{ "id": 4250502, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. Debbie CRUZ, Defendant-Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Cruz", "decision_date": "2011-09-14", "docket_number": "No. 32,130", "first_page": "548", "last_page": "557", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "150 N.M. 548" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "263 P.3d 890" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "2011-NMSC-038" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "594 A.2d 1006", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1010" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 Conn.App. 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Conn. App.", "case_ids": [ 753482 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/conn-app/25/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 So.2d 663", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9586519 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "664" }, { "page": "664-65", "parenthetical": "interpreting a statute that not only required that a check be used to obtain money, or articles of value or services, but also specifically codifying that \"past due\" accounts were excluded" }, { "page": "665", "parenthetical": "\"[Rjeliance upon the cheek must have been the efficient inducement which moved the party receiving it to part with something of value, including valuable services, relying upon its validity.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/378/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "594 N.E.2d 198", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" }, { "page": "200", "parenthetical": "interpreting an Ohio statute that defined defraud as \" 'knowingly obtain, by deception, some benefit for oneself or another, or to knowingly cause, by deception, some detriment to another' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ohio Misc.2d 202", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio Misc. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 A.2d 703", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "707-11" }, { "page": "706-07" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 Md. 646", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md.", "case_ids": [ 1877487 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md/274/0646-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 Nev. 270", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Nev.", "case_ids": [ 8556175 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nev/82/0270-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 So.2d 1033", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7611826 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1036" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/484/1033-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 Ga. App. 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga. App.", "case_ids": [ 476253 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "page": "133-34", "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/184/0556-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-050", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4245434 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/147/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "2010-NMSC-009", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4244953 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/147/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 A.2d 100", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 N.J.Super. 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Super.", "case_ids": [ 437880 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-super/48/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 S.E. 216", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1927, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220", "parenthetical": "Stacey, C.J., concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "194 N.C. 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8612587 ], "year": 1927, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Stacey, C.J., concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/194/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Kan. 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Kan.", "case_ids": [ 507593 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "785" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/kan/197/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 P. 838", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "year": 1922, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "839" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Kan. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Kan.", "case_ids": [ 1894385 ], "year": 1922, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/kan/111/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 N.E.2d 955", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "956-57" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ohio Misc.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio Misc. 2d", "case_ids": [ 6711707 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-misc-2d/55/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 N.E. 897", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1924, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "899" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ohio St. 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio St.", "case_ids": [ 973646 ], "year": 1924, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-st/109/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 Ariz. 