{ "id": 4247680, "name": "Theresa ORTIZ for the Estate of Robert Baros, deceased, Worker-Respondent, v. OVERLAND EXPRESS, uninsured employer, and New Mexico Workers' Compensation Administration Uninsured Employers' Fund, Employer-Insurer-Petitioners", "name_abbreviation": "Ortiz v. Overland Express", "decision_date": "2010-04-30", "docket_number": "No. 31,612", "first_page": "405", "last_page": "414", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "148 N.M. 405" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2010-NMSC-021" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "237 P.3d 707" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "75 N.M. 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5371791 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294", "parenthetical": "stating that it is well settled that the party alleging an affirmative defense has the burden of proof" }, { "page": "124", "parenthetical": "stating that it is well settled that the party alleging an affirmative defense has the burden of proof" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/75/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 N.M. 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 723314 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "91" }, { "page": "333" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/113/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-041", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4244257 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 5" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0680-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 N.M. 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1592854 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "129" }, { "page": "368" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/108/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMSC-031", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3670086 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/140/0030-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 N.M. 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2846132 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "148" }, { "page": "847" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/66/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMSC-016", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 929202 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/137/0734-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-032", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4243724 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.M. 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 731596 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" }, { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/114/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008-NMSC-055", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4242149 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/145/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-042", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4244567 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0790-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMSC-001", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3671666 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 21", "parenthetical": "holding that when the Legislature enacts a statute, it is presumed that the Legislature is aware of existing statutes" }, { "parenthetical": "holding that when the Legislature enacts a statute, it is presumed that the Legislature is aware of existing statutes" }, { "parenthetical": "holding that when the Legislature enacts a statute, it is presumed that the Legislature is aware of existing statutes" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/140/0836-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 N.M. 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5326226 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "219", "parenthetical": "\"We have held that it is proper for this court to consider prior and subsequent statutes in pari materia to determine legislative intent.\"" }, { "page": "377", "parenthetical": "\"We have held that it is proper for this court to consider prior and subsequent statutes in pari materia to determine legislative intent.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/78/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 764", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566662 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "768-69" }, { "page": "354-55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0764-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMCA-149", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3671846 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/140/0797-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-057", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4245830 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 23", "parenthetical": "holding that if giving effect to the language of a statute is absurd or unreasonable, then