{ "id": 4247821, "name": "In the Matter of the CABLE FAMILY TRUST DATED JUNE 10, 1987, as Amended. Gary D. Cable, Beneficiary-Petitioner, v. Wells Fargo Bank New Mexico, N.A., Petitioner-Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "Cable v. Wells Fargo Bank New Mexico, N.A.", "decision_date": "2010-03-23", "docket_number": "No. 30,787", "first_page": "127", "last_page": "137", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "148 N.M. 127" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2010-NMSC-017" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "231 P.3d 108" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "2007 WL 4181927", "category": "reporters:specialty_west", "reporter": "WL", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "*2", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he court's reasoning in Powell is faulty.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Cal.Rptr.2d 319", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr. 2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "322", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "331" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Cal.App.4th 1194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 4th", "case_ids": [ 1021123 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-4th/95/1194-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 Cal.Rptr.2d 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr. 2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" }, { "page": "504", "parenthetical": "\"In interpreting the trust instrument, we seek the intent of the trustors as revealed in the document considered as a whole.\"" }, { "page": "504", "parenthetical": "recognizing effectiveness of surviving spouse's trust revocation as to his half of the trust corpus" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Cal.App.4th 1434", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 4th", "case_ids": [ 525318 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-4th/83/1434-01" ] }, { "cite": "938 F.Supp. 14", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 5651587 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17-19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/938/0014-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 S.W.3d 613", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 8321037 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw3d/218/0613-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008-NMCA-045", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3784271 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/143/0716-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMCA-145", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 827354 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 N.M. 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1555177 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "513" }, { "page": "544" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/97/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "920 So.2d 193", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8989885 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195-96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/920/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 N.M. 729", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2768208 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "733", "parenthetical": "emphasizing the need to honor the intent of the grantors, despite deficiencies in technical document drafting" }, { "page": "1116", "parenthetical": "emphasizing the need to honor the intent of the grantors, despite deficiencies in technical document drafting" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/85/0729-01" ] }, { "cite": "2002-NMCA-097", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 260730 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 10, 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/132/0701-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-050", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4245434 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/147/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 N.M. 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1592771 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "71", "parenthetical": "\"When the issue to be determined rests upon the interpretation of documentary evidence, this Court is in as good a position as the trial court to determine the facts and draw its own conclusions.\"" }, { "page": "915", "parenthetical": "\"When the issue to be determined rests upon the interpretation of documentary evidence, this Court is in as good a position as the trial court to determine the facts and draw its own conclusions.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/108/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMSC-002", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3669263 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/141/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008-NMCA-005", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3783433 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/143/0269-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1305, "char_count": 38026, "ocr_confidence": 0.685, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1671379785555611e-07, "percentile": 0.5854150184045479 }, "sha256": "e8e14d73af4ed10336d4b5ee284083c8fcc868081b1e5892de308dbfc0e47d31", "simhash": "1:b925e6d360cf1a95", "word_count": 6158 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:58:33.542282+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Chief Justice, PATRICIO M. SERNA, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES and RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justices." ], "parties": [ "In the Matter of the CABLE FAMILY TRUST DATED JUNE 10, 1987, as Amended. Gary D. Cable, Beneficiary-Petitioner, v. Wells Fargo Bank New Mexico, N.A., Petitioner-Respondent." