{ "id": 4248734, "name": "Tyler GLYNN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of New Mexico, TAXATION AND REVENUE DEPARTMENT, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, Respondent-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Glynn v. State", "decision_date": "2011-01-20", "docket_number": "No. 29,453", "first_page": "518", "last_page": "526", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "149 N.M. 518" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "252 P.3d 742" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2011-NMCA-031" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "87 N.M, 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2831423 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440", "parenthetical": "stating that \"a lawful arrest [is] the essential introductory step to implied consent provisions\"" }, { "page": "647", "parenthetical": "stating that \"a lawful arrest [is] the essential introductory step to implied consent provisions\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/87/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 N.M. 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1558934 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413", "parenthetical": "holding that exclusionary rule applies in forfeiture proceedings" }, { "page": "568", "parenthetical": "holding that exclusionary rule applies in forfeiture proceedings" }, { "page": "412-13" }, { "page": "567-68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/120/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 Ariz. 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz.", "case_ids": [ 550542 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 25-26" }, { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/203/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "614 A.2d 1303", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 7935053 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1306-07" }, { "page": "1307" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/614/1303-01" ] }, { "cite": "743 A.2d 1110", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1119", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "252 Conn. 38", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Conn.", "case_ids": [ 546873 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/conn/252/0038-01" ] }, { "cite": "761 A.2d 448", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 N.H. 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.H.", "case_ids": [ 200937 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nh/145/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 Kan. 625", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Kan.", "case_ids": [ 3669290 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply in administrative proceeding to revoke a driver's license under a statutory scheme substantially similar to New Mexico's Implied Consent Act" }, { "page": "953", "parenthetical": "holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply in administrative proceeding to revoke a driver's license under a statutory scheme substantially similar to New Mexico's Implied Consent Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/kan/285/0625-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMCA-025", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4243080 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/145/0636-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 N.M. 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2715689 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46", "parenthetical": "holding that a driver's license is a privilege" }, { "page": "452", "parenthetical": "holding that a driver's license is a privilege" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/67/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 N.M. 619", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1559011 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632" }, { "page": "1057" }, { "page": "631" }, { "page": "1056", "parenthetical": "explaining that driving is an activity regulated by the government and that \"administrative revocation of the person's license is not considered punishment for a crime\"" }, { "page": "1060" }, { "page": "626" }, { "page": "1051", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/120/0619-01" ] }, { "cite": "2000-NMCA-103", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1217173 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/129/0800-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMCA-099", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 18439 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 7" }, { "page": "\u00b6 7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/124/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008-NMCA-049", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3784375 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/143/0792-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMCA-163", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3783824 