{ "id": 4249871, "name": "In the Matter of Esther V., a child. STATE of New Mexico, ex rel. CHILDREN, YOUTH and FAMILIES DEPARTMENT, Petitioner-Petitioner and Cross-Respondent, v. MARLENE C., Respondent-Respondent and Cross-Petitioner", "name_abbreviation": "State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Department v. Marlene C.", "decision_date": "2011-01-21", "docket_number": "No. 31,738", "first_page": "315", "last_page": "329", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "149 N.M. 315" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "248 P.3d 863" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2011-NMSC-005" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "2009-NMCA-058", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4243911 ], "weight": 27, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 1, 10, 14" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 4, 14" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 13-14" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 5-6" }, { "page": "\u00b6 13" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 15, 18" }, { "page": "\u00b6 17" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 15-18" }, { "page": "\u00b6 15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMCA-100", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 257605 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/127/0699-01" ] }, { "cite": "490 U.S. 30", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 605240 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36", "parenthetical": "discussing the \"important substantive requirement[s]\" that ICWA imposes on state courts" }, { "parenthetical": "discussing the \"important substantive requirement[s]\" that ICWA imposes on state courts" }, { "parenthetical": "discussing the \"important substantive requirement[s]\" that ICWA imposes on state courts" }, { "page": "32, 34, 52-53" }, { "page": "37" }, { "page": "50" }, { "page": "34" }, { "page": "36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/490/0030-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 Or.App. 10", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Or. App.", "case_ids": [ 4378292 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "explaining that \"it is implicit that 'emergency removal' authority extends to non-reservation Indian children\"" }, { "parenthetical": "explaining that \"it is implicit that 'emergency removal' authority extends to non-reservation Indian children\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or-app/70/0010-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 Cal. Rptr.3d 726", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr. 3d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "735-36", "parenthetical": "explaining that \u00a7 1922 should be read to apply to Indian children who are not residents of or domiciled on a reservation" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 Cal.App.4th 1148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 4th", "case_ids": [ 2883997 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "explaining that \u00a7 1922 should be read to apply to Indian children who are not residents of or domiciled on a reservation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-4th/130/1148-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 N.M. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1552801 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101" }, { "page": "289" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/117/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 Cal.Rptr.2d 343", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr. 2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349", "parenthetical": "explaining that the state proceeding best suited for addressing ICWA is the proceeding that requires findings that parallel the ICWA findings" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 Cal. App.4th 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 4th", "case_ids": [ 1103568 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "explaining that the state proceeding best suited for addressing ICWA is the proceeding that requires findings that parallel the ICWA findings" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-4th/80/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 Wis.2d 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8666973 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "noting that state statutes should be read to harmonize with ICWA" }, { "page": "238", "parenthetical": "noting that state statutes should be read to harmonize with ICWA" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/166/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMSC-018", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3668635 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" }, { "page": "\u00b6 12" }, { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/141/0535-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 P.3d 354", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357", "parenthetical": "\"Different requirements apply for the voluntary placement as opposed to involuntary removal of an Indian child____ [I]n a voluntary proceeding, if an Indian parent desires to withdraw his/her consent to placement, the child must be returned to his/her care.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 Wash.App. 781", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. App.", "case_ids": [ 3982248 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"Different requirements apply for the voluntary placement as opposed to involuntary removal of an Indian child____ [I]n a voluntary proceeding, if an Indian parent desires to withdraw his/her consent to placement, the child must be returned to his/her care.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-app/148/0781-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 Pa.Super. 555", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa. Super.", "case_ids": [ 655399 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "'We construe \u00a7 1913(b) as applying to situations ... wherein a consensual foster care placement was made in the first place and there is no inherent bar to a withdrawal of the consent.\"" }, { "page": "37", "parenthetical": "'We construe \u00a7 1913(b) as applying to situations ... wherein a consensual foster care placement was made in the first place and there is no inherent bar to a withdrawal of the consent.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa-super/356/0555-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 Mont. 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mont.", "case_ids": [ 3735854 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that \u00a7 1913(a) \"has no application to the involuntary termination proceedings initiated by the [state]\"" }, { "page": "1217", "parenthetical": "holding that \u00a7 1913(a) \"has no application to the involuntary termination proceedings initiated by the [state]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mont/353/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 F.3d 1038", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 8948185 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1063" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/415/1038-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 N.M. 416", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 727721 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419", "parenthetical": "noting that the guidelines are persuasive authority" }, { "page": "454", "parenthetical": "noting that the guidelines are persuasive authority" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/116/0416-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 U.S. 373", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6177519 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/426/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "734 F.2d 1359", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 416425 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1369" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/734/1359-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 N.M. 803", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1598975 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "808" }, { "page": "1185" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/105/0803-01" ] }, { "cite": "25 