{ "id": 4245851, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. Lloyd LUCERO, Defendant-Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Lucero", "decision_date": "2010-03-02", "docket_number": "No. 31,365", "first_page": "747", "last_page": "752", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "147 N.M. 747" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2010-NMSC-011" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "228 P.3d 1167" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "121 N.M. 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566540 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0553-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996-NMCA-038", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 4" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 N.M. 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1587670 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457", "parenthetical": "holding that a defendant who shoots an individual during a fist fight is not entitled to a jury instruction on justifiable homicide" }, { "page": "667", "parenthetical": "holding that a defendant who shoots an individual during a fist fight is not entitled to a jury instruction on justifiable homicide" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/58/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996-NMSC-068", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 322338 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/122/0596-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 N.M. 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2867238 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364" }, { "page": "1157" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/90/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996-NMSC-073", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 322297 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/122/0724-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008-NMSC-036", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4002169 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/144/0305-01" ] }, { "cite": "945 P.2d 996", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 N.M. 778", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 142224 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/123/0778-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMSC-044", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 49" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 P.3d 125", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 N.M. 532", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2008-NMCERT-011", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCERT", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566509 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "34" }, { "page": "264" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMCA-060", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 929130 ], "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" }, { "page": "\u00b6 2" }, { "page": "\u00b6 13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/137/0456-01" ] }, { "cite": "2001-NMCA-021", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 352378 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 13" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 2-3" }, { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/130/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008-NMCA-158", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4243382 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" }, { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/145/0273-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 875, "char_count": 20780, "ocr_confidence": 0.692, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3468947775360689e-07, "percentile": 0.6324108085065964 }, "sha256": "dae0871aff17c9e9b6dc55682bdeb751b412017f171e1ad198d3ba7968b14863", "simhash": "1:fb66ac877de38e61", "word_count": 3301 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:21:31.817470+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Chief Justice and PATRICIO M. SERNA, RICHARD C. BOSSON, and CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justices." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. Lloyd LUCERO, Defendant-Respondent." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nMAES, Justice.\n{1} Following a jury trial, Lloyd Lucero (Defendant) was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-2-3(B) (1994), in connection with the shooting death of Pablo Martinez (Victim). The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant\u2019s conviction, concluding that Defendant was entitled to receive UJI 14-5181 NMRA, self-defense by means of nondeadly force, because \u201cDefendant offered sufficient evidence to support a self-defense theory and an accidental shooting theory.\u201d State v. Lucero, 2008-NMCA-158, \u00b6 10, 145 N.M. 273, 196 P.3d 974. On appeal, the State claims that the Court of Appeals improperly concluded that Defendant was entitled to UJI 14-5181 because (1) Defendant only offered evidence in support of an accidental shooting theory; (2) Defendant used deadly force, rather than nondeadly force, when he shot and killed Victim; (3) Defendant was the first aggressor in the conflict; and (4) Defendant failed to request UJI 14-5181 in writing as required by Rule 5-608 NMRA.