at 2534.\n{12} The fact that the report at issue in the present case is not sworn to by the forensic chemist who prepared it, therefore, does not insulate it against Defendant\u2019s right of confrontation. It would be nonsensical to admit an out-of-court statement that proves an element of an offense simply because it was not a statement under oath when a sworn statement proving the same element would be inadmissible.\n2. RELIABILITY\n{13} The State argues, as reasoned in Dedman, that the chemist\u2019s report at issue is inherently reliable because it is objective and aimed at \u201cgetting to the bottom of the matter.\u201d See 2004-NMSC-037, \u00b6\u00b6 24, 30, 136 N.M. 561, 102 P.3d 628 (stating that blood-alcohol reports \u201cfollow a routine manner of preparation that guarantees a certain level of comfort as to their trustworthiness\u201d and are \u201cmade to ensure an accurate measurement\u201d) (citation omitted). Melendez-Diaz directly addresses the argument that forensic reports are the product of \u201cneutral, scientific testing.\u201d 557 U.S. at-, 129 S.Ct. at 2536 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court noted that \u201c[fjorensic evidence is not uniquely immune from the risk of manipulation!}]\u201d and \u201csometimes [forensic analysts] face pressure to sacrifice appropriate methodology for the sake of expediency[,]\u201d and may \u201calter the evidence in a manner favorable to the prosecution.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While there may be other and perhaps better methods to challenge or verify the results of a forensic test, \u201cthe Constitution guarantees one way: confrontation.\u201d Id,. As the Court stated in Crawford, \u201c[t]he Framers would be astounded to learn that ex parte testimony could be admitted against a criminal defendant because it was elicited by \u2018neutral\u2019 government officers.\u201d 541 U.S. at 66, 124 S.Ct. 1354. As Crawford made clear, the reliability of a testimonial statement is not a measure of its susceptibility to the right of confrontation. See id. at 61, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (\u201cAdmitting statements deemed rehable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation.\u201d).\n{14} The reliability test for testimonial evidence was abandoned when Crawford overruled Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). 541 U.S. at 61-62, 124 S.Ct. 1354; see also Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at -, 129 S.Ct. at 2533 (noting that the Roberts theory \u201cthat unconfronted testimony was admissible as long as it bore indicia of reliability\u201d was rejected). This Court applied the Roberts reliability test in Dedman to blood alcohol reports because we determined that the reports were non-testimonial. Following Melendez-Diaz and our opinion in Bullcoming, however, we now hold that such forensic reports are testimonial in nature. Therefore, any consideration of their reliability is irrelevant to a determination of confrontation requirements. That Young considered himself objective and simply tried to get to the bottom of the matter have no bearing on the analysis.\n{15} The State also contends that the analysts\u2019 reports are not susceptible to confrontation because of their routine nature as business records under Rule 11-803(F) and as public records under Rule 11-803(H). The State argues that while the forensic chemists are government officers in this case, the forensic reports at issue are produced as part of a non-adversarial, routine process, and although they were prepared for trial, the reports were not prepared as testimony for trial. We reject this contention because Young\u2019s testimony belies the argument that the reports are not prepared as testimony and Melendez-Diaz refutes such an argument.\n{16} Young testified that his analytical process and reporting were done in the \u201cnormal and ordinary course of business,\u201d meaning only that such procedures and analyses are frequently conducted by the Southern Crime Laboratory. Although generating and maintaining such reports are \u201cpart of the duties and responsibilities\u201d of the laboratory, Young testified that the majority of the work done at the laboratory is \u201cfor criminal prosecution purposes.\u201d Indeed, Young testified that he expects that he will be called to testify in court regarding all of the reports he prepares. Testifying in a broader sense, Young was not able to think of any other purpose for the laboratory\u2019s forensic analyses, except perhaps when it receives requests from hospitals. Even in those circumstances, hospital personnel must contact a police officer to have the materials submitted to the laboratory for analysis, which indicates the prosecutorial nature of the laboratory\u2019s work. In fact, Young testified that the only way to submit materials to the laboratory for analysis is by a police officer, even though the laboratory is ostensibly open and available to the public. Further, while the forensic laboratory is no longer a division of the State Police, it operates as a technical support division of the Department of Public Safety, which oversees the State Police. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 9 \u2014 19\u20147(D) (2007). The New Mexico Administrative Code also specifies that forensic laboratory notes and reports are included in the \u201cbar coded evidence analysis statistics and tracking database\u201d employed by the Department of Public Safety, and consequently the State Police. See 1.18.790.172 NMAC (5/14/2007) (emphasis omitted); \u00a7 9-19-7(A) (\u201cThe department shall have access to all records, data and information of ... its own organizational units, not specifically held confidential by law.\u201d). Therefore, both the facts and Young\u2019s testimony indicate that the purpose for conducting forensic analyses and reporting the results has nothing to do with administering the agency as either a business or a separate entity, no matter how broadly defined, and everything to do with prosecuting criminal cases at trial.\n{17} Next, the State\u2019s argument that the reports are admissible because they are routine under Rules 11-803(F) and (H) is answered by Melendez-Diaz and must be rejected. The relevant portions of Rules 11-803(F) and (H) are identical to Federal Rules of Evidence 803(6) and (8), which are discussed in Melendez-Diaz. See 557 U.S. at-, 129 S.Ct. at 2538. Our analysis in Dedman, which was filed before the opinion in Melendez-Diaz, qualified the defendant\u2019s blood alcohol report as a public record under the meaning of Rule 11-803(H) on the basis of the underlying reliability and trustworthiness of the reports. Dedman, 2004-NMSC-037, \u00b6 24, 136 N.M. 561, 102 P.3d 628 (noting that \u201creports follow a routine manner of preparation that guarantees a certain level of comfort as to their trustworthiness\u201d). The Dedman Court reiterated our prior determination that Rule 11-803(H) is aimed at excluding \u201creports of law enforcement personnel engaged in investigative and prosecutorial activities.\u201d Dedman, 2004-NMSC-037, \u00b6 24, 136 N.M. 561, 102 P.3d 628 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Dedman Court determined that analysts at the Scientific Laboratory Division are neither police officers nor law enforcement personnel and that the reports are \u201cprepared in a non-adversarial setting.\u201d Id. Given that nothing in the Dedman record indicated that standard laboratory procedures were not followed or that the results were unreliable, and given that the Dedman Court determined that the laboratory analysts in question were not law enforcement personnel, the Court upheld admittance of the blood alcohol report as a public record under Rule 11-803(H). Dedman, 2004-NMSC-037, \u00b6 24, 136 N.M. 561, 102 P.3d 628.\n{18} In Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the argument that such reports are admissible without confrontation for being \u201cakin to the types of official and business records admissible at common law[,]\u201d because the Court determined that they \u201cdo not qualify as traditional official or business records\u201d since they are specifically prepared for use at trial. 557 U.S. at-, 129 S.Ct. at 2538 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Quoting Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 114, 63 S.Ct. 477, 87 L.Ed. 645 (1943), the Melendez-Diaz Court reiterated its holding that such reports do \u201cnot qualify as ... business reeord[s] because, although kept in the regular course of ... operations, [they are] \u2018calculated for use essentially in the court, not in the business.\u2019 \u201d 557 U.S. at -, 129 S.Ct. at 2538. The Palmer Court made it clear that the business records exception, now termed \u201c[r]ecords of regularly conducted activity,\u201d see Fed. R.Evid. 803(6) advisory committee note, was meant to apply to \u201centries made systematically or as a matter of routine to record events or occurrences, to reflect transactions with others, or to provide internal controls\u201d and that relate to the \u201cmanagement or operation of the business[.]\u201d 318 U.S. at 113, 63 S.Ct. 477. Such records are considered inherently trustworthy, as opposed to records that are created as a \u201csystem of recording events or occurrences\u201d that have \u201clittle or nothing to do with the management or operation of the business\u201d such as \u201cemployees\u2019 versions of their accidents.