U.S.C. \u00a7 1901", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(4)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2004-NMSC-032", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 1224669 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/136/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-050", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4245434 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/147/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "2010-NMSC-009", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4244953 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 37" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/147/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMCA-070", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3669122 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 24" }, { "page": "\u00b6 35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/141/0692-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008-NMCA-024", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3784538 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/143/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "25 U.S.C. \u00a7 1913", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)", "parenthetical": "providing requirements for valid parental consent to foster care placement or termination of parental rights" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1901-1963", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1531, "char_count": 54566, "ocr_confidence": 0.691, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.3907492826870126e-07, "percentile": 0.7978347386276188 }, "sha256": "320434c22d5b3545e3b355716ec6a729b2149d06746349607b0e4e82578b37f3", "simhash": "1:613c42077baad5a2", "word_count": 8898 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:48:34.747020+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: PATRICIO M. SERNA, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, RICHARD C. BOSSON and EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justices." ], "parties": [ "In the Matter of Esther V., a child. STATE of New Mexico, ex rel. CHILDREN, YOUTH and FAMILIES DEPARTMENT, Petitioner-Petitioner and Cross-Respondent, v. MARLENE C., Respondent-Respondent and Cross-Petitioner." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nDANIELS, Chief Justice.\n{1} This case addresses the relationship between the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1901-1963 (2006), which sets \u201cminimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families,\u201d \u00a7 1902, and the New Mexico Abuse and Neglect Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 32A-4-1 to -34 (1993, as amended through 2009), which governs the State\u2019s transfer of custody of a child in eases of abuse or neglect. More specifically, we are asked to determine when and how a district court in an abuse and neglect proceeding must make the two factual findings required by \u00a7 1912(d) and (e) of ICWA. Subsection 1912(d) provides,\nAny party seeking to effect a foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child under State law shall satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.\nSubsection 1912(e) provides,\nNo foster care placement may be ordered in such proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported by clear and convincing evidence, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.\n{2} In this case, the district court entered an order finding that Marlene C. (Mother) neglected her month-old baby (Child) and gave legal custody to the Children, Youth and Families Department (CYFD). Mother appealed, arguing that the district court failed to make the factual findings required by \u00a7 1912(d) and (e) of ICWA at the adjudicatory hearing. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep\u2019t v. Marlene C., 2009-NMCA-058, \u00b6\u00b6 1, 10, 14, 146 N.M. 588, 212 P.3d 1142. The Court of Appeals reversed the adjudication of neglect, holding that CYFD failed to prove the \u00a7 1912(e) requirement by clear and convincing evidence as required by the statute. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 18, 20. The Court of Appeals did not decide whether the findings required by \u00a7 1912(d) and (e) must always be made at the adjudicatory hearing. See id. \u00b6 14. We hold that, in a contested adjudication to which ICWA applies, the district court must always make the findings of fact required under \u00a7 1912(d) and (e) of ICWA at the adjudication stage, founded either on evidence of record or admissions supported by a factual basis. We therefore reverse the district court\u2019s adjudication of neglect and remand to that court for further hearing.\nI. BACKGROUND\n{3} Mother, a member of the Navajo Nation, and Child, who is eligible for enrollment in the Navajo Nation, were living with a Gallup-based family pursuant to a safety contract with CYFD in which the family agreed to provide a residence for Mother and Child and \u201censur[e] the child\u2019s safety.\u201d Child\u2019s father (Father) was incarcerated at the time. On August 21, 2007, CYFD received a referral indicating that the safety-contract family no longer wanted to help Mother and Child because Mother \u201cwas causing family discord, making [false] allegations, leaving with the baby on foot and in the extreme heat, and bringing items into the home that [were] against [the family\u2019s] religious beliefs.\u201d\n{4} In response to the referral, CYFD immediately faxed to the district court a petition alleging abuse and neglect, a motion for an ex parte custody order with a supporting affidavit, and a proposed ex parte custody order to be signed by the district judge. CYFD\u2019s petition alleged that Mother and Father neglected Child, contrary to Section 32A-4-2(E)(4), \u201cin that [they] are unable to discharge their responsibilities to and for [C]hild because of incarceration, hospitalization or other physical or mental disorder or incapacity,\u201d and that Mother and Father abused Child, contrary to Section 32A-4-2(B)(1), \u201cin that [C]hild has suffered or is at risk of suffering serious harm because of the action or inaction of the child\u2019s parent, guardian or custodian.\u201d The petition also noted that ICWA applies to Child because Child is Native American. The supporting affidavit contained facts to establish probable cause that Child was abused or neglected, and it stated that \u201creasonable and active efforts ha[d] been made to avoid removal of the child from the home.\u201d\n{5} The district court signed the submitted ex parte custody order within ten minutes of receiving CYFD\u2019s request, thereby commanding the immediate removal of Child from Mother\u2019s care, granting \u201clegal and physical custody of the child\u201d to CYFD, and appointing a guardian ad litem for Child. The district court\u2019s order found that there was \u201cprobable cause to believe that ... [C]hild [was] abused or neglected,\u201d that CYFD custody was \u201cnecessary,\u201d and that CYFD had made \u201cactive efforts ... to avoid removal of [C]hild from the home.\u201d\n{6} On August 24, 2007, the district court appointed counsel to represent Mother, and, on August 27, the court set a custody hearing within ten days of the ex parte order as required by Section 32A-4-18(A). In response to CYFD\u2019s abuse and neglect petition, Mother\u2019s counsel filed a response denying \u201call allegations of neglect or abuse\u201d and disputing that CYFD made \u201creasonable efforts ... to avoid removing the child.\u201d The temporary custody hearing was postponed several days to accommodate the various parties and the excusal of the district court judge and was ultimately held on September 12, 2007.\n{7} At the thirty-minute custody hearing, counsel for Mother asked the court to allow him five minutes to consult with Mother before the hearing began, explaining that he had not had an opportunity to talk to his client. After conferring with counsel, Mother neither renewed her denial of the alleged abuse and neglect nor challenged the portion of CYFD\u2019s affidavit that stated CYFD had made active and reasonable efforts to keep the family together. Instead, she stipulated to temporary CYFD custody of Child pending the adjudicatory hearing, which was scheduled for October 5, 2007. The court verified Mother\u2019s understanding of the stipulation in open court as follows:\nJudge: ... We are here today for a hearing to determine whether or not reasonable grounds exist to allow the State of New Mexico to keep your child and take legal custody of your child.... If you want a hearing, you can have a hearing to dispute that there is not reasonable grounds for the government to keep your child from you____Do you understand?