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz.", "case_ids": [ 4981859 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1926, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1099-1100" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/30/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 Harv. L.Rev. 451", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Harv. L. Rev.", "weight": 3, "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451", "parenthetical": "\"In [that] era of expanding credit and the widespread use of checks as a substitute for currency, it [was] necessary to have some effective legal deterrent for the issuance of checks drawn without funds.\" (footnote omitted)" }, { "page": "453" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 P. 821", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "weight": 5, "year": 1917, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "822" }, { "page": "822" }, { "page": "822", "parenthetical": "\"There are three sections of the Code of 1915, which are applicable to the facts of the case, ... [Sections] 1551, 1553, and 1560.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 N.M. 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 4724743 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1917, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495" }, { "page": "495" }, { "page": "495" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/22/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.M. 721", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 731654 ], "weight": 23, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "722-23" }, { "page": "816-17" }, { "page": "722" }, { "page": "816" }, { "page": "722" }, { "page": "816" }, { "page": "722" }, { "page": "816" }, { "page": "817" }, { "page": "723" }, { "page": "817" }, { "page": "723" }, { "page": "817" }, { "page": "723" }, { "page": "817" }, { "page": "723" }, { "page": "817" }, { "page": "722-23" }, { "page": "816-17" }, { "page": "723" }, { "page": "817" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/114/0721-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 764", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566662 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "769" }, { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0764-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-057", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4245830 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/147/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-013", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4243054 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "2011-NMSC-007", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4248768 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/149/0215-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMSC-027", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3669085 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/141/0817-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 P. 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "weight": 5, "year": 1921, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "applying the 1919 Act" }, { "page": "882" }, { "page": "882" }, { "page": "882" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 N.M. 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8842724 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1921, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "applying the 1919 Act" }, { "page": "525" }, { "page": "524-25" }, { "page": "525" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/26/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMSC-041", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3692623 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/142/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "227 P.3d 1056", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 N.M. 674", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2010-NMCERT-001", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCERT", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2010-NMCA-011", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4246160 ], "weight": 25, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 1, 26, 40" }, { "page": "\u00b6 31" }, { "page": "\u00b6 31" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 34-37" }, { "page": "\u00b6 31" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 32-33" }, { "page": "\u00b6 40" }, { "page": "\u00b636" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/147/0753-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1426, "char_count": 36999, "ocr_confidence": 0.712, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.1416204187966171 }, "sha256": "3e64efc01b1eaa0cab40a0117ab9c3a815e7099ab8fab6d1caea327f766fb30f", "simhash": "1:393e2c14b68e6620", "word_count": 6281 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:53:59.243869+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WE CONCUR: CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice, PATRICIO M. SERNA, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justices." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. Debbie CRUZ, Defendant-Respondent." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nBOSSON, Justice.