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nDANIELS, Justice.\n{1} This case requires us to determine whether the community property trust created by a married couple granted the surviving spouse the power to amend the trust\u2019s remainder distribution schedule after the death of the first spouse. The Court of Appeals upheld the affirmative answer to that question by the district court solely on the theory that the surviving spouse\u2019s undisputed right to withdraw all assets of the trust estate implicitly included a lesser power to amend the trust. While we conclude that the Court of Appeals was correct in upholding the surviving spouse\u2019s right to amend, we do so through a broader analysis of the totality of the trust provisions. Because we hold that the power of amendment was specifically intended by the grantors in this case, we do not need to hypothesize whether an unrestricted power to withdraw necessarily includes a power to amend in all cases as a matter of law.\nI. BACKGROUND\n{2} In July 1987, Lowell and Martha Cable created the Cable Family Trust to care for the needs of each other and to distribute any assets that remained after the deaths of both of them to their three children, Petitioner Gary Cable, Larrie Cable, and Shirley Trevino (for purposes of clarity, all family members will be referred to by their first names in this Opinion). Although the property initially placed into the trust was separate property, in December of the same year, Lowell and Martha entered into a community property agreement that designated \u201call property, ... regardless of when acquired, and all property hereinafter acquired\u201d as community property. Three months later, Martha died, leaving Lowell as the sole surviving grantor.\n{3} Over the next fifteen years, Lowell made a series of amendments to the trust, among which were his 1988 appointment of Gary as trustee and his 1994 amendment, after he remarried, replacing Gary as trustee with a predecessor of Wells Fargo Bank. Of particular significance to the issues in this case is Lowell\u2019s 1999 amendment to the post-trust distribution schedule, redirecting 39 percent of the trust remainder to (1) his eleven grandchildren (2.5% each); (2) five nonprofit organizations \u2014 The Salvation Army, Habitat for Humanity, Albuquerque Rescue Mission, Albuquerque Little Theatre, and Musical Theatre of the Southwest (1.5% each); (3) St. Paul Lutheran Church (2.5%); and (4) two close friends (1.5% jointly). The greater part of the trust remainder, 61 percent of the total, was still to be distributed among Martha and Lowell\u2019s three children, but the original equal three-way distribution among them was amended to provide for a 30-30-40 split, with 18.3 percent of the total trust proceeds going to each of their two sons, Gary and Larrie, and 24.4 percent going to their daughter, Shirley. In dollar terms, the amended distribution schedule meant that Shirley would receive roughly $36,600 more than either of her brothers. The 1999 amendments were the last made before Lowell died in 2002.\n{4} After Lowell\u2019s death, trustee Wells Fargo filed a petition in the district court for approval to distribute the remainder of the trust estate, amounting to about $600,000, in accordance with the 1999 amended distribution schedule. Gary filed a written opposition to Wells Fargo\u2019s request and moved for declaratory judgment and summary judgment. His position was that all of the trust amendments Lowell had made in the years after the death of Martha, including the 1999 distribution schedule, were beyond Lowell\u2019s authority as surviving grantor. Gary argued that he therefore was entitled to receive a full one-third share of the trust remainder, as originally designated in the 1987 schedule, instead of the 18.3 percent he would receive by the terms of the 1999 schedule, a dollar difference of about $90,000.\n{5} Much of the focus of the litigation in this case has been the proper interpretation of Section 9.1 of the instrument creating the trust, which provides in its entirety:\n9.1 Power in Grantors During Lifetimes of Grantors. Grantors reserve the right at any time or times to amend or revoke this instrument and the trusts hereunder, in whole or in part, by an instrument or instruments in writing, signed by Grantors and delivered in Grantors\u2019 lifetimes to Trustee; provided, however, that no such alteration, amendment or revocation shall affect the character of any property held by the Trust, and the interest of the Husband and Wife in the various Trust assets, whether community, separate or otherwise, shall retain its character as such. Nothing herein shall be construed as a transfer of separate properties from Husband to Wife, or from Wife to Husband, and in the event of any revocation, all property shall be reeonveyed to the respective owners. If this instrument is revoked in its entirety, the revocation shall take effect upon the delivery of the required writing to Trustee. On the revocation of this instrument in its entirety, Trustee shall deliver to Grantors, or as Grantors may direct in the instrument of revocation, all the Trust property. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Grantors may specifically declare in writing certain assets to be community property.