\nMother: Yes.\nJudge: Are you willing to give up that right?\nAttorney: In other words, are you willing to not have a hearing today, but to say okay, they can keep the child on a temporary basis?\nMother: No, I want to get them back.\nAttorney: I understand you want to get them back. The question is do you want a hearing today on whether you should have them temporarily back now. Because you\u2019re going to have a hearing later on what\u2019s called an adjudication. Do you understand that?\nMother: Yes.\nAttorney: Temporarily they\u2019re going to be with the State, understand? You\u2019re going to have visitation. I think she understands, your honor.\nJudge: Alright. So with your permission, we will not have a hearing to determine whether or not at this time you should get your kids back. We\u2019re not going to have that hearing. Do you understand that?\nMother: Yes____\nJudge: And ... down the line we can have a further hearing called an adjudication to see if your child will remain with the State for a longer period of time. We\u2019re not going to have that right now. Do you understand that?\nMother: Um-hum.\n{8} The court then signed the stipulated order, which stated that \u201c[tjhere is probable cause to believe that the [parents] are not able to provide adequate supervision and care for the child\u201d and that \u201c[e]lear and convincing evidence exists to believe that continued custody of the child by the parent or guardian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.\u201d Mother did not contest the findings contained in the stipulated order.\n{9} The district court held an adjudicatory hearing on October 29 and November 28. Father did not contest the proceedings, but Mother disputed the allegations of abuse and neglect. Relying on Mother\u2019s earlier stipulation and the ex parte custody order, CYFD did not present \u201cqualified expert testimony\u201d as required by \u00a7 1912(e) of ICWA or otherwise address the \u00a7 1912 requirements at the adjudicatory hearing. At the close of the hearing, the judge dismissed the abuse allegation but found neglect on the part of Mother. The judge\u2019s written order stated that \u201c[t]he Court finds by clear and convincing [evidence that Mother] has neglected the child ... in that [she] is unable to discharge [her] responsibilities to and for the child because of incarceration, hospitalization or other physical or mental disorder or incapacity; and a factual basis exists to support this finding.\u201d\n{10} Mother appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the requirements of \u00a7 1912(d) and (e) of ICWA were not satisfied. Marlene C., 2009-NMCA-058, \u00b6\u00b6 4, 14, 146 N.M. 588, 212 P.3d 1142. Mother argued that the \u201cactive efforts\u201d finding required by \u00a7 1912(d) and the \u201clikely to result in serious ... damage\u201d finding required by \u00a7 1912(e) must be made at the adjudicatory stage of the abuse and neglect proceedings. Marlene c., 2009-NMCA-058, \u00b6\u00b6 13-14, 146 N.M. 588, 212 P.3d 1142. CYFD countered \u201cthat Mother failed to preserve her ICWA challenges for review ... and, in the alternative, that the district court made the requisite findings\u201d before the adjudicatory hearing, thereby satisfying \u00a7 1912(d) and (e). Id. \u00b6 4.\n{11} Although Mother raised CYFD\u2019s failure to satisfy \u00a7 1912(d) and (e) for the first time on appeal, the Court of Appeals allowed her challenge pursuant to \u00a7 1914 of ICWA, which provides in relevant part that \u201cany parent or Indian custodian from whose custody [an Indian] child was removed ... may petition any court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate such action upon a showing that such action violated any provision of [Sections 1911, 1912, and 1913 of this title.\u201d Marlene C., 2009-NMCA-058, \u00b6\u00b6 5-6, 146 N.M. 588, 212 P.3d 1142 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). CYFD does not renew its preservation argument before this Court.\n{12} On the merits of Mother\u2019s appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with CYFD that \u00a7 1912(d)\u2019s requirement that \u201cactive efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family\u201d was satisfied by the ex parte custody order, in which the district court stated that CYFD had made \u201cactive efforts ... to avoid removal of [C]hild from the home.\u201d See id. \u00b6 17. The Court of Appeals disagreed, however, with CYFD\u2019s contention that Mother stipulated to the finding required by \u00a7 1912(e) by signing the temporary custody order, which stated that \u201c[c]lear and convincing evidence exists to believe that continued custody of [C]hild by the parent or guardian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to [C]hild.\u201d Marlene C., 2009-NMCA-058, \u00b6 13, 146 N.M. 588, 212 P.3d 1142 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court reasoned that CYFD did not and could not \u201cprove its case under Section 1912(e)\u201d at the temporary custody hearing because Mother\u2019s consent at that hearing transformed it into a \u201cvoluntary proceeding\u201d pursuant to \u00a7 1913(a), rendering \u00a7 1912\u2019s requirements for involuntary proceedings inapplicable at that stage. See Marlene C., 2009-NMCA-058, \u00b6\u00b6 15, 18, 146 N.M. 588, 212 P.3d 1142; 25 U.S.C. \u00a7 1913(a) (providing requirements for valid parental consent to foster care placement or termination of parental rights). Because Mother voluntarily consented to temporary custody pending adjudication, the Court of Appeals held that CYFD was obligated to establish at the adjudicatory hearing the likelihood of serious damage through the presentation of qualified expert testimony as required by \u00a7 1912(e). See Marlene C., 2009-NMCA-058, \u00b6 17, 146 N.M. 588, 212 P.3d 1142.\n{13} CYFD petitioned this Court for review of the Court of Appeals opinion, and Mother cross-petitioned. We granted both petitions for certiorari to review three issues: (1) did the Court of Appeals err by holding that Mother\u2019s consent to temporary custody pending the adjudicatory hearing transformed the involuntary custody hearing into a voluntary proceeding governed by \u00a7 1913 of ICWA; (2) in a contested adjudication, does the trial court always need to make the factual findings required by \u00a7 1912(d) and (e) of ICWA at the adjudicatory hearing on abuse and neglect, or can those findings be made at an earlier stage of the proceedings; and (3) if the \u00a7 1912(d) and (e) findings must be made at the adjudication stage, should we reverse the adjudication and dismiss the petition for lack of proof, or should we remand for additional proceedings in which that proof may be presented?\nII. DISCUSSION\nA. Standard of Review\n{14} The interpretation of ICWA and its relationship to our state statute on abuse and neglect present questions of law that we review de novo. See Cherino v. Cherino, 2008-NMCA-024, \u00b6 7, 143 N.M. 452, 176 P.3d 1184 (\u201c[T]he applicability of the ICWA requires us to interpret statutory language, which is ... subject to de novo review.\u201d); State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep\u2019t v. Benjamin O., 2007-NMCA-070, \u00b6 24, 141 N.M. 692, 160 P.3d 601 (interpreting the Abuse and Neglect Act de novo).\n{15} Our overarching goal when interpreting ICWA is to effectuate Congress\u2019s intent. The text of ICWA is the primary indicator of congressional intent, and to the extent that the language of the statute is \u201cclear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.\u201d Quynh Truong v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2010-NMSC-009, \u00b6 37, 147 N.M. 583, 227 P.3d 73 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Where a statute is ambiguous, we seek a construction that will harmonize all relevant statutory provisions and avoid absurd results. See State v. Nick R., 2009-NMSC-050, \u00b6 11, 147 N.M. 182, 218 P.3d 868 (explaining that statutory construction must be done in a manner that avoids absurd results); State v. Smith, 2004-NMSC-032, \u00b6 10, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022 (noting that statutory subsections \u201cmust be considered in reference to the statute as a whole\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).