\u201d Id. Broadening the rule to incorporate \u201cany regular course of conduct which may have some relationship to business ... opens wide the door to avoidance of cross-examination\u201d because then entities could make recording certain activities that are not covered under the business records exception a routine event. Id. at 114, 63 S.Ct. 477 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, \u201c[b]usiness and public records are generally admissible absent confrontation[]\u201d not only because they qualify under an exception to the hearsay rules, but because they are not testimonial, \u201chaving been created for the administration of an entity\u2019s affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial.\u201d Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at-, 129 S.Ct. at 2539-40 (emphasis added).\n{19} The chemical forensic reports at issue in this case are inadmissible absent confrontation, because although it is the \u201cbusiness\u201d of the Southern Crime Laboratory, a public agency, to analyze substances for narcotic content, the laboratory\u2019s purpose for preparing chemical forensic reports is for their use in court, not as a function of the laboratory\u2019s administrative activities. These reports are precisely the type of out-of-court statement that must be excluded under Palmer, because admitting them \u201copens wide the door to avoidance of cross-examination[.]\u201d 318 U.S. at 114, 63 S.Ct. 477. As a result, Champagne\u2019s chemical forensic report and Young\u2019s testimony about her report were not admissible and violate Defendant\u2019s right of confrontation if Defendant is deprived of meaningful cross-examination.\n3. ORDINARY WITNESS\n{20} The State also argues that Champagne is not an \u201cordinary\u201d witness, because she did not \u201cperceive[] an event that gave rise to a personal belief in some aspect of the defendant\u2019s guilt.\u201d Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at-, 129 S.Ct. at 2551 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Quoting Dedman, the State contends that the forensic report in question, although it was prepared for trial, was created in a routine manner, was non-adversarial, and was meant to ensure accuracy, so it must be treated differently than testimonial hearsay under a Confrontation Clause analysis. 2004-NMSC-037, \u00b6 30, 136 N.M. 561, 102 P.3d 628. We disagree, and hold that, to the extent Bullcoming overruled Dedman, chemical forensic reports of the type at issue in this case are testimonial, and their admission violated Defendant\u2019s right of confrontation.\n{21} Champagne\u2019s report, in fact, goes directly to an issue of guilt in that it identifies the white, crystal-like substance located near Defendant\u2019s hiding place as methamphetamine, a necessary element of the crime of possession of a controlled substance, for which Defendant was charged. As such, Champagne\u2019s report serves to bear testimony against Defendant, and is the functional equivalent of live, in-court testimony that would otherwise be offered directly by Champagne herself. For this reason, the prosecution must produce her for cross-examination, or admission of the report is barred by the Confrontation Clause.\n{22} The State, relying on the dissent in Melendez-Diaz, also suggests that forensic analysts are not \u201cordinary witnesses\u201d because they \u201cobserve[d] neither the crime nor any human action related to it.\u201d 557 U.S. at-, 129 S.Ct. at 2552 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In refuting this variation of the argument that analysts are not accusatory witnesses, Melendez-Diaz rejects this \u201cnovel exception\u201d to the right of confrontation because it \u201cwould exempt all expert witnesses \u2014 a hardly \u2018unconventional\u2019 class of witnesses.\u201d Id. at-, 129 S.Ct. at 2535. Encapsulated within this approach is the Court\u2019s rejection of the theory that only testimony elicited by interrogation implicates the right of confrontation. Id. (\u201cThe Framers were no more willing to exempt from cross-examination volunteered testimony or answers to open-ended questions than they were to exempt answers to detailed interrogation.\u201d) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Whether produced through interrogation or volunteered, the analysts\u2019 affidavits in Melendez-Diaz \u201cwere presented in response to a police request\u201d and \u201csuffice[] to trigger the Sixth Amendment\u2019s protection},]\u201d so they \u201cshould be subject to confrontation as well.\u201d Id. Similarly, Champagne\u2019s report was also presented in response to a police request and should be subject to confrontation by Defendant.