\n{6} Wells Fargo filed a motion for summary judgment that relied primarily on provisions contained in the trust instrument itself, but that also relied on a supporting affidavit executed by Wayne Marsh, the attorney who had drafted the original 1987 Cable Family Trust agreement at Lowell and Martha\u2019s request. Mr. Marsh\u2019s affidavit recited in relevant part (1) that he drafted Section 9.1 of the agreement to provide that Grantors \u201creserve the right at any time or times to amend or revoke\u201d the trust and its provisions; (2) that it was his practice to explain to his clients that this standard language routinely used by him in trust agreements \u201cconfers upon the surviving spouse the power to amend the trust agreement after the death of the first spouse\u201d; and (3) that, as the attorney who prepared the agreement for Lowell and Martha, he believed that Section 9.1 accurately stated the intent of his clients to allow the surviving spouse the power to amend. Gary argued in opposition that the use of the plural term \u201cGrantors\u201d in Section 9.1 meant that both grantors had to agree jointly to any amendment, and that it was therefore impossible for Lowell to have any such amendment power after Martha\u2019s death.\n{7} The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo, agreeing that Lowell, as surviving grantor, had the power of amendment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that result. Cable v. Wells Fargo Bank N.M., N.A. (In Re Cable Family Trust), 2008-NMCA-005, 143 N.M. 269, 175 P.3d 937 (filed 2007). The Court of Appeals rejected attorney Marsh\u2019s interpretation of the effect of Section 9.1 of the trust and instead relied exclusively on Section 2.4, which provided in relevant part: \u201cTrustee shall ... pay over to the surviving Grantor such amount or amounts of principal as the surviving Grantor may demand in writing delivered to Trustee.\u201d Id. \u00b6 2. In essence, the Court viewed the power to take all as necessarily including the power to take less than all and to redistribute it. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 1, 17.\n{8} We granted certiorari to consider those issues.\nII. STANDARD OF REVIEW\n{9} The parties agree that the material facts in this case are undisputed and that the case should have been resolved by summary judgment, although they disagree about the principles of law that should be applied to the undisputed facts. \u201cAn appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment presents a question of law and is reviewed de novo. Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u201d Montgomery v. Lomos Altos, Inc., 2007-NMSC-002, \u00b6 16, 141 N.M. 21, 150 P.3d 971 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).\n{10} The legal inquiry in this case involves the interpretation of trust language and the application of statutes to the trust and its terms. Both tasks also require de novo review. Arch, Ltd. v. Yu, 108 N.M. 67, 71, 766 P.2d 911, 915 (1988) (\u201cWhen the issue to be determined rests upon the interpretation of documentary evidence, this Court is in as good a position as the trial court to determine the facts and draw its own conclusions.\u201d); State v. Nick R., 2009-NMSC-050, \u00b6 11, 147 N.M. 182, 218 P.3d 868 (\u201cStatutory construction is a matter of law we review de novo.\u201d).\nIII. DISCUSSION\nRole of Grantor\u2019s Intent\n{11} We start with the basic principle that \u201c[i]n construing the provisions of wills and trust instruments, the court must attempt to ascertain and give effect to the [grantor\u2019s] intent.\u201d Fenley v. Estate of Deupree (In re Estate of Deupree), 2002-NMCA-097, \u00b6\u00b6 10, 12, 132 N.M. 701, 54 P.3d 542 (noting that a court may consider the language and conduct of the parties, the surrounding circumstances, and, where needed to interpret ambiguous language, extrinsic evidence of the parties\u2019 intent, including testimony of the attorney who drafted the trust) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Loco Credit Union v. Reed, 85 N.M. 729, 733, 516 P.2d 1112, 1116 (1973) (emphasizing the need to honor the intent of the grantors, despite deficiencies in technical document drafting).\n{12} In the Uniform Trust Code (UTC), adopted by the New Mexico Legislature in 2003 as NMSA 1978, Sections 46A-1-101 to 46A-11-1105 (2003, as amended through 2009), the phrase \u201cterms of the trust\u201d is defined as \u201cthe manifestation of the settlor\u2019s intent regarding a trust\u2019s provisions as expressed in the trust instrument or as may be established by other evidence that would be admissible in a judicial proceeding.\u201d Section 46A-1-103(R); see also Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Terms of the Trust \u00a7 4 (2003) (\u201cThe phrase \u2018terms of the trust\u2019 means the manifestation of intention of the settlor with respect to the trust provisions expressed in a manner that admits of its proof in judicial proceedings.\u201d).\nThe phrase \u201cthe terms of the trust\u201d is used in a broad sense ... [and] includes any manifestations of the settlor\u2019s intention at the time of the creation of the trust, whether expressed by written or spoken words or by conduct.... The terms of the trust may appear clearly from written or spoken words, or they may be provided by statute, supplied by rules of construction, or determined by interpretation of the words or conduct of the settlor in the light of all of the circumstances surrounding the creation of the trust.\nRestatement (Third) of Trusts: Terms of the Trust \u00a7 4 cmt. a.