\nB. The Purpose and Policy of ICWA\n{16} Congress enacted ICWA upon finding that \u201can alarmingly high percentage of Indian families\u201d were broken up by the often unwarranted removal and placement of Indian children in \u201cnon-Indian foster and adoptive homes and institutions.\u201d 25 U.S.C. \u00a7 1901(4). Congress noted that \u201cthere is no resource ... more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children\u201d and that the states, through their administrative and judicial bodies, \u201chave often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian ... families.\u201d \u00a7 1901(3), (5). In light of those historic facts, Congress enacted ICWA to \u201cprotect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families.\u201d \u00a7 1902.\n{17} ICWA is a remedial statute in that it was enacted to stem the \u201calarmingly high percentage of Indian families\u201d being separated by removal of children through custody proceedings. \u00a7 1901(4). We interpret remedial statutes \u201cliberally to facilitate and accomplish [their] purposes and intent.\u201d State ex rel. Stratton v. Gurley Motor Co., 105 N.M. 803, 808, 737 P.2d 1180, 1185 (Ct. App.1987). Furthermore, \u201cstatutes enacted for the benefit of Indians must be liberally construed with all doubts resolved in favor of the Indians.\u201d Preston v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 1359, 1369 (9th Cir.1984); accord Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., Minn., 426 U.S. 373, 392, 96 S.Ct. 2102, 48 L.Ed.2d 710 (1976).\n{18} When construing ICWA we are also informed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs interpretive guidelines, which were published to assist state courts tasked with interpreting ICWA within the context of their own child welfare procedures. See Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings (ICWA Guidelines), 44 Fed.Reg. 67,584, 67,-584 (Nov. 26, 1979) (noting that state courts have primary responsibility for interpreting ICWA and that Congress intended to give state courts flexibility); see also In re Guardianship of Ashley Elizabeth R., 116 N.M. 416, 419, 863 P.2d 451, 454 (Ct.App. 1993) (noting that the guidelines are persuasive authority). According to the ICWA Guidelines,\nCongress through [ICWA] has expressed its clear preference for keeping Indian children with their families.... Proceedings in state courts involving the custody of Indian children shall follow strict procedures and meet stringent requirements to justify any result in an individual ease contrary to these preferences.... [T]he Act shall be liberally construed in favor of a result that is consistent with these preferences. Any ambiguities in any of such statutes, regulations, rules or guidelines shall be resolved in favor of the result that is most consistent zvith these preferences.\n44 Fed.Reg. at 67,585 to -86 (emphasis added).\n{19} In short, when construing ICWA we must resolve all ambiguities liberally in favor of the Indian parent and the tribe in order to effectuate the purpose of the Act, which is to prevent the unnecessary removal of Indian children.\nC. A Parent or Custodian\u2019s Consent to Temporary Custody Does Not Transform an Involuntary Proceeding into a Voluntary Proceeding to Which \u00a7 1913 of ICWA Applies.\n{20} Initially, we address the Court of Appeals\u2019 characterization of Mother\u2019s stipulation at the custody hearing as a \u201cconsent to a foster care placement\u201d within the meaning of \u00a7 1913(a) of ICWA. See Marlene C., 2009-NMCA-058, \u00b6\u00b6 15-18, 146 N.M. 588, 212 P.3d 1142. Section 1913 details the requirements for valid parental consent in situations where a \u201cparent or Indian custodian voluntarily consents to a foster care placement or to termination of parental rights.\u201d CYFD argues that this portion of the Court of Appeals opinion is inconsistent with the purpose of \u00a7 1913, which is to establish procedures for voluntary proceedings that are distinguishable from those used for involuntary proceedings. For the reasons that follow, we agree with CYFD and hold that \u00a7 1913 applies only to circumstances in which the parent or Indian custodian has initiated a voluntary proceeding.\n{21} The characterization by the Court of Appeals that Mother\u2019s stipulation at the initial custody hearing was a voluntary consent within the meaning of \u00a7 1913(a) is problematic because, under \u00a7 1913(b), a parent can withdraw consent to a voluntary foster care placement at any time and regain custody of the child. The Court of Appeals\u2019 construction relies on the plain language of \u00a7 1913(a), which details the requirements for a valid parental consent in situations where \u201cany parent or Indian custodian voluntarily consents to a foster care placement or to termi-. nation of parental rights.\u201d We decline to adopt the Court of Appeals\u2019 construction.\n{22} By enacting \u00a7 1913, entitled \u201cParental rights; voluntary termination,\u201d we believe that Congress intended to establish a separate set of requirements for cases where a parent or Indian custodian voluntarily initiates a proceeding in order to relinquish parental or custodial rights to a child. Section 1913 does not contain the same procedural due process protections found in \u00a7 1912, such as notice to the parents and tribe, expert testimony, the appointment of counsel, and proof by clear and convincing evidence. Instead, \u00a7 1913 details the requirements for a valid consent to voluntary foster care placement or termination of parental rights, in Subsection (a), and provides mechanisms allowing a parent to have the child returned, even in some instances after a final decree of termination or adoption has been entered, in Subsections (b) through (d).\n{23} Our conclusion that \u00a7 1913 applies only to voluntary proceedings initiated by the parent harmonizes two otherwise contradictory provisions within ICWA that define the term \u201cfoster care placement.\u201d Section 1903(l)(i) defines a foster care placement as \u201cany action removing an Indian child from its parent or Indian custodian for temporary placement ... where the parent ... cannot have the child returned upon demand.\u201d Section 1913(b) provides that a parent \u201cmay withdraw consent to a foster care placement under State law at any time and, upon such withdrawal, the child shall be returned to the parent.\u201d We conclude that a foster care placement made in a voluntary proceeding is governed by \u00a7 1913 and is unaffected by \u00a7 1903(l)(i)\u2019s definition, which applies only to involuntary proceedings. See \u00a7 1903 (providing that the definitions apply \u201cexcept as may be specifically provided otherwise\u201d).\n{24} Additional authority supports our conclusion that \u00a7 1913 applies only to voluntary proceedings. The ICWA Guidelines clearly distinguish \u00a7 1913, discussed under the heading \u201cVoluntary Proceedings,\u201d from \u00a7 1912, discussed under \u201cInvoluntary Placements, Adoptions, or Terminations ... of Parental Rights.\u201d See ICWA Guidelines, 44 Fed.Reg. at 67, 592 to -93. Other jurisdictions have treated involuntary placements differently than voluntary placements and have held that \u00a7 1913 applies only to voluntary proceedings initiated by the parent. See, e.g., Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1063 (9th Cir.2005) (noting that \u201c \u00a7 1913 establishes parental rights in voluntary child custody proceedings involving Indian children\u201d); In re J.M., 353 Mont. 64, 218 P.3d 1213, 1217 (2009) (holding that \u00a7 1913(a) \u201chas no application to the involuntary termination proceedings initiated by the [state]\u201d); In re Adoption of K.L.R.F., 356 Pa.Super. 555, 515 A.2d 33, 37 (1986) (\u2018We construe \u00a7 1913(b) as applying to situations ... wherein a consensual foster care placement was made in the first place and there is no inherent bar to a withdrawal of the consent.\u201d); In re Welfare of MG, 148 Wash.App. 781, 201 P.3d 354, 357 (2009) (\u201cDifferent requirements apply for the voluntary placement as opposed to involuntary removal of an Indian child____ [I]n a voluntary proceeding, if an Indian parent desires to withdraw his/her consent to placement, the child must be returned to his/her care.