we interpret it according to its obvious spirit or reason" }, { "parenthetical": "holding that if giving effect to the language of a statute is absurd or unreasonable, then we interpret it according to its obvious spirit or reason" }, { "parenthetical": "holding that if giving effect to the language of a statute is absurd or unreasonable, then we interpret it according to its obvious spirit or reason" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/147/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 N.M. 624", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1573152 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "627", "parenthetical": "\"If there is any doubt as to the meaning of the words, we are permitted to interpret by looking to legislative intent. ...\"" }, { "page": "544", "parenthetical": "\"If there is any doubt as to the meaning of the words, we are permitted to interpret by looking to legislative intent. ...\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/94/0624-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 P.3d 792", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 N.M. 642", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2009-NMCERT-004", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCERT", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 N.M. 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1552772 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" }, { "page": "1358" }, { "page": "353" }, { "page": "1359" }, { "page": "353" }, { "page": "1359" }, { "page": "354" }, { "page": "1360", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "353" }, { "page": "1360" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/117/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMCA-041", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4244363 ], "weight": 25, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 7" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 14-15" }, { "page": "\u00b6 17" }, { "page": "\u00b6 30" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "\u00b6 15" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 31, 33" }, { "page": "\u00b6 30" }, { "page": "\u00b6 32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0170-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1163, "char_count": 30542, "ocr_confidence": 0.688, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1335412854621936e-07, "percentile": 0.5767494552771223 }, "sha256": "4aebc783cd6cad73410448a9dd43dbdb01b86ea06163097e228cc68f30391965", "simhash": "1:90cc2793529b87bb", "word_count": 4824 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:58:33.542282+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice, PATRICIO M. SERNA, RICHARD C. BOSSON, and EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justices." ], "parties": [ "Theresa ORTIZ for the Estate of Robert Baros, deceased, Worker-Respondent, v. OVERLAND EXPRESS, uninsured employer, and New Mexico Workers\u2019 Compensation Administration Uninsured Employers\u2019 Fund, Employer-Insurer-Petitioners." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nMAES, Justice.\n{1} Robert Baros (Worker) died as a result of an accident that occurred while he was working as a delivery service driver/courier for Overland Express (Employer). The Workers\u2019 Compensation Judge (WCJ) denied workers\u2019 compensation benefits, finding that the sole cause of the accident was Worker\u2019s illegal use of methamphetamine and amphetamine. The issues presented in this appeal are (1) whether the Legislature intended to exclude methamphetamine and amphetamine from the prohibited drugs set forth in NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-12 (1989) and NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-12.1 (2001) of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (WCA), following the Legislature\u2019s 1972 amendment to the New Mexico Drug and Cosmetic Act (DCA), NMSA 1953, Section 54-6-27(F)(2) (1967, as amended through 1971), which removed the definition of \u201cdepressant, stimulant or hallucinogenic\u201d drugs; and (2) whether there was substantial evidence to support the WCJ\u2019s determination that Worker\u2019s death was \u201coccasioned solely by\u201d his use of the illegal drugs methamphetamine and amphetamine, pursuant to Section 52-1-12. We conclude that the Legislature did not intend to exclude methamphetamine and amphetamine from the list of drugs prohibited by Section 52-1-12 and Section 52-1-12.1. We further conclude that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding of the WCJ that these drugs were the sole cause of Worker\u2019s death. Accordingly we remand this case to the WCJ for further proceedings.\nI. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY\n{2} On October 30, 2004, during the course of his employment, Worker was driving Employer\u2019s van northbound on Interstate 25 when he crossed lanes and made contact with the rear of another vehicle. As a result, Worker\u2019s van left the roadway, rolling over several times. Worker was pronounced dead at the scene.