{ "id": 4248974, "name": "STATE of New Mexico HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, Petitioner-Appellee, In the Matter of Sandra Bankston, Claimant, v. ACCURATE MACHINE & TOOL CO., INC., Respondent-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State Human Rights Commission v. Accurate Machine & Tool Co.", "decision_date": "2010-08-25", "docket_number": "No. 29,003", "first_page": "119", "last_page": "125", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "149 N.M. 119" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "245 P.3d 63" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2010-NMCA-107" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "2002-NMSC-006", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 183123 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 3" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/131/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMCA-087", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1224603 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/136/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMCA-016", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 142243 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 16", "parenthetical": "holding that a judgment that may be erroneous and barred by claim preclusion must be challenged on appeal and cannot be attacked collaterally in another proceeding and in another court" }, { "parenthetical": "holding that a judgment that may be erroneous and barred by claim preclusion must be challenged on appeal and cannot be attacked collaterally in another proceeding and in another court" }, { "parenthetical": "holding that a judgment that may be erroneous and barred by claim preclusion must be challenged on appeal and cannot be attacked collaterally in another proceeding and in another court" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/123/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "2000-NMSC-035", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 1217167 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b614" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/129/0787-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 N.M. 764", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1588533 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "765", "parenthetical": "holding that issues raised in appellate briefs that are unsupported by cited authority need not be reviewed on appeal" }, { "page": "1330", "parenthetical": "holding that issues raised in appellate briefs that are unsupported by cited authority need not be reviewed on appeal" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/100/0764-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMCA-156", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3784921 ], "weight": 12, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 19" }, { "page": "\u00b6 20" }, { "parenthetical": "holding that a judgment that may be erroneous and barred by claim preclusion must be challenged on appeal and cannot be attacked collaterally in another proceeding and in another court" }, { "parenthetical": "holding that a judgment that may be erroneous and barred by claim preclusion must be challenged on appeal and cannot be attacked collaterally in another proceeding and in another court" }, { "page": "\u00b6 20" }, { "page": "\u00b6 21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/143/0195-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 N.M. 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1580170 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238-39" }, { "page": "1270-71" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/102/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "2000-NMCA-078", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1217125 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/129/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 N.M. 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1597126 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523-24" }, { "page": "147" }, { "page": "524" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/107/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008-NMCA-031", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3783791 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/143/0620-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 794, "char_count": 18090, "ocr_confidence": 0.679, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.12982294956584e-08, "percentile": 0.3229587902615172 }, "sha256": "903d591c45a07715300edde1183376a8e1328e021aaba8d1c6cb710e61aa8321", "simhash": "1:5c8aeea10981bd81", "word_count": 2878 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:48:34.747020+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: CYNTHIA A. FRY, Chief Judge, and CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Judge." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, Petitioner-Appellee, In the Matter of Sandra Bankston, Claimant, v. ACCURATE MACHINE & TOOL CO., INC., Respondent-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nROBLES, Judge.\n{1} Accurate Machine & Tool Co., Inc. (Accurate) appeals the district court\u2019s order enforcing a judgment from the Human Rights Commission (HRC), awarding Sandra Bankston (Claimant) $63,657.05 for discrimination claims based on sexual harassment and retaliation. Accurate argues that the HRC lacked subject matter jurisdiction when it entered its judgment, and it was therefore improper for the district court to enforce the HRC\u2019s determination. Accurate also argues that the HRC conducted a \u201cone[-]sided\u201d and \u201ccursory\u201d investigation. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\n{2} Claimant filed her complaint with the HRC against Accurate on October 7, 2005, alleging sexual harassment and retaliation. The HRC issued a written complaint, which was served on Accurate on September 28, 2006, with hearing dates set for October 11 and 12, 2006. NMSA 1978, \u00a7 28-l-10(F) (2005) (\u201c[T]he commission shall issue a written complaint in its own name against the respondent [which] shall set forth the alleged discriminatory practice [and] shall require the respondent to answer the allegations of the complaint at a hearing ... not ... more than fifteen or less than ten days after service of the complaint.\u201d). The hearing dates were later rescheduled for October 23 and 24, 2006. Although this Court does not have a record of the HRC hearings, it appears that, on October 23, 2006, at the first hearing, Accurate argued that the HRC had lost subject matter jurisdiction to hear the complaint because the hearing was taking place outside of the statutorily required fifteen days within which a hearing must be held following the service of a complaint. Id. The hearing officer disagreed and continued the hearing. On July 16, 2007, the HRC issued a written final order that concluded that Claimant had proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Accurate had violated NMSA 1978, Section 28-1-7 (2004). Claimant was awarded damages and attorney fees in the amount of $63,657.05. Accurate did not appeal and did not pay Claimant.\n{3} By May 9, 2008, Accurate had not complied with HRC\u2019s judgment. Claimant sought assistance through the Secretary of Labor who, in turn, requested that the Attorney General\u2019s Office secure enforcement of the HRC\u2019s decision in district court. NMSA 1978, \u00a7 28-1-12 (1987) (\u201cIf a respondent to a complaint filed pursuant to the Human Rights Act ... is not complying with an order of the commission, the attorney general ... at the request of the secretary, shall secure enforcement of the commission\u2019s order by a district court. The proceeding shall be initiated by the filing of a petition in the district court[.]\u201d (citation omitted)). Following the filing of a petition to enforce the HRC\u2019s order, the district court held a hearing during which the merits of the petition were argued by the Attorney General\u2019s Office and Accurate. Accurate argued that subject matter jurisdiction can be raised collaterally at any time. The district court granted the petition to enforce the HRC\u2019s order. This appeal followed.\nII. DISCUSSION\nA. Subject Matter Jurisdiction\n{4} The question of subject matter jurisdiction does not require preservation. See Rule 12-216(B) NMRA. This Court determines de novo whether an agency has subject matter jurisdiction of a case and personal jurisdiction over parties. Citizen Action v. Sandia Corp., 2008-NMCA-031, \u00b6 12, 143 N.M. 620, 179 P.3d 1228. Appeals from courts or agencies that lack subject matter jurisdiction will confer no jurisdiction on this Court. Id. \u00b6 13.\n{5} On appeal, Accurate argues that, by holding the hearing outside of the statutorily required fifteen days after being served with the complaint, the HRC lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear Claimant\u2019s complaint in the first instance. See \u00a7 28-l-10(F). It is, therefore, Accurate\u2019s position that failure to comply with the mandatory statutory requirements was a jurisdictional bar to Claimant\u2019s action and, citing Lopez v. New Mexico Board of Medical Examiners, 107 N.M. 145, 754 P.2d 522 (1988), Accurate argues that the HRC\u2019s decision was void and that its enforcement must be reversed. Finally, Accurate states that because the challenge is to the subject matter jurisdiction of the HRC, this issue may appropriately be brought in a collateral proceeding. We disagree.