\n{13} As with other types of donative documents, the primary evidence of grantor intent is the plain language of each provision, when read in conjunction with the document as a whole:\nThe text of a donative document must be read in its entirety. Each portion, whether it be a word, phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph, article, or some other portion, is connected to a whole. The donor is presumed to intend that the various portions complement or modify each other. The case may arise, for instance, in which two portions, read in isolation, appear contradictory. But, when construction of the document as a consistent whole would be facilitated by reading one portion as modifying the other or reading both as mutually modifying each other, that construction prevails.\nRestatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills & Other Donative Transfers \u00a7 10.2 cmt. b (2003). See generally \u00a7 46A-1-112 (stating that the rules of construction for documents disposing of property \u201capply as appropriate to the interpretation of the terms of a trust and the disposition of the trust property\u201d).\nAnalysis of Trust Expressions of Grantor Intent\n{14} Instead of trying to draw conclusions about the intent of Lowell and Martha from parsing language in isolated parts of their trust documents, we must instead examine all relevant components and then consider how they fit together to compose the whole expression of their intent. Viewed in that manner, we conclude that the documentation reflects an overarching intent to create a trust that would (1) provide for both Lowell and Martha, with the power to amend or revoke its provisions during their joint lifetimes; (2) provide for the needs and wishes of the surviving spouse, with the same power to amend or revoke after the death of the first of them; and (3) convey any remaining assets in the trust estate to other beneficiaries after the deaths of both spouses. A number of sections of the trust documentation support this interpretation and reflect a clear intention to vest complete control of the entire estate in the surviving spouse after the death of the first.\n{15} To begin with, the section specifically governing trust interpretation provides a clear expression of Lowell and Martha\u2019s intent that all provisions of the trust are meant to be liberally construed in favor of the surviving spouse\u2019s interests and above the interests of other beneficiaries:\n1.6 Interpretation. Inasmuch as the continued welfare of Grantors is of primary and paramount concern, Trustee is directed to liberally construe all provisions of this trust in favor of the surviving Grantor, and if there is any doubt or conflict of interest, the rights and interests of the surviving Grantor shall be dealt with by Trustee as primary and paramount to the rights and interests of all other beneficiaries.\n{16} The first sentence of Section 2.1, entitled \u201cBoth Grantors Living and Competent,\u201d makes it clear that \u201c[w]hile both Grantors are living, Trustee shall dispose of the net income and principal of the community property of this trust as both Grantors may direct Trustee from time to time by a written instrument signed by both Grantors and delivered to Trustee.\u201d (Emphasis added.) By contrast, Section 2.3, entitled \u201cDeath of First Grantor to Die,\u201d provides that \u201c[u]pon the death of the first Grantor to die (hereinafter referred to as \u2018deceased Grantor\u2019), the remaining trust estate shall be administered and distributed in accordance with the subsequent provisions of PART TWO.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\n{17} The \u201csubsequent provisions of PART TWO\u201d include Section 2.4, entitled \u201cDuring Surviving Grantor\u2019s Lifetime,\u201d which explicitly directs not only that the Trustee shall pay \u201cfor the surviving Grantor\u2019s benefit such amounts of principal as Trustee may deem necessary or advisable for his or her care, maintenance and support in reasonable comfort,\u201d but also that the survivor is given an unrestricted right to take any or all of the trust assets on demand: \u201cTrustee shall also pay over to the surviving Grantor such amount or amounts of principal as the surviving Grantor may demand in writing delivered to Trustee.\u201d\n{18} Another of the \u201cs\u00fabsequent provisions of PART TWO\u201d recognizes the right of the survivor to redirect the distribution of all of the trust remainder \u201cfor the use and benefit of such person or persons, including the estate of the surviving Grantor, upon such conditions, with such powers, in such manner, and at such times as the surviving Grantor shall direct by his or her Last Will and Testament.\u201d\n{19} Wells Fargo also argues that, in addition to the surviving grantor\u2019s unrestricted power to take all the trust assets during the surviving grantor\u2019s lifetime under Section 2.4 and the unrestricted power to redistribute the remainder through a will provision, Section 9.1, \u201cPower in Grantors During Lifetimes of Grantors,\u201d also recognizes the right of the survivor to continue to exercise the right of amendment or revocation through any signed document: \u201cGrantors reserve the right at any time or times to amend or revoke this instrument and the trusts hereunder, in whole or in part, by an instrument or instruments in writing, signed by Grantors and delivered in Grantors\u2019 lifetimes to Trustee ____\u201d\n{20} Gary argues, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the use of the plural term \u201cGrantors\u201d in Section 9.1 excludes the power of one grantor, even after the death of the first, to continue to exercise the power of revocation or amendment. We disagree for several reasons.\n{21} To begin with, such a narrow construction would be inconsistent with the thrust of the several provisions of Sections One and Two that emphasize the unrestricted power of the survivor to use and control the trust assets, both before and after his or her death.