\u201d). Because \u00a7 1913 does not apply to involuntary proceedings like the one before us, we must look elsewhere for guidance.\nD. In a Contested Adjudication of Abuse or Neglect of an Indian Child, the Court Always Must Make the Factual Findings Required by \u00a7 1912(d) and (e) of ICWA at the Adjudicatory Hearing.\n1. Overview of New Mexico Abuse and Neglect Proceedings\n{25} The primary issue before this Court is when, within the procedural framework established by New Mexico\u2019s Abuse and Neglect Act, the district court should address \u00a7 1912(d)\u2019s \u201cactive efforts ... to prevent the breakup of the Indian family\u201d requirement and \u00a7 1912(e)\u2019s \u201clikely to result in serious ... damage\u201d requirement. To provide context for our discussion, we begin our analysis with a brief overview of the relevant stages of an abuse and neglect proceeding, including the ex parte custody stage, custody hearing, adjudicatory hearing, and dispositional hearing.\n{26} CYFD initiates a proceeding by filing a petition alleging abuse or neglect with the district court. See \u00a7 32A-4-15; Rule 10-312 NMRA. To obtain immediate custody of the child, CYFD must also file a motion for an ex parte custody order, including an affidavit showing probable cause that custody is necessary and that the child has been abused or neglected. See \u00a7 32A-4-16(A)-(B); Rule 10-311(A) NMRA. If the district court finds probable cause, it may issue an order giving CYFD interim legal custody of the child until an initial custody hearing is held. See \u00a7\u00a7 32A-4-16(A), -18(A). The rules of evidence do not apply to the issuance of an ex parte custody order. Section 32A-4-16(C); Rule 11-1101(D)(2) NMRA. At the inception of the abuse and neglect proceedings, the district court must appoint counsel for the parent and a guardian ad litem for the child. Section 32A-4-10(B)-(C).-\n{27} The district court must hold a custody hearing within ten days of the date the petition is filed \u201cto determine if the child should remain in or be placed in [CYFDJ\u2019s custody pending adjudication.\u201d Section 32A-4-18(A)\u201e CYFD must give the parent \u201creasonable notice of the time and place of the custody hearing.\u201d Section 32A-^-18(B). The parent must be informed of the allegations in the petition, potential consequences if those allegations are found true, and the rights to counsel and an adjudicatory hearing. Section 32A-4-10(G); Rule 10-314 NMRA. The rules of evidence do not apply at the custody hearing. Section 32A-4-18(H); Rule 11-1101(D)(2). If the court finds that there is probable cause to believe there has been abuse or neglect, the court determines custody of the child pending the adjudicatory hearing on the merits of the petition. See \u00a7 32A-4-18(A), (D).\n{28} At the adjudicatory hearing the court determines whether the allegations in the petition are true. The adjudicatory hearing is an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the abuse or neglect case, complete with due process protections.\n[A]t a minimum, due process in neglect and abuse proceedings requires timely notice reasonably calculated to inform the person concerning the subject and issues involved in the proceeding; a reasonable opportunity to refute or defend against a charge or accusation; a reasonable opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses and present evidence on the charge or accusation; representation by counsel, when such representation is required by constitution or statute; and a hearing before an impartial decisionmaker.\nState ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep\u2019t v. Kathleen D.C. (In re Damion M.C.), 2007-NMSC-018, \u00b6 12, 141 N.M. 535, 157 P.3d 714 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The adjudicatory hearing must be \u201ccommenced within sixty days after the date of service\u201d of the petition upon the respondent. Section 32A-4-19(A); see also Rule 10-343 NMRA (detailing triggering events for the sixty-day time limit). If the respondent denies the allegations in the petition, the court must hear evidence on the petition and make findings on whether the child is abused, neglected, or both. Section 32A-4-20(G). Unlike the ex parte and custody hearing stages, the rules of evidence apply at the adjudicatory hearing. Rule 10-141 NMRA; see also Rule 11-1101(A), (D). The court must determine, in the absence of a valid admission, whether the child is abused or neglected \u201con the basis of clear and convincing evidence, competent, material and relevant in nature.\u201d Section 32A-4-20(H).\n{29} If the court concludes on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that the child is abused or neglected, the next stage is the dispositional hearing, which can either be included within the adjudicatory hearing or conducted separately within thirty days after the adjudication of abuse or neglect. Sections 32A-^4-20(H), -22(A). At disposition the court makes factual findings relevant to a custody determination, determines custody of the child, and establishes a treatment plan. Section 32A-4-22. The court must make multiple findings regarding the interests of the child, the wishes of the child and parent, and the ability of the potential custodians. Section 32A-4-22(A). The rules of evidence do not apply at disposition; the court is instead allowed to consider \u201call relevant and material evidence helpful in determining the questions presented, including oral and written reports, ... even though not competent had it been offered during the part of the hearings on adjudicatory issues.\u201d Section 32A-4-20(I); Rule 11-1101(D)(2).\n2. The \u00a7 1912(d) and (e) Findings in the Context of New Mexico\u2019s Procedural Framework\n{30} With New Mexico\u2019s procedural framework in mind, we consider which procedural stage is best suited for addressing the requirements of \u00a7 1912(d) and (e) of ICWA. See R.A.C.P. v. State (In re Interest of D.S.P.), 166 Wis.2d 464, 480 N.W.2d 234, 238 (1992) (noting that state statutes should be read to harmonize with ICWA); San Diego Cnty. Health & Human Servs. Agency v. Francisco Z. (In re Matthew Z.), 80 Cal. App.4th 545, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 343, 349 (2000) (explaining that the state proceeding best suited for addressing ICWA is the proceeding that requires findings that parallel the ICWA findings). CYPD\u2019s regular practice has been to address the findings required by \u00a7 1912(d) and (e) at the earliest possible procedural stage. Accordingly, CYFD asserts in this case that the district court, by issuing the ex parte custody order, made the \u201cactive efforts\u201d finding required by \u00a7 1912(d) and that Mother\u2019s stipulation at the temporary custody hearing satisfied \u00a7 1912(e)\u2019s \u201cserious ... damage\u201d requirement. CYFD argues in the alternative that the dispositional hearing is the appropriate procedural stage for addressing the requirements of ICWA. Mother argues that the factual findings required by \u00a7 1912(d) and (e) must always be made at the adjudicatory hearing. We agree with Mother that \u00a7 1912(d) and (e) findings must be made at the adjudicatory hearing because the adjudicatory hearing is the procedural phase that affords the Indian parent and tribe the most procedural due process protection and best accommodates the requirements of \u00a7 1912.\n{31} To construe ICWA within the procedural framework of New Mexico\u2019s Abuse and Neglect Act, we begin with a textual analysis to determine whether the plain meaning of the relevant ICWA provisions addresses the question at hand. The plain language of \u00a7 1912(d) and (e) specifies what is required to be shown: (1) that \u201cactive efforts have been made\u201d and (2) that \u201cthe continued custody of the child ... is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage.\u201d But the text gives only a vague indication of when the findings must be made: prior to a \u201cfoster care placement,\u201d which ICWA defines as \u201cany action removing an Indian child from its parent or Indian custodian for temporary placement in a foster home ... where the parent or Indian custodian cannot have the child returned upon demand, but where parental rights have not been terminated.