\n{6} In Lopez, the question before our Supreme Court was whether the statutorily allotted amount of time given for an administrative agency to render a decision was jurisdictional or procedural. Id. at 146^47, 754 P.2d at 523-24. After examining the plain language of the controlling statute, our Supreme Court concluded that the language was jurisdictional and, therefore, the agency\u2019s decision was void. Id. at 147, 754 P.2d at 524; but see N.M. Dep\u2019t of Health v. Compton, 2000-NMCA-078, \u00b6 12, 129 N.M. 474, 10 P.3d 153 (noting that some mandatory statutory time limitations are not jurisdictional, but rather are intended to promote expeditious review); Redman v. Bd. of Regents, 102 N.M. 234, 238-39, 693 P.2d 1266, 1270-71 (Ct.App.1984) (same). However, Lopez involved direct appeals from an agency\u2019s determination. 107 N.M. 145, 754 P.2d 522. In the instant case, we conclude that before the merits of Accurate\u2019s arguments may be reached, this Court must examine the ramifications of challenges to subject matter jurisdiction in collateral proceedings.\n{7} Collateral attacks are efforts to defeat judgments, their force, or their effects in an incidental proceeding not provided by law for the express purpose of attacking the judgment. See State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep\u2019t v. Andree G., 2007-NMCA-156, \u00b6 19, 143 N.M. 195, 174 P.3d 531. Accurate appears to be making two arguments supporting its position that the present appeal is not a collateral attack. On the one hand, Accurate argues that an order from the HRC is not self-executing, that the statutory framework provides for two types of direct appeal to district court, and that the present case is one of those types of direct appeal. On the other hand, Accurate appears to argue, in the alternative, that although collateral attacks on subject matter jurisdiction are generally not permissible, if this Court determines that Accurate\u2019s challenge to the HRC\u2019s order is a collateral attack, such an attack would be permissible in the present case because it falls within a recognized exception. We address both contentions.\n1. The Present Case is not a Direct Appeal\n{8} Accurate acknowledges that it did not appeal the HRC\u2019s order of July 16, 2007, awarding Claimant money for damages and attorney fees. Accurate contends, however, that \u201c[t]he HRA provides for two avenues of direct appeal.\u201d The first is NMSA 1978, Section 28-1-13 (2005), which requires the filing of the notice of appeal within ninety days of the entry of the HRC\u2019s order, and the second is the enforcement proceeding of Section 28-1-12. We consider the provisions of each statute.\n{9} Section 28-1-13 provides, in pertinent part:\nA person aggrieved by an order of the [HRC] may obtain a trial de novo in the district court of the county where the discriminatory practice occurred or where the respondent does business by filing a notice of appeal within ninety days from the date of service of the commission\u2019s order.\nSection 28-l-13(A). This statute clearly contemplates that an aggrieved party, not a prevailing party, may appeal from the HRC\u2019s order if the party so desires. In this case, Accurate was the aggrieved party and, for whatever reason, it elected not to appeal.\n{10} The relevant part of Section 28-1-12 provides:\nIf a respondent to a complaint filed pursuant to the [HRA] is not complying with an order of the commission, the attorney general or district attorney, at the request of the secretary, shall secure enforcement of the commission\u2019s order by a district court.\nThis statute contemplates that the prevailing party may seek assistance in obtaining enforcement of an HRC order if the respondent fails to comply with the order. This is precisely what happened in the present case\u2014 the Attorney General\u2019s Office sought enforcement on Claimant\u2019s behalf in district court.\n{11} Accurate\u2019s chain of logic posits that Section 28-1-13 is permissive and not mandatory, ostensibly because an aggrieved party may or may not appeal an adverse order and, in the absence of a direct appeal, if an enforcement petition is filed in district court under Section 28-1-12, the district court would have the \u201cdiscretion [to] make an order to decree enforcement of the order of the [HRC].\u201d Therefore, Accurate maintains, if the district court has the discretion to enforce the HRC\u2019s order, the Legislature must have intended to give the district court the power to entertain challenges to the HRC\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction as part of an enforcement action, which is the same power the court would have if the aggrieved party had appealed under Section 28-1-13. We disagree with Accurate.