{ "id": 4246549, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. Alberto SAVEDRA, Jose Lozano, Sr., and Scott Yates, Defendants-Respondents", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Savedra", "decision_date": "2010-05-12", "docket_number": "No. 31,288", "first_page": "301", "last_page": "305", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "148 N.M. 301" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2010-NMSC-025" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "236 P.3d 20" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "2009-NMSC-019", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4243851 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 19-20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008-NMSC-062", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4242786 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/145/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 U.S. 514", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9139028 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/407/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMSC-035", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 2550981 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/138/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMCA-007", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 322321 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/122/0831-01" ] }, { "cite": "968 P.2d 328", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 N.M. 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 827440 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMCA-158", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 N.M. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5333038 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/83/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMCA-145", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3670224 ], "weight": 12, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" }, { "page": "\u00b6 7" }, { "page": "\u00b6 11" }, { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/140/0779-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-038", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4243125 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 46" }, { "page": "\u00b6 43" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 28, 48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008-NMCA-129", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4002188 ], "weight": 15, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 16" }, { "page": "\u00b6 11" }, { "page": "\u00b6 4" }, { "page": "\u00b6 28" }, { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/144/0859-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 615, "char_count": 13396, "ocr_confidence": 0.679, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.7085596440161745e-07, "percentile": 0.7020393853077921 }, "sha256": "4bdfde1494f15ab3968fa6d80c0e4fb95afe2303d81f5f23b87e48704acf0968", "simhash": "1:b11291d14eb58de3", "word_count": 2194 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:58:33.542282+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, RICHARD C. BOSSON, and EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justices." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. Alberto SAVEDRA, Jose Lozano, Sr., and Scott Yates, Defendants-Respondents." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nSERNA, Justice.\n{1} In this appeal, we are presented with the recurring issue of how our six-month rules should be administered when the State dismisses charges in magistrate court and subsequently refiles the same charges in district court. On separate occasions, Defendants Savedra, Lozano, and Yates were charged with misdemeanor Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) in magistrate court, and did not reach a plea agreement. In each case, the State dismissed the charges in magistrate court and refiled the cases in district court pursuant to a prosecutorial policy of the district attorney in the Fifth Judicial District, the purpose of which is to avoid duplicative trials. After more than six months had elapsed from the arraignment or waiver of arraignment in magistrate court, each of the Defendants moved to dismiss their cases on the basis of a six-month rule violation. The district court granted each of the motions. The State appealed the dismissals, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in a consolidated case. State v. Yates, 2008-NMCA-129, \u00b6 16, 144 N.M. 859, 192 P.3d 1236. We granted the State\u2019s petition for certiorari to address whether the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the district court\u2019s orders dismissing the three cases. We affirm.\nDISCUSSION\n{2} The six-month rules that we have established for our trial courts \u201cprovide the courts and parties with a rudimentary warning of when speedy trial problems may arise.\u201d State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, \u00b6 46, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387. The time limits for the commencement of trial in magistrate courts are governed by Rule 6-506 NMRA. The rule provides in pertinent part: \u201cThe trial of a criminal citation or complaint shall be commenced within one hundred eighty-two (182) days after whichever of the following events occurs latest: (1) the date of arraignment or the filing of a waiver of arraignment of the defendant!!]\u201d Rule 6-506(B); see also State v. Carreon, 2006-NMCA-145, \u00b6 6, 140 N.M. 779, 149 P.3d 95 (\u201cCommencement of trial within the stated period, while not jurisdictional, is mandatory.\u201d). In district court, the time in which a trial must be commenced is governed by Rule 5-604 NMRA, providing in pertinent part: \u201cThe trial of a criminal case or habitual criminal proceeding shall be commenced six (6) months after whichever of the following events occurs latest: (1) the date of arraignment, or waiver of arraignment, in the district court of any defendant!!]