{ "id": 4246569, "name": "Beatrice C. ROMERO and Michael Ferree, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. PHILIP MORRIS INCORPORATED, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, Defendants-Petitioners", "name_abbreviation": "Romero v. Philip Morris Inc.", "decision_date": "2010-06-25", "docket_number": "No. 31,433", "first_page": "713", "last_page": "732", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "148 N.M. 713" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2010-NMSC-035" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "242 P.3d 280" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "477 U.S. 242", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6206897 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/477/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 F.Supp.2d 362", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9432484 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/199/0362-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 U.S. 781", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 377350 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1946, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/328/0781-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 F.Supp.2d 1253", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 11373290 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1270" }, { "page": "1305" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/231/1253-01" ] }, { "cite": "2001-NMCA-031", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 352301 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/130/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 F.Supp.2d 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9233626 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/320/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.M. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 731641 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232" }, { "page": "1253" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/114/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "550 U.S. 544", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3556136 ], "weight": 11, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "554" }, { "page": "557" }, { "page": "557" }, { "page": "554" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/550/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "475 U.S. 574", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6205783 ], "weight": 18, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "588", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "593-94" }, { "page": "588" }, { "page": "587" }, { "page": "587-88" }, { "page": "595" }, { "page": "596-97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/475/0574-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 F.3d 452", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 1567141 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/156/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 F.3d 112", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 1397117 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" }, { "page": "122", "parenthetical": "\"[N]o conspiracy should be inferred from ambiguous evidence or from mere parallelism when defendants' conduct can be explained by independent business reasons.\"" }, { "page": "118", "parenthetical": "noting that plaintiffs must \"meet [a] demanding standard of proof required in the context of an antitrust case\"" }, { "page": "134-35" }, { "page": "133", "parenthetical": "holding that advance price announcements can serve an important purpose in the industry" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/166/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 F.Supp.2d 403", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8928155 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/385/0403-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 F.3d 184", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 8925115 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "207" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/423/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "465 U.S. 752", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11337242 ], "weight": 11, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761", "parenthetical": "\"Independent action is not proscribed.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"Independent action is not proscribed.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"Independent action is not proscribed.\"" }, { "page": "764" }, { "page": "763" }, { "page": "763" }, { "page": "763" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/465/0752-01" ] }, { "cite": "946 F.Supp. 209", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7653737 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/946/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 120", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566580 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124" }, { "page": "5" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0120-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008-NMCA-152", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4242362 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/145/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 N.M. 695", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590350 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "702" }, { "page": "1269" }, { "page": "702" }, { "page": "1269" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/109/0695-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMCA-077", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 2543410 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/139/0750-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 N.M. 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566863 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1940, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "645", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/44/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 N.M. 801", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1592874 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "803", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "629", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "804-05" }, { "page": "630-31", "parenthetical": "determining that plaintiffs antitrust conspiracy claim should not survive summary judgment by considering plaintiffs evidence in light of evidence presented by defendants" }, { "page": "804" }, { "page": "630", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "804" }, { "page": "630" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/108/0801-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 N.M. 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1598968 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55" }, { "page": "465" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/105/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 N.M. 789", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5334147 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "792-93", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "679-80", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/83/0789-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 N.M. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 723217 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334-35" }, { "page": "1244-45" }, { "page": "335" }, { "page": "1245" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/113/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "2000-NMCA-036", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 106559 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/128/0830-01" ] }, { "cite": "477 U.S. 317", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6207800 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327", "parenthetical": "\"Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole .... \"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole .... \"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole .... \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/477/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 N.M. 753", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2872270 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "756", "parenthetical": "\"Summary judgment is a drastic remedy to be used with great caution.\"" }, { "page": "592", "parenthetical": "\"Summary judgment is a drastic remedy to be used with great caution.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/90/0753-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMSC-043", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 106517 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/128/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMSC-002", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 2543928 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/139/0012-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMSC-002", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3669263 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 16", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" }, { "page": "\u00b6 16", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/141/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 F.3d 1287", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9096102 ], "weight": 15, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1300" }, { "page": "1300", "parenthetical": "\"The problem with this reliance on circumstantial evidence, however, is that such evidence is by its nature ambiguous, and necessarily requires the drawing of one or more inferences in order to substantiate claims of illegal conspiracy.