\n{2} We conclude that Defendant was not entitled to a self-defense instruction because the evidence adduced at trial established that the shooting was accidental, rather than intentional, and that the amount of force used by Defendant was excessive and unjustified under the circumstances. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and affirm Defendant\u2019s conviction.\nI. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY\n{3} On July 23, 2005, at approximately 2:30 a.m., Defendant and his girlfriend, Stacy Leonard, were watching a movie at Defendant\u2019s home when a car pulled into the driveway blaring loud music, revving its engine, and \u201cpeeling out.\u201d Neither Defendant nor Stacy recognized the car, which narrowly missed hitting a propane tank as it maneuvered back and forth in the driveway. Defendant went outside and loudly questioned the car\u2019s occupants, but he received no response.\n{4} Defendant went back inside the house, put on a pair of blue jeans and a pair of shoes, and retrieved a .25 caliber pistol from his dresser drawer. Defendant put the pistol in his right front pocket, went back outside, and walked toward the car with his hand resting on the handle of the pistol. The car was in the same spot where Defendant last had seen it, but the music was quieter and Defendant could now discern two individuals, one male and one female, sitting in the front seats. The car began to drive away, but stopped at the end of the driveway. Victim exited the car, walked rapidly toward Defendant, and punched him in the face. Defendant shot Victim once in the chest. Victim returned to the car and sped off, but subsequently died from the gunshot wound inflicted by Defendant.\n{5} Defendant was arrested and charged by criminal information with second-degree murder, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-2-l(B) (1994) and NMSA 1978, Section 31-18-16(A) (1993). In addition to second-degree murder, the jury was instructed on the lesser included offenses of voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter, as well as the defense of self-defense. The jury was unable to reach a verdict, however, and the trial court declared a mistrial.\n{6} The State subsequently filed an amended criminal information charging Defendant with voluntary manslaughter, contrary to Section 30-2-3(A), and involuntary manslaughter, contrary to Section 30-2-3(B). During his second trial, Defendant testified that he had retrieved the pistol from his bedroom, where he unlocked the trigger lock and cocked the hammer, because\nI felt threatened. I didn\u2019t know who was out there, and I didn\u2019t know what they were going to do or what they were planning on because they were not answering me at all, so that\u2019s why I went inside and grabbed my gun because I was concerned on who they were and I didn\u2019t know what they had[.]\nDefendant stated that when Victim punched him in the face, \u201cI stumbled just like out of a reaction, I put my hands up and the gun was still in my hand at that time, and I shot off one round.\u201d Defendant testified that he had not intended to shoot Victim, \u201c[i]t was just the reflex of getting hit, you put your hands up. I pulled my hand out of my pocket and [inaudible] fired. I didn\u2019t even know how high I was aiming or how low or anything.\u201d {7} At the close of evidence, Defendant requested a self-defense jury instruction in accordance with UJI 14-5171 NMRA (justifiable homicide; self-defense). The trial court denied the instruction in light of Defendant\u2019s testimony that the shooting was an accident, rather than an intentional act of self-defense. The jury found Defendant not guilty of the crime of voluntary manslaughter, but guilty of the crime of involuntary manslaughter. The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury\u2019s verdicts, and Defendant appealed his conviction.\n{8} The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant\u2019s conviction, noting that \u201c \u2018a defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction if he or she introduces evidence from which the jury could reasonably find that the killing resulted from the threats or provocation that preceded it, even if the ultimate injury occurred accidentally.\u2019 \u201d Lucero, 2008-NMCA-158, \u00b6 6, 145 N.M. 273, 196 P.3d 974 (quoting State v. Gallegos, 2001-NMCA-021, \u00b6 13, 130 N.M. 221, 22 P.3d 689). The Court determined that \u201c[i]n the present case, the events of the entire evening, together with Defendant\u2019s testimony, could raise a reasonable doubt about whether Victim\u2019s actions put Defendant in fear of great bodily harm resulting in Defendant\u2019s arming himself,\u201d id. \u00b6 8, and, therefore, the trial court improperly denied Defendant\u2019s request for a self-defense instruction. Although \u201cthere was also testimony to support the theory that the gun went off by accident,\u201d the Court explained that \u201cit is for the jury to weigh and resolve conflicting evidence and testimony.\u201d Id. \u00b6 9.\n{9} The Court noted that \u201c[w]hen evidence supports a defendant\u2019s theory that he was acting in self-defense, but that the resulting death was an accident, the trial court should instruct the jury using UJI 14-5181 NMRA, the nondeadly force self-defense instruction.