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" }, { "page": "\u00b6 14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/143/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMCA-150", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3784447 ], "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" }, { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/143/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "2010-NMSC-016", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4246356 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/148/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "2010-NMSC-027", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4247077 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/148/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 N.M. 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1597076 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538" }, { "page": "1304" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/107/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "2000-NMCA-074", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1217170 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/129/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMCA-025", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1427972 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/135/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMCA-044", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1428008 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" }, { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/135/0431-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1101, "char_count": 31860, "ocr_confidence": 0.686, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.42067552684361e-08, "percentile": 0.5164540480931514 }, "sha256": "3b2a4102aac44a992976901733ce15a1286fed62eb5c5a5296f572e80a03f6de", "simhash": "1:3b897633fdcb2783", "word_count": 5109 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:48:34.747020+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: JAMES J. WECHSLER and ROBERT E. ROBLES, Judges." ], "parties": [ "Tyler GLYNN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of New Mexico, TAXATION AND REVENUE DEPARTMENT, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, Respondent-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nFRY, Judge.\n{1} Petitioner Tyler Glynn (Driver) appeals the district court\u2019s ruling affirming the Motor Vehicle Division\u2019s (MVD) revocation of his driver\u2019s license. Driver contends that the district court and the MVD erred in concluding that at the license revocation hearing the MVD could consider the constitutionality of the traffic stop that resulted in his arrest for driving while intoxicated (DWI). Driver also contends that the MVD and the district court were collaterally estopped from considering the constitutionality of the stop by a prior municipal court ruling that there was no probable cause to stop Driver. For the following reasons, we affirm and conclude that the validity of the traffic stop is irrelevant to the issues to be decided by the MVD in a license revocation proceeding and, further, that the exclusionary rule does not apply in such a proceeding. Because of our disposition, we need not consider Driver\u2019s collateral estoppel argument.\nBACKGROUND\n{2} Driver was arrested in March 2008 for DWI. A Farmington police officer observed Driver\u2019s vehicle strike a curb and fail to maintain its lane. After making contact with Driver, the officer observed that Driver had an odor of alcohol, and Driver admitted to drinking alcohol. Driver failed field sobriety tests, and his breath alcohol test resulted in readings of .09 and .08. Driver was then served with a notice of license revocation pursuant to the Implied Consent Act (the Act), NMSA 1978, Sections 66-8-105 to -112 (1978, as amended through 2010). Following his arrest, a criminal charge of DWI was filed in the Farmington, New Mexico, municipal court. Driver filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop, which the municipal court granted, finding that there was \u201cinsufficient probable cause for [the] stop.\u201d As a result of the suppression, the charge against Driver in municipal court was dismissed with prejudice.\n{3} Meanwhile, Driver had requested a license revocation hearing before the MVD pursuant to Section 66-8-112. After the municipal court dismissed the DWI charge against him, Driver filed a motion with the MVD to dismiss the revocation proceedings, arguing that the MVD was now collaterally estopped from reconsidering whether there was reasonable suspicion to justify his stop because the issue had already been decided by the municipal court. Driver also filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained after his stop, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Driver\u2019s vehicle.