\"" }, { "page": "1300", "parenthetical": "holding that evidence tending to exclude indepen-' dent conduct is necessary only when the plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence to prove a conspiracy" }, { "page": "1304", "parenthetical": "holding that the judge does not act as fact-finder, but only makes a determination of the \"reasonableness of the inferences that c[an] be drawn from the evidence, [which are] threshold legal determinations that appropriately [are] made by the district court\"" }, { "page": "1301", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "1310" }, { "page": "1301", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "1291" }, { "page": "1317-18" }, { "page": "1316-17" }, { "page": "1315" }, { "page": "1319" }, { "page": "1319" }, { "page": "1321", "parenthetical": "\"[I]f prices are fixed ... there is no rational reason to undertake extremely significant and expanding retail promotional expenditures, which are a paradigmatically competitive activity.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/346/1287-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 U.S. 209", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 355638 ], "weight": 18, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212" }, { "page": "227" }, { "page": "227" }, { "page": "239" }, { "page": "239" }, { "page": "236" }, { "page": "239" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/509/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "204 P.3d 30", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 N.M. 705", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2009-NMCERT-002", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCERT", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2009-NMCA-022", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4243048 ], "weight": 39, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 24, 44" }, { "page": "\u00b6 27" }, { "page": "\u00b6 44" }, { "page": "\u00b6 20" }, { "page": "\u00b6 24" }, { "page": "\u00b6 25" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 27-30" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 33-37, 40" }, { "page": "\u00b6 40" }, { "page": "\u00b6 36" }, { "page": "\u00b6 37" }, { "page": "\u00b6 37" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 4-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/145/0658-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 2029, "char_count": 65501, "ocr_confidence": 0.702, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.9619273848806757e-07, "percentile": 0.9043077414938091 }, "sha256": "03ef6601d46ffb3cf6a516250288d68cce81845c031a19515bf5f6eec8e4298f", "simhash": "1:3d72fe98ed00756a", "word_count": 10205 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:58:33.542282+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice, PATRICIO M. SERNA, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, and RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justices." ], "parties": [ "Beatrice C. ROMERO and Michael Ferree, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. PHILIP MORRIS INCORPORATED, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, Defendants-Petitioners." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nCH\u00c1VEZ, Justice.\n{1} In this class action lawsuit, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants engaged in an agreement to fix the price of cigarettes from 1993 to 2000. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, because although Plaintiffs offered evidence of parallel pricing, they failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether any evidence, in addition to the parallel pricing, tended to exclude independent conduct on Defendants\u2019 part, as required by federal substantive law. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected the federal \u201cplus factor\u201d approach, and instead held that Plaintiffs could prove a conspiracy by parallel conduct alone, as long as independent conduct was an implausible explanation. Romero v. Philip Morris, Inc., 2009-NMCA-022, \u00b6\u00b6 24, 44, 145 N.M. 658, 203 P.3d 873. The Court of Appeals also concluded that when looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, a genuine issue of material fact existed, therefore precluding summary judgment. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 43-44. Romero v. Philip Morris Inc., 2009-NMCERT-002, 145 N.M. 705, 204 P.3d 30.\n{2} We granted Defendants\u2019 petition for writ of certiorari to consider two issues. First, we consider whether the Court of Appeals applied the incorrect standard for summary judgment. Second, we consider whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied federal substantive law regarding alleged agreements to fix prices. Although we agree with the summary judgment standard applied by the Court of Appeals, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not correctly apply federal substantive law as required by NMSA 1978, Section 57-1-15 (1979). Under federal substantive antitrust law, 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1 (2006), evidence of parallel price increases alone is not sufficient in the context of an oligopoly to prove an agreement to fix prices. Such evidence is always ambiguous, and therefore plaintiffs who allege a price-fixing agreement must also provide evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that parallel price increases were the result, of independent conduct. Because federal law limits the inferences available to a jury to those that are reasonable, plaintiffs relying upon circumstantial evidence cannot survive summary judgment, as a matter of law, unless the evidence tends to exclude the possibility that the alleged conspirators acted independently. Independent conduct is also referred to in case law as \u201cconscious parallelism,\u201d \u201ctacit collusion,\u201d or \u201clegal independent conduct.\u201d We therefore affirm the district court\u2019s grant of summary judgment and reverse the Court of Appeals.\nBACKGROUND\n{3} The following facts are undisputed. Plaintiffs are \u201c[pjersons in the State of New Mexico ... who purchased cigarettes indirectly from Defendants, or any parent, subsidiary or affiliate thereof, at any time from November 1, 1993 to the date of the filing of this action [April 10, 2000].\u201d The original Defendants were Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds (\u201cRJR\u201d), Brown & Williamson (\u201cB & W\u201d), Lorillard, and Liggett. The events leading up to this lawsuit were set in motion in response to a Philip Morris strategy beginning with an event known as \u201cMarlboro Friday.\u201d Prior to Marlboro Friday, Philip Morris, the market leader, had been steadily losing market share to discount and deep discount cigarettes since 1980, when Liggett pioneered the development of generic cigarettes. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 212, 113 S.Ct. 2578, 125 L.Ed.2d 168 (1993). In an attempt to regain market share, Philip Morris announced Marlboro Friday on April 2,1993, \u201ca nationwide promotion on Marlboro that reduced prices at retail by approximately 20 percent, an average of 40$ per pack.\u201d In response, RJR and B & W instituted similar promotions. As part of its strategy, Philip Morris announced on July 20, 1993, that there would be a similar reduction on all premium brands, discount brands, and deep discount brands starting on August 9, 1993. Defendants RJR and B & W also followed these price reductions. After these decreases, Defendants began to increase their wholesale list prices on premium and discount cigarettes in near lock-step fashion. Some increases were due to settlements with the 50 states, some because of increases in federal excise taxes, and others were simply planned. Even with these increases, wholesale list prices did not exceed pre-Marlboro Friday levels until August 3, 1998, or when adjusted for inflation, ongoing settlement costs, and federal excise taxes, the list prices did not surpass pre-Marlboro Friday amounts until August 1999. During the time period of the alleged agreement to fix prices, 1993 to 2000, Defendants were engaged in competition with one another regarding promotions at the retail level, resulting in a direct reduction of the retail prices of cigarettes.\n{4} Plaintiffs filed this class action lawsuit on April 10, 2000, alleging violations of New Mexico antitrust and consumer protection laws. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 57-1-1 to-15 (1979, as amended through 1987); NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 57-12-1 to -22 (1967, as amended through 1999). Defendants filed motions for summary judgment. In granting the motion for summary judgment, the district court held that Plaintiffs had met their initial burden of showing a pattern of parallel behavior, but failed to meet their second burden of showing the existence of plus factors that would tend to exclude the possibility that the alleged conspirators acted independently. Plaintiffs argued that the following were plus factors that tended to exclude Defendants\u2019 independent conduct: (1) the economies of the marketplace; (2) Defendants\u2019 strong motivation to conspire; (3) the fact that Defendants condensed the price tiers to facilitate their conspiracy; (4) Defendants acted contrary to their own self-interests; (5) alleged conspiratorial meetings in foreign markets; (6) Defendants had engaged in past conspiracies, such as misrepresenting the health consequences of smoking; (7) Defendants monitored their conspiracy through monthly factory shipment data reports prepared by Management Science Associates (\u201cMSA\u201d); (8) opportunities to conspire, including inter-firm communications and meetings; and (9) pricing decisions were made by those in high-level positions. However, the district court relied on the Eleventh Circuit case of Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1300 (11th Cir.2003), to reject Plaintiffs\u2019 plus factors. The district court also held that even with the presentation of plus factors, \u201cthere still exists the opportunity for the defendants] to rebut the inference of collusion by presenting evidence establishing that no reasonable fact-finder could conclude that they entered into a price-fixing conspiracy.\u201d Plaintiffs appealed.\n{5} On appeal, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that \u201cMarlboro Friday and the industry-wide price reductions that occurred afterward represented the triumph of competition over oligopolistic price coordination.