\n{12} Accurate cites no case law that directly supports this proposition. When a party cites no authority for a proposition, we assume that, after a diligent search, it was unable to find authority for support. In re Adoption of Doe, 100 N.M. 764, 765, 676 P.2d 1329, 1330 (1984) (holding that issues raised in appellate briefs that are unsupported by cited authority need not be reviewed on appeal). Accurate does not direct this Court to an analogous administrative statutory scheme, whereby direct appeals may be obtained by no action on the part of the aggrieved party. See Rule 12-213(A)(4) NMRA (stating that briefs submitted to this Court \u201cshall contain a statement of the applicable standard of review, the contentions of the appellant and a statement explaining how the issue was preserved in the court below, with citations to authorities, record proper, transcript of proceedings or exhibits relied on\u201d (emphasis added)). Accurate\u2019s argument essentially makes the provisions of Section 28-1-13 superfluous to Section 28-1-12. See In re Adjustments to Franchise Fees, 2000-NMSC-035, \u00b614, 129 N.M. 787, 14 P.3d 525 (stating that statutes must be interpreted, so that no part is rendered \u201csurplusage or superfluous\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Accurate fails to explain why there would be a need for a statutory provision that provides for direct appeal when waiting would likewise perfect an appeal. Under this view, an aggrieved party could simply ignore an adverse HRC order, decline to appeal from it, and hope that the prevailing party did not seek to enforce the order. Then, if the prevailing party did seek enforcement, the aggrieved party could have a second bite at the apple and assert all the errors it perceived at the HRC proceeding.\n{13} Such an interpretation would also run counter to our rules that provide the procedures for administrative appeals. Rule 1-074(B)(2) NMRA provides specifically that appeals from the HRA are governed exclusively by Rule 1-076 NMRA. The provisions of Rule 1-076 do not suggest that an aggrieved party is entitled to a direct appeal by simply waiting for an enforcement action. On the contrary, Rule 1-076(D) provides that appeals must be taken within ninety days and Rule 1-076(B) and (L) provide that the appeal is taken by the aggrieved party not the prevailing party. We conclude that Accurate\u2019s waiting of nearly a year without taking any action to enforce an existing judgment is not a direct appeal and, therefore, the petition to enforce the HRC\u2019s order filed in district court was a collateral proceeding.\n2. Accurate\u2019s Collateral Attack is not Permissible\n{14} In Andree G., we held that, where a party had the ability to challenge subject matter jurisdiction in the original action, no attack on the final judgment may be made in a collateral matter. 2007-NMCA-156, \u00b6 20, 143 N.M. 195, 174 P.3d 531; see Thoma v. Thoma, 1997-NMCA-016, \u00b6 16, 123 N.M. 137, 934 P.2d 1066 (filed 1996) (holding that a judgment that may be erroneous and barred by claim preclusion must be challenged on appeal and cannot be attacked collaterally in another proceeding and in another court); see also Cordova v. Larsen, 2004-NMCA-087, \u00b6 15, 136 N.M. 87, 94 P.3d 830 (holding that \u201c[a] party that has had an opportunity to litigate the question of subject-matter jurisdiction may not ... reopen that question in a collateral attack upon an adverse judgment\u201d (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). \u201cIn such a case, the litigant had the opportunity to raise the jurisdictional issue in the initial litigation and slept on that opportunity.\u201d Andree G., 2007-NMCA-156, \u00b6 20, 143 N.M. 195, 174 P.3d 531 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments \u00a7 12 (1982), we did recognize three exceptions where a final judgment would not preclude a collateral attack on subject matter jurisdiction.\n(1) The subject matter of the action was so plainly beyond the court\u2019s jurisdiction that its entertaining the action was a manifest abuse of authority; or\n(2) Allowing the judgment to stand would substantially infringe the authority of another tribunal or agency of government; or\n(3) The judgment was rendered by a court lacking capability to make an adequately informed determination of a question concerning its own jurisdiction and as a matter of procedural fairness the party seeking to avoid the judgment should have opportunity belatedly to attack the court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction.\nAndree G, 2007-NMCA-156, \u00b6 21, 143 N.M. 195, 174 P.3d 531.