\n{4} At the revocation hearing, the MVD hearing officer concluded that collateral estoppel was inapplicable because the municipal court had employed the wrong standard in analyzing the legality of the traffic stop; the municipal court had decided that there was no probable cause to stop Driver and not that there was no reasonable suspicion. In addition, the hearing officer concluded that even if the elements of collateral estoppel had been met, it was inapplicable because MVD, as an administrative agency, was unable to grant equitable remedies such as collateral estoppel. The hearing officer then determined that the police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Driver and that all of the evidence obtained after the stop was admissible. After finding that all elements necessary for revocation had been established, the hearing officer revoked Driver\u2019s license for six months.\n{5} Following the hearing, Driver appealed the MVD\u2019s revocation of his license to the district court. On appeal, Driver argued that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him, that collateral estoppel applied, and that the breath alcohol tests were invalid. In addition to requesting that the district court exercise its appellate jurisdiction to review the MVD\u2019s decision, Driver asked the district court to invoke its original jurisdiction to decide the constitutional question of whether there was reasonable suspicion for the stop. Driver contended that the MVD was not permitted to decide constitutional questions and that the issue of reasonable suspicion could only be considered in the district court. The district court affirmed the revocation of Driver\u2019s license, concluding that the MVD\u2019s decision was supported by substantial evidence, that there was sufficient evidence of reasonable suspicion, that collateral estoppel did not apply, and that the results of the breath alcohol tests were admissible. However, the district court did not make any ruling on whether the MVD had the authority to decide the constitutional question raised by Driver.\n{6} Driver appeals the judgment of the district court, arguing that the MVD does not have the statutory authority to consider whether a stop is supported by reasonable suspicion and that only the district court has jurisdiction to consider the issue. In addition, Driver maintains that collateral estoppel barred the district court from reconsidering whether the stop was lawful. For the following reasons, we affirm the revocation of Driver\u2019s license.\nDISCUSSION\nDriver\u2019s Appeal Was Timely Filed\n{7} As an initial matter, the MVD argues that Driver\u2019s appeal was untimely because he filed a notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 12-201 NMRA, not a petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 12-505 NMRA (2006). The district court entered an order affirming the judgment of the MVD on March 18, 2009. Driver filed a notice of appeal on March 30, 2009, twelve days after the entry of the district court\u2019s order. On April 21, 2009, thirty-four days after the entry of the district court\u2019s order, Driver filed a docketing statement. Driver\u2019s docketing statement requested, for the first time, a writ of certiorari to review the district court\u2019s decision. The MVD contends that because the district court exercised only its appellate jurisdiction, Driver was required to file a petition for a writ of certiorari within twenty days of the district court\u2019s decision and that Driver\u2019s notice of appeal was insufficient to meet this requirement.\n{8} When a party appeals from a judgment reflecting the district court\u2019s exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, Rule 12-505 requires the party to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Court of Appeals. At the time Driver filed his notice of appeal, Rule 12 \u2014 505(C) provided that a \u201cpetition for writ of certiorari shall be filed with the clerk of the Court of Appeals within twenty (20) days after entry of the final action by the district court.\u201d However, when a party appeals the district court\u2019s exercise of its original jurisdiction, the party must file a notice of appeal within thirty days of the district court\u2019s final order. Rule 12-201(A)(2).\n{9} The MVD argues that because the district court exercised only its appellate jurisdiction, Driver was required to file a petition for certiorari within twenty days of the district court\u2019s final order. Because Driver filed a notice of appeal within twenty days, but not a petition for a writ of certiorari, the MVD contends that Driver\u2019s appeal was untimely. In response, Driver argues that the district court declined to exercise its original jurisdiction, despite Driver\u2019s request that it do so in order to determine whether the traffic stop was constitutionally sound. Consequently, Driver maintains the proper procedure for appealing from the district court\u2019s refusal to exercise its original jurisdiction is a direct appeal, not a petition for writ of certiorari. Driver further contends that it is unclear what mechanism should be used by a party seeking review if the district court concurrently exercises both its appellate and original jurisdiction.