\u201d Romero, 2009-NMCA-022, \u00b6 27, 145 N.M. 658, 203 P.3d 873; see also id. \u00b6 44. Although the Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of Lorillard and Liggett because the evidence showed that they had merely acted \u201cconsistent with conscious parallelism,\u201d id. \u00b6 46, the Court reversed summary judgment in favor of Philip Morris, RJR, and B & W because \u201c[ajpplying Brooke Group, and relying on the opinions of Plaintiffs\u2019 expert, Dr. [Keith] Leffler, we think that a reasonable factfinder could view conscious parallelism as a relatively implausible explanation for the anticompetitive scenario that played out following Marlboro Friday,\u201d Romero, 2009-NMCA-022, \u00b6 44, 145 N.M. 658, 203 P.3d 873. The Court acknowledged that New Mexico follows \u201cfederal case law interpreting Section 1 of the Sherman Act for substantive rules defining the scope of liability under [the New Mexico Antitrust Act] NMAA Section 1.\u201d Id. \u00b6 18. It held that \u201cbehavior of market participants characterizable as mere conscious parallelism does not satisfy the conspiracy element requirement of NMAA Section 1,\u201d id. \u00b6 22, and noted that federal courts have recognized the \u201cdoctrine of conscious parallelism as a substantive principle of antitrust law,\u201d id. \u00b623. The Court also noted that federal law requires plaintiffs to present evidence of \u201cplus factors\u201d that tend to exclude the possibility of independent conduct. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 23-24. However, it did not follow federal precedent regarding plus factors, but held that \u201cthe sounder approach for a New Mexico court is to engage in an independent and rigorous evaluation of the evidence in deciding whether or not the plaintiffs\u2019 evidence tends to suggest a degree of coordination that exceeds the parallelism that could be accomplished through lawful conscious parallelism.\u201d Id. \u00b624 (emphasis added). In addition, the Court held that \u201c[t]he nonexistence of conscious parallelism is not a separate element of the plaintiffs case.\u201d Id. \u00b6 25.\nIf the plaintiff comes forward with evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to exclude lawful conscious parallelism as the most likely explanation for the parallelism proved by the plaintiff, then the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case that would defeat summary judgment. At trial, then, the burden of negating the exculpatory inference of lawful conscious parallelism simply merges into the plaintiffs ultimate burden of convincing the factfinder that the parallelism proved by the plaintiff was more likely than not the result of a conspiracy.\nId. The Court of Appeals then constructed a hypothetical situation in which the jury could find that Defendants entered into an agreement to fix prices. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 27-30. Although rejecting the concept of plus factors, the Court held that\n[tjestimony by a qualified economics expert that the character or degree of parallelism actually exhibited by prices exceeds the parallelism that economic theory predicts would result from independent competitive behavior is precisely the type of evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the defendants acted independently ... [and] constitutes an extremely forceful \u201cplus factor\u201d....\nId. \u00b6 32. The Court also held that \u201cDr. Leffler\u2019s testimony is sufficient to meet Plaintiffs\u2019 burden of production,\u201d id., and that \u201cconscious parallelism in a complex, multi-variable industry is \u2018improbable,\u2019 \u201d id. \u00b6 35 (citation omitted). In its conclusion, the Court of Appeals noted numerous ways in which the parallelism cited by Plaintiffs could not reasonably have been the result of Defendants\u2019 independent conduct. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 44-45.\n{6} As stated previously, we granted certiorari to determine whether the Court misapplied the summary judgment standard and whether the Court failed to follow substantive federal antitrust law. We reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the district court\u2019s grant of summary judgment.\nSUMMARY JUDGMENT\n{7} Defendants argue that the Court of Appeals applied the incorrect summary judgment standard by referring to the \u201ctraditional stringent standard that a movant must meet.\u201d Id. \u00b6 15. The standard, as articulated by the Court of Appeals, is to \u201cview the facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment and draw all reasonable inferences in support of a trial on the merits.\u201d Id. \u00b6 17 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This was a correct statement of the standard for summary judgment in New Mexico:\nSummary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Where reasonable minds will not differ as to an issue of material fact, the court may properly grant summary judgment. All reasonable inferences are construed in favor of the non-moving party.\nMontgomery v. Lomos Altos, Inc., 2007-NMSC-002, \u00b6 16, 141 N.M. 21, 150 P.3d 971 (filed 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). \u201cSummary judgment is reviewed on appeal de novo.\u201d Juneau v. Intel Corp., 2006-NMSC-002, \u00b6 8, 139 N.M. 12, 127 P.3d 548 (filed 2005).\n{8} New Mexico courts, unlike federal courts, view summary judgment with disfavor, preferring a trial on the merits. Compare Handmaker v. Henney, 1999-NMSC-043, \u00b6 21, 128 N.M. 328, 992 P.2d 879 (noting that \u201cthe policy in New Mexico disfavor[s] summary judgment\u201d), and Pharmaseal Labs., Inc. v. Goffe, 90 N.M. 753, 756, 568 P.2d 589, 592 (1977) (\u201cSummary judgment is a drastic remedy to be used with great caution.\u201d), with Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (\u201cSummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole .... \u201d), and 11 James William Moore, Moore\u2019s Federal Practice \u00a7 56.03[1] (3d ed.2007) (discussing the trend in the federal courts to use summary judgment as a means of case management and resolution). Federal courts, on the other hand, following the \u201cCelotex trilogy,\u201d have become more inclined to grant summary judgment and \u201csubstantially increased the availability of summary judgment and encouraged greater use of the motion by trial courts.\u201d 11 Moore, supra \u00a7 56.03[1], at 56-23. The Celotex trilogy favored greater use of summary judgment and \u201cgave strong rhetorical support to summary judgment as a means of ease management and resolution.\u201d 11 Moore, supra \u00a7 56.03[1], at 56-23; see also \u00a7 56.03[2][c], at 56-28 (noting that Matsushita abrogated \u201cbig case\u201d and \u201cdefendant motive and state of mind\u201d exceptions to summary judgment and allowing summary judgment where it traditionally had not been allowed (internal quotation marks omitted)); \u00a7 56.03[3], at 56-30 (noting that Anderson requires the courts to consider the substantive evidentiary burden at the summary judgment stage, thus creating a heightened evidentiary burden for those opposing summary judgment); \u00a7 56.03[5], at 56-36 (noting that Celotex held that movant for summary judgment could meet burden by demonstrating absence of support for essential element of claim and not just affidavits).\n{9} We continue to refuse to loosen the reins of summary judgment, as doing so would \u201cturn what is a summary proceeding into a full-blown paper trial on the merits.\u201d Bartlett v. Mirabal, 2000-NMCA-036, \u00b6 32, 128 N.M. 830, 999 P.2d 1062 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We do not wish to grant trial courts greater authority to grant summary judgment than has been traditionally available in New Mexico. See id. \u00b6\u00b6 37-38. \u201cPermitting trial courts a license to quantify or analyze the evidence in a given case under whatever standard may apply ... would adversely impact our jury system and infringe on the jury\u2019s function as the trier of fact and the true arbiter of the credibility of witnesses.\u201d Id. \u00b6 38. By our refusal to align our state\u2019s approach with that of the federal courts, we do not intend to imply that summary judgment is never appropriate.\n{10} In New Mexico, summary judgment may be proper when the moving party has met its initial burden of establishing a prima facie case for summary judgment. See Roth v. Thompson, 113 N.M. 331, 334-35, 825 P.2d 1241, 1244-45 (1992). \u201cBy a prima facie showing is meant such evidence as is sufficient in law to raise a presumption of fact or establish the fact in question unless rebutted.\u201d Goodman v. Brock, 83 N.M. 789, 792-93, 498 P.2d 676, 679-80 (1972) (citations omitted). Once this prima facie showing has been made, the burden shifts to the nonmovant \u201cto demonstrate the existence of specific evidentiary facts which would require trial on the merits.\u201d Roth, 113 N.M. at 335, 825 P.2d at 1245. \u201cA party may not simply argue that such [evidentiary] facts might exist, nor may it rest upon the allegations of the complaint.\u201d See Dow v. Chilili Coop. Ass\u2019n, 105 N.M. 52, 55, 728 P.2d 462, 465 (1986). Rather, \u201c[t]he party opposing the summary judgment motion must adduce evidence to justify a trial on the issues.\u201d Clough v. Adventist Health Sys., Inc., 108 N.M. 801, 803, 780 P.2d 627, 629 (1989) (citation omitted). Such evidence adduced must result in reasonable inferences. See Montgomery, 2007-NMSC-002, \u00b6 16, 141 N.M. 21, 150 P.3d 971. \u201cAn inference is not a supposition or a conjecture, but is a logical deduction from facts proved and guess work is not a substitute therefor.\u201d Stambaugh v. Hayes, 44 N.M. 443, 451, 103 P.2d 640, 645 (1940) (citation omitted). When disputed facts do not support reasonable inferences, they cannot serve as a basis for denying summary judgment. Only when the inferences are reasonable is summary judgment inappropriate.