\n{15} Accurate argues that the immediate case falls within the third exception articulated in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments \u00a7 12 and recognized in Andree G. Accurate\u2019s argument is that hearing officers lack the capability to make adequately informed determinations of their own jurisdiction, and the question of whether an administrative agency has jurisdiction over parties or subject matter in a given case is a question of law. Finally, Accurate notes that when an appellate court reviews an agency\u2019s determination of jurisdiction, little deference is given to the agency\u2019s conclusion, and the standard of review is de novo. In re Qwest Commc\u2019ns Int\u2019l, Inc., 2002-NMSC-006, \u00b6 3, 131 N.M. 770, 42 P.3d 1219. The crux of the third exception to the bar against collaterally attacking subject matter jurisdiction is that out of procedural fairness, a party should be allowed to belatedly attack the original and erroneous jurisdictional determination. Accurate had that opportunity. After making subject matter jurisdiction arguments to the hearing officer, Accurate was entitled to appeal to the district court, but failed to do so. See \u00a7 28-l-13(A) (allowing ninety days from the date of service of the commission\u2019s order for filing notice of appeal). The Restatement (Second) of Judgments \u00a7 12 cmt. e. further emphasizes this point.\nThe policies favoring finality over validity presuppose that fair opportunity is available to contest subject matter jurisdiction in the court whose jurisdiction is in question. ... Generally, the rules also afford opportunity for appellate review, through extraordinary writ if not otherwise, of the first instance court\u2019s determination of its subject matter jurisdiction.\n{16} The focus of the third exception pertains to procedural facilities that are not always provided in courts of limited jurisdiction. \u201cTheir rules of procedure sometimes make appellate review difficult or burdensome.\u201d Id. It is therefore when \u201c[t]he opportunity to challenge subject matter jurisdiction in such a forum may ... be inadequate\u201d that a subsequent collateral attack on a judgment \u201cmay ... be permitted.\u201d Id. In the case at bar, we fail to see how the HRC\u2019s determination regarding subject matter jurisdiction foreclosed Accurate from raising the issue on appellate review, such that the only alternative available was a collateral attack.\n{17} We conclude that Accurate was afforded the opportunity to challenge the HRC\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction through the appeals process. Moreover, in the interests of procedural fairness, after actually litigating the HRC\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction and then taking no further action, Accurate\u2019s subsequent claims in another proceeding that attempt to readdress the HRC\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction are outweighed by the principle of finality in this particular case.\nB. The HRC\u2019s Investigation\n{18} We now turn to Accurate\u2019s argument that the HRC conducted a cursory investigation that was \u201clast minute\u201d in nature and set up a \u201crush to judgment.\u201d Accurate contends that the HRC\u2019s investigative actions \u201crubber-stamp[edj\u201d the filing of the claim of discrimination, and there was no effort made to independently \u201cuncover the truth.\u201d We conclude that this issue is not properly before us. This case is an appeal from the district court\u2019s order to decree enforcement of the order of the HRC. Accurate\u2019s contentions necessarily involve the merits of the case and an attack on the HRC\u2019s final order. Accurate had the opportunity to properly bring this issue via an appeal under Section 28-1-13 and declined to do so.\nIII. CONCLUSION\n{19} We affirm the district court\u2019s enforcement of the order from the HRC and remand this case to district court for further proceedings.\n{20} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: CYNTHIA A. FRY, Chief Judge, and CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Judge.", "type": "majority", "author": "ROBLES, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Gary K. King, Attorney General, Tania Maestas, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen A. Vigil, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.", "Dubois, Cooksey & Bischoff, P.A., William J. Cooksey, Wagner, Ford & Associates, P.A., Kenneth R. Wagner, L. Helen Bennett, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.", "Geer, Wissel & Levy, P.A., Jane C. Levy, Robert D. Levy, Albuquerque, NM, for Claimant Amicus Curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2010-NMCA-107\n245 P.3d 63\nSTATE of New Mexico HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, Petitioner-Appellee, In the Matter of Sandra Bankston, Claimant, v. ACCURATE MACHINE & TOOL CO., INC., Respondent-Appellant.\nNo. 29,003.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nAug. 25, 2010.\nCertiorari Denied, Oct. 20, 2010, No. 32,617.\nGary K. King, Attorney General, Tania Maestas, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen A. Vigil, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.\nDubois, Cooksey & Bischoff, P.A., William J. Cooksey, Wagner, Ford & Associates, P.A., Kenneth R. Wagner, L. Helen Bennett, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.\nGeer, Wissel & Levy, P.A., Jane C. Levy, Robert D. Levy, Albuquerque, NM, for Claimant Amicus Curiae." }, "file_name": "0119-01", "first_page_order": 145, "last_page_order": 151 }