\n{10} We first observe that the district court\u2019s order does not unambiguously state that the court declined to exercise its original jurisdiction. Rather, the order is conflicting regarding what type of jurisdiction the court exercised. On the one hand, the order states the findings necessary to uphold the MVD\u2019s statutory determinations \u201c[i]n accordance with [Section] 66-8-12, and Rule 1-074 NMRA,\u201d which suggests that the district court was acting in its appellate capacity. However, the order also goes on to state that \u201cthere was sufficient evidence of reasonable suspicion to stop [Driver\u2019s] vehicle.\u201d This conclusion suggests that the district court was acting in accordance with its original jurisdiction.\n{11} We have previously noted that \u201cthis Court may, at its discretion, elect to treat a notice of appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari if the notice of appeal was filed within twenty days after the district court\u2019s final action.\u201d Dixon v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep\u2019t, 2004-NMCA-044, \u00b6 10, 135 N.M. 431, 89 P.3d 680. Because of the uncertainty regarding the district court\u2019s order and the uncertainty regarding the correct procedure for appealing a district court\u2019s decision involving both its appellate and original jurisdiction, we elect to treat Driver\u2019s notice of appeal as a timely petition for writ of certiorari since it was filed within twenty days of the district court\u2019s order. See Maso v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep\u2019t, 2004-NMCA-025, \u00b6 17 n. 1, 135 N.M. 152, 85 P.3d 276 (declining to decide whether an appeal from a decision in which the district court exercises both appellate and original jurisdiction would be made by filing a notice of appeal, a petition for certiorari, or both). We therefore address the merits of Driver\u2019s appeal.\nThe Legality of the Traffic Stop Is Not an Issue to Be Decided by the MVD\n{12} Driver argues that the MVD lacks subject matter jurisdiction in revocation proceedings to decide whether a stop is justified by reasonable suspicion. Driver relies on Maso, in which the driver untimely requested an MVD hearing on the revocation of his driver\u2019s license and argued that his request was late because he did not understand the English-language notice of revocation served on him. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 4-5. The driver argued that the MVD\u2019s denial of a hearing due to the late request constituted a denial of due process of law. Id. \u00b6 6. This Court held that \u201c[b]eeause Section 66-8-112(E) specifies the issues that MVD can consider in a revocation proceeding, MVD cannot adjudicate constitutional questions,\u201d such as the due process question asserted by the driver. Id. \u00b6 12.\n{13} Driver contends that because the determination of whether the stopping officer had reasonable suspicion is a constitutional question, Maso prohibits the MVD from considering the question. Driver argues that while the MVD is not permitted to consider whether a stop is justified by reasonable suspicion, the district court, exercising its original jurisdiction, can consider whether reasonable suspicion justified a stop. In response, the MVD argues that consideration of whether a stop is justified by reasonable suspicion is implicitly within the scope of MVD\u2019s statutory authority. The MVD maintains that the district court can only consider whether reasonable suspicion justified a stop when reviewing the MVD\u2019s decision while exercising its appellate jurisdiction.\n{14} Determining the MVD\u2019s authority in revocation hearings under the Act is a question of law that we review de novo. Cf. Martinez v. N.M. State Eng\u2019r Office, 2000-NMCA-074, \u00b6 20, 129 N.M. 413, 9 P.3d 657 (stating that determining what issues may be decided by the state personnel board under the applicable statutory scheme is a question of law). To the extent that Driver contends the MVD lacks the statutory authority to consider the validity of a traffic stop that results in license revocation, we agree. As we explain below, we conclude that a traffic stop that complies with Fourth Amendment requirements is not a necessary element of a license revocation under the Act.\n{15} The Act provides that \u201c[a]ny person who operates a motor vehicle within this state shall be deemed to have given consent ... to chemical tests of his breath or blood or both ... for the purpose of determining the drug or alcohol content of his blood if arrested\u201d for any driving-related offense allegedly committed while the person was under the influence. Section 66-8-107(A). When an officer arrests a driver for DWI, if the arrested driver refuses to submit to a chemical test or if the test of the driver\u2019s blood or breath reveals an alcohol concentration above specified statutory levels, the arresting officer serves the driver with written notice of revocation and of the driver\u2019s right to a hearing, takes the driver\u2019s license, and issues a temporary license to the driver. Section 66-8-111.1. Within ten days of receiving the notice of revocation, the driver may then request a hearing before the MVD. Section 66-8-112(B).