\n{3} Employer did not have the required workers\u2019 compensation insurance at the time of Worker\u2019s death. Therefore, Theresa Ortiz (Worker\u2019s estate), the mother of Worker\u2019s two minor children, filed a claim for benefits with the Uninsured Employers\u2019 Fund (UEF), which the claims adjuster denied. Worker\u2019s estate then filed a Workers\u2019 Compensation Complaint with the Workers\u2019 Compensation Administration against Employer and the UEF (hereinafter collectively referred to as Employer).\n{4} At the trial no live testimony was presented. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 52-5-7 (1993) (governing procedures for filing claims disputes under the WCA). The parties stipulated that the \u201clive testimony of parties and witnesses at [the] formal trial [was] not necessary, rather the formal trial [will] consist solely of evidentiary closing arguments.\u201d They also submitted deposition testimony and stipulated to the admission of their respective exhibits. The following facts were stipulated to in the Amended Pre-Trial Order:\nc. Prior to Worker\u2019s death, he had dual employment with TLC and [Employer] ....\nd. With regard to Worker\u2019s regular job with TLC Paving, he averaged 40 hours per week, Monday thru Friday. He would normally go to bed each night between 10:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m., and arise each morning between 5:00 a.m. and 5:30 a.m. to get ready for work.\ne. [The day before the accident], Worker returned home from work with TLC around 5:00 p.m., ate dinner, played with his children for about 1/2 hour and then slept around one and one-half hours before arising to go to and report for work with [Employer].\n(1) Worker\u2019s representative contends that Worker reported to work with [Employer] at 10:00 p.m., while Employer contends that Worker\u2019s shift began at 12 midnight.\nThe exhibits also indicated that Worker then drove Employer\u2019s delivery van all night until the accident, which occurred at 7:00 a.m. the next morning.\n{5} The police report of the investigation of Worker\u2019s accident was one of the exhibits admitted into evidence by the stipulation. Included in the report were statements made by the driver (Witness) of the vehicle struck by Worker. Witness indicated that he was heading northbound on Interstate 25 and noticed Worker\u2019s van behind him slowly cross over from the left lane into the right lane. Worker\u2019s van made contact with the rear of Witness\u2019s vehicle and rolled over several times as it left the roadway.\n{6} The investigating officer concluded that \u201c[b]y the tire marks left on the roadway it appears that [Worker] made no attempt to brake prior to coming into contact with [the other vehicle].\u201d The time of day, Witness\u2019s description of the van\u2019s movement, and the lack of braking led the investigating officer to \u201cbelieve that [Worker] was unaware of the pending collision,\u201d and that he was \u201ceither asleep or unable to avoid making contact with [Witness\u2019s] vehicle or he was otherwise preoccupied.\u201d\n{7} The Autopsy Report from the Office of the Medical Investigator concluded that the cause of death was multiple blunt force injuries. The toxicology report revealed that Worker\u2019s femoral blood contained 0.08 mg/1 of amphetamine, 0.78 mg/1 of methamphetamine, and 0.03 mg/1 of morphine.\n{8} Following a trial, the WCJ denied benefits to Worker\u2019s estate \u201cbecause the sole cause of Worker\u2019s accident resulting in death was illegal drug use, pursuant to Section 52-1-12 NMSA.\u201d Worker\u2019s estate appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Worker\u2019s use of illegal drugs was the sole cause of the accident, in light of evidence of fatigue. Thus, Worker\u2019s estate claimed that it was entitled to recover workers\u2019 compensation benefits reduced by 10 percent, according to Section 52-1-12.1, since the drugs were only a contributing cause of the accident.\n{9} Section 52-1-12 provides that a worker is precluded from recovering benefits if her or she is injured while under the influence of \u201ca depressant, stimulant or hallucinogenic drug as defined in the New Mexico Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act.\u201d Because the definition for \u201cdepressant, stimulant or hallucinogenic\u201d drugs had been removed in 1972 from the DCA, the Court of Appeals, sua sponte, directed the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing whether the use of methamphetamine and amphetamine bars recovery of benefits pursuant to Section 52-1-12. Ortiz ex rel. Baros v. Overland Express, 2009-NMCA-041, \u00b6 7, 146 N.M. 170, 207 P.3d 1147. In a divided opinion, the Court held that, based upon the plain language and amendatory history of Section 52-1-12, the DCA, and its successor the DDCA, the Legislature did not intend to include the use of methamphetamine and amphetamine as prohibited drugs under either Section 52-1-12 or Section 52-1-12.1. Ortiz, 2009-NMCA-041, \u00b6\u00b6 14-15, 146 N.M. 170, 207 P.3d 1147. The Court therefore held that Sections 52-1-12 and 52-1-12.1 were inapplicable to the present case and Worker\u2019s estate was entitled to recover full workers\u2019 compensation benefits. Ortiz, 2009-NMCA-041, \u00b6 17, 146 N.M. 170, 207 P.3d 1147. The Court did not reach the issue of whether Worker\u2019s drug use was the sole cause of the accident.