\n{22} Second, there are a number of other provisions in the document that assist in the proper interpretation of Section 9.1. One of those is Section 4.2, \u201cGender and Number,\u201d which provides that \u201c[t]he neuter gender shall include the masculine and feminine, and the masculine gender shall include the neuter and feminine and words used in the singular shall include the plural and vice versa.\u201d On that same subject, the trust also contained a final section entitled \u201cFURTHER TERMS AND PROVISIONS,\u201d which \u201csupersede any of the preceding provisions which may be in conflict\u201d and which emphasize in Section 1(G) that \u201c[w]here the context permits, any gender shall be deemed to refer to the other genders, the singular to refer to the plural and the plural to refer to the singular.\u201d\n{23} Following those commands, by properly reading \u201cthe plural to refer to the singular\u201d in Section 9.1, makes it clear that after there are no longer two living grantors, the survivor is permitted to exercise what was previously a joint power of amendment or revocation: \u201cGrantor[] reserve[s] the right at any time or times to amend or revoke this instrument and the trusts hereunder, in whole or in part, by an instrument or instruments in writing, signed by Grantor[] and delivered in Grantor[\u2019s] lifetime[] to Trustee.\u201d\n{24} The guidelines regarding gender and number interchangeability control a variety of the trust\u2019s provisions. If we did not apply the section universally throughout the trust, absurdities would result. See Roberts v. Sarros, 920 So.2d 193, 195-96 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2006) (approving the use of singular and plural interchangeability when doing otherwise would make other portions of the document absurd). For example, without substituting the singular for the plural, Section 5.1, giving the trustee the power to file tax returns \u201con behalf of Grantors during Grantors\u2019 lifetimes,\u201d would not allow the trustee to file tax returns on behalf of the surviving grantor. Section 6.6.a, which requires the trustee \u201c[d]uring Grantors\u2019 [{lifetimes\u201d to render accounts \u201cto Grantors whenever requested to do so by Grantors,\u201d would leave the survivor powerless to demand an accounting or learn the status of the trust\u2019s income and principal. Section 7.1 provides that the trustee may resign by giving \u201cwritten notice to Grantors during Grantors\u2019 lifetimes, or after the death of both Grantors, to each of the adult beneficiaries.\u201d Not reading the provision to refer to the single survivor after the death of the first spouse would result in the absurdity that the trustee could resign only before the death of the first and after the death of the second, but not while only the second was still alive.\n{25} In contrast, there are a few provisions of the trust agreement where the instrument contains express language clarifying that the context of those particular provisions would prohibit substitution of the singular for the plural. For example, Section 2.1, \u201cBoth Grantors Living and Competent,\u201d uses qualifying language to delineate which construction, singular or plural, is exclusively intended:\nWhile both Grantors are living, Trustee shall dispose of the net income and principal of the community property of this trust as both Grantors may direct Trustee from time to time by a written instrument signed by both Grantors and delivered to Trustee. If one Grantor becomes incapacitated, the competent Grantor shall have the right to dispose of the net income and principal of one-half of the community property as the competent Grantor may direct.\n(Emphasis added.)\nBy the express addition of limiting adjectives before the nouns \u201cGrantor\u201d and \u201cGrantors,\u201d Lowell and Martha clarified that any disposal of the trust property during their joint lifetimes could be done only by their joint instruction. There is no such limiting language in Section 9.1.\n{26} The Court of Appeals was concerned that applying the trust\u2019s direction to interchange the plural and the singular where context would permit would have allowed either Lowell or Martha to alter the trust unilaterally during their joint lifetimes, to the detriment of the other\u2019s interests. This concern ignores the clear import of other provisions, including particularly Section 2.1\u2019s clear instruction that \u201c[wjhile both Grantors are living, Trustee shall dispose of the net income and principal of the community property of this trust as both Grantors may direct Trustee from time to time by a written instrument signed by both Grantors----\u201d The trust\u2019s provisions, including the singular-for-plural directives and the provisions of both Section 2.1 and Section 9.1, can be, and therefore must be, read in harmony. Where \u201ctwo portions, read in isolation, appear contradictory,\u201d we are to presume \u201cthe various portions complement or modify each other.\u201d Restatement (Third) of Prop. \u00a7 10.2 cmt. b.