\n{11} In addition to requiring reasonable inferences, New Mexico law requires that the alleged facts at issue be material to survive summary judgment. To determine which facts are material, the court must \u201clook to the substantive law governing the dispute,\u201d Farmington Police Officers Ass\u2019n v. City of Farmington, 2006-NMCA-077, \u00b6 17, 139 N.M. 750, 137 P.3d 1204. The inquiry\u2019s focus should be on whether, under substantive law, the fact is \u201cnecessary to give rise to a claim.\u201d Eoff v. Forrest, 109 N.M. 695, 702, 789 P.2d 1262, 1269 (1990); see also Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 2008-NMCA-152, \u00b6 6, 145 N.M. 179, 195 P.3d 24 (\u201cAn issue of fact is \u2018material\u2019 if the existence (or nonexistence) of the fact is of consequence under the substantive rules of law governing the parties\u2019 dispute.\u201d); Parker v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 121 N.M. 120, 124, 909 P.2d 1, 5 (Ct.App.1995) (\u201cA fact is material for the purpose of determining whether a motion for summary judgment is meritorious if it will affect the outcome of the case.\u201d). In this case, substantive federal antitrust law is the filter through which we must determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist. See \u00a7 57-1-15.\nFEDERAL SUBSTANTIVE ANTITRUST LAW: PROVING THE CONSPIRACY\n{12} As substantive law is the filter through which we apply summary judgment, and to construe our law in harmony with federal law, see \u00a7 57-1-15, we must first undertake an analysis of substantive federal antitrust law. To establish a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff \u201cmust be able to show: (1) concerted action, (2) by two or more persons, (3) which unreasonably restrains interstate or foreign trade or commerce.\u201d In re Med. X-Ray Film Antitrust Litig., 946 F.Supp. 209, 215 (E.D.N.Y.1996); see also 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1. It is important to note that Section 1 is not violated when the alleged conspirators act independently. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761, 104 S.Ct. 1464, 79 L.Ed.2d 775 (1984) (\u201cIndependent action is not proscribed.\u201d).\nThe essence of a Section 1 claim is the existence of an agreement. Unilateral action simply does not support liability; there must be a unity of purpose or a common design and understanding or a meeting of the minds in an unlawful agreement. Concerted action is established where two or more distinct entities have agreed to take action against the plaintiff.\nGordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 207 (3d Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Contrary to most markets, it is not always obvious whether firms in an oligopoly have acted independently. See In re Wireless Tel. Servs. Antitrust Litig., 385 F.Supp.2d 403, 420 n. 24 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (defining oligopoly as \u201ccontrol or domination of a market by a few large sellers, creating high prices and low output similar to those found in a monopoly\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). \u201c[F]irms in a concentrated market might in effect share monopoly power, setting their prices at a profit-maximizing, supracompetitive level by recognizing their shared economic interests and their interdependence with respect to price and output decisions.\u201d Brooke Group Ltd., 509 U.S. at 227, 113 S.Ct. 2578.\n[A]n oligopolist\u2019s price and output decisions will have a noticeable impact on the market and on its rivals.... [For example,] in a market served by three large companies, each firm must know that if it reduces its price and increases its sales at the expense of its rivals, they will notice the sales loss, identify the cause, and probably respond____Because of their mutual awareness, oligopolists\u2019 decisions may be interdependent although arrived at independently.\nVI Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application \u00b6 1429a (2d ed.2003). To summarize, where there are very few sellers (firms) within a market, the actions of one seller will have a noticeable effect on the actions taken by the other sellers. The other sellers may perform a cost-benefit analysis and react to the actions of the leader, producing results similar to an unlawful price-fixing agreement, but actually resulting from lawful, independent action. This \u201c[t]acit collusion [or independent conduct] ... describes the process, not in itself unlawful, by which firms in a concentrated market might in effect share monopoly power, setting their prices at a profit-maximizing, supracompetitive level by recognizing their shared economic interests and their interdependence with respect to price and output decisions.\u201d Brooke Group Ltd., 509 U.S. at 227, 113 S.Ct. 2578 (emphasis added). In an oligopolistic setting, the distinction between lawful, independent conduct and illegal conduct is most at issue when circumstantial evidence is used to prove the existence of an agreement to fix prices.\n{13} To prove a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, plaintiffs can produce direct or circumstantial evidence of an illegal agreement to fix prices. See Monsanto Co., 465 U.S. at 764, 104 S.Ct. 1464. Direct evidence of such an agreement is \u201cexplicit and requires no inferences to establish the proposition or conclusion being asserted.\u201d In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 118 (3d Cir.1999). In contrast, circumstantial evidence necessarily requires that inferences be drawn. See Williamson Oil Co., 346 F.3d at 1300 (\u201cThe problem with this reliance on circumstantial evidence, however, is that such evidence is by its nature ambiguous, and necessarily requires the drawing of one or more inferences in order to substantiate claims of illegal conspiracy.\u201d). \u201cWhile direct evidence, the proverbial \u2018smoking-gun,\u2019 is generally the most compelling means by which a plaintiff can make out his or her claim, it is also frequently difficult for antitrust plaintiffs to come by.\u201d Rossi v. Standard Roofing, Inc., 156 F.3d 452, 465 (3d Cir.1998).\n{14} As a result of the need to draw inferences from circumstantial evidence and the likelihood that parallel conduct in an oligopoly stems from lawful, independent conduct, federal courts require antitrust plaintiffs to present evidence \u201cthat tends to exclude the possibility that the alleged conspirators acted independently.\u201d Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Monsanto Co., 465 U.S. at 763, 104 S.Ct. 1464 (noting that \u201cit is of considerable importance that independent action by the manufacturer, and concerted action on nonprice restrictions, be distinguished from price-fixing agreements\u201d); Williamson Oil Co., 346 F.3d at 1300 (holding that evidence tending to exclude indepen-' dent conduct is necessary only when the plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence to prove a conspiracy). Without requiring such a showing, pro-competitive conduct, the conduct that the antitrust laws are designed to protect, may be deterred. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 593-94, 106 S.Ct. 1348. \u201c[C]onduct as consistent with permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does not, standing alone, support an inference of antitrust conspiracy ... [and plaintiffs] must show that the inference of conspiracy is reasonable in light of the competing inferences of independent action or collusive action that could not have harmed [them].\u201d Id. at 588, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (citations omitted).\n{15} As a result of the limited inferences that can be drawn from circumstantial evidence and the interdependent nature of an oligopoly, the plaintiffs must present more than evidence of parallel pricing to prove the existence of an agreement between the defendants to fix prices. Although \u201cparallel business behavior is admissible circumstantial evidence from which the fact finder may infer agreement, it falls short of conclusively establishing] agreement or ... itself constituting] a Sherman Act offense.\u201d Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (alterations in original); see also In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d at 122 (\u201c[N]o conspiracy should be inferred from ambiguous evidence or from mere parallelism when defendants\u2019 conduct can be explained by independent business reasons.\u201d). Evidence of parallel pricing without more is inherently ambiguous in the oligopolistic setting because there are so many different means, lawful and unlawful, by which parallel pricing can be achieved. See VI Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra \u00b6 1431b (discussing the numerous explanations for parallel pricing, including \u201cimperfect express collusion, merely interdependent behavior, and fairly independent and non-interdependent conduct\u201d).\n{16} It is the judge\u2019s duty to review the evidence presented by the plaintiffs and make a threshold legal determination as to whether it tends to exclude the possibility that the defendants acted independently. See Williamson Oil Co., 346 F.3d at 1304 (holding that the judge does not act as fact-finder, but only makes a determination of the \u201creasonableness of the inferences that c[an] be drawn from the evidence, [which are] threshold legal determinations that appropriately [are] made by the district court\u201d). If the evidence offered by the plaintiff is ambiguous and can equally lead to the conclusion that the alleged conduct was the result of independent action as opposed to illegal conduct, the plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact that there was a conspiracy. See Monsanto Co., 465 U.S. at 763, 104 S.Ct. 1464; Blauwkamp v. Univ. of N.M. Hosp., 114 N.M. 228, 232, 836 P.2d 1249, 1253 (Ct.App.1992) (holding that failure to establish an essential element of plaintiffs claim is sufficient grounds for summary judgment); see also In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d at 118 (noting that plaintiffs must \u201cmeet [a] demanding standard of proof required in the context of an antitrust case\u201d); Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 554, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (recognizing \u201cproof of a \u00a7 1 conspiracy must include evidence tending to exclude the possibility of independent action\u201d).