\u201d Id. \u00b6 7 (citing State v. Romero, 2005-NMCA-060, \u00b6 12, 137- N.M. 456, 112 P.3d 1113). Although Defendant had tendered an improper jury instruction, the Court determined that \u201c \u2018Defendant\u2019s tender of a proper, written instruction ... would not have alerted the trial court to its error ... and would not have resulted in avoidance of the error because the error was based on incorrect rationales having nothing to do with the tender of written instructions.\u2019 \u201d Id. \u00b6 11 (quoting State v. Diaz, 121 N.M. 28, 34, 908 P.2d 258, 264 (Ct.App.1995)). Because the record reflected that \u201cthe trial court understood [Defendant\u2019s self-defense] theory but misapplied the law to deny the jury instruction,\u201d the Court held that \u201cthe trial court had an independent duty to instruct the jury on Defendant\u2019s theory of self-defense.\u201d Id. \u00b6 12.\n{10} We granted the State\u2019s petition for writ of certiorari pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 34-5-14(B) (1966) and Rule 12-502 NMRA to determine whether the Court of Appeals properly concluded that Defendant was entitled to UJI 14-5181, self-defense by means of nondeadly force. State v. Lucero, 2008-NMCERT-011, 145 N.M. 532, 202 P.3d 125.\nII. DISCUSSION\n{11} \u201cThe propriety of jury instructions given or denied is a mixed question of law and fact. Mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo.\u201d State v. Salazar, 1997-NMSC-044, \u00b6 49, 123 N.M. 778, 945 P.2d 996. \u201cFor a defendant to be entitled to a self-defense instruction ... there need be only enough evidence to raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of a juror about whether the defendant lawfully acted in self-defense. If any reasonable minds could differ, the instruction should be given.\u201d State v. Rudolfo, 2008-NMSC-036, \u00b6 27, 144 N.M. 305, 187 P.3d 170 (citation omitted). \u201cWhen evidence at trial supports the giving of an instruction on a defendant\u2019s theory of the case, failure to so instruct is reversible error.\u201d State v. Broum, 1996-NMSC-073, \u00b6 34, 122 N.M. 724, 931 P.2d 69.\n{12} The State claims that the trial court properly denied Defendant\u2019s request for a self-defense instruction because Defendant testified that the shooting was an accident, rather than an intentional act of self-defense. Defendant does not dispute that the shooting was an accident, but nonetheless claims that he was entitled to a self-defense instruction pursuant to Gallegos and Romero.\n{13} \u201cEvery killing of a person by another is presumed to be unlawful, and only when it can be shown to be excusable or justifiable will it be held otherwise.\u201d State v. Noble, 90 N.M. 360, 364, 563 P.2d 1153, 1157 (1977). A killing in self-defense is justifiable because \u201can otherwise criminal action becomes permissible under the circumstances. Self-defense is thus a complete defense; if established, a defendant is not guilty of the crime.\u201d 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law \u00a7 60 (2006) (footnote omitted); see also UJI 14-5171 (justifiable homicide); 2 Charles E. Torc\u00eda, Wharton\u2019s Criminal Law \u00a7 138 (15th ed.1994) (noting that a killing in self-defense is justifiable because \u201cthe killing of the assailant was \u2018authorized\u2019 by the law\u201d). By contrast, an accidental killing is excusable because it is \u201can unintended homicide which occurs in the course of performing a lawful act, without criminal negligence.\u201d 2 Torcia, supra, \u00a7 138; see also UJI 14-5140 NMRA (excusable homicide). \u201cAs in other cases of excusable homicide, the slayer is not criminally responsible therefor, as an act that is committed accidentally does not involve a mental state cognizable to the criminal offenses of murder and involuntary manslaughter.\u201d 40 C.J.S. Homicide \u00a7 168 (2006) (footnote omitted).\n{14} As the foregoing analysis reflects, the fundamental distinction between self-defense and accident is the defendant\u2019s mental state. A killing in self-defense is intentional in nature, but justified by the imminent threat to the defendant\u2019s life or limb, whereas an accidental killing is unintentional and non-negligent in nature. This distinction is reflected in our uniform jury instructions. UJI 14-5171 (justifiable homicide; self defense), provides, in relevant part, that a killing is in self-defense if \u201c[t]he defendant was in fact put in fear by the apparent danger of immediate death or great bodily harm and killed [the victim] because of that fear.\" UJI 14-5171 (emphasis added). By contrast, UJI 14-5140 (excusable homicide), provides, in relevant part, that a killing is accidental if it is committed \u201cwith usual and ordinary caution and without any unlawful intent.\" UJI 14-5140 (emphasis added); see also NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-2-5(A) (1963) (\u201cHomicide is excusable ... when committed by accident or misfortune in doing any lawful act, by lawful means, with usual and ordinary caution and without any unlawful intent.