\n{1} Defendant was convicted of issuing payroll cheeks with insufficient funds to cover them. Because the worthless checks were issued a week after the last day of the pay period, the Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, relying on previous opinions of our respective courts to conclude that the Worthless Cheek Act (\u201cthe modern Act\u201d), NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 30-36-1 to -10 (1963, as amended through 1984), applies only to a \u201ccontemporaneous exchange\u201d and not to preexisting or antecedent debts. We reject that distinction as inconsistent with the clear legislative intent and purpose of the Act. We reverse and remand to the Court of Appeals for their consideration of the remaining issues raised, but not decided, on appeal.\nBACKGROUND\n{2} Debbie Cruz (\u201cDefendant\u201d) was the owner and president of DGM Construction. DGM employed Benjamin Kallestewa, Vicki Kallestewa, and Leo Erachio (collectively, \u201cthe workers\u201d) to work on a construction project on the Zuni Pueblo in 2002. Defendant signed all the company\u2019s paychecks, which were delivered to the workers by the site foreman one week after the end of the pay period. In June 2002, the workers cashed four paychecks at a local trading post. The trading post owner deposited the checks at his bank, but the bank returned all four checks for insufficient funds. The trading post owner made three additional attempts to deposit the checks before the bank returned the cheeks for a final time, noting that the \u201caccount [had] closed.\u201d\n{3} Defendant was charged with four counts of issuing worthless checks, pursuant to Section 30-36-4 of the Act. Convicted on each count, Defendant argued on appeal, among other issues, the lack of sufficient evidence to prove that she had issued a check \u201cin exchange for anything of value\u201d as set forth in Section 30-36-4 of the Act. State v. Cruz, 2010-NMCA-011, \u00b6\u00b6 1, 26, 40, 147 N.M. 753, 228 P.3d 1173. The Court of Appeals agreed, reversing Defendant\u2019s convictions on that ground. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 1, 41.\n{4} Relying on some hoary case law from this Court and a more recent case of its own, the Court of Appeals concluded that the statutory \u201cexchange\u201d for which the worthless checks issued \u2014 in this case an exchange of labor for wages \u2014 had to be \u201ccontemporaneous,\u201d meaning the checks had to issue at or near the end of the pay period. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 31, 33, 38. Because these paychecks were delivered one week after the end of the pay period, they were in payment of an \u201cantecedent or pre-existing debt\u201d not covered by the Act. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 32-33. Thus, if we were to follow the logic of the Court of Appeals, the Act would never apply to most payroll situations in which a delay of a week or two between the end of the pay period and receipt of a paycheck is common. We granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the Act and whether the case law on which it relied has any continuing vitality. State v. Cruz, 2010-NMCERT-001,147 N.M. 674, 227 P.3d 1056.\nDISCUSSION\n{5} As phrased in the petition for certiorari, we consider whether the Act\u2019s prohibition against issuing worthless checks \u201cin exchange for anything of value\u201d applies to checks issued for labor, often \u201cpaid within the traditional two weeks required for processing payroll.\u201d \u2018We review issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation de novo.\u201d State v. Lucero, 2007-NMSC-041, \u00b6 8, 142 N.M. 102, 163 P.3d 489.\n{6} This is the first time we apply the Act in its modern form, as it has been approximately ninety years since we last spoke on this subject. We considered predecessor versions of the Act in the early part of the last century. Since our last relevant review, see generally State v. Davis, 26 N.M. 523, 194 P. 882 (1921) (applying the 1919 Act), it has been amended or replaced in its entirety nine times. See 1929 N.M. Laws, eh. 126, \u00a7 1; 1937 N.M. Laws, ch. 142, \u00a7\u00a7 1-5; 1953 N.M. Laws, ch. 132, \u00a7 1; 1959 N.M. Laws, ch. 113, \u00a7\u00a7 1-2; 1961 N.M. Laws, ch. 206, \u00a7 1; 1963 N.M. Laws, ch. 315, \u00a7\u00a7 1-10; 1965 N.M. Laws, ch. 114, \u00a7\u00a7 1-2; 1979 N.M. Laws, ch. 8, \u00a7\u00a7 1-2; 1984 N.M. Laws, ch. 110, \u00a7\u00a7 1-2. Thus, our Davis, 26 N.M. 523, 194 P. 882, opinion from 1921 \u2014 the most recent relevant case from this Court \u2014 considered a substantially different statute.\n{7} We begin our analysis by looking at the language of the modern Act, for the most part enacted in 1963, and the plain meaning of its text. See State v. Moya, 2007-NMSC-027, \u00b6 6, 141 N.M. 817, 161 P.3d 862 (\u201c[0]ur primary goal is to effectuate the Legislature\u2019s intent. We do so by looking first to the words the Legislature chose and the plain meaning of the language.\u201d). We will then turn to prior iterations of the Act and the case law interpreting them and determine whether such a comparison can shed any light on the Act in its present form.\n{8} Defendant was convicted of violating Section 30-36-4 of the Act, which states:\nIt is unlawful for a person to issue in exchange for anything of value, with intent to defraud, any check, draft or order for payment of money upon any bank or other depository, knowing at the time of the issuing that the offender has insufficient funds in or credit \"with the bank or depository for the payment of such cheek, draft or order in full upon its presentation.\n(Emphasis added.) This appeal turns on the meaning of the phrase in Section 30-36-4 \u201cin exchange for anything of value.\u201d\n{9} The Act defines a \u201cthing of value\u201d to include \u201cmoney, property, services, goods and wares; and lodging.