\n{17} To assist in determining which evidence would tend to exclude independent action, federal courts have created \u201cplus factors.\u201d \u201c[A]ny showing ... that \u2018tend[s] to exclude the possibility of independent action\u2019 can qualify as a \u2018plus factor.\u2019 \u201d Williamson Oil Co., 346 F.3d at 1301 (citation omitted). These \u201c \u2018plus factors\u2019 ... remove [the plaintiffs] evidence from the realm of equipoise and render that evidence more probative of conspiracy than of conscious parallelism.\u201d Id. In determining whether evidence constitutes a plus factor, i.e., tends to exclude independent conduct, the court should consider the following: \u201c[I]f a benign explanation for the action is equally or more plausible than a collusive explanation, the action cannot constitute a plus factor,\u201d id. at 1310; the evidence presented by the plaintiffs must be economically sensible or plaintiffs must \u201ccome forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim,\u201d Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348; see also In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 320 F.Supp.2d 1, 12 (D.D.C.2004) (\u201c[I]n the face of economic factors dictating that the nonmoving party\u2019s theory is irrational, that party must submit evidence to establish that the theory remains practical and genuine despite economic evidence to the contrary.\u201d). In addition, \u201ca showing that the defendants\u2019 behavior would not be reasonable or explicable (i.e. not in their legitimate economic self-interest) if they were not conspiring to fix prices or otherwise restrain trade\u201d also constitutes a plus factor. Williamson Oil Co., 346 F.3d at 1301 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The requirement of tending to exclude independent conduct necessarily requires that the court view the plaintiffs\u2019 evidence in light of the defendants\u2019 evidence to determine whether the plaintiffs\u2019 evidence tends to exclude the possibility that defendants were acting independently. See Rule 1-056(C) NMRA (stating that the judge must review \u201cthe pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits\u201d); see also Clough, 108 N.M. at 804-05, 780 P.2d at 630-31 (determining that plaintiffs antitrust conspiracy claim should not survive summary judgment by considering plaintiffs evidence in light of evidence presented by defendants). The phrase \u201c \u2018plus factors\u2019 refers simply to the additional facts or factors required to be proved as a prerequisite to finding that parallel action amounts to a conspiracy.\u201d VI Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra \u00b6 1433e. Whether the courts want to call them plus factors or not, the requirement that the plaintiffs tend to exclude independent conduct does not change.\nNEW MEXICO ANTITRUST PLAINTIFFS MUST PRESENT EVIDENCE TENDING TO EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT DEFENDANTS ACTED INDEPENDENTLY\n{18} Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the New Mexico Antitrust Act, which states that \u201c[e]very contract, agreement, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce, any part of which trade or commerce is within this state, is unlawful.\u201d Section \u00a7 57-1-1. To prove a cause of action under the Antitrust Act the Legislature requires that \u201cthe Antitrust Act shall be construed in harmony with judicial interpretations of the federal antitrust laws. This construction shall be made to achieve uniform application of the state and federal laws prohibiting restraints of trade and monopolistic practices.\u201d Section 57-1-15 (emphasis added). It is therefore the duty of the courts to ensure that New Mexico antitrust law does not deviate substantially from federal interpretations of antitrust law. See State v. Guerra, 2001-NMCA-031, \u00b6 14, 130 N.M. 302, 24 P.3d 334 (\u201cThe word \u2018shall\u2019 as used in a statute is generally construed to be mandatory.\u201d).\n{19} Federal substantive law as it relates to oligopolies controls in this case. There is no doubt that the tobacco industry, in which five companies manufacture more than 97% of the cigarettes sold in the United States, is a classic oligopoly. See Williamson Oil Co., 346 F.3d at 1291. Because the cigarette industry is an oligopoly, it is likely that when one tobacco company (i.e., Philip Morris) acts in a certain manner (i.e., Marlboro Friday and subsequent price increases), the other firms (RJR, B & W, Lorillard, and Liggett) will determine whether it is in their best interest to follow the leader\u2019s actions. As we will discuss below, when Philip Morris began raising prices after Marlboro Friday, RJR\u2019s and B & W\u2019s conduct in following subsequent price increases was just as likely due to their own independent analysis of what was in their best interests as it was the result of an illegal price-fixing agreement. Therefore, Plaintiffs must present evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that Defendants acted independently or they can not meet their burden of establishing a genuine issue of material fact. Because Plaintiffs rely on circumstantial evidence to prove the existence of a price-fixing agreement, see Romero, 2009-NMCA-022, \u00b6 20, 145 N.M. 658, 203 P.3d 873, if they have not presented evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that Defendants acted independently, they have not met their burden of establishing a genuine issue of material fact.\n{20} Material facts are those \u201cnecessary to give rise to a claim,\u201d Eoff, 109 N.M. at 702, 789 P.2d at 1269, and to give rise to a Section 1 claim, evidence that tends to exclude independent action by the defendants is necessary to show that there was an unlawful agreement. See Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (\u201cAn allegation of parallel conduct is thus much like a naked assertion of conspiracy in a \u00a7 1 [Sherman Act] complaint: it gets the complaint close to stating a claim, but without some further factual enhancement it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of \u2018entitle[ment] to relief.\u2019\u201d); see also Monsanto Co., 465 U.S. at 763, 104 S.Ct. 1464 (\u201cOn a claim of concerted price-fixing, the antitrust plaintiff must present evidence sufficient to carry its burden of proving that there was such an agreement.\u201d). The United States Supreme Court has explicitly stated that \u201cwhen allegations of parallel conduct are set out in order to make a \u00a7 1 claim, they must be placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be independent action.\u201d Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Without this showing, an essential element of the conspiracy claim is absent and there can be no issue of material fact.\n{21} In rejecting the plus factor approach used by the federal courts and holding that parallel conduct can be enough to prove a conspiracy, the Court of Appeals fails to construe the New Mexico Antitrust Act in harmony with judicial interpretations of federal antitrust law required by Section 57-1-15. See Romero, 2009-NMCA-022, \u00b6 24, 145 N.M. 658, 203 P.3d 873. This ignores the United States Supreme Court\u2019s holding that \u201c[t]he inadequacy of showing parallel conduct or interdependence, without more, mirrors the ambiguity of the behavior: consistent with conspiracy, but just as much in line with a wide swath of rational and competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of the market,\u201d Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 554, 127 S.Ct. 1955, and that plus factors are the tool for reviewing the evidence presented, see VI Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra \u00b6 1432a (\u201cWe conclude that the Sherman Act \u00a7 1 requirement of a contract, combination, or conspiracy is not satisfied by uniform anticompetitive pricing that results merely from recognized interdependence without the addition of any facilitators.\u201d). Contrary to the holding of the Court of Appeals that proof tending to exclude independent conduct is not a separate element of Plaintiffs\u2019 case, Romero, 2009-NMCA-022, \u00b6 25, 145 N.M. 658, 203 P.3d 873, we hold that the requirement that only reasonable inferences can be drawn from ambiguous evidence is a substantive component of federal antitrust law, and that Plaintiffs must present evidence tending to exclude independent conduct to ensure uniform application of federal and state laws. See \u00a7 57-1-15.\n{22} In reversing the district court and holding that an agreement to fix prices can be shown only with parallel conduct, the Court of Appeals requires a different quantum of proof than the federal court and, as a result, fails to construe our law in harmony with federal law. The Court of Appeals assumes that a jury could find a conspiracy, see Romero, 2009-NMCA-022, \u00b6\u00b6 27-30, 145 N.M. 658, 203 P.3d 873, without discussing Defendants\u2019 evidence that the in-tandem increases, shifts in market share, and supposed behavior contrary to self-interest were just as likely the result of independent, rational business decisions made to maximize profits, rather than an agreement to fix prices, because any alternative other than following the price increases was a losing option. In its hypothesis, the Court of Appeals errs in accepting certain plus factors with no discussion of whether they actually tend to exclude independent conduct. Id. \u00b629 (discussing signaling and clandestine communications). Additionally, in assuming the jury could find a conspiracy based solely on parallel behavior, the Court allows an inference that is per se unreasonable. Id. Rather than reviewing Plaintiffs\u2019 evidence in light of all of the evidence presented, the Court asserts that it just upheld its \u201cobligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and to allow the non-movant the benefit of any reasonable inferences supported by the evidence____\u201d Id. \u00b6 31. The Court fails to use substantive federal antitrust law as the filter to first determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist in favor of summary judgment. Instead, the Court employs New Mexico\u2019s summary judgment standard to overcome the strict requirements of substantive law. This is exactly the rationale rejected in Matsushita. See 475 U.S. at 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (\u201cRespondents correctly note that \u2018[o]n summary judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts ... must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.