\u201d \u00a7 1903(l)(i). This language does not unambiguously indicate which procedural phase within a foster care placement proceeding is the proper time for the \u00a7 1912(d) and (e) findings to be made. Accordingly, we resort to the policy and purpose of. ICWA and our tools of statutory construction as we attempt to effectuate Congress\u2019s intent.\n3. New Mexico\u2019s Ex Parte and Custody Heanng Stages Are Unsatisfactory Procedural Stages for Addressing the Requirements of \u00a7 1912(d) and (e) of ICWA.\n{32} New Mexico\u2019s ex parte and custody hearing stages are ill-suited for making the \u00a7 1912(d) and (e) findings because they are emergency proceedings that do not provide sufficient due process protections. New Mexico\u2019s ex parte and custody hearing stages are expedited emergency proceedings that enable the State to remove a child and take temporary custody in order to ensure the child\u2019s safety until a full hearing on the merits is held. See Yount v. Millington, 117 N.M. 95, 101, 869 P.2d 283, 289 (Ct.App.1993) (\u201c[W]hen a child\u2019s safety is threatened, that is a sufficient basis to justify postponing the parent\u2019s hearing until after the child has been taken into protective custody.\u201d). Congress has expressly recognized a state\u2019s power to implement emergency removal and placement actions for Indian children in \u00a7 1922 of ICWA which states, in pertinent part:\nNothing in this subchapter shall be construed to prevent the emergency removal of an Indian child who is a resident of or is domiciled on a reservation, but temporarily located off the reservation, from his parent or Indian custodian or the emergency placement of such child in a foster home or institution, under applicable State law, in order to prevent imminent physical damage or harm to the child.\n{33} Although \u00a7 1922 expressly refers only to Indian children who are residents of or domiciled on the reservation, we conclude that CYFD must necessarily have the power to take emergency custody of any Indian child who is physically located off the reservation. ICWA gives an Indian tribe exclusive jurisdiction \u201cover any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe.\u201d \u00a7 1911(a). But when an emergency arises with respect to a child who is physically located off a reservation, the time-sensitive nature of the emergency may require CYFD to take immediate action to remove the child from harm\u2019s way without first establishing whether the child is subject to exclusive tribal jurisdiction. See ICWA Guidelines, 44 Fed.Reg. at 67, 589 to -90. Once the child is safe, \u00a7 1922 requires CYFD to \u201cexpeditiously initiate a child custody proceeding subject to the provisions of this subchapter, transfer the child to the jurisdiction of the appropriate Indian tribe, or restore the child to the parent or Indian custodian, as may be appropriate.\u201d Section 1922 thus allows CYFD to secure the child first and ask questions about the child\u2019s residence and domicile later in order to ensure the child\u2019s safety.\n{34} The ICWA guidelines, the statute\u2019s legislative history, and the decisions of other jurisdictions support our conclusion. Other states have recognized their ability to perform an emergency removal of an Indian child without first adhering to the requirements of \u00a7 1912. See San Bernardino Cnty. Dep\u2019t of Children\u2019s Servs. v. Jeannie V. (In re S.B.), 130 Cal.App.4th 1148, 30 Cal. Rptr.3d 726, 735-36 (2005) (explaining that \u00a7 1922 should be read to apply to Indian children who are not residents of or domiciled on a reservation); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep\u2019t of Multnomah Cnty. v. Charles (In re Jade Charles), 70 Or.App. 10, 688 P.2d 1354, 1358 n. 2 (1984) (explaining that \u201cit is implicit that \u2018emergency removal\u2019 authority extends to non-reservation Indian children\u201d). ICWA\u2019s legislative history explains that \u00a7 1922 was intended to \u201cpermit, under applicable state law, the emergency removal of an Indian child from his parent or Indian custodian or emergency placement of such child in order to prevent imminent physical harm to the child notwithstanding the provisions of [ICWA].\u201d H.R.Rep. No. 95-1386, at 25 (1978), 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7548. The ICWA Guidelines confirm that although \u201cemergency action must be taken without the careful advance deliberation normally required,\u201d the \u201ccourt shall be required to comply with the requirements of [ICWA] and reach a decision within 90 days unless there are \u2018extraordinary circumstances\u2019 that make additional delay unavoidable.\u201d 44 Fed.Reg. at 67,590. We conclude that New Mexico\u2019s ex parte and custody hearings are emergency proceedings under \u00a7 1922 to which the requirements of \u00a7 1912 do not apply.\n{35} Additionally, the ex parte and custody hearing stages are unsatisfactory settings in which to make the \u00a7 1912(d) and (e) findings because the timing of those stages does not fit within the notice timeline provided by \u00a7 1912 and because they require a lesser standard of proof than that required by ICWA. Under ICWA, a \u201cfoster care placement or termination of parental rights proceeding\u201d cannot be held \u201cuntil at least ten days after receipt of notice by the parent or Indian custodian and the tribe,\u201d and the parent, Indian custodian, or tribe is entitled to \u201cup to twenty additional days to prepare for such proceeding.\u201d \u00a7 1912(a). In contrast, New Mexico\u2019s ex parte stage allows CYFD to obtain a court order for immediate removal of a child without any notice to the parent or tribe. See \u00a7 32A-4-16. CYFD must provide the parent with \u201creasonable notice\u201d of the custody hearing, but the hearing must be held within ten days of the date the petition is filed. Section 32A-4-18(A)-(B). Section 32A-4-18\u2019s ten-day time frame does not allow notice to reach the tribe and parent at least ten days and up to thirty days before the custody hearing as required by \u00a7 1912(a). The ten-day period does not allow the parent to consult fully with counsel and prepare a complete defense on the merits of serious legal and factual issues. And it does not allow CYFD to adequately prepare to present the expert witness testimony required by \u00a7 1912(e). At the ex parte and custody hearing stages, a denial of parental custody under New Mexico law requires only a showing of probable cause indicating abuse or neglect, see \u00a7\u00a7 32A-4-16(A), -18(C), while \u00a7 1912(e) of ICWA expressly requires clear and convincing evidence that \u201cserious emotional or physical damage to the child\u201d is likely. These divergent timelines and standards of proof distinguish the ex parte and custody hearing stages from the adjudication stage, which comports with the requirements of \u00a7 1912.\nA The Adjudicatory Hearing Is the Best Procedural Stage in Which to Make the \u00a7 1912(d) and (e) Findings.\n{36} New Mexico\u2019s adjudicatory hearing incorporates procedural due process protections and a stringent standard of proof that parallel those required by ICWA. The adjudicatory hearing must be held within sixty days after the date the petition is served on the parent. Section 32A-4-19(A). This time frame comports with ICWA\u2019s requirement that the parent and tribe receive notice at least ten days and up to thirty days before the commencement of a foster care placement proceeding. See \u00a7 1912(a). The timing of the adjudicatory hearing allows for the notice required by \u00a7 1912(a) while meeting the ICWA requirement that CYFD \u201cexpeditiously\u201d initiate a foster care placement proceeding following an emergency removal or placement proceeding. See \u00a7 1922. If a parent denies allegations of abuse or neglect at the adjudicatory hearing, the court must hear all evidence bearing on the issue. Section 32A-4-20(G). Because the adjudicatory hearing is an evidentiary hearing, it is a practical time to satisfy the ICWA requirement that CYFD present the \u201ctestimony of qualified expert witnesses.\u201d See \u00a7 1912(e). At a contested adjudication, the State is required to prove abuse or neglect by \u201cclear and convincing evidence, competent, material and relevant in nature.