\n{16} If the driver requests a hearing, the applicable statute limits the MVD hearing officer\u2019s authority as follows:\nF. The [MVD] shall enter an order sustaining the revocation or denial of the person\u2019s license or privilege to drive if the [MVD] finds that:\n(1) the law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to believe the driver was driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs;\n(2) the person was arrested;\n(3) this hearing is held no later than ninety days after notice of revocation; and\n(4) either:\n(a) the person refused to submit to the test upon request of the law enforcement officer after the law enforcement officer advised him that his failure to submit to the test could result in the revocation of his privilege to drive; or\n(b) that a chemical test was administered pursuant to the provisions of the Implied Consent Act and the test results indicated an alcohol concentration in the person\u2019s blood or breath of eight one hundredths or more if the person is twenty-one years of age or older, four one hundredths or more if the person is driving a commercial motor vehicle or two one hundredths or more if the person is less than twenty-one years of age.\nSection 66-8-112(F).\n{17} \u201cIn reviewing a statute, this Court\u2019s role is to effect the [Legislature's intent as evidenced by the statute\u2019s plain terms and to avoid strained or absurd construction. The first rule of statutory construction is that the plain language of a statute is the primary indicator of legislative intent.\u201d Dixon, 2004-NMCA-044, \u00b6 6, 135 N.M. 431, 89 P.3d 680 (internal citation omitted).\n{18} Notably, Section 66-8-112(F) does not indicate that the validity of the traffic stop that resulted in a DWI arrest is an issue. The only issues to be decided by the hearing officer are whether (1) the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the driver was driving while under the influence, (2) the person was arrested, (3) the hearing was held within ninety days after notice of revocation, and (4) the driver either refused chemical testing or his/her test resulted in specified blood alcohol concentrations. The plain language of the statute says nothing about the preliminary traffic stop. Thus, even assuming that an officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the driver\u2019s vehicle, the statute states that revocation of a driver\u2019s license will be upheld as long as the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the driver was DWI and the other three elements are satisfied.\n{19} The MVD maintains that the hearing officer\u2019s authority to determine the validity of the traffic stop is implicit. In support of its argument, the MVD relies on State ex rel. Taxation & Revenue Dep\u2019t v. Van Ruiten, 107 N.M. 536, 760 P.2d 1302 (Ct.App.1988). In that case, the driver appealing the revocation of his driver\u2019s license argued that the police officer did not have reasonable suspicion to instigate the traffic stop. Id. at 538, 760 P.2d at 1304. This Court stated, \u201cwe assume, as do the parties, that such is implicit in the issues to be decided at the administrative hearing.\u201d Id. Because this statement was an assumption rather than a determination of a contested issue, it constitutes dicta. See State v. Sims, 2010-NMSC-027, \u00b6 20, 148 N.M. 330, 236 P.3d 642 (explaining that dicta is language unnecessary to the decision of the issues before the court and is not binding as a rule of law\u201d (internal citation omitted)). We conclude that by its plain terms, the Act does not require the MVD hearing officer to consider the validity of the traffic stop underlying the license revocation at issue.\n{20} Driver does not disagree with our reading of the elements to be decided by the MVD hearing officer. Instead, Driver assumes that reasonable suspicion for the underlying traffic stop is constitutionally mandated and that only the district court has the authority to decide the issue. We agree that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Johnson, 2010-NMSC-016, \u00b6 13, 148 N.M. 50, 229 P.3d 523. However, the actual question we must consider is whether the exclusionary rule applies in administrative license revocation proceedings. If the exclusionary rule does not apply to the proceedings, then the authority of the MVD to consider the legality of a stop is irrelevant because the evidence would be admitted regardless of the legality of the stop. See Scanlon v. Las Cruces Pub. Schs., 2007-NMCA-150, \u00b6 9, 143 N.M. 48, 172 P.3d 185 (noting that a constitutional violation would only affect the outcome of an administrative proceeding \u201cif the evidence obtained during the search could not be considered as a basis for the hearing authority\u2019s disciplinary action\u201d). The question of whether the exclusionary rule applies to a license revocation proceeding is a constitutional question that we review de novo. See State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep\u2019t v. Michael T., 2007-NMCA-163, \u00b6 8, 143 N.M. 75, 172 P.3d 1287.