\n{10} In his dissent, Judge Wechsler concluded that the Legislature plainly intended to include \u201cdepressant, stimulant or hallucinogenic drug[s]\u201d within the list of prohibited drugs enumerated in Sections 52-1-12 and 52-1-12.1. Ortiz, 2009-NMCA-041, \u00b6 30, 146 N.M. 170, 207 P.3d 1147 (Wechsler, J., dissenting). \u201cHowever, the Legislature\u2019s removal of the definition of \u2018depressant, stimulant or hallucinogenic drug\u2019 from the predecessor to the DDCA ... presented an apparent conflict between the statutory wording and the overall legislative intent.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In such cases, it is the Judiciary\u2019s \u201c \u2018responsibility to search for and effectuate ... legislative intent.\u2019\u201d Id. \u00b6 28 (Wechsler, J., dissenting) (quoting State ex. rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 117 N.M. 346, 353, 871 P.2d 1352, 1358 (1994)). Therefore, Judge Wechsler concluded that\nalthough the Legislature removed the definition of \u201cdepressant, stimulant or hallucinogenic drug\u201d from the predecessor to the DDCA, the DDCA\u2019s reference to the Schedules of the Controlled Substances Act, which include a definition of the stimulants methamphetamine and amphetamine, is nevertheless sufficient for those drugs to be included in the DDCA and, by way of that link, in Section 52-1-12.\nId. \u00b6 34 (Wechsler, J., dissenting). With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence, Judge Wechsler believed that substantial evidence supported the WCJ\u2019s determination that Worker\u2019s use of illegal drugs was the sole cause of the accident. Id. \u00b6 27 (Wechsler, J., dissenting).\n{11} We granted Employer\u2019s petition for writ of certiorari pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 34-5-14(B)(4) (1972) and Rule 12-502 NMRA, which presents the following questions for our review: (1) whether the Court of Appeals \u201cerred in holding that the Legislature did not intend to include the drugs methamphetamine and amphetamine as ... prohibited drug[s] in the definitions of a \u2018depressant, stimulant or hallucinogenic\u2019 [drug] in Sections 52-1-12 and 52-1-12.1\u201d; and (2) whether \u201cthere is substantial evidence to support the [WCJ\u2019s] determination that Worker\u2019s ... death was due solely to his use of the illegal drugs methamphetamine and amphetamine contrary to Section 52-1-12\u201d of the WCA. Ortiz v. Overland Express, 2009-NMCERT-004, 146 N.M. 642, 213 P.3d 792. See \u00a7 34-5-14(B)(4) (providing that this Court\u2019s appellate jurisdiction extends to cases involving \u201can issue of substantial public interest\u201d); Rule 12-502 (governing petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari seeking review of decisions of the Court of Appeals).\nII. DISCUSSION\nA. Whether the Exclusion of Methamphetamine and Amphetamine Contravenes the Purpose, Object, and Intent of the Legislature\n{12} Under Section 52-1-12, a worker is prohibited from obtaining workers\u2019 compensation benefits when injured if he is under the influence of certain drugs:\nNo compensation is payable from any employer under the provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act [Chapter 52, Article 1 NMSA 1978] if the injury to the person claiming compensation was occasioned solely by the person being under the influence of a depressant, stimulant or hallucinogenic drug as defined in the New Mexico Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act [Chapter 26, Article 1 NMSA 1978] or under the influence of a narcotic drug as defined in the Controlled Substances Act [30-31-1 NMSA 1978]....\n(Emphasis added.)\n{13} Section 52-1-12 refers us to two other statutes to determine whether a drug falls under its provisions: (1) the DDCA, to determine if the drug is \u201ca depressant, stimulant or hallucinogenic\u201d; and (2) the Controlled Substances Act, to determine if the drug is a \u201cnarcotic.\u201d\n{14} The 1971 amendment to the DDCA defined a depressant, stimulant, or hallucinogenic as\nany drug which contains any quantity of amphetamine or any of its optical isomers; any salt of amphetamine or any salt of an optical isomer of amphetamine; or any substance which the federal act has found to be, and by regulation, designated as habit-forming because of its stimulant effect on the central nervous system.\n1971 N.M. Laws, ch. 245, \u00a7 2. In 1972, however, this definition for depressant, stimulant, or hallucinogenic drug was removed. 1972 N.M. Laws, ch. 84, \u00a7 43.