\n{27} We recognize that courts should not \u201cadd words to those in the [instrument] to contradict its language,\u201d and we emphasize that we have no interest in adding words to contradict the language of the trust agreement before us. Sanchez v. Quintana (In re Estate of Padilla), 97 N.M. 508, 513, 641 P.2d 539, 544 (Ct.App.1982). Without adding or contradicting any terms, but simply by combining Sections 2.1 and 9.1 and substituting the singular for the plural as directed in Sections 4.2 and 1(G), the trust provides clear and consistent directives:\nGrantor} ] reserve[s] the right at any time or times to amend or revoke this instrument and the trusts hereunder, in whole or in part, by an instrument or instruments in writing, signed by Grantor} ] and delivered in Grantor[\u2019s] lifetime}, provided that w]hile both Grantors are living, Trustee shall dispose of the net income and principal of the community property of this trust [only] as both Grantors may direct ... by a written instrument signed by both Grantors____\n{28} When its provisions are read in harmony, the trust agreement unambiguously provides that during the joint lifetimes of the grantors, amendments could be made only by direction of both; after the death of the first, amendments could be made by direction of the only one remaining to give directions.\nTestimony of Drafting Attorney\n{29} To the extent that it can be argued that there was any ambiguity in the proper interpretation of the documentation on its face, the extrinsic evidence provided by the attorney who was retained by Lowell and Martha to draft their trust agreement confirms our interpretation. All relevant evidence may be considered to determine a grantor\u2019s intent, including relevant extrinsic evidence, so long as it does not contradict the clear terms of an otherwise unambiguous donative document. See Restatement (Third) of Prop. \u00a7 10.2; see also \u00a7 46A-1-103(R) (\u201c}I]ntent ... may be established by other evidence that would be admissible in a judicial proceeding}.]\u201d); Garcia v. Taylor (In re Estate of Frietze), 1998-NMCA-145, \u00b6 10, 126 N.M. 16, 966 P.2d 183 (noting that extrinsic evidence cannot contradict unambiguous terms). Here, attorney Marsh\u2019s affidavit was the only available extrinsic evidence of donative intent, and it demonstrated that Section 9.1 was drafted by the attorney with the intent of, and explained to Lowell and Martha as, conferring \u201cupon the surviving spouse the power to amend the trust agreement after the death of the first spouse.\u201d\n{30} Although our construction is consistent with that set forth in the drafting attorney\u2019s affidavit, the extent of the litigation in this case should serve as a caution to those drafting similar instruments to take special care when drafting in order to minimize the risks of confusion and unnecessary litigation, and, even worse, frustration of a grantor\u2019s intent by misinterpretation or invocation of default rules. Cf. Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Power of Settlor to Revoke or Modify \u00a7 63 cmts. b-d (\u201c[N]o competent drafter ever leaves [the question of revocability] to default law.\u201d).\nCommunity Property Concerns\n{31} Finally, we address specifically the community property concerns addressed by Gary. While we respect the values inherent in our community property laws and of the community property principles expressed in the trust documents, they do not call for a different interpretation of this trust instrument for several reasons. First, community property default rules do not override a grantor\u2019s intent as manifested in the trust. Second, Gary\u2019s citations to out-of-state cases are distinguishable from and inapplicable to this case. Finally, Lowell\u2019s amendments to the trust were within the spirit of our community property principles because his proposed distribution mathematically affected only his half of the community property.\n{32} We start our community property analysis with a review of the relevant default rules set forth in the New Mexico statutes. The UTC provides the default rule for the amendability of a revocable community property trust:\nB. If a revocable trust is created or funded by more than one settlor:\n(1) to the extent the trust consists of community property, the trust may be revoked by either spouse acting alone but may be amended only by joint action of both spouses[.]\nSection 46A-6-602(B). The Restatement of the Law of Trusts bolsters the UTC\u2019s restriction on community property trust amendments. The general rule in the Restatement for multiple settlor trusts is that \u201cunless the terms of the trust provide otherwise, each settlor ordinarily ... may revoke or amend the trust with regard to that portion of the trust property attributable to the settlor\u2019s contribution.\u201d Restatement (Third) of Trusts \u00a7 63 cmt. k. However, the Restatement lists an exception for trusts \u201cestablished by spouses and consisting of community property,\u201d which states:\nIn the absence of a contrary provision in the terms of the trust, the trust may be amended only by the joint action of both spouses during their joint lifetime; but it may be revoked by either spouse acting alone, thereby terminating the trust and causing the property to be restored to the spouses, free of trust, as their community property.\nId.\n{33} Both the UTC and the Restatement are careful to note that this default rule does not govern when the terms of the trust provide otherwise. Section 46A-1-105 (stating that \u201c[e]xcept as otherwise provided in the terms of the trust, the [UTC] governs ... [and] [t]he terms of a trust [generally] prevail over any provision of the Uniform Trust Code\u201d); Restatement (Third) of Trusts \u00a7 63 cmt. k (\u201cThe trust terms, of course, may make contrary provision[.]\u201d). As we have noted, Lowell and Martha did make contrary provisions in the trust they jointly created.