\nThe Exclusionary Rule Does Not Apply in License Revocation Hearings\n{21} Both Driver and the MVD maintain that the exclusionary rule should apply in license revocation hearings. However, we are not bound by the MVD\u2019s apparent concession on this issue, and we conduct our own analysis as to whether the rule is applicable under these circumstances. Cf. State v. Caldwell, 2008-NMCA-049, \u00b6 8, 143 N.M. 792, 182 P.3d 775 (explaining that appellate courts are not bound by the state\u2019s concession that conduct was unitary for purposes of double jeopardy analysis and that this Court will conduct its own analysis).\n{22} This Court first considered whether the exclusionary rule applies in administrative proceedings in Scanlon, 2007-NMCA-150, \u00b6 11, 143 N.M. 48, 172 P.3d 185. In that case, we noted that under federal law, the exclusionary rule is not a constitutional right but a prudential rule designed to deter future unconstitutional government conduct. Federal law does not extend application of the exclusionary rule to civil proceedings. Id. We further noted that our Supreme Court has interpreted the New Mexico Constitution to implicitly provide a personal right to the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 11-12. The exclusionary rule \u201csafeguard[s] the right to be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures by putting the parties in the same position they would have been in had the constitutional violation not occurred.\u201d Id. \u00b6 12. However, the \u201ccore application\u201d of the right to exclude evidence \u201cis in the context of criminal prosecution brought to bear after violation of that right.\u201d Id. \u00b6 13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\n{23} Despite the fact that the right to exclude illegally obtained evidence is primarily reserved for criminal prosecutions, our Supreme Court has applied the exclusionary rule in at least one type of proceeding that is not a criminal trial- \u2014 probation revocation proceedings. Id. We explained in Scanlon that the exclusionary rule applied in probation proceedings because \u201cthe liberty interest at stake in a probation revocation hearing is the same as the liberty interest at stake in a criminal proceeding.\u201d Id. Specifically, in both criminal trials and probation revocation proceedings, an individual\u2019s freedom can be affected by the admission or exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. Id. We noted that \u201ca probation revocation proceeding is closely related to the core purpose of preventing the use of illegally obtained evidence against a person accused of a crime.\u201d Id.\n{24} We then concluded that the exclusionary rule did not apply in a school disciplinary hearing because the \u201cchild\u2019s interest in continuing his education\u201d was \u201cunrelated to the liberty interest at stake in a criminal trial or in a probation revocation proceeding.\u201d Id. \u00b6 14. We explained that \u201c[bjecause school disciplinary proceedings are so far removed from the context of criminal prosecution brought to bear after violation of the right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion, ... they are not the intended context for the protections provided by New Mexico\u2019s constitutional exclusionary rule.\u201d Id. We concluded that the \u201chearing authority properly considered the evidence\u201d that was allegedly illegally seized from the student\u2019s car. Id.\n{25} Relying on Scanlon, we later concluded that the exclusionary rule also does not apply in abuse and neglect proceedings. Michael T., 2007-NMCA-163, \u00b6 14, 143 N.M. 75, 172 P.3d 1287. We rejected the father\u2019s argument that the exclusionary rule should apply because the proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature. Id. \u00b6 12. We explained that while the proceedings might ultimately result in the termination of a parent\u2019s right to his or her children, the nature of the proceeding is to protect the children, not to punish the parents. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 11-12. We noted that the \u201cpurposes of the exclusionary rule\u2014 deterring unreasonable searches and seizures (under the United States Constitution) and preserving the status quo in order to protect a person\u2019s liberty interest (under the New Mexico Constitution) \u2014 -would not be advanced if the evidence [was] suppressed.\u201d Id. \u00b6 12.\n{26} Thus, whether the exclusionary rule applies to MVD driver\u2019s license revocation proceedings depends on whether the purposes of the rule would be furthered by its application to these proceedings. A license revocation proceeding, like a proceeding for termination of parental rights, is quasi-criminal in nature. See Dente v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep\u2019t, 1997-NMCA-099, \u00b6 7, 124 N.M. 93, 946 P.2d 1104 (noting that \u201c[{license revocation proceedings are much in the nature of criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings\u201d), overruled on other grounds by State Taxation & Revenue Dep\u2019t v. Bargas, 2000-NMCA-103, \u00b6 15, 129 N.M. 800, 14 P.3d 538. While the proceedings are quasi-criminal, our Supreme Court has held that a driver\u2019s license revocation is remedial, not punitive, and that it \u201cserves the legitimate nonpunitive purpose of protecting the public from the dangers presented by drunk drivers and helps enforce regulatory compliance with the laws governing the licensed activity of driving.