\n{15} Concurrent with the removal of the definition from the DDCA, the Legislature enacted the New Mexico Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 1972 N.M. Laws, ch. 84, \u00a7 1. The CSA included the definition of controlled substances as \u201cany drug, substance or immediate precursor enumerated in Schedules I through V of the Controlled Substances Act,\u201d and organized the drugs according to their depressant, stimulant, and hallucinogenic effects within Schedules I, II, and III. Id. \u00a7\u00a7 6-8, 43. Notably, Schedule II identified drugs \u201cassociated with a stimulant effect on the central nervous system\u201d and included any substance containing any quantity of methamphetamine or amphetamine. Id. \u00a7 7.\n{16} Employer claims on appeal that when the Legislature classified drugs in the CSA, according to their \u201cdepressant, stimulant and hallucinogenic\u201d effects, the Legislature intended to retain and incorporate by reference the stimulants methamphetamine and amphetamine in the DDCA. Employer argues that the Court of Appeals\u2019 conclusion to the contrary conflicts with case law, legislative intent, and the public interest.\n{17} The majority of the Court in Ortiz concluded that to read methamphetamine and amphetamine into Sections 52-1-12 and 52-1-12.1 would require them to engage in \u201cimpermissibly broad construction\u201d and thus limited their analysis to the plain meaning of the statute. 2009-NMCA-041, \u00b6 15, 146 N.M. 170, 207 P.3d 1147. Since the DDCA currently does not define \u201cdepressant, stimulant or hallucinogenic drugs,\u201d the Court of Appeals concluded that it could not \u201cpresume that after 1972, the Legislature intended to include methamphetamine and amphetamine in the definition of \u2018depressant, stimulant, and hallucinogenic drug\u2019 in Section 52-1-12 and Section 52-1-12.1.\u201d Id. \u00b6 14. Judge Wechsler dissented from the majority, opining that the plain meaning of the statute was \u201cmuddled\u201d and concluded that in such cases \u201c \u2018it is part of the essence of judicial responsibility to search for and effectuate the legislative intent \u2014 the purpose or object \u2014 underlying the statute.\u2019\u201d Id. \u00b628 (Wechsler, J., dissenting) (quoting Gallegos, 117 N.M. at 353, 871 P.2d at 1359). Judge Wechsler reasoned that \u201cthe reference to the definitional language of the DDCA is ancillary\u201d and that the Court should look to the definition of stimulant drug in Section 30-31-7(A)(3), which includes methamphetamine and amphetamine, in order to effectuate the Legislature\u2019s intention that recovery under the WCA should be barred when the use of such drugs causes an accident. Ortiz, 2009-NMCA-041, \u00b6\u00b6 31, 33, 146 N.M. 170, 207 P.3d 1147 (Wechsler, J., dissenting).\n{18} Because Section 51-1-12 refers to a statutory definition that does not exist in the DDCA, there is \u201can apparent conflict between the statutory wording and the overall legislative intent.\u2019 \u201d Ortiz, 2009-NMCA-041, \u00b6 30, 146 N.M. 170, 207 P.3d 1147 (Wechsler, J., dissenting) (quoting Gallegos, 117 N.M. at 353, 871 P.2d at 1359). When a statute\u2019s language is ambiguous or unclear, we look to legislative intent to inform our interpretation of the statute. See Perea v. Baca, 94 N.M. 624, 627, 614 P.2d 541, 544 (1980) (\u201cIf there is any doubt as to the meaning of the words, we are permitted to interpret by looking to legislative intent. ...\u201d); Lion\u2019s Gate Water v. D\u2019Antonio, 2009-NMSC-057, \u00b6 23, 147 N.M. 523, 226 P.3d 622 (2009) (holding that if giving effect to the language of a statute is absurd or unreasonable, then we interpret it according to its obvious spirit or reason).\nAs nearly as we can, we must put ourselves in the place of those who uttered the words, and try to divine how they would have dealt with the unforeseen situation; and, although their words are by far the most decisive evidence of what they would have done, they are by no means final.\nGallegos, 117 N.M. at 354, 871 P.2d at 1360 (citation omitted). To the extent that this question implicates statutory interpretation, we review issues concerning legislative intent de novo. State v. Fleming, 2006-NMCA-149, \u00b6 9, 140 N.M. 797, 149 P.3d 113.\n{19} When interpreting statutes, we seek to give effect to legislative intent by looking to the \u201clanguage used and eonsider[ing] the statute\u2019s history and background.\u201d Key v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 121 N.M. 764, 768-69, 918 P.2d 350, 354-55 (1996). In this case, the statutory history provides us with guidance as to the legislative intent. When the Legislature deleted the definition of depressant, stimulant, or hallucinogenic drug from the DDCA in 1972, they did not remove the reference to \u201cdepressant, stimulant or hallucinogenic drug[s]\u201d in Section 52-1-12. When Section 52-1-12 was modified in 1989, the reference remained. In 2001, the Legislature amended the WCA by adding Section 52-1-12.1, entitled \u201cReduction in compensation when alcohol or drugs contribute to injury or death.\u201d Section 52-1-12.1 refers to the same statute as Section 52-1-12: \u201cdepressant, stimulant or hallucinogenic drug as defined in the New Mexico Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act [Chapter 26, Article 1 NMSA 1978] or under the influence of a narcotic drug as defined in the Controlled Substances Act [30-31-1 NMSA 1978].