\u201d Section 30-36-2(D) (emphasis added). The Act does not define \u201cexchange,\u201d see \u00a7 30-36-2 (defining only \u201ccheck,\u201d \u201cperson,\u201d \u201cdraw,\u201d \u201cthing of value,\u201d and \u201ccredit\u201d), and so we must interpret the word by applying its ordinary meaning. See Oldham v. Oldham, 2011-NMSC-007, \u00b6 10,149 N.M. 215, 247 P.3d 736 (\u201c \u2018[W]e look first to the plain language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning, unless the Legislature indicates a different one was intended.\u2019 \u201d (quoting Marbob Energy Corp. v. N.M. Oil Conservation Comm\u2019n, 2009-NMSC-013, \u00b6 9, 146 N.M. 24, 206 P.3d 135)). The ordinary definition of \u201cexchange\u201d includes a broad construction, \u201c[t]o give in return for something received,\u201d and more specific interpretations, such as \u201ctrade\u201d and \u201c[t]o give and receive reciprocally,\u201d among others. The American Heritage Dictionary 619 (4th ed.2000). Without any further guidance as to the definition of \u201cexchange,\u201d we may appropriately apply any of the ordinary definitions.\n{10} Thus, under a straightforward, textual reading of the Act, its language would appear to embrace the present dispute arising from paychecks issued in exchange for labor. Recall that the Act specifically includes \u201cservices\u201d within the definition of \u201cthing of value,\u201d which can only mean that our Legislature intended to cover situations in which workers are paid by check for their \u201cservices.\u201d As we will address later, the text of the Act does not condition its protections on whether payment is a \u201ccontemporaneous\u201d transaction; the word never appears in the Act. Nor does the Act say that worthless cheeks issued in exchange for \u201cantecedent or pre-existing debts\u201d are excluded; those words are equally absent from the text of the Act.\n{11} Our textual reading of the operative portion of the Act comports with its stated purpose as well. See Lion\u2019s Gate Water v. D\u2019Antonio, 2009-NMSC-057, \u00b6 23, 147 N.M. 523, 226 P.3d 622 (\u201cStatutes are enacted as a whole, and consequently each section or part should be construed in connection with every other part or section, giving effect to each, and each provision is to be reconciled in a manner that is consistent and sensible so as \u2018to produce a harmonious whole.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Key v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 121 N.M. 764, 769, 918 P.2d 350, 355 (1996)). In the words of our Legislature, the purpose of the Act is\nto remedy the evil of giving checks on a bank without first providing funds in or credit with the depository on which they are made or drawn to pay or satisfy the same, which tends to create the circulation of worthless checks on banks, bad banking, check kiting and mischief to trade and commerce.\nSection 30-36-3.\n{12} Applying the Act to worthless payroll checks, with or without a lapse of time between payment and work performed, presumably furthers the purposes of the Act. Worthless payroll checks, no less than any others, go to the heart of the \u201cevil of giving checks on a bank without first providing funds in or credit with the depository.\u201d Id. Worthless checks issued for payroll have the same deleterious effect on the banking system and represent a \u201cmischief to trade and commerce,\u201d id., whether or not the bad checks issue contemporaneously with the last work day, or a week or two later. Thus, reading a strict requirement of \u201ccontemporaneous\u201d into the Act\u2019s exchange, would appear to undercut the laudable policy goals of the Act.\n{13} Perhaps most persuasive is that if we were to exclude common payroll transactions from the Act, then we would narrow significantly the scope of the Act. Indeed, we would render the inclusion of \u201cservices\u201d within the definition of \u201cthing of value\u201d practically meaningless. Thus, even aside from the text of the Act, if we focus on an interpretation that fosters, not obstructs, the beneficial goals of the Act, then the direction taken by our Court of Appeals gives rise to considerable doubt.\nThe Court of Appeals Opinion\n{14} How did our Court of Appeals come to such a different conclusion? First, we must acknowledge some of our ease law that, quite frankly, begs for clarification. See Cruz, 2010-NMCA-011, \u00b6 31, 147 N.M. 753, 228 P.3d 1173 (discussing State v. Platt, 114 N.M. 721, 722-23, 845 P.2d 815, 816-17 (Ct. App.1992); Davis, 26 N.M. at 525, 194 P. at 882; State v. Tanner, 22 N.M. 493, 495, 164 P. 821, 822 (1917)). The Court of Appeals cited to Platt, Davis, and Tanner, concluding that \u201c[i]t is well established that a check given in payment for an antecedent or preexisting debt is not covered by the ... Act.\u201d Cruz, 2010-NMCA-011, \u00b6 31, 147 N.M. 753, 228 P.3d 1173. The Court of Appeals was not wrong in terms of its reading of history.\n{15} However, the Court of Appeals was not asked to consider, and it did not consider, whether the 1963 repeal of the Act and its replacement with a substantially different statute might affect the persuasive authority of such distant precedent. The Court of Appeals validated its reasoning by looking to ease law from other states, interpreting other statutes. See Cruz, 2010-NMCA-011, \u00b6\u00b6 34-37, 147 N.M. 753, 228 P.3d 1173. Because the confusion, at least initially, lies in our own case law, it falls on this Court to address the matter squarely.