\u201d State ex rel. Schwartz v. Kennedy, 120 N.M. 619, 632, 904 P.2d 1044, 1057 (1995). Unlike a criminal trial or a probation revocation proceeding, a person\u2019s liberty interests are not at stake in an MVD license revocation proceeding. Rather, the only interest at stake for a driver in a revocation proceeding is his or her ability to drive a vehicle. But the loss of this ability constitutes the loss of a privilege, not the loss of a right. See generally NMSA 1978, \u00a7 66-5-30 (2003) (authorizing the MVD to suspend or revoke licenses); see also Schwartz, 120 N.M. at 631, 904 P.2d at 1056 (explaining that driving is an activity regulated by the government and that \u201cadministrative revocation of the person\u2019s license is not considered punishment for a crime\u201d); Johnson v. Sanchez, 67 N.M. 41, 46, 351 P.2d 449, 452 (1960) (holding that a driver\u2019s license is a privilege). Consequently, a driver who loses his or her license has even less at stake than does a parent in a proceeding for termination of parental rights. See State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep\u2019t v. John R., 2009-NMCA-025, \u00b6 27, 145 N.M. 636, 203 P.3d 167 (explaining that \u201ca parent has a fundamental interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children\u201d). Just as we concluded that the exclusionary rule does not apply in proceedings for the termination of parental rights, we now conclude that the rule has no applicability in license revocation proceedings. The primary purpose of both types of proceedings is the protection of someone other than the person whose Fourth Amendment rights were allegedly violated' \u2014 the children in a termination proceeding and the driving public in a license revocation proceeding.\n{27} The majority of courts in other jurisdictions that have addressed this issue have concluded that the exclusionary rule does not apply in proceedings for the revocation of a driver\u2019s license. See, e.g., Martin v. Kan. Dep\u2019t of Revenue, 285 Kan. 625, 176 P.3d 938, 953 (2008) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply in administrative proceeding to revoke a driver\u2019s license under a statutory scheme substantially similar to New Mexico\u2019s Implied Consent Act); Lopez v. Dir., N.H. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 145 N.H. 222, 761 A.2d 448, 451 (2000) (same); Fishbein v. Kozlowski, 252 Conn. 38, 743 A.2d 1110, 1119 (1999) (same); Powell v. Sec\u2019y of State, 614 A.2d 1303, 1306-07 (Me.1992) (same); see also Tornabene v. Bonine ex rel. Ariz. Highway Dep\u2019t, 203 Ariz. 326, 54 P.3d 355, \u00b6\u00b6 25-26 (Ariz.Ct.App.2002) (same). The Maine Supreme Judicial Court aptly observed that \u201c[rjequiring hearing examiners to apply the exclusionary rule would unnecessarily complicate and burden an administrative proceeding designed to focus on the single issue of whether a person was operating a vehicle with excessive alcohol in his blood.\u201d Powell, 614 A.2d at 1307; see Dente, 1997-NMCA-099, \u00b6 7, 124 N.M. 93, 946 P.2d 1104 (explaining that a license revocation hearing is \u201cdesigned to be a summary administrative proceeding that handles revocation matters quickly\u201d).\n{28} Driver analogizes license revocation to civil forfeiture of property under the Controlled Substances Act and argues that because the exclusionary rule applies in forfeiture proceedings, it should also apply in license revocation proceedings. See In re Forfeiture of Fourteen Thousand Six Hundred Thirty Nine Dollars ($14,639), 120 N.M. 408, 413, 902 P.2d 563, 568 (Ct.App. 1995) (holding that exclusionary rule applies in forfeiture proceedings). He maintains that forfeiture of property is tied to the commission of drug offenses just as license revocation is tied to the commission of DWI.\n{29} We are not persuaded. Forfeiture proceedings have no purpose other than punishment of the person who has violated the Controlled Substances Act. See id. at 412-13, 902 P.2d at 567-68 (noting that the purpose of forfeiture \u201cis to penalize for the commission of an offense against law\u201d and that \u201cthe [Ljegislature\u2019s choice to tie forfeiture directly to the commission of drug offenses ... confirms the punitive nature of these provisions\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). In contrast, a license revocation may penalize a driver, but its primary goal \u201cis to provide the public with safe roadways.\u201d Schwartz, 120 N.M. at 635, 904 P.2d at 1060.