\u201d The Legislature\u2019s continued reference to depressant, stimulant, or hallucinogenic drugs in these two sections demonstrates their intent to include these drugs within the class of drugs that limit or bar recovery of workers\u2019 compensation benefits. See State v. Gonzales, 78 N.M. 218, 219, 430 P.2d 376, 377 (1967) (\u201cWe have held that it is proper for this court to consider prior and subsequent statutes in pari materia to determine legislative intent.\u201d).\n{20} In addition, the Legislature\u2019s substitution of \u201ccontrolled substance,\u201d which refers us to the CSA, for \u201cdepressant, stimulant or hallucinogenic drug\u201d in 1972, demonstrates its intention that we should look to the CSA to determine which drugs limit or bar recovery of workers\u2019 compensation benefits. See State v. Maestas, 2007-NMSC-001, \u00b6 21, 140 N.M. 836, 149 P.3d 933 (filed 2006) (holding that when the Legislature enacts a statute, it is presumed that the Legislature is aware of existing statutes); see also Las Cruces v. Rogers, 2009-NMSC-042, \u00b6 12, 146 N.M. 790, 215 P.3d 728 (\u201cStatutes concerning the same subject matter must be read in connection with each other.\u201d (citing State v. Marquez, 2008-NMSC-055, \u00b6 7, 145 N.M. 1, 193 P.3d 548)). Within the Schedules of the CSA, drugs are classified according to their effect on the central nervous system. Drugs with depressant, stimulant, or hallucinogenic effects are listed in Sections 30-31-8(B), 30-31-7(A)(3), and 30-31-6(0, respectively. Section 30-31-7(A)(3), which lists drugs that have a \u201cstimulant effect on the central nervous system,\u201d identifies both methamphetamine and amphetamine. By identifying methamphetamine and amphetamine as stimulant drugs in the CSA, we can infer that the Legislature intended them to be included as \u201cdepressant, stimulant or hallucinogenic drug[s]\u201d prohibited by Section 52-1-12.\n{21} Worker\u2019s estate maintains, however, that it is the role of the Legislature, not the Judiciary, to correct the reference to the non-existent definition of depressant, stimulant, and hallucinogenic drugs. Yet, as noted above, this Court has consistently recognized that it is appropriate for the Judiciary to look beyond the plain meaning of the statute\u2019s language to effectuate legislative intent when the statute is ambiguous. For instance, in Gallegos, the Court expressed that it is \u201cthe high duty and responsibility of the judicial branch of government to facilitate and promote the legislature\u2019s accomplishment of its purpose \u2014 especially when such action involves correcting an apparent legislative mistake.\u201d 117 N.M. at 353, 871 P.2d at 1360. We agree with Judge Wechsler in Ortiz that \u201cthe Legislature committed oversight when it removed the specific definitions referred to in Section 52-1-12.\u201d 2009-NMCA-041, \u00b6 32, 146 N.M. 170, 207 P.3d 1147 (Wechsler, J., dissenting). Therefore, pursuant to our duty to effectuate legislative intent, we correct this apparent oversight.\nB. Whether There Was Substantial Evidence to Find That Worker\u2019s Use of Methamphetamine and Amphetamine Was the Sole Cause of Worker\u2019s Accident\n{22} Worker\u2019s use of methamphetamine and amphetamine before the accident either bars recovery of benefits pursuant to Section 52-1-12 or reduces it by 10 percent pursuant to Section 52-1-12.1. In order to determine if Worker\u2019s estate\u2019s recovery should be barred or simply reduced, we address the issue of whether Worker\u2019s use of methamphetamine and amphetamine was the sole cause of Worker\u2019s death. Worker\u2019s estate contends that there was not substantial evidence to support the WCJ\u2019s conclusion that Worker\u2019s use of methamphetamine was the sole cause of the accident, in light of evidence of Worker\u2019s fatigue. Employer argues that the WCJ reasonably could have found that Worker\u2019s fatigue was caused by his illegal consumption of drugs, rather than his lack of sleep.\n{23} The WCJ\u2019s Compensation Order contained the following Findings of Fact on the issue of causation:\n17. The accident of October 30, 2004, was occasioned solely by Worker\u2019s use of methamphetamine and amphetamine without prescription of a physician....\n18. At the time of accident, Worker was under the influence of amphetamine and methamphetamine. That drug is a narcotic drug. The use of that drug was the exclusive proximate cause of the accident of October 30, 2004.\n(Emphasis added.) The WCJ also made the following conclusion of law regarding causation: \u201c7. Claimant for Worker is not entitled to any benefits. This is because the sole cause of Worker\u2019s accident resulting in death was illegal drug use, pursuant to Section 52-1-12 NMSA.\u201d\n{24} \u201c[T]he issue of causation is a factual question to be determined by the fact finder,\u201d in this case, the WCJ. Wilson v. Yellow Freight Sys., 114 N.M. 407, 410, 839 P.2d 151, 154 (Ct.App.1992). \u201cWe review factual findings of [the WCJ] under a whole record standard of review.