\n{34} In their trust agreement, Lowell and Martha manifested their desire to protect their respective community property interests while both were alive. Sections 2.1 {\u201cBoth Grantors Alive and Competent \u201d) and 2.2 (\u201cIncapacity of Grantor \u201d) required written approval of both to dispose of community property and further provided that if one became incompetent or incapacitated, the other could dispose of only his or her own half of any community property. Section 9.1 specifically provided that amendments or revocations would not affect the community or separate nature of the property they had placed in the trust. This is consistent with the default rules expressed in the New Mexico statutes, that with respect to community property \u201cthe trust may be revoked by either spouse acting alone but may be amended only by joint action of both spouses.\u201d Section 46A-6-602(B)(l).\n{35} After the death of the first spouse, however, Section 2.3 (\u201cDeath of First Grant- or to Die\u201d) provided that Sections 2.1 and 2.2, dealing with revocations and amendments while both were alive, were no longer applicable. Lowell and Martha, through creation of their,trust, chose to retain then-community property interests while both were alive but also chose to leave their respective shares of their community property to the other after the death of the first. See Bell v. Estate of Bell, 2008-NMCA-045, \u00b6 23, 143 N.M. 716, 181 P.3d 708 (\u201cAfter funding the Trust, Decedent no longer owned those assets because they became the property of the Trust and because the title to the assets was thus in the Trustee.\u201d). They each chose upon death to leave all community property in the trust, rather than make a separate testamentary disposition, which either would have had the power to do in the absence of the trust. NMSA 1978, \u00a7 45-2~805(A) (1993) (\u201cUpon the death of either spouse, one-half of the community property belongs to the surviving spouse, and the other half is subject to the testamentary disposition of the decedent. ...\u201d).\n{36} In affirming the district court\u2019s grant of summary judgment in favor of trustee Wells Fargo, the Court of Appeals relied solely on the theory that Section 2.4\u2019s recognition of the survivor\u2019s power to withdraw all assets and do with them as he or she wished necessarily included the power to amend, because \u201cit would serve no substantive purpose to permit revocation and creation of a new trust with the same corpus but not allow amendment of the original trust.\u201d Cable, 2008-NMCA-005, \u00b6 16, 143 N.M. 269, 175 P.3d 937 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The opinion relied for that proposition on Kimberlin v. Dull, 218 S.W.3d 613, 617 (Mo.Ct.App.2007) (holding that a power to revoke necessarily includes a power to amend), and Suzan Tantleff Trusts v. FDIC, 938 F.Supp. 14, 17-19 (D.D.C.1996) (holding that a power to withdraw assets necessarily includes a power to revoke the trust entirely).\n{37} Gary challenges the Court of Appeals\u2019 reliance on precedents from non-community property jurisdictions and cites instead two cases from intermediate appellate courts in California, a community property jurisdiction. Those cases, however, construe different trust language reflecting different donative intent. Parker v. Powell (In re Estate of Powell), 83 Cal.App.4th 1434, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 501, 505 (2000), held that a surviving spouse\u2019s trust revocation was only effective as to half of the trust corpus because California\u2019s probate code transmuted the trust property \u201cfrom community [property] to separate property upon [the wife\u2019s] death.\u201d Powell is distinguishable in several important respects: The Powell trust, unlike the Cable Family Trust, did not grant an unrestricted power to withdraw to the surviving spouse, it did not allow surviving spouse amendments through a will, it did not contain a provision that favored a construction in the surviving spouse\u2019s interests, and it did not contain other provisions expressing the grantors\u2019 intent to give the surviving spouse the power to amend. The Powell court appropriately recognized that the controlling question was \u201cone of interpretation of the trust instrument.\u201d Id. at 504 (\u201cIn interpreting the trust instrument, we seek the intent of the trustors as revealed in the document considered as a whole.\u201d). The simple difference between outcomes is that the Cable Family Trust contains many provisions clarifying that the surviving spouse has unrestricted amendment power, while the Powell trust was sufficiently ambiguous as to the scope of revocation to require that default rules be employed.\n{38} Crook v. Contreras (In re Estate of Kouba), 95 Cal.App.4th 1194, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 319 (2002), is also distinguishable. In Crook, a married couple executed a trust that by its express terms was expressly revocable and amendable only \u201cduring the joint lives of the Trustors,\u201d but became irrevocable upon the death of one. Id. at 321 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). The trust also provided that upon the death of the first grantor, it would be divided into two separate trusts: \u201cTrust A\u201d would contain the surviving spouse\u2019s interest and \u201cTrust B\u201d would contain the remainder. The surviving spouse could not touch Trust B, but had substantial control over Trust A. The issue in the case only concerned the surviving spouse\u2019s control over Trust A. While Trust A gave the surviving spouse an unrestricted power to withdraw and allowed amendment through last will and testament, its express terms provided that \u201c[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided in this Declaration, on the death of either Trustor the trusts created by this Declaration shall become irrevocable and not subject to amendment or modification.