\n{30} The MVD\u2019s primary argument in support of the exclusionary rule\u2019s applicability appears to be that the MVD has always interpreted the Act to require hearing officers to determine whether an arrest of a driver was lawful and that if the exclusionary rule does not apply, a person who was improperly arrested but not charged could still face license revocation. We agree with the MVD that the Act requires a hearing officer to determine whether a law enforcement officer \u201chad reasonable grounds to believe\u201d that a driver was DWI, Section 66-8-112(F)(l), and that this determination is similar to a determination of whether probable cause supports an arrest. See State v. Richerson, 87 N.M, 437, 440, 535 P.2d 644, 647 (Ct.App. 1975) (stating that \u201ca lawful arrest [is] the essential introductory step to implied consent provisions\u201d). However, by the Act\u2019s express terms, this determination does not include a determination regarding the reasonableness of the stop preceding the arrest.\n{31} Furthermore, we see no inherent inconsistency in a scenario in which a driver\u2019s license is revoked even if the same driver is not charged with or convicted of DWI due to, for example, an illegal stop. A license revocation hearing \u201cis entirely separate and distinct from the proceeding to determine the guilt or innocence of the person as to the crime of DWI.\u201d See Schwartz, 120 N.M. at 626, 904 P.2d at 1051 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The exclusionary rule excludes evidence of the illegal stop from the criminal DWI proceeding, thereby preventing the loss of the driver\u2019s liberty interest and deterring future police misconduct. The driver nonetheless loses his or her driver\u2019s license in order to temporarily remove the driver from the roads of the state if the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe the driver was DWI and if the other elements necessary for revocation are met. The revocation serves to protect the public from a driver who has chosen either to refuse chemical testing or to ingest intoxicating alcohol or drugs before driving, regardless of whether the initial traffic stop was valid or not.\n{32} In response to the concern that police will be encouraged to heedlessly stop drivers without reasonable suspicion in order to secure license revocations, we quote the apt observation of the Arizona Court of Appeals that \u201cit [is] unlikely that law enforcement officers, lacking any reasonable suspicion of D[W]I, will assign scarce resources to randomly stop motorists on the chance that the officers will develop reasonable grounds to permit them to request the motorist to submit to testing.\u201d Tornabene, 54 P.3d at 365.\n{33} In conclusion, we explain Maso in light of our holding in the present case. Maso involved a challenge to the procedure giving rise to a license revocation hearing and specifically addressed whether service of an English-language notice of revocation complied with the requirements of due process. Thus, our holding in Maso \u2014 that the constitutional question of what constituted due process could be decided only by the district court and not by the MVD \u2014 has continuing vitality today. Our decision in the present case is distinguished from Maso because the present case addresses the substantive issues to be decided by the MVD in a license revocation hearing, not the procedural aspects of such a hearing. Because the Act does not require the MVD to address the validity of the underlying traffic stop and because the exclusionary rule does not apply in revocation proceedings, the constitutionality of the stop need not be decided by any tribunal for purposes of license revocation under the Act.\n{34} Because we conclude that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable in an MVD proceeding, we do not address Driver\u2019s argument that the MVD was collaterally estopped from considering the legality of the stop. Even if, as Driver argues, the MVD could not reconsider the ruling of the municipal court, the evidence obtained during the stop would still have been admissible.\nCONCLUSION\n{35} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the revocation of Driver\u2019s license.\n{36} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: JAMES J. WECHSLER and ROBERT E. ROBLES, Judges.", "type": "majority", "author": "FRY, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Titus & Murphy, P.C., Victor A. Titus, Farmington, NM, for Appellant.", "Gary K. King, Attorney General, Julia Belles, Special Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2011-NMCA-031\n252 P.3d 742\nTyler GLYNN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of New Mexico, TAXATION AND REVENUE DEPARTMENT, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, Respondent-Appellee.\nNo. 29,453.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nJan. 20, 2011.\nCertiorari Denied, No. 32,862, March 8, 2011.\nTitus & Murphy, P.C., Victor A. Titus, Farmington, NM, for Appellant.\nGary K. King, Attorney General, Julia Belles, Special Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee." }, "file_name": "0518-01", "first_page_order": 544, "last_page_order": 552 }