\u201d DeWitt v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 2009-NMSC-032, \u00b6 12, 146 N.M. 453, 212 P.3d 341. A whole record standard of review mandates that \u201cthis Court reviews both favorable and unfavorable evidence to determine whether there is evidence that a reasonable mind could accept as adequate to support the conclusions reached by the fact finder.\u201d Wagner v. AGW Consultants, 2005-NMSC-016, \u00b6 79, 137 N.M. 734, 114 P.3d 1050. This Court has stated that \u201c[t]he purpose of findings of fact is to set out the ultimate facts of the case, and they must be read together and the conclusions of law flow therefrom.\u201d Hay v. N.M. State Highway Dep\u2019t, 66 N.M. 145, 148, 343 P.2d 845, 847 (1959). To determine whether a challenged finding is supported by substantial evidence, \u201cthe reviewing court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the agency decision, but may not view favorable evidence with total disregard to contravening evidence.\u201d Grine v. Peabody Natural Res., 2006-NMSC-031, \u00b6 28, 140 N.M. 30, 139 P.3d 190 (internal quotations marks and citation omitted). To warrant reversal, this Court must be persuaded that it \u201ccannot conscientiously say that the evidence supporting the decision is substantial, when viewed in the light that the [whole] record ... furnishes.\u201d Tollman v. ABF (Arkansas Best Freight), 108 N.M. 124, 129, 767 P.2d 363, 368 (Ct.App.1988) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\n{25} The evidence supporting the decision is not sufficient to establish that Worker\u2019s drug use was the sole cause of the accident. Based on the levels of drugs in Worker\u2019s blood, neither of the expert witnesses could state with any certainty that Worker\u2019s drug use was the sole cause of the accident. Worker\u2019s estate\u2019s expert witness, Dr. Eugenia Brazwell, stated that neither she nor anyone else could testify with a reasonable degree of toxicologic probability that the accident was \u201coccasioned solely\u201d by the drugs consumed by Worker at the time of the accident. Explaining her inability to draw this conclusion, Dr. Brazwell stated that \u201cit\u2019s difficult to tell just by a level [of drugs in the blood] exactly what state [Worker] was in.\u201d She further stated that it is possible than an individual \u201cwith this amount of drugs in [his] system could function and not have an accident.\u201d Employer submitted the report of Dr. Don Fisher, an expert of toxicology and occupational diseases. Dr. Fisher similarly concluded that, though the blood levels were high enough to be a contributing cause, it would be \u201cdifficult to be absolutely sure ... whether the accident was \u2018occasioned solely\u2019 by the level of drugs,\u201d even leaving room for doubt.\n{26} There was substantial evidence presented to establish that fatigue was a contributing factor of the accident. In the Amended Pre-Trial Order, the parties stipulated that on the day before the accident Worker worked a full day at his other job with TLC Paving and only slept for approximately one and one-half hours before going to work for Employer. He then drove all night, and the accident occurred early the next morning at 7:00 a.m. In his police report, the investigating officer indicated that, considering the evidence that Worker made no attempt to brake, the time of morning, and Witness\u2019s description of Worker slowly drifting into his lane, Worker \u201cwas either asleep or unable to avoid making contact\u201d with the other vehicle.\n{27} Worker\u2019s estate\u2019s expert witness concluded that fatigue was likely a contributing cause of the accident. In her report, Dr. Brazwell concluded that the circumstances of the accident were consistent with Worker having fallen asleep at the wheel. She also testified that \u201c[Booking at the accident scenario and the fact that [Worker] did not apply braking [it] seemed like he was probably more in a somnolent state, that he was more sleepy or lethargic.\u201d She further stated that she would not be comfortable being on the road with an individual who was sober, but who had as little sleep as Worker.\n{28} The WCJ\u2019s findings of fact in support of his determination that Worker\u2019s drug use was the sole cause of the accident are actually conclusions of law. In his findings of fact, the WCJ concluded that the accident was \u201coccasioned solely by\u201d Worker\u2019s use of methamphetamine and that Worker\u2019s drug use was the \u201cexclusive proximate cause\u201d of the accident. (Emphasis added.) When conclusions of law are listed as facts, we do not afford them any deference in our review. Chapman v. Varela, 2009-NMSC-041, \u00b6 5, 146 N.M. 680, 213 P.3d 1109. There were no other factual findings in the Order to support the WCJ\u2019s conclusion that Worker\u2019s drug use was the sole cause of the accident. Moreover, the WCJ failed to address the overwhelming evidence of Worker\u2019s fatigue, specifically Worker\u2019s lack of sleep and the length of time Worker had been driving before the accident occurred, raised in Worker\u2019s estate\u2019s Requested Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. We also express concern that the WCJ incorrectly found that methamphetamine was a narcotic drug. The CSA identifies methamphetamine as a stimulant drug, which unlike narcotic drugs, has the usual effect of counteracting fatigue. The WCJ\u2019s improper classification of methamphetamine illustrates that the WCJ may have misunderstood the drug\u2019s effect on Worker.