\nB. TRIAL TESTIMONY REGARDING THE ABSENT CHEMIST\u2019S REPORT WAS TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY AND VIOLATED DEFENDANT\u2019S RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION.\n{23} The State also contends that admission of Champagne\u2019s chemical forensic report did not violate Defendant\u2019s confrontation rights in any meaningful way because Young testified about the report and was subject to cross-examination. The State\u2019s argument would have merit if Young had expressed his own opinion based upon the underlying data that contributed to the opinion announced in the report. It is proper to \u201cadmit opinion testimony based, in part, upon reports of others which are not in evidence but which the expert customarily relies upon in the practice of his profession.\u201d State v. Chambers, 84 N.M. 309, 311, 502 P.2d 999, 1001 (1972) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also O\u2019Kelly v. State, 94 N.M. 74, 77, 607 P.2d 612, 615 (1980) (noting that \u201cRule [11-J703 [NMRA,] which governs the permissible bases upon which the opinion of an expert may be founded,\u201d provides that experts may rely upon or otherwise base their opinions on \u201cfacts or data,\u201d but not merely the oral or written opinions of non-testifying experts (citations omitted)). However, reliance upon such hearsay facts or data, or partial reliance upon another expert\u2019s opinion that is not in evidence, to form an independent expert opinion does not necessarily make the hearsay itself admissible. See Sewell v. Wilson, 101 N.M. 486, 489, 684 P.2d 1151, 1154 (Ct.App.1984) (citations omitted).\n{24} We have previously held that the admission into evidence of reports containing the opinions of non-testifying experts is prejudicial error. O\u2019Kelly, 94 N.M. at 76, 607 P.2d at 614. In O\u2019Kelly, the testifying expert simply restated the hearsay opinion of a non-testifying expert on direct examination and the testimony was admitted at trial over the defendant\u2019s objection. Id. On appeal, we held that the admission of the non-testifying expert\u2019s opinion was reversible error because a testifying expert is limited by Rule 11-703 to relying on \u201cfacts or data\u201d in forming an opinion, and so is precluded from relying \u201cupon the oral or written opinion of another expert.\u201d O\u2019Kelly, 94 N.M. at 77, 607 P.2d at 615 (citations omitted); see also Sewell, 101 N.M. at 490, 684 P.2d at 1154 (holding that hearsay opinion letter of non-testifying expert was improperly admitted through testimony of expert because it was \u201copinion\u201d).\n{25} The rationale for this holding is grounded in both the right of confrontation and concern for ensuring the opportunity for effective cross-examination as demonstrated by the cases relied upon by this Court in O\u2019Kelly. Among the cases O\u2019Kelly cited for support was United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54 (7th Cir.1971), overruled by United States v. Lawson, 653 F.2d 299, 303 n. 12 (7th Cir.1981) (noting that Bohle \u201cwas written prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence\u201d), which held that a doctor\u2019s in-trial restatement of the hearsay opinion of a non-testifying expert was inadmissible because the defendant had no opportunity for effective cross-examination regarding the hearsay opinion. Bohle, 445 F.2d at 69. Bohle was nominally overruled by Lawson following adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, but the Lawson Court restated the same principles in even stronger language.\nIn criminal cases, a court\u2019s inquiry under Rule 703 must go beyond finding that hearsay relied on by an expert meets these standards. An expert\u2019s testimony that was based entirely on hearsay reports, while it might satisfy Rule 703, would nevertheless violate a defendant\u2019s constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses. The Government could not, for example, simply produce a witness who did nothing but summarize out-of-court statements made by others. A criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to an effective cross-examination.\nLawson, 653 F.2d at 302 (footnotes omitted). We find Lawson\u2019s rationale persuasive.\n{26} Therefore, we must determine whether Young\u2019s testimony was an expression of his own opinion or whether he was merely parroting Champagne\u2019s opinion. Our review of the record leads us to the conclusion that Young was merely repeating the contents of Champagne\u2019s report and her opinion.\n{27} Champagne\u2019s report was admitted during Young\u2019s testimony despite Defendant\u2019s objection. After reviewing the report, Young testified about Champagne\u2019s analysis and opinion, as follows:\n[Prosecutor]: Okay, what is the result of that analysis? Young: The results are methamphetamine was identified. [Prosecutor]: Okay, how much?