\u201d Rule 5-604(B)(1) (emphasis added). However, there is no district court or magistrate court rule to address the interplay between the six-month rule provisions for each court when a complaint is dismissed in magistrate court and later refiled in district court.\n{3} Because of this gap in the rules, a long line of appellate court opinions have sought to preserve the protections of the six-month rule by requiring the State to demonstrate that its decision to dismiss and refile was not done in bad faith to circumvent the protections of the six-month rule. See Carreon, 2006-NMCA-145, \u00b6 7, 140 N.M. 779, 149 P.3d 95 (reiterating that \u201cthe State cannot escape the effect of the six-month rule if the dismissal and re-filing are done for a bad reason, including doing so for the purpose of circumventing the six-month rule\u201d); accord State ex rel. Delgado v. Stanley, 83 N.M. 626, 495 P.2d 1073 (1972); State v. Ahasteen, 1998-NMCA-158, 126 N.M. 238, 968 P.2d 328; State v. Bolton, 1997-NMCA-007, 122 N.M. 831, 932 P.2d 1075. Accordingly, in the present appeals, the Court of Appeals majority reasoned that it was \u201cinclined to adhere to [its] conclusion in Carreon [, 2006-NMCA-145, \u00b6 11, 140 N.M. 779, 149 P.3d 95] that the mere existence of the prosecutorial policy of dismissing every magistrate court case that is not settled before the six-month deadline is insufficient to sustain the State\u2019s burden.\u201d Yates, 2008-NMCA-129, \u00b6 11, 144 N.M. 859, 192 P.3d 1236 (internal quotation marks omitted). We agree that Carreon is directly on point and dictates that we affirm the district court\u2019s dismissals.\n{4} As in Carreon, the State in these eases dismissed Defendants\u2019 magistrate charges and refiled the same charges in district court pursuant to a policy in which the prosecutor would dismiss a case in magistrate court once it became apparent that there would be no plea agreement and then refile the same charges in district court. The State offered no other reason for the dismissals and subsequent refilings. The facts in these eases are such that the Carreon holding \u2014 that the mere existence of such a policy is insufficient to meet the State\u2019s burden \u2014 directly applies to Defendants\u2019 cases. Since the State did not meet its burden to show why its dismissal and refiling was done for reasons other than to circumvent the six-month rule, Defendants\u2019 six-month rule time periods commenced with either the arraignment or waiver of arraignment in magistrate court and continued to run until they expired; a new six-month rule time period did not commence once the cases were refiled in district court.\n{5} We agree with the Court of Appeals that a literal application of Rule 5-604(B)(1), which would grant the State a new six-month time period in which to bring the case to trial upon refiling in district court, \u201cviolatefs] the spirit of the six-month rule[.]\u201d Yates, 2008-NMCA-129, \u00b6 4, 144 N.M. 859, 192 P.3d 1236. This Court has adopted the six-month rules in order to effectuate a criminal defendant\u2019s right to a speedy trial and to \u201cassure prompt disposition of criminal cases.\u201d Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, \u00b6 43, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387 (\u201cAs a case management tool, the six-month rule accounts for the amount of delay considered reasonable in bringing cases to trial.\u201d). Thus, the right protected by the six-month rules belongs to a criminal defendant, not the State, the courts, or any other party. To allow the State a new six-month time period in which to bring a case to trial after refiling would permit the State to cause delay in bringing defendant to trial after he or she was charged in magistrate court. See Carreon, 2006-NMCA-145, \u00b6 6, 140 N.M. 779, 149 P.3d 95 (noting that the six-month rules \u201cguard against lack of preparedness on the part of the State\u201d). The focus of administration of the six-month rule should be on the defendant and his or her right to have a prompt disposition of his or her criminal charges. Thus, when charges are dismissed in the courts of limited jurisdiction, which include magistrate, metropolitan, and municipal courts, and later refiled in district court, the triggering event for six-month rule purposes is the triggering event that occurred in the court of limited jurisdiction, and the six-month time period is not automatically reset upon the refiling. In light of the existing case law in this area, the prosecution should have known that its policy of dismissing and refiling in district court was an insufficient basis for restarting the six-month rule period in district court. Accordingly, the dismissals of Defendants\u2019 cases are affirmed because they were not brought to trial within the time period required under the magistrate court six-month rule and there was no basis for restarting the six-month rule period under the district court\u2019s rule.\n{6} While affirmance is warranted in these eases, we do take note of Judge Castillo\u2019s special concurrence in these appeals, suggesting that we re-examine the six-month rules for district and magistrate courts. In particular, Judge Castillo suggested that:\nPerhaps it would be helpful for the Supreme Court to consider amending the Rules of Criminal Procedure for district courts and magistrate courts in order to explain under what circumstances the arraignment in magistrate court would remain the triggering event for application of the district court six-month rule and under what circumstances a new six-month rule would begin.\nYates, 2008-NMCA-129, \u00b6 28, 144 N.M. 859, 192 P.3d 1236 (Castillo, J., specially concurring). As the Court of Appeals noted in its Opinion, the six-month rules in magistrate and district court do not address the procedural posture presented in Defendants\u2019 cases \u2014 there is no provision in either set of rules governing a situation when a case is dismissed in magistrate court and then later refiled in district court. Id. \u00b6 13; see also State v. Heinsen, 2005-NMSC-035, \u00b6 26, 138 N.M. 441, 121 P.3d 1040 (noting that Rule 5-604 \u201cis silent on the effect of a dismissal in magistrate court and refiling in the district court\u201d).