\u201d Section 32A-4-20(H). Consistently, \u00a7 1912(e) of ICWA requires a showing by \u201cclear and convincing evidence ... that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.\u201d The similarities between New Mexico\u2019s requirements for an adjudicatory hearing and the ICWA requirements for the involuntary placement of an Indian child in foster care make the adjudicatory hearing the best procedural phase for the court to make the findings required by \u00a7 1912(d) and (e).\n{37} More importantly, requiring courts to make the factual findings prescribed by \u00a7 1912(d) and (e) at the adjudicatory hearing furthers the purposes and policies behind ICWA because both the parent and the tribe are able to participate meaningfully in the process. Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of their children; due process of law is required before parents can be deprived of that right. See Kathleen D.C., 2007-NMSC-018, \u00b6 12, 141 N.M. 535, 157 P.3d 714. ICWA also protects the interests of both the Indian child and the tribe by preventing the unwarranted removal of Indian children from their unique culture and heritage. See \u00a7 1901(3)-(5). Because we must construe ICWA by resolving all ambiguities liberally in favor of the Indian parent and tribe, we conclude that the findings required by \u00a7 1912(d) and (e) always must be made at the adjudicatory hearing, which incorporates due process protections.\n5. New Mexico\u2019s Dispositional Hearing Does Not Comport with ICWA\u2019s \u00a7 1912(d) and (e) Requirements.\n{38} Compared with the adjudicatory hearing, the dispositional hearing stage is less compatible with the requirements of \u00a7 1912(d) and (e). The dispositional stage occurs later in the process, after the court has already ruled on the allegations of abuse and neglect. Sections 32A-4-20(H), -22(A). CYFD asserts that the \u00a7 1912 findings do not factor into whether a child is abused or neglected but are instead \u201cmore a dispositional type of issue.\u201d We disagree. The \u00a7 1912(e) finding is closely analogous to a finding of abuse under New Mexico law. Compare \u00a7 1912(e) (requiring \u201ca determination ... that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child\u201d), with \u00a7 32A-4-2(B)(1) (defining an abused child as any child \u201cwho has suffered or who is at risk of suffering serious harm because of the action or inaction of the child\u2019s parent, guardian or custodian\u201d). It makes little sense for the court to address the merits of an abuse allegation at the adjudicatory hearing and then later make the similar \u00a7 1912(e) finding at disposition.\n{39} The parties before us agree that the dispositional stage does not provide the parent with due process protections afforded the parent at adjudication. The rules of evidence do not apply at disposition; in fact, the court can receive and rely upon information that would not have been considered competent evidence had it been offered at the adjudicatory hearing. See \u00a7 32A-4-20(I); Rule 11-1101(D)(2). The Abuse and Neglect Act does not specify the standard of proof that applies at disposition. These non-evidentiary procedures are inconsistent with ICWA\u2019s requirements of \u201cclear and convincing evidence\u201d and \u201ctestimony of qualified expert witnesses.\u201d \u00a7 1912(e). They are likewise inconsistent with a parent\u2019s right to contest that \u201cactive efforts have been made ... to prevent the breakup of the Indian family.\u201d See \u00a7 1912(d). We conclude that the dispositional hearing is an unsatisfactory stage at which to address the requirements of \u00a7 1912(d) and (e) of ICWA.\n6. A Parent Can Admit to the Factual Findings Required by \u00a7 1912(d) and (e) Only If the Court Adheres to Procedural Safeguards Protecting the Rights and Interests of the Parent, Child, and Tribe.\n{40} Parental stipulations to temporary CYFD custody pending adjudication are not unusual in abuse and neglect proceedings. Our holding does not preclude stipulations to temporary custody pending adjudication, so long as the court ensures that the parent knowingly enters into the stipulation. Although we differ from the view expressed in the Court of Appeals opinion that \u00a7 1913(a) controls voluntary stipulations made in involuntary proceedings, we agree that \u00a7 1913(a) provides helpful guidance on what should be required for a valid parental stipulation in involuntary proceedings. See Marlene C., 2009-NMCA-058, \u00b6 15, 146 N.M. 588, 212 P.3d 1142. Under \u00a7 1913(a), a parent\u2019s consent is valid only if the court ensures \u201cthat the terms and consequences of the consent were fully explained in detail and were fully understood by the parent or Indian custodian.\u201d It is reasonable that the same underlying principle should govern valid parental consent to temporary custody pending adjudication: A parent must understand what the consent really means.\n{41} At the custody hearing in this case, Mother\u2019s newly appointed counsel explained to her that Child was temporarily going to be in State custody, and the judge explained that there would be a later hearing called an adjudication to determine whether Child would remain with the State for a longer period of time. Mother does not contest that she intended to stipulate to temporary custody pending adjudication. But nothing in the record indicates that Mother understood her stipulation to temporary custody to amount to a permanent waiver of the substantive rights afforded by \u00a7 1912(d) and (e). The stipulation order entered at the custody hearing did not purport to waive any of Mother\u2019s statutory rights under ICWA.\n{42} Admission to the factual findings required by \u00a7 1912 invokes more stringent procedural safeguards than a parental stipulation to temporary custody. Unlike the custody hearing, which is a preliminary emergency proceeding, the adjudicatory hearing addresses the ultimate merits of the case, and a parent\u2019s admission to allegations of either abuse or neglect or to the factual findings required by \u00a7 1912(d) and (e) has much more serious consequences than a stipulation to temporary custody. The result of a stipulation to abuse or neglect may well be a permanent severance of the relationship between the parent and child. Accordingly, the court must adhere to stricter procedural safeguards at adjudication to ensure that parents do not casually surrender either their fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of their children or the substantive rights protected by ICWA. See Kathleen D.C., 2007-NMSC-018, \u00b6 12, 141 N.M. 535, 157 P.3d 714 (providing that the \u201cinterest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children is a fundamental liberty interest\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989) (discussing the \u201cimportant substantive requirement[s]\u201d that ICWA imposes on state courts).\n{43} Congress enacted ICWA to protect the rights and interests of the parent, the tribe, and the child. See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 490 U.S. at 32, 34, 52-53, 109 S.Ct. 1597 (holding that a parent cannot defeat ICWA\u2019s provision of exclusive tribal jurisdiction over an Indian child domiciled on the reservation by simply giving birth off the reservation and placing the child for adoption). Congress intended ICWA to \u201cprotect the rights of the Indian child as an Indian and the rights of the Indian community and tribe in retaining its children in its society.\u201d Id. at 37, 109 S.Ct. 1597 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When enacting ICWA, Congress knew that removing Indian children from their family and tribe could negatively impact the tribe\u2019s \u201clong-term ... survival and [have] damaging social and psychological impact[s] on many individual Indian children.\u201d Id. at 50,109 S.Ct. 1597 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). ICWA therefore protects a child\u2019s interest in retaining \u201chis or her tribal and cultural heritage.\u201d Id. at 50 n. 24, 109 S.Ct. 1597 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And ICWA furthers tribal sovereignty by ensuring that tribes are able to raise their children with their own cultural and societal values. Id. at 34, 109 S.Ct. 1597.