\nYoung: I believe it was 1.05 grams. [Prosecutor]: And is there a purity in that?\nYoung: Yes, sir.\n[Prosecutor]: What\u2019s the purity?\nYoung: It turned out at 64.3%.\n{28} On cross-examination, Young acknowledged that he had neither seen, analyzed, nor treated any of the evidence Champagne used to create her report. He testified that he had not weighed the evidence, nor had he conducted gas chromatography or mass spectrometry on it. Young further testified that (1) he had not done a purity analysis of the substance, (2) he had not performed any chemical testing on it, and (3) he had not supervised Champagne\u2019s analytical work. Rather, he testified ambiguously on cross-examination that \u201call I can do is look at the evidence and what [sic] I agree with her results. That\u2019s all I can do and from her results and testing materials and notes I agree with what she has.\u201d\n{29} It is not clear from Young\u2019s testimony whether he relied upon his own analysis of the underlying facts and data contributing to Champagne\u2019s opinion to arrive at his own, independent conclusion. A fair reading of the transcript shows that Young\u2019s testimony was a restatement of Champagne\u2019s conclusory opinion regarding the narcotic content of the substance, its weight, and its purity as stated in her hearsay report marked Exhibit 13. The prosecutor never asked Young whether he had analyzed the raw data that contributed to the opinion in Exhibit 13, nor was Young asked whether he had an opinion regarding whether the substance was a narcotic and, if so, the degree of its purity.\n{30} The determinations of whether a substance is narcotic and its degree of purity \u2014 \u25a0 two conclusions that presumably require some expert judgment to compare the computerized analytical results with reference data \u2014 must be classified as \u201copinion,\u201d rooted in the assessment of one who has specialized knowledge and skill. Champagne ostensibly used her training, skill, and knowledge to form an opinion that the substance in question was methamphetamine. Cf Bullcoming, 2010-NMSC-007, \u00b625 (holding that the results of the gas chromatograph BAC test do not constitute expert opinion, but rather constitute \u201cfacts and data\u201d of the type reasonably relied upon by experts). That expert determination was in turn employed by the prosecution to prove one element of the crime with which Defendant was charged. Defendant therefore had a right to challenge the judgment and conclusions behind Champagne\u2019s opinion. Because she did not testify, her opinion could not be effectively challenged. See Vermont v. Toume, 142 Vt. 241, 453 A.2d 1133, 1135 (1982) (holding that admission of non-testifying expert\u2019s opinion through testifying expert\u2019s testimony precluded cross-examination and violated Confrontation Clause).\n{31} The State would have us hold that forensic chemists and their testimony are fungible for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. The State\u2019s argument seems to be that Champagne would have given the same testimony as did Young because she would have been relying upon her report to the same extent that Young relied upon it. Citing the Court of Appeals opinion in State v. Christian, 119 N.M. 776, 783, 895 P.2d 676, 683 (Ct.App.1995), the State argues that Champagne probably would not have remembered preparing Defendant\u2019s report and probably would have relied upon her laboratory notes to testify. Thus, the State contends that Young was equally qualified to \u201cinterpret\u201d Champagne\u2019s notes, which were available for Defendant to examine, so he could properly stand in her place to testify without any \u201cmeaningful\u201d interference with Defendant\u2019s right of confrontation.\n{32} We hold that the Christian confrontation analysis is no longer sound. Christian was decided before Crawford and Melendez-Diaz, so its confrontation analysis, based on necessity and reliability, is no longer good law. See Christian, 119 N.M. at 782, 895 P.2d at 682 (\u201cThe confrontation clause places two conditions on the admission of hearsay evidence: necessity and reliability.\u201d). As we described earlier in this opinion, the confrontation analysis has become more sharply focused since Crawford. 541 U.S. at 59, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (\u201cTestimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.\u201d). Neither necessity nor reliability now function as exceptions to the Confrontation Clause requirement of cross-examination. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 146, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006) (\u201cWe rejected that [indicia of reliability] argument ... in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), saying that the Confrontation Clause \u2018commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.\u2019 \u201d). The only possible exception mentioned in Crawford is a testimonial statement made by a child victim of sexual assault. 541 U.S. at 58 n. 8, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Because such statements are not at issue in this case, we hold that the State\u2019s reliance on Christian is misplaced. Experts and their opinions are not fungible when the testifying expert has not formed an independent conclusion from the underlying facts or data, but merely restates the hearsay opinion of a non-testifying expert.\n{33} Young\u2019s testimony regarding Champagne\u2019s report violated Defendant\u2019s right of confrontation because it introduced Champagne\u2019s opinion, not his. Because it was Champagne\u2019s opinion, Defendant was entitled to cross-examine Champagne on a number of issues, including what test she performed, whether the test was routine, whether the test results required interpretation and the exercise of judgment, the use of skills she did not possess, any bias she might have, the risks of error in interpreting the results, and whether she made such errors. Had Young unequivocally testified that it was his opinion that the substance at issue was methamphetamine weighing 1.05 grams with a 64.3% purity, Defendant could have cross-examined him concerning these opinions. The basis for such opinion might have been the underlying data and Champagne\u2019s notes if Young testified that these are the types of facts or data reasonably relied upon by chemical forensic experts in forming opinions. See Rule 11-703. Indeed, the underlying data and notes may have been admitted consistent with Rule 11-703 had the court determined \u201cthat their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert\u2019s opinion substantially outweighfed] their prejudicial effect.\u201d Id. Under such circumstances, Defendant would have had the opportunity to effectively cross-examine Young, and his right to confrontation would not have been violated.\nC. ADMISSION OF THE HEARSAY REPORTS AND TESTIMONY WAS HARMLESS ERROR.\n{34} As its final argument, the State contends that any error in admitting Champagne\u2019s report was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant maintains, without arguing the matter, that the admissions were not harmless. We reject Defendant\u2019s unsupported argument and hold that the admissions were harmless error.\n{35} \u201c[A] reviewing court should only conclude that a[] [constitutional] error is harmless when there is no reasonable possibility it affected the verdict.\u201d State v. Barr, 2009-NMSC-024, \u00b6 53, 146 N.M. 301, 210 P.3d 198 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Three factors may be considered when determining whether constitutional error meets the standard of harmlessness. Id. \u00b6 55. \u201cNo one factor is determinative; rather, they are considered in conjunction with one another.\u201d Id.\nThe factors are whether there is: (1) substantial evidence to support the conviction without reference to the improperly admitted evidence; (2) such a disproportionate volume of permissible evidence that, in comparison, the amount of improper evidence will appear minuscule; and (3) no substantial conflicting evidence to discredit the State\u2019s testimony.\nId. \u00b6 56 (footnote omitted). \u201c[W]hen assessing the harmfulness of error, it is not the role of the appellate court to reweigh the evidence against a defendant^]\u201d Id. \u00b6 57. Therefore, \u201c[t]he harmless error analysis does not center on whether, in spite of the error, the right result was reached. Rather, the focus is on whether the verdict was impacted by the error.\u201d Id. \u201cWeighing these factors, a court must decide if it can conclude with the requisite level of certainty that an error did not contribute to the jury\u2019s verdict.\u201d State v. Macias, 2009-NMSC-028, \u00b6 39, 146 N.M. 378, 210 P.3d 804.