\u2019 But antitrust law limits the range of permissible inferences from ambiguous evidence in a \u00a7 1 case.\u201d (citation omitted)).\n{23} We also disagree with the Court of Appeals in Romero that both Dr. Leffler\u2019s opinion and Brooke Group set forth \u201cmajor points of departure\u201d from the plus factor approach discussed in Williamson Oil. The Court noted that Dr. Leffler stated that \u201c[t]he economic evidence indicates that it is highly unlikely that independent competitive behavior explains the price restructuring and price changes for cigarettes during the alleged conspiracy period.\u201d Id. \u00b6 32 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court also held that \u201cDr. Leffler\u2019s opinion testimony, if believed, would permit a reasonable factfinder to exclude lawful parallelism as the most likely explanation for the parallelism demonstrated by cigarette prices during the class period.\u201d Id. Although the Court held that it was \u201cnot inclined to appoint [itself an] amateur econo[mist] and attempt to second guess Dr. Leffler\u2019s reasoning,\u201d id. \u00b6 39, it did not give consideration to the fact that there were several ambiguities in Dr. Leffler\u2019s opinion that were drawn out in his deposition. While Dr. Leffler opined that the parallel price increases were not the result of lawful parallelism, he also agreed that the factors he used to determine the existence of a price-fixing conspiracy could not \u201ctell you one way or the other whether you have conscious parallelism or you\u2019ve got something beyond conscious parallelism like a price fixing agreement.\u201d He also offered the opinion that an explicit agreement was a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act as opposed to oligopolistic coordination and there was no explicit agreement in this case. Dr. Leffler stated that rational oligopolists would act to maximize profits, rational oligopolists would have matched the Marlboro Friday price reduction, and RJR and B & W were most likely acting to maximize their profits by failing to re-widen the price gap. Dr. Leffler even went so far as to acknowledge that the cigarette industry \u201cresponded as I would have expected them to respond ... [t]o match the price cut and then to anticipate future price increases, to extend the oligopoly cooperation to the discount sector.\u201d\n{24} In general, Dr. Leffler\u2019s report concludes that following Marlboro Friday, Defendants\u2019 actions amounted to illegal price-fixing. However, his statements and responses in his deposition demonstrate that he actually thought it was just as likely that Defendants would have behaved in the same manner if they were acting independently and not under an illegal price-fixing agreement, because to act any other way would have been less profitable and, as such, against their economic interest.\n{25} Without becoming amateur economists, the Court of Appeals could have easily recognized inconsistencies between Dr. Leffler\u2019s report and his deposition. Based on these ambiguities in the evidence, it would have been necessary under substantive antitrust law to hold that the evidence did not tend to exclude independent conduct because it was also consistent with independent conduct. See Holiday Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 231 F.Supp.2d 1253, 1270 (N.D.Ga.2002) (\u201cIf, when considered in its entirety, [the evidence] is totally ambiguous or to the opposite effect, it is not relevant and may not be relied upon by the jury.\u201d). By holding that such ambiguous evidence tended to exclude independent conduct and would allow the jury to reach a reasonable inference, the Court of Appeals failed to ensure uniform application of state and federal antitrust law.\n{26} The Court of Appeals also relied heavily on several facets of the United States Supreme Court\u2019s analysis in Brooke Group to bolster both its reliance on Dr. Leffler\u2019s opinion and its conclusion that independent action was an unlikely explanation for the parallel pricing observed during the period of the alleged agreement to fix prices. Romero, 2009-NMCA-022, \u00b6\u00b6 33-37, 40, 145 N.M. 658, 203 P.3d 873. In each instance, however, reliance on Brooke Group is premised on a misreading of the Supreme Court\u2019s analysis. While the Court of Appeals correctly observed that Brooke Group recognizes the \u201cinherent limitations\u201d of independent conduct and that it is an \u201cimprobable\u201d explanation for \u201cmultivariable coordination,\u201d that conclusion was based on an analysis of \u201cthe net price in the market\u201d or retail pricing, not on list or wholesale prices, which underlie the basis of the claim in the instant case. Brooke Group Ltd., 509 U.S. at 239, 113 S.Ct. 2578. Similarly, while Brooke Group did analyze \u201cthe likelihood that tacit collusion could result in industry-wide, in-tandem increases in the prices of both generic and premium cigarettes,\u201d Romero, 2009-NMCA-022, \u00b6 40, 145 N.M. 658, 203 P.3d 873, it did so only in the context of retail pricing.\n{27} Retail pricing is influenced by so many variables that the cigarette oligopoly cannot exert collective control over it through independent conduct. See Brooke Group Ltd., 509 U.S. at 239, 113 S.Ct. 2578 (noting that retail prices are determined in part by \u201clist prices, but also by a wide variety of discounts and promotions to consumers and by rebates to wholesalers\u201d). Cigarette wholesalers, who buy direct from cigarette manufacturers at wholesale list prices, set prices for retailers, who then set retail prices for consumers. All levels of pricing are affected by various manufacturer discounts and promotions. Therefore, \u201cto coordinate in an effective manner [at the retail level] ... the cigarette companies would have been required, without communicating, to establish parallel practices with respect to each of these variables, many of which, like consumer stickers or coupons, were difficult to monitor.\u201d Id. at '239, 113 S.Ct. 2578. This complexity explains why independent conduct is an improbable means of coordinating parallel retail pricing and why Brooke Group suggests that independent conduct should be rejected as a likely explanation in that circumstance. Id. This conclusion, however, cannot be logically extended to wholesale list prices, which are simply determined by the manufacturers. Brooke Group is very clear that \u201cit would be unreasonable to draw conclusions about the existence of tacit coordination or supracompetitive pricing from data that reflect only list prices,\u201d because \u201cin an oligopoly setting ... price competition is most likely to take place through less observable and less regulable means than list prices.\u201d Id. at 236, 113 S.Ct. 2578 (emphasis added).\n{28} Despite these significant distinctions between Brooke Group and the instant case, the Court of Appeals nonetheless suggests that \u201cDefendants\u2019 theory of the present case seems ... easily as complex as the recoupment theory rejected in Brooke Group.\u201d Romero, 2009-NMCA-022, \u00b6 36, 145 N.M. 658, 203 P.3d 873. The Court holds that only a \u201csingle-tier market\u201d can be effectively controlled by legal oligopolistic coordination, because a two-tier wholesale market is too complex and has too many variables, making independent conduct an implausible explanation for parallel pricing. Id. \u00b6 40 (\u201cThe present ease does not involve the type of simple price leadership in a single-tier market that characterized the tobacco industry prior to the introduction of generic cigarettes.\u201d). Finding the two-tier system complex, the Court of Appeals rejects independent conduct as a plausible explanation for the observed list pricing. Id. \u00b6 37 (\u201c[Ljawful oligopolistic coordination was incapable of containing the competition from non-premium cigarettes.\u201d).\n{29} The point of Marlboro Friday and subsequent price reductions, however, was to simplify the wholesale pricing scheme, collapsing the market from ten pricing tiers to two, so there would be a less complex pricing system. Due to the interdependent nature of an oligopoly, \u201coligopolistic rationality\u201d can \u201cprovide for price increases through ... price leadershipH\u201d if the other firms believe that following the pricing leader will maximize their profits. VI Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra \u00b6 1429a-b (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing interdependent decision-making and how the actions of one firm may result in the independent decision of other firms to follow if doing so will maximize profits). To stem the flow of market share into the discount sector, Philip Morris realized the need to close the price gap between premium and discount cigarettes, and set about undertaking this task with Marlboro Friday and the subsequent price reductions in the premium and discount sectors. With the price gap closed and only two price tiers remaining, Philip Morris was able to take advantage of the expected \u201coligopolistic rationality\u201d when prices began to ascend to pre-Marlboro Friday levels. Dr. Leffler opined that RJR and B & W were acting as rational oligopolists by following Philip Morris in subsequent price increases to prevent further price cuts similar to Marlboro Friday. Compliance was ensured by the looming threat of continued revenue losses should Philip Morris institute a second Marlboro Friday. By relying on \u201coligopolistic rationality\u201d and having condensed the ten-tier system to two tiers, Philip Morris used its dominant market position and the inherent interdependencies of the cigarette oligopoly to force the other manufacturers to comply with its subsequent price increases in both pricing tiers. These strategic moves were all part of Philip Morris\u2019s strategy to \u201cbox in its competitors\u201d and advance its own competitive position.