\u201d). Indeed, juries are not given an instruction on the defense of accident because, in the absence of criminal negligence, the defendant cannot be found guilty of involuntary manslaughter. UJI 14-5140, Committee commentary; see generally State v. Yarborough, 1996-NMSC-068, \u00b6 20, 122 N.M. 596, 930 P.2d 131 (holding that \u201cthe State must show at least criminal negligence to convict a criminal defendant of involuntary manslaughter\u201d).\n{15} To receive a self-defense instruction regarding justifiable homicide, Defendant was required to produce evidence supporting a reasonable inference that he intentionally and purposefully fired his pistol out of fear of immediate death or great bodily harm. However, Defendant failed to produce any evidence indicating that he fired the pistol intentionally. Indeed, Defendant testified that the pistol discharged accidentally or reflexively as a result of the physical assault initiated by Victim. Moreover, the evidence was insufficient for the jury reasonably to find that Victim threatened Defendant with death or great bodily harm. Although a punch to the face is the type of force that may cause bodily injury, it is not the type of force that creates a high probability of death, results in serious disfigurement, results in loss of any member or organ of the body, or results in permanent prolonged impairment of the use of any member or organ of the body. See UJI 14-131 NMRA (defining \u201cgreat bodily harm\u201d); see also State v. Heisler, 58 N.M. 446, 457, 272 P.2d 660, 667 (1954) (holding that a defendant who shoots an individual during a fist fight is not entitled to a jury instruction on justifiable homicide); State v. Duarte, 1996-NMCA-038, \u00b6 4, 121 N.M. 553, 915 P.2d 309 (\u201c[Djeadly force may not be used in a situation involving simple battery or in a struggle in which there has been no indication that death or great bodily harm could result.\u201d); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Siibstantive Criminal Law \u00a7 10.4(b) (2d ed.2003) (noting that \u201cdeadly force may only be used against what is reasonably believed to be deadly force\u201d). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly denied Defendant\u2019s request for UJI 14-5171.\n{16} Defendant claims, however, that he was entitled to a justifiable homicide self-defense instruction pursuant to Gallegos. We disagree. In Gallegos, the defendant was charged and convicted of involuntary manslaughter after she shot and killed an individual who was involved in a physical altercation with her husband, during which her husband sustained two stab wounds. 2001-NMCA-021, \u00b6\u00b6 2-3, 130 N.M. 221, 22 P.3d 689. The State claimed that the defendant was precluded from raising the defense of self-defense because \u201cself-defense requires an intent to do something in order to prevent injury or death,\u201d whereas involuntary manslaughter requires the State to prove \u201can accidental killing.\u201d Id. \u00b6 8. The Court of Appeals rejected the State\u2019s claim, reasoning that \u201c[i]t is entirely plausible that a person could act intentionally in self-defense and at the same time achieve an unintended result.\u201d Id. \u00b6 12 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Gallegos held that a defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction if the evidence supports a reasonable inference that the defendant\u2019s use of force was intentional, even if the consequences of that force were accidental. Id. \u00b6 13.\n{17} In Gallegos, the evidence regarding the defendant\u2019s intentional use of force was conflicting. The defendant testified that \u201cshe never took aim and did not realize the gun had fired until someone shouted that she had shot Victim. She said she did not intend for the gun to go off when it did.\u201d Id. \u00b6 4. However, an eyewitness to the shooting testified that the defendant intentionally had \u201caimed the gun at a fleeing combatant.\u201d Id. In light of the conflicting evidence regarding the defendant\u2019s intent, the Court of Appeals held that the issue of self-defense should have been submitted to the jury, reasoning that \u201c[a] jury given a self-defense instruction can resolve any anomalies in the circumstances surrounding the homicide, including the question of whether the defendant accidentally killed the victim while defending himself or another.\u201d Id. \u00b6 14.\nFor example, if the jury found that the gun discharged accidentally due to some negligence on Defendant\u2019s part, it could also find that a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have taken care that the gun did not discharge. Therefore, Defendant\u2019s self-defense theory would fail, and the jury could convict her of the crime charged-involuntary manslaughter. The jury could also reject the self-defense theory if it found that Defendant knew that someone other than Victim stabbed Husband. Thus, the anomalies in the evidence that troubled the district court will be resolved by the jury when it is properly instructed.\nId. \u00b6 15.