\n{7} The Court of Appeals also expressed concerns\nthat [the classifications of the State\u2019s reasons for dismissing a ease as \u201cgood\u201d or \u201cbad\u201d] has unnecessarily judgmental connotations, suggesting that the focus of our analysis is whether the State has acted with a culpable state of mind and that six-month rule consequences attach only when the State has acted in bad faith or engaged in gamesmanship.\nYates, 2008-NMCA-129, \u00b6 9, 144 N.M. 859, 192 P.3d 1236. We share these concerns. The six-month rules were primarily created to effectuate a criminal defendant\u2019s right to a speedy trial. But as it stands, the \u201cgood faith-bad faith\u201d analysis developed through the Delgado line of cases renders a defendant\u2019s right to be promptly tried as a contingent right, one that may provide protection only if the State had \u201cbad\u201d reasons for dismissing and refiling. We find this impermissible.\n{8} As we have previously stated, the right protected by the six-month rules is a criminal defendant\u2019s right, not that of the State, the courts, or any other party; it is not a tool to punish the State for dismissing and refiling cases in bad faith, nor should its diminution be a reward for the State\u2019s good behavior. Viewed in that light, the cases in which courts have conducted a \u201cgood faith-bad faith\u201d analysis regarding the State\u2019s reasons for dismissing and refiling a case in order to determine if a new six-month time period should be granted are misguided. Instead, any inquiry into the State\u2019s reasons for dismissing and refiling in district court should be done within the context of any speedy trial challenge the defendant may raise after the ease is refiled in district court. See Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, \u00b6\u00b6 28, 48, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387 (providing new time frames for engaging in the four-factor Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) speedy trial balancing test and noting that delay resulting from dismissal and refiling should be weighed against the State); see also State v. Maddox, 2008-NMSC-062, \u00b6 13, 145 N.M. 242, 195 P.3d 1254 (\u201cThe reasons for a period of the delay may either heighten or temper the prejudice to the defendant caused by the length of the delay.\u201d).\n{9} In light of the foregoing, we recognize the need to revise our six-month rules to incorporate our decision set forth in this Opinion. Within the context of criminal proceedings in our courts of limited jurisdiction, our six-month rules continue to serve a useful purpose. But in our district courts, the six-month rule has become an unnecessary and sometimes counterproductive method for protecting a defendant\u2019s right to a speedy trial. Therefore, effective for all cases pending as of the date this Opinion is filed, we withdraw the six-month rule provisions set forth in Rule 5-604(B)-(E). See State v. Pieri, 2009-NMSC-019, \u00b6\u00b6 19-20, 146 N.M. 155, 207 P.3d 1132 (recognizing the Court\u2019s authority to make rule changes applicable to pending cases). In its place, defendants may rely upon and assert their right to a speedy trial whenever they believe impermissible delay has occurred; whether that delay is the result of a dismissal and refiling or any other cause. We therefore request that our Rules of Criminal Procedure for District Courts Committee, Rules for Courts of Limited Jurisdiction Committee, and Metropolitan Courts Rules Committee consider how best to revise their rules to allow for the dismissal of cases from a limited jurisdiction court and refiling in district court in a manner that is consistent with the principles set forth in this Opinion and that protects the defendant\u2019s right to a speedy trial.\nCONCLUSION\n{10} The State failed to meet its burden to show why its dismissals and refilings were not done to circumvent the six-month rule. Thus, Defendants\u2019 six-month rule time periods commenced with either the arraignment or waiver of arraignment in magistrate court and continued to run until they expired; new six-month time periods were not given to the State once the cases were refiled in district court. Accordingly, the dismissals of Defendants\u2019 cases are affirmed.\n{11} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, RICHARD C. BOSSON, and EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justices.", "type": "majority", "author": "SERNA, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Gary K. King, Attorney General, Max Shepherd, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.", "Thomas E. Lilley, P.C., Thomas E. Lilley, Roswell, NM, Trace L. Rabern, Attorney and Counselor at Law, L.L.C., Trace L. Rabern, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent Alberto Savedra.", "Gary C. Mitchell, P.C., Gary C. Mitchell, Ruidoso, NM, for Respondents Jose Lozano, Sr., and Scott Yates." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2010-NMSC-025\n236 P.3d 20\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. Alberto SAVEDRA, Jose Lozano, Sr., and Scott Yates, Defendants-Respondents.\nNo. 31,288.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nMay 12, 2010.\nCertiorari Denied June 24, 2010.\nGary K. King, Attorney General, Max Shepherd, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.\nThomas E. Lilley, P.C., Thomas E. Lilley, Roswell, NM, Trace L. Rabern, Attorney and Counselor at Law, L.L.C., Trace L. Rabern, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent Alberto Savedra.\nGary C. Mitchell, P.C., Gary C. Mitchell, Ruidoso, NM, for Respondents Jose Lozano, Sr., and Scott Yates." }, "file_name": "0301-01", "first_page_order": 335, "last_page_order": 339 }