\n{36} Under the facts of this ease, we determine that there was no reasonable possibility that the improperly-admitted evidence affected the verdict. Even if Exhibit 13 had been excluded, as well as Young\u2019s testimony on Champagne\u2019s opinion and conclusions, the record still establishes that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to convict Defendant on the single count of possession of a controlled substance. Young\u2019s testimony regarding his independent conclusion in Exhibit 12 that the larger bag found in the jacket pocket contained methamphetamine, based on his own chemical analysis, provided a sufficient, independent basis, without reference to the improperly-admitted evidence, for the jury to find Defendant guilty of possessing methamphetamine. Defendant was charged with one count of possession in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-23(D) (1972) (amended 2005). \u201cSection 30-31-23 is unambiguous; a plain reading of the provision indicates that any clearly identifiable amount of a controlled substance is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for possession of a controlled substance.\u201d State v. Wood, 117 N.M. 682, 685, 875 P.2d 1113, 1116 (Ct.App.1994). There was no evidence that contradicted Young\u2019s testimony regarding the larger bag of methamphetamine and Defendant has not argued that the evidence was not sufficient to support a finding that he was in possession of the jacket. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt that one of the two bags contained methamphetamine was all that was necessary to sustain the conviction. Therefore, the effect of excluding evidence relating to the smaller bag would have been inconsequential. Admission of the Champagne report was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.\nIII. CONCLUSION\n{37} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Champagne\u2019s chemical forensic report and Young\u2019s trial testimony regarding that report violated Defendant\u2019s right of confrontation and were inadmissible. Nonetheless, we find the error of their admission harmless and affirm Defendant\u2019s conviction.\n{38} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: PATRICIO M. SERNA, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, RICHARD C. BOSSON, and CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justices.\n. Laboratory reports that only record chain of custody or the maintenance history of the machine may not offend the Confrontation Clause. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at - n. 1, 129 S.Ct. at 2532 n. 1.\n. Rule 11-803(F) provides for the admission of a memorandum, report, record or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record or data compilation!.]\nThe term \"business\" is defined broadly in the rule to include \"business, institution, association, profession, occupation and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.\u201d Id. Rule 11-803(H) provides for the admission of [r]ecords, reports, statements or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (1) the activities of the office or agency, (2) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel!.]\n. Because of the similarities between the rules, we find federal case law instructive in interpreting the state rule. State v. Lopez, 1997-NMCA-075, \u00b6 10, 123 N.M. 599, 943 P.2d 1052.\n. It should be noted that in Bohle the testifying expert based his opinion only in part upon the non-testifying expert's hearsay opinion, but the testifying expert's opinion still was held to be inadmissible. Our case law, however, allows partial reliance on another expert's opinion. See Chambers, 84 N.M. at 311, 502 P.2d at 1001. Our reliance on Bohle in the O\u2019Kelly opinion illustrates the rationale behind our concern when an expert relies upon the opinion of another expert: The opposing party has no opportunity to cross-examine the basis for the hearsay opinion because the opinion is not the testifying expert's own opinion. This is especially true when, as is the situation in this case, the testifying expert relies solely on the opinion of another expert.\n. An Act to establish rules of evidence for certain courts and proceedings, Pub.L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat.1926 (1975) (providing that the rules enacted therein are to be known as the \u201cFederal Rules of Evidence\u201d).\n. Defendant abandoned his argument raised in the district court that Exhibit 12 is inadmissible hearsay, so we do not address that issue.", "type": "majority", "author": "CH\u00c1VEZ, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender, Nina Lalevic, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.", "Gary K. King, Attorney General, James W. Grayson, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2010-NMSC-008\n225 P.3d 1280\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Anthony ARAGON, Defendant-Petitioner.\nNo. 31,187.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nFeb. 12, 2010.\nHugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender, Nina Lalevic, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.\nGary K. King, Attorney General, James W. Grayson, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent." }, "file_name": "0474-01", "first_page_order": 510, "last_page_order": 522 }