\u201d Id. at 322 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). While the disputed beneficiary argued that an unrestricted power to withdraw implied the power to amend, the Crook court decided that, \u201c[sjince the trust instrument expressly deprived [the surviving spouse] of the power to revoke, modify or amend the trusts, she also lacked any implied power to do so.\u201d Id. at 331. The Cable Family Trust, on the other hand, has no provision denying the survivor the power to amend, and in fact contains clear grants of control to the survivor.\n{39} In addition to the fact that Powell and Crook are distinguishable, we note that both have been criticized for their reasoning and results in a judicial opinion and in the Estate Planning & California Probate Reporter. See Papich v. Papich, No. PR060208, 2007 WL 4181927, at *2 (Cal.Ct.App. Nov. 28, 2007) (\u201c[T]he court\u2019s reasoning in Powell is faulty.\u201d); Continuing Educ. of the Bar, Validity of Wills; Revocation of Trusts, 23 Est. Plan. & Cal. Prob. Rep. 108 cmt. (Feb. 2002) (\u201c[I]t is difficult not to be concerned about a conclusion [in Crook ] that results in a triumph of form over substance.\u201d).\nMartha\u2019s Original Community Interest Unaffected by 1999 Amendment\n{40} Even if the law were different and a trust could not be created that would give a surviving spouse the right to make a trust amendment affecting what was once a deceased\u2019s half of their community property, the reality is that Lowell did not do so in this case. His 1999 amendments affected less than half of the assets remaining in the trust. By allowing what originally was Martha\u2019s half share to go equally to their three children, as they had contemplated in the first remainder distribution schedule, the totality of the 1999 distribution amendments would be accomplished solely by dividing what originally was Lowell\u2019s half share in the following manner:\nLowell\u2019s One-Half Interest (50% of the whole)\nGary - 1.63% of the whole\nLarrie - 1.63% of the whole\nShirley - 7.73% of the whole\nGrandchildren - 27.50% of the whole\nCharity - 10.00% of the whole\nFriends - 1.50% of the whole\nBy adding these figures to Martha\u2019s original distribution schedule, a one-third share to each child from what had been her community interest, both Martha\u2019s and Lowell\u2019s desired distribution schemes could be achieved, The following table details the relevant calculations:\nLowell\u2019s Share Martha\u2019s Share Total Received Beneficiaries (% of whole trust) (% of whole trust) (% of whole trust)\nLarrie Cable_1.63%_16.67%_18.30%\nGary Cable_1.63%_16.67%_18.30%\nShirley Trevino_7.73%_16.67%_24.40%\nGrandchildren_27.50%_0.00%_27.50%\nCharity_10.00%_0.00%_10.00%\nFriends_1.50%_0.00%_1.50%\nApprox, total_50.00%_50.00%_100.0%\n{41} By contrast, Gary\u2019s position would deny not only Lowell\u2019s right to control the half of the community property that Martha intentionally had left in trust for his benefit, it would also deny Lowell\u2019s right to control the part that had been his own half of the community property before Martha\u2019s death. There is no principle of New Mexico law that would dictate such an extreme result. Indeed, even the California precedent relied on by Gary would not dictate that result. See Powell, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d at 504 (recognizing effectiveness of surviving spouse\u2019s trust revocation as to his half of the trust corpus).\n{42} Finally, we find it unnecessary to reach the propriety of the Court of Appeals\u2019 reliance solely on implying a right to amend from the surviving spouse\u2019s unrestricted power to withdraw all assets of the trust. Our holding is based on the broader basis of the donative intent reflected in the totality of the trust documentation and supporting extrinsic evidence in this case. While the provision granting an unrestricted right of the survivor to withdraw all assets is certainly helpful in that analysis, it is only one of a number of manifestations of the intent expressed by Lowell and Martha in their trust. We do not need to, and by this Opinion explicitly do not, address hypothetical issues that might result from a trust in which there is an apparent conflict between a provision granting a survivor total power to withdraw and a provision denying the survivor the right to amend, as was presented in Crook.\nIV. CONCLUSION\n{43} Lowell\u2019s 1999 amendments, including the revised distribution schedule and appointment of Wells Fargo as successor trustee, were authorized by both the letter and the intent of the Cable Family Trust. We therefore affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo and remand to the district court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.\n{44} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Chief Justice, PATRICIO M. SERNA, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES and RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justices.", "type": "majority", "author": "DANIELS, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Law Offices of Jane B. Yohalem, Jane B. Yohalem, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.", "Hurley, Toevs, Styles, Hamblin & Panter, P.A., Gregory W. MacKenzie, Albuquerque, NM, for Respondent." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2010-NMSC-017\n231 P.3d 108\nIn the Matter of the CABLE FAMILY TRUST DATED JUNE 10, 1987, as Amended. Gary D. Cable, Beneficiary-Petitioner, v. Wells Fargo Bank New Mexico, N.A., Petitioner-Respondent.\nNo. 30,787.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nMarch 23, 2010.\nLaw Offices of Jane B. Yohalem, Jane B. Yohalem, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.\nHurley, Toevs, Styles, Hamblin & Panter, P.A., Gregory W. MacKenzie, Albuquerque, NM, for Respondent." }, "file_name": "0127-01", "first_page_order": 161, "last_page_order": 171 }