\n{29} Relying on Dr. Brazwell\u2019s testimony that methamphetamine causes fatigue when taken over a period of days, Employer argues that Worker\u2019s drug use was the cause of his fatigue. Dr. Brazwell explained that while the initial physical effect of methamphetamine is as a stimulant that counteracts fatigue and sleepiness, when a large amount of methamphetamine is taken over a period of days, the result is the opposite, causing extreme sleepiness. She indicated that if Worker had a history of drug use then that history could be construed as evidence that he was substance dependent and had been using drugs for a period of days. Thus, in order to bolster its theory that Worker was an abuser of methamphetamine who had been on a binge for a period of days when the accident occurred, Employer presented Worker\u2019s criminal record that showed prior use of illegal drugs. However, the criminal record produced by Employer is of little probative value, since we cannot glean from the record whether methamphetamine was involved in the crime or whether the violation was for distribution or possession. In addition, the violation occurred in 1988, sixteen years before Worker\u2019s accident.\n{30} Employer did not present any further evidence indicating that Worker had used methamphetamine in the days leading up to the accident. Since Employer raised Worker\u2019s drug use as an affirmative defense, which would bar recovery by Worker\u2019s estate pursuant to Section 52-1-12, Employer had the burden of proving that Worker\u2019s accident was \u201coccasioned solely by\u201d his drug use. See Estate of Mitchum v. Triple S Trucking, 113 N.M. 85, 91, 823 P.2d 327, 333 (Ct.App.1991) (recognizing Section 52-1-12 as an affirmative defense); see also J.A. Silversmith, Inc. v. Marchiondo, 75 N.M. 290, 294, 404 P.2d 122, 124 (1965) (stating that it is well settled that the party alleging an affirmative defense has the burden of proof). Employer failed to meet its evidentiary burden. In the absence of evidence that Worker was a \u201cbinge\u201d or habitual user of methamphetamine, who had been using methamphetamine in the days leading up to the accident, the record is insufficient to support a conclusion that Worker\u2019s drug use caused his fatigue. There was therefore insufficient evidence that Worker\u2019s use of drugs was the sole cause of the accident to the exclusion of other contributing causes, such as Worker\u2019s fatigue.\nIII. CONCLUSION\n{31} We conclude that the Legislature intended to include methamphetamine and amphetamine as stimulant drugs under Sections 52-1-12 and 52-1-12.1. Based on our review of the whole record, we further conclude that there was insufficient evidence to support the WCJ\u2019s conclusion that these drugs were the sole cause of Worker\u2019s accident, and thus the workers\u2019 compensation benefits should be reduced by 10 percent pursuant to Section 52-1-12.1. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals\u2019 holding that Worker\u2019s estate is entitled to full workers\u2019 compensation benefits under the WCA. This matter is remanded to the WCJ for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.\n{32} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice, PATRICIO M. SERNA, RICHARD C. BOSSON, and EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justices.\n. The DCA was later renamed the New Mexico Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act (DDCA), and recompiled as NMSA 1978, Sections 26-1-1 to - 26 (1967, as amended through 2009).\n. The CSA was recompiled as NMSA 1978, Sections 30-31-1 to -41 (1972, as amended through 2009).", "type": "majority", "author": "MAES, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Richard Nelson, Albuquerque, NM, for Petitioner Pro Se.", "Richard J. Crollett, Sharon L. Gentry, Albuquerque, NM, for Petitioner.", "Law Offices of Jeffrey C. Brown, Jeffrey C. Brown, Albuquerque, NM, for Respondent." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2010-NMSC-021\n237 P.3d 707\nTheresa ORTIZ for the Estate of Robert Baros, deceased, Worker-Respondent, v. OVERLAND EXPRESS, uninsured employer, and New Mexico Workers\u2019 Compensation Administration Uninsured Employers\u2019 Fund, Employer-Insurer-Petitioners.\nNo. 31,612.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nApril 30, 2010.\nRichard Nelson, Albuquerque, NM, for Petitioner Pro Se.\nRichard J. Crollett, Sharon L. Gentry, Albuquerque, NM, for Petitioner.\nLaw Offices of Jeffrey C. Brown, Jeffrey C. Brown, Albuquerque, NM, for Respondent." }, "file_name": "0405-01", "first_page_order": 439, "last_page_order": 448 }