\n{18} We conclude that Gallegos is distinguishable from the present case. First, in Gallegos, the evidence regarding the defendant\u2019s intentional use of force was conflicting and, therefore, the issue properly was submitted to the jury for resolution. Second, in Gallegos, the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant\u2019s use of deadly force was \u201creasonable under the circumstances,\u201d id. \u00b6 20, because the defendant\u2019s husband suffered two stab wounds, from which the jury reasonably could have inferred that (1) the defendant believed her husband was in immediate danger of death or great bodily harm, (2) she killed the victim to prevent the death or great bodily harm, and (3) a reasonable person in the same circumstances as the defendant would have acted as the defendant did. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 19-20; see UJI 14-5172 NMRA (justifiable homicide; defense of another). By contrast, the evidence in the present case was insufficient to establish that Defendant\u2019s use of force was either intentional or reasonable under the circumstances. Accordingly, we conclude that Defendant\u2019s reliance on Gallegos is misplaced.\n{19} Alternatively, Defendant claims that he was entitled to a non-deadly force self-defense instruction pursuant to Romero. We disagree. In Romero, the defendant was convicted of second degree murder for the death of his wife. 2005-NMCA-060, \u00b6 2, 137 N.M. 456, 112 P.3d 1113. At trial, the evidence revealed \u201cthat the marriage involved domestic violence\u201d and that the defendant and his wife had engaged in a physical altercation the night of her death. Id. \u00b6 4. The defendant requested an instruction regarding nondeadly force self-defense, which the trial court denied, reasoning that an \u201cinstruction on nondeadly force self-defense is inapplicable as a matter of law when the victim dies.\u201d Id. \u00b6 9. The Court of Appeals reversed the defendant\u2019s conviction, holding that UJI 14-5181 \u201cis contemplated to be used in certain homicide cases\u201d when the evidence reveals that \u201c[t]he force used by defendant ordinarily would not create a substantial risk of death or great bodily harm.\u201d Romero, 2005-NMCA-060, \u00b6 13, 137 N.M. 456, 112 P.3d 1113 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court concluded that Romero was one of those cases because\nthe evidence was that [the defendant] was both humiliated and attacked by the victim. The attack, consisting of hitting, scratching, pinning down, and grabbing, allowed Defendant to respond with the like force of hitting, punching, grabbing, and biting. The victim\u2019s injuries, in the light most favorable to Defendant, were a broken nose, and various cuts and bruises. The cause of death was disputed, and in the light most favorable to Defendant, the cause of death did not exclude an accidental death caused by the exercise of non-deadly force.\nId. \u00b6 15 (emphasis added).\n{20} We conclude that Romero is distinguishable from the present case. In Romero, the defendant intentionally used non-deadly force in self-defense (i.e., hitting, punching, grabbing, and biting), but that force unintentionally and unforeseeably resulted in the victim\u2019s death. See Gallegos, 2001-NMCA-021, \u00b6 12, 130 N.M. 221, 22 P.3d 689 (holding that a defendant who intentionally uses force in self-defense, but achieves an unintended result, may be entitled to a self-defense instruction). By contrast, in the present case, Defendant unintentionally used deadly force (i.e., shooting Victim in the chest), which had the foreseeable, albeit unintentional, consequence of killing Victim. Because Defendant\u2019s use of force was unintentional and ordinarily would (and in fact did) result in death or great bodily harm, Defendant was not entitled to UJI 14-5181.\n{21} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction regarding the intentional use of force in self-defense. Accordingly, we need not address whether Defendant was the first aggressor in the conflict with Victim or whether Defendant had tendered a proper self-defense instruction in accordance with Rule 5-608.\nIII. CONCLUSION\n{22} We hold that Defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction regarding justifiable homicide, UJI 14-5171, or nondeadly force self-defense, UJI 14-5181, because the evidence established that the shooting was accidental, rather than intentional, and that the force used by Defendant was excessive and unjustified under the circumstances. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and affirm Defendant\u2019s conviction.\n{23} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Chief Justice and PATRICIO M. SERNA, RICHARD C. BOSSON, and CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justices.", "type": "majority", "author": "MAES, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Gary K. King, Attorney General, Joel Jacobsen, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.", "Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender, William A. O\u2019Connell, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2010-NMSC-011\n228 P.3d 1167\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. Lloyd LUCERO, Defendant-Respondent.\nNo. 31,365.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nMarch 2, 2010.\nGary K. King, Attorney General, Joel Jacobsen, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.\nHugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender, William A. O\u2019Connell, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent." }, "file_name": "0747-01", "first_page_order": 783, "last_page_order": 788 }