\n{30} Prior to Marlboro Friday, Philip Morris attempted to box in its competitors and reduce the discount-premium price gap by independently raising generic and discount cigarette prices. However, this attempt failed. Romero, 2009-NMCA-022, \u00b6 37, 145 N.M. 658, 203 P.3d 873. No discount cigarette manufacturers responded because with ten pricing tiers and the large price gap between discount and premium cigarettes, discount cigarettes could continue to grow revenue by cannibalizing the premium cigarette market share; it was not in their interest at that point to follow Philip Morris\u2019s price leadership, and they had no incentive to do so. Contrary to the Court of Appeals\u2019s conclusion that \u201c[t]his evidence [supports] Dr. Leffler\u2019s opinion that by itself, lawful oligopolistic coordination was incapable of containing the competition from non-premium cigarettes,\u201d Romero, 2009-NMCA-022, \u00b6 37, 145 N.M. 658, 203 P.3d 873, this initial failure to control discount list prices simply explains Philip Morris\u2019s rationale and motivation for both Marlboro Friday and its subsequent pricing strategy. Philip Morris needed to simplify the pricing structure and exert its market influence before the oligopoly would respond to its price leadership.\n{31} Nothing about the cigarette oligopoly\u2019s coordination of the wholesale two-tier market is multi-variable or complex as described in Brooke Group. Retail pricing, not list pricing, is multi-variable and complex and makes independent conduct an improbable explanation for parallel pricing. See Brooke Group Ltd., 509 U.S. at 239, 113 S.Ct. 2578. Therefore, simultaneous coordinated pricing in both tiers does not, by itself, tend to exclude independent conduct due to complexity. Rather the opposite is true. It is undisputed by Plaintiffs that Philip Morris\u2019s Marlboro Friday was the initiation of a highly competitive strategy. That strategy did not end on Marlboro Friday, but persisted throughout the alleged conspiracy as Philip Morris worked to maintain a narrow price gap between discount and premium cigarettes and worked to raise prices in both tiers. With this strategy, Philip Morris maintained its newly-acquired market share and increased its revenue, while manufacturers that depended on the discount sector lost market share and revenue. Philip Morris sought to regain market share it had lost to the discount sector prior to Marlboro Friday, and over a roughly six-year period, it increased wholesale prices to regain the status quo prior to Marlboro Friday.\n{32} The result of Philip Morris\u2019s market dominance was that premium cigarettes and discount cigarettes became subject to interdependent conduct, whereas prior to Marlboro Friday only premium cigarettes were subject to such oligopolistic control. Plaintiffs\u2019 expert, Dr. Leffler, stated that Marlboro Friday \u201ccaused a restructuring in the industry and a change in the competitive relationships.\u201d As a result of this restructuring, oligopolistic functioning and rationale extended to the discount sector where there had been no such functioning prior to Marlboro Friday. Indeed, Dr. Leffler even acknowledged in his deposition that the industry merely \u201cextend[ed] the oligopoly cooperation to the discount sector.\u201d As oligopolistic control is lawful in the premium price tier, there is no rationale for arguing that it is illegal in the discount price tier. For these reasons, the Court of Appeals\u2019s reliance on Brooke Group was misplaced.\n{33} Thus, we must determine whether Plaintiffs\u2019 proffered evidence of plus factors tends to exclude the possibility that Defendants acted independently. Plaintiffs cite to the following plus factors, in addition to parallel pricing, as tending to exclude the possibility that Defendants acted independently: (1) the economies of the marketplace, such as a highly concentrated market, cigarette fungibility, high barriers to entry in the industry, absence of close substitutes, and a history of collusion; (2) a strong motivation to conspire, resulting from the desperate times facing the cigarette industry, including \u201ca dramatic decline in its sales as a result of ... increased public awareness of the detrimental health effects of smoking\u201d; (3) the condensation of price tiers to facilitate the conspiracy; (4) actions contrary to self-interest, including Philip Morris\u2019s pre-announcing its price reductions and Defendants\u2019 failure to attempt to re-widen the price gap by reducing discount prices; (5) conspiratorial meetings in other markets; (6) a smoking and health conspiracy; (7) the manner in which Defendants monitored the conspiracy through Management Science Associates (\u201cMSA\u201d); (8) opportunities to conspire; and (9) pricing decisions made at high levels. Although the ambiguities in Dr. Leffler\u2019s opinion have previously been discussed, see supra, \u00b6\u00b6 23-25, we will further review the evidence presented by Dr. Leffler, since this is the only plus factor cited by the Court of Appeals.\n{34} We reject Plaintiffs\u2019 plus factors for reasons similar to those set forth in Williamson Oil Co. because Defendants\u2019 conduct is just as consistent with lawful, independent action as it is with price fixing, and therefore it does not tend to exclude independent conduct. We briefly discuss Plaintiffs\u2019 plus factors to address why they do not tend to exclude the possibility of independent conduct by Defendants. (1) The majority of the economies of the marketplace to which Plaintiffs cite are nothing more than inherent characteristics of an oligopoly and cannot tend to exclude independent action. See Holiday Wholesale Grocery Co., 231 F.Supp.2d at 1305. In fact, Plaintiffs\u2019 expert agreed that these factors are \u201cconducive to collusion, whether it be in the form of tacit collusion [independent conduct] or some kind of explicit agreement fixing prices,\u201d and that \u201clooking at [these] structural factors alone, just like prices, does not allow you ... to distinguish between whether the prices in this industry are the result of price fixing conspiracy on the one hand or conscious parallelism on the other hand.\u201d In addition, the history of collusion cited by Plaintiffs is based on a 1946 violation of the Sherman Act. See Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 66 S.Ct. 1125, 90 L.Ed. 1575 (1946). However, Plaintiffs do not explain how a ease from more than fifty years ago is indicative of a present day price-fixing agreement, especially when only one of the current Defendants, RJR, was a defendant in the 1946 case. See Williamson Oil Co., 346 F.3d at 1317-18.(2) The motivation to conspire cited by Plaintiffs cannot serve as tending to exclude independent conduct because \u201c[profit is a legitimate motive in pricing decisions, and something more is required before a court can conclude that competitors conspired to fix pricing in violation of the Sherman Act.\u201d In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d at 134-35.(3) When Philip Morris took action to condense the price tiers, it is just as likely that they did so to reduce the price gap and maximize profits as to facilitate a price fixing agreement, and thus this does not tend to exclude independent conduct. (4) Plaintiffs argue that Defendants took actions contrary to self-interest by pre-announcing price decisions and failing to re-widen the price gap. Philip Morris argues that the June 20, 1993 pre-announcement of a price decrease to take effect twenty days later was not a signal to the other cigarette manufacturers, but was made to allow wholesalers and retailers to avoid an immediate reduction in the value of their inventory and to accommodate the burden of implementing a price reduction. See id. at 133 (holding that advance price announcements can serve an important purpose in the industry). In addition, failure to re-widen the price gap does not tend to exclude independent conduct. Plaintiffs\u2019 expert testified that RJR and B & W were acting as rational oligopolists in following Philip Morris\u2019s price reduction, and that RJR and B & W made rational business decisions not to re-widen the price gap because they would not have made more money doing so. See VI Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra \u00b6 1429b (discussing that other firms in an oligopoly will follow the price leader \u201cwhen they believe that it will maximize industry profits\u201d). (5) The alleged conspiratorial meetings in other markets cannot serve as tending to exclude independent conduct because Plaintiffs offered no support to connect the actions in foreign markets with the actions in the United States. In addition, Plaintiffs\u2019 expert testified that he knew of no such connection and price changes in the United States were independent of those in the international market. (6) Similarly, concluding that an alleged smoking and health conspiracy facilitated coordination of a conspiracy in this case would require the jury to engage in speculation, and therefore it does not tend to exclude independent conduct. See Williamson Oil Co., 346 F.3d at 1316-17; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 595, 106 S.Ct. 1348. (7) The manner in which Defendants monitored the conspiracy through MSA is not evidence tending to exclude independent conduct because there is an equally rational legal explanation for this such as to \u201cdevise competitive strategies, gauge the success of their promotions, monitor the impact of new styles or packing on the market, and determine whether increased promotional spending was needed in certain geographic areas to compete with competitors\u2019 programs.\u201d In addition, Dr. Leffler acknowledged under oath that the information exchanged was not pricing information. As this information is ambiguous at best, it can not be seen as tending to exclude independent conduct. See Williamson Oil Co., 346 F.3d at 1315.