\n{44} The tribe\u2019s interest in its children is one more reason that the requirements of \u00a7 1912 cannot be taken lightly or addressed in a cursory manner. ICWA is replete with provisions designed to protect the tribe\u2019s interest in child custody proceedings affecting the tribe\u2019s children, including \u00a7 1911(a) (providing exclusive tribal jurisdiction over reservation domiciliaries), \u00a7 1911(b) (providing presumptive tribal jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries), \u00a7 1911(c) (giving tribes the right to intervene in state court proceedings), \u00a7 1912(a) (providing for the tribe\u2019s right to notice of involuntary state court proceedings), \u00a7 1914 (providing for the tribe\u2019s right to petition for invalidation of state court actions), \u00a7 1915(c) (allowing tribes to reorder the placement priorities applicable to state court actions), \u00a7 1915(e) (giving the tribe the right to obtain placement records), and \u00a7 1919 (giving tribes the authority to enter agreements with states). ICWA protects the tribe\u2019s interest primarily through its jurisdictional provisions and child placement preferences. See \u00a7\u00a7 1911 (establishing ICWA\u2019s jurisdictional scheme), 1915 (establishing placement preferences for Indian children); see also Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 490 U.S. at 36, 109 S.Ct. 1597 (explaining that ICWA\u2019s jurisdictional provisions are \u201cthe heart\u201d of ICWA and that \u00a7 1915, establishing placement preferences for Indian children, is the most important substantive requirement that ICWA imposes on state courts).\n{45} While an abuse and neglect proceeding is designed to protect the best interests of the child and the rights of the parents, ICWA goes further by protecting the unique relationship between a tribe and its children. That relationship is not to be severed casually or without good cause. If a parent wishes to admit to the factual findings required by ICWA without a full adjudicatory hearing, we must require procedural safeguards that meet the standards New Mexico law requires for admissions in ordinary abuse and neglect proceedings. The New Mexico Children\u2019s Court Rules provide that a parent can admit to abuse or neglect, by \u201cadmitting sufficient facts to permit a finding that the allegations of the petition are true,\u201d Rule 10-342(A) NMRA, and give details of the procedural safeguards required for an admission to be valid, Rule 10-342(C)-(D). We hold that similar procedural requirements apply when a parent admits to the factual findings prescribed under \u00a7 1912(d) and (e). Before the court accepts a parent\u2019s admission to the \u00a7 1912(d) and (e) findings, the court must make \u201csuch inquiry as shall satisfy the court that there is a factual basis for the admission.\u201d Rule 10-342(D). CYFD must be prepared to offer evidence to satisfy the court that such a basis exists. Cf. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep\u2019t v. Stella P., 1999-NMCA-100, \u00b6 35, 127 N.M. 699, 986 P.2d 495 (explaining that to meet CYFD\u2019s burden of proof in a termination of parental rights proceeding, CYFD must present \u201csufficient testimony to allow the court to make the required statutory findings\u201d).\n{46} Additionally, before accepting an admission, the court must ensure that the admission is voluntary and that the parent understands (1) the allegations of the petition, (2) the possible dispositions should the allegations of the petition be found true, (3) the right to deny the allegations and have a full adjudicatory hearing, and (4) that the admission waives the parent\u2019s right to contest the \u00a7 1912(d) and (e) findings in a full adjudicatory hearing. See Rule 10-342(C). In this case, Mother\u2019s stipulation to temporary custody pending adjudication did not meet the requirements for a valid evidentiary admission to the factual findings required by \u00a7 1912(d) and (e).\nE. The Proper Remedy in This Case is Reversal of the Adjudication of Neglect and Remand for Further Proceedings.\n{47} CYFD asks this Court to reverse the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision and, if ICWA requirements were not satisfied in this case, to remand this case to the district court to hold an additional hearing regarding the ICWA requirements. Mother argues that the adjudication of neglect must be reversed based on insufficiency of the evidence. While we agree with Mother that the adjudication of neglect must be reversed because the findings required by \u00a7 1912(d) and (e) of ICWA were not made at the adjudicatory hearing on abuse and neglect, we conclude that remanding to the district court for further proceedings is appropriate in this case.\n{48} Ordinarily, appellate reversal on substantive grounds of an adjudication of abuse or neglect results in the dismissal of the petition and a remand to the district court, which \u201cretains jurisdiction to determine whether the parent prevailing on appeal should regain custody of the child.\u201d Benjamin O., 2007-NMCA-070, \u00b6 35, 141 N.M. 692, 160 P.3d 601. If CYFD does not believe that reunification is in the best interests of the child, \u201cit can bring new or current allegations of abuse, neglect, or abandonment to the district court\u2019s attention,\u201d id. \u00b6 39, and argue that such \u201callegations of abuse or neglect are sufficient to establish abuse or neglect by clear and convincing evidence,\u201d id. \u00b6 40.\n{49} In this ease, we are deciding issues of first impression regarding proper implementation of the ICWA requirements in New Mexico courts. CYFD asserts that it has made a good faith effort to comply with the letter and spirit of ICWA by addressing \u00a7 1912(d) and (e) at the earliest possible procedural stage. We recognize that if we were to order dismissal of the abuse and neglect petition for lack of proof on the ICWA requirements, CYFD would be precluded from bringing the same potentially meritorious allegations in a new petition but instead would have to decide whether it had grounds to supplement the original petition or file a new petition with different allegations of abuse or neglect. We conclude that requiring CYFD to begin the process anew in this case by bringing new allegations of abuse or neglect neither promotes judicial economy nor protects Child\u2019s best interests. Accordingly, we remand this case to the district court for a new adjudicatory hearing so that CYFD can present any evidence, including qualified expert testimony, that bears on the findings required by \u00a7 1912(d) and (e).\nIII. CONCLUSION\n{50} In child abuse and neglect proceedings to which ICWA applies, the findings required by \u00a7 1912(d) and (e) always must be addressed at the adjudicatory hearing. They were not in this case. Accordingly, we reverse the adjudication of neglect and remand this case to the district court for a new adjudicatory hearing that satisfies the requirements of \u00a7 1912(d) and (e) of ICWA.\n{51} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: PATRICIO M. SERNA, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, RICHARD C. BOSSON and EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justices.\n. Pursuant to Rule 10-342(A) NMRA, \"The respondent may make an admission by: (1) admitting sufficient facts to permit a finding that the allegations of the petition are true; or (2) declaring the respondent\u2019s intention not to contest the allegations in the petition.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "DANIELS, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "New Mexico Children, Youth & Families Department, Rebecca J. Liggett, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner and Cross-Respondent.", "Law Offices of Jane B. Yohalem, Jane B. Yohalem, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent and Cross-Petitioner." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2011-NMSC-005\n248 P.3d 863\nIn the Matter of Esther V., a child. STATE of New Mexico, ex rel. CHILDREN, YOUTH and FAMILIES DEPARTMENT, Petitioner-Petitioner and Cross-Respondent, v. MARLENE C., Respondent-Respondent and Cross-Petitioner.\nNo. 31,738.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nJan. 21, 2011.\nNew Mexico Children, Youth & Families Department, Rebecca J. Liggett, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner and Cross-Respondent.\nLaw Offices of Jane B. Yohalem, Jane B. Yohalem, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent and Cross-Petitioner." }, "file_name": "0315-01", "first_page_order": 341, "last_page_order": 355 }