(8) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants had many opportunities to conspire because high-ranking officials from each manufacturer met on numerous occasions. However, the fact that Defendants may have met does not reasonably lead to the inference that they conspired to discuss price fixing. \u201c[M]ere contacts and communications, or the mere opportunity to conspire, among antitrust defendants is insufficient evidence from which to infer an anticompetitive conspiracy____\u201d Clough, 108 N.M. at 804, 780 P.2d at 630 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Williamson Oil Co., 346 F.3d at 1319.(9) Finally, pricing decisions made at high levels do not tend to exclude independent conduct as \u201c[f]irms routinely consolidate decisionmaking authority in high ranking officers for a multitude of wholly legitimate reasons.\u201d Williamson Oil Co., 346 F.3d at 1319. In light of the ambiguous nature of Plaintiffs\u2019 plus factors, we hold that they do not tend to exclude independent conduct.\n{35} We also affirm the district court\u2019s ruling that \u201ceven after going through the plus factors, there still exists the opportunity for the defendant to rebut the inference of collusion by presenting evidence establishing that no reasonable fact-finder could conclude that they entered into a price-fixing conspiracy.\u201d Plaintiffs and the Court of Appeals erred in failing to acknowledge any legitimate rational explanations for the actions taken by Defendants. Plaintiffs ignore both retail competition and the effect that competition had on the \u201cactual \u2018transaction\u2019 prices.\u201d Defendants competed \u201cvigorously\u201d on retail pricing, spending a combined total of over $25 billion. This competition led to RJR and B & W filing a lawsuit against Philip Morris alleging violations of the Sherman Act and unfair competition for conduct that occurred in the midst of the alleged conspiracy. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 199 F.Supp.2d 362 (M.D.N.C.2002). RJR and B & W argued that Philip Morris \u201cdesigned and executed Retail Leaders to monopolize and restrain trade in the United States cigarette market by paying retailers for advantageous display and signage space which Plaintiffs say restricts information needed by consumers, disrupts the price-setting mechanism of the market, and limits Plaintiffs\u2019 abilities to promote their products.\u201d Id. at 365. It would be unreasonable to infer that companies who fiercely competed at the retail level to the extent of suing one another would at the same time agree to fix prices.\n{36} Plaintiffs also fail to explain the economic rationale for Defendants competing so fiercely on retail promotions that would undermine any benefit they may have been receiving from a price-fixing conspiracy at the wholesale level. See Williamson Oil Co., 346 F.3d at 1321 (\u201c[I]f prices are fixed ... there is no rational reason to undertake extremely significant and expanding retail promotional expenditures, which are a paradigmatically competitive activity.\u201d). From 1994 to 1999, Philip Morris\u2019s increased spending on retail promotions increased by $1,651 billion, which equaled 60% of its operating income. From 1993 to 1999, RJR\u2019s increased spending on retail promotions increased by $570 million, which was 141.6% of its operating income. B & W increased its spending on retail promotions from 1992 to 1998 by $492.5 million. This retail competition caused retail prices to vary, \u201ceven among brands that were priced identically at list.\u201d\n{37} In addition, market shares did not remain static but shifted and resulted in clear winners, such as Philip Morris, and clear losers, such as RJR and B & W. Philip Morris walked away a winner by ensuring that the price gap remained at a desirable level, while RJR and B & W, both of which had relied heavily on discount cigarettes, lost market share. During the period of the alleged conspiracy, Philip Morris\u2019s market share grew from 42.2% to 50.5%; RJR\u2019s share shrunk from 30.6% to 23.0%; and B & W\u2019s share declined from 16.6% to 11.7%. These shifts in market share also resulted in substantial revenue adjustments, further highlighting the winners and losers. For example, \u201cin 1999 alone [Philip Morris] realized an additional $2.9 billion in revenues as a result of its cumulative increase in market share since 1993.\u201d In 1999, RJR was down approximately $3 billion in annual revenues compared to 1993, and B & W lost $1.3 billion in annual revenues from 1993 to 1999. Plaintiffs offer no evidence to explain why RJR and B & W would participate in a conspiracy that would result in lost market share and revenue. Rather, it is more likely that RJR and B & W acted as they did because it was the best option for them to follow out of a number of bad options. Philip Morris argued that each price increase subsequent to Marlboro Friday was for legitimate business reasons and independently made. Philip Morris stated that Plaintiffs had produced no evidence to support the allegation that the pricing actions taken were \u201cintended to accomplish anything other than to advance [Philip Morris\u2019s] economic self-interest.\u201d There is no doubt that Marlboro Friday was a competitive act. In fact, Plaintiffs\u2019 economic expert stated that RJR and B & W were acting to maximize their profits in the way they reacted to Marlboro Friday and that any other options, such as attempting to reduce the price gap, would have led to inferior profits. In other words, Defendants had no choice but to follow the lead of Philip Morris and Plaintiffs failed to present evidence showing otherwise.\n{38} Defendants made a prima facie case supporting summary judgment by providing evidence of fierce retail competition that undermined the plausibility of a price-fixing agreement, demonstrating that wholesale prices remained lower than pre-Marlboro Friday levels and did not exceed pre-Marlboro Friday levels until almost five years later, and by highlighting the ambiguities in Dr. Leffler\u2019s opinion. This evidence showed that Defendants \u2018\u201chad no rational economic motive to conspire, and ... their conduct is consistent with other, equally plausible explanations.\u2019 \u201d Clough, 108 N.M. at 804, 780 P.2d at 630 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 596-97, 106 S.Ct. 1348). In reviewing Plaintiffs\u2019 plus factors, we find that the district court properly granted summary judgment.\nCONCLUSION\n{39} Failing to produce evidence tending to exclude independent action, Plaintiffs have not raised a genuine issue of material fact that there was an agreement between Defendants to fix the prices of cigarettes. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm summary judgment in favor of all Defendants.\n{40} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice, PATRICIO M. SERNA, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, and RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justices.\n. We adopt the Court of Appeals recitation of the facts of the pre-Marlboro Friday events. See Romero v. Philip Morris, Inc., 2009-NMCA-022, \u00b6\u00b6 4-10, 145 N.M. 658, 203 P.3d 873.\n. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), and Celotex Cotp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).\n. Declaration of RJR CEO: \"[Biased on Marlboro Friday, RJR believed that [Philip Morris] would not allow a competitor to take market share away from Marlboro by cutting prices. Thus, RJR believed, any further price reduction would be futile and would result in lower profits.\u201d\n. \"[MSA] provides data collection, processing, and storage services to numerous Fortune 500 companies, including American Express, MCI, Coca-Cola, and Michelin Tires.\" \"MSA Inc. shipment-to-wholesale data are aggregated, historical data on manufacturer shipments of cigarettes to wholesalers that manufacturers provide to MSA Inc. for processing, and do not contain any cigarette pricing information.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Montgomery & Andrews, P.A., Sarah M. Singleton, Walter J. Melendres, Victor R. Ortega, Santa Fe, NM, Arnold & Porter, L.L.P., Kenneth L. Chernof, Washington, DC, Boies, Schiller & Flexner, L.L.P., David Boies, Armonk, NY, Jack G. Stern, New York, NY, Amy J. Mauser, Washington, DC, for Petitioner Philip Morris Incorporated.", "Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., Andrew G. Schultz, Albuquerque, NM, Jones Day, Edwin L. Fountain, Washington, DC, Thomas Demitraek, Cleveland, OH, for Petitioners R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company and Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation.", "Youtz & Valdez, P.C., Shane C. Youtz, Albuquerque, NM, Ball & Scott Law Offices, Gordon Ball, Knoxville, TN, Cuneo Gilbert & Laduea, L.L.P., Jonathan W. Cuneo, Daniel Cohen, Hausfeld, L.L.P., Michael D. Hausfeld, Megan E. Jones, Washington, DC, for Respondents." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2010-NMSC-035\n242 P.3d 280\nBeatrice C. ROMERO and Michael Ferree, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. PHILIP MORRIS INCORPORATED, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, Defendants-Petitioners.\nNo. 31,433.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nJune 25, 2010.\nMontgomery & Andrews, P.A., Sarah M. Singleton, Walter J. Melendres, Victor R. Ortega, Santa Fe, NM, Arnold & Porter, L.L.P., Kenneth L. Chernof, Washington, DC, Boies, Schiller & Flexner, L.L.P., David Boies, Armonk, NY, Jack G. Stern, New York, NY, Amy J. Mauser, Washington, DC, for Petitioner Philip Morris Incorporated.\nRodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., Andrew G. Schultz, Albuquerque, NM, Jones Day, Edwin L. Fountain, Washington, DC, Thomas Demitraek, Cleveland, OH, for Petitioners R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company and Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation.\nYoutz & Valdez, P.C., Shane C. Youtz, Albuquerque, NM, Ball & Scott Law Offices, Gordon Ball, Knoxville, TN, Cuneo Gilbert & Laduea, L.L.P., Jonathan W. Cuneo, Daniel Cohen, Hausfeld, L.L.P., Michael D. Hausfeld, Megan E. Jones, Washington, DC, for Respondents." }, "file_name": "0713-01", "first_page_order": 747, "last_page_order": 766 }