\n{16} To understand our early precedent, it is helpful to recall that when the crime of issuing worthless checks was first enacted, see NMSA 1915, \u00a7 1560 (1907), it was intended to supplement existing crimes that were familiar to the courts of the time. See Bad Check Laws, 44 Harv. L.Rev. 451, 451 (1931) (\u201cIn [that] era of expanding credit and the widespread use of checks as a substitute for currency, it [was] necessary to have some effective legal deterrent for the issuance of checks drawn without funds.\u201d (footnote omitted)). Existing common-law crimes, such as \u201ccheating,\u201d had been thought too narrow because they often focused on the manner in which the bad check was used (e.g., to obtain property falsely) and not on the issuance of the worthless check itself. See id at 451-52 (\u201cThe common law crime of cheating ha[d] never been deemed broad enough to embrace this evil. Under the early English statute making it a crime to obtain property by false pretenses, however, such [a check issued without sufficient funds] was sometimes regarded as a form of false pretense, and it\u2019s [sic] issuance indictable.\u201d (footnotes omitted)). In other words, over time and with the growing use of checks in commerce, the evil had become \u2019the issuance of a check without sufficient funds, regardless of how property might have been obtained by virtue of that check. See id at 452-53. Therefore, specific statutes were created to address the problem of bad checks. See id. at 453.\n{17} New Mexico seems to have followed the national trend. The first version of the Act appeared in New Mexico statutes alongside crimes such as \u201cCheating and false pretenses\u201d and \u201cCheating and false representations\u201d in the \u201cCheats \u2014 Frauds\u2014False Pretenses\u201d article. See generally NMSA 1915, \u00a7\u00a7 1551 to -72 (1854, as amended through 1909). Notably, the cheating crimes required that a person obtain or attempt to obtain property, or a forgery in the case of \u201cCheats and false pretenses,\u201d through the use of some form of trickery or deception. See \u00a7\u00a7 1551 to -53 (emphasis omitted). In addition, \u201cCheating and false representation\u201d could be accomplished by obtaining property through the use of a check. In comparison, the original Act required that a person \u201cwilfully or with intent to defraud draw or utter any order or check or other instrument, for moneys, on any bank ... knowing that such order or check or other instrument will not be paid or honored upon presentation thereof.\u201d See \u00a7 1560 (1907). Unlike the cheats crimes, the original Act did not explicitly require that things of value be obtained by use of a check; nor did it make any reference to false pretense. Id. Instead, the original Act concentrated more on the issuer\u2019s state of mind when the check issued, regardless of the manner in which the check was used.\n{18} Tanner, written in 1917, is the only-case from this Court to mention the original version of the Act. 22 N.M. at 495, 164 P. at 822. Although the Court of Appeals cites Tanner to support the existence of a preexisting debt rule, see Cruz, 2010-NMCA-011, \u00b6 31, 147 N.M. 753, 228 P.3d 1173, on closer scrutiny we cannot agree. Tanner only mentions the original Act in passing, stating that the Act and the earlier mentioned cheating crimes were all properly indicted. Tanner, 22 N.M. at 495, 164 P. at 822 (\u201cThere are three sections of the Code of 1915, which are applicable to the facts of the case, ... [Sections] 1551, 1553, and 1560.\u201d). The Court\u2019s legal inquiry in Tanner, however, was whether the facts alleged in the indictment \u2014 a worthless check in return for the delivery of cattle \u2014 were sufficient to show false pretenses. The crimes \u201cCheats and false pretenses\u201d and \u201cCheats and false representations\u201d each mention \u201cfalse pretenses,\u201d explicitly as a violation of those crimes. See id. at 495 n. 1, 164 P. at 822 n. 1. The original Act did not. While it is possible that the justices on the Tanner Court also thought false pretenses was an element of the original Act, Tanner does not actually say that. In our judgment, therefore, Tanner is a weak reed upon which the Court of Appeals relied for the proposition that the modern Act requires false pretenses in obtaining property and does not apply to pre-existing debts. The Tanner opinion is simply not clear.\n{19} During this same \u201cera of expanding credit and the widespread use of checks as a substitute for currency,\u201d Bad Check Laws, supra, at 451, other jurisdictions began to recognize the essential difference between worthless check acts and other common-law crimes. For example, the Arizona Supreme Court stated in 1926:\nWhile the courts generally hold that one who obtains property upon a credit agreement and later gives a bogus check in payment is not guilty of the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses because nothing in exchange for the check is obtained, the offense defined in [Arizona\u2019s Bad Check Act] is a new and distinct one, and to be guilty of it is not necessary that one obtain money or property at the time of passing the check.\nState v. Meeks, 30 Ariz. 436, 247 P. 1099, 1099-1100 (1926). The Ohio Supreme Court commented similarly:\nIt was the evident purpose of this statute to prevent the negotiation of false cheeks drawn on accounts which did not exist, or were insufficient to pay the checks drawn. It was meant, for example, to protect hotelkeepers from receiving \u2018cold checks\u2019 in payment of obligations incurred for lodging, many of which are past due. It was enacted to protect business men all over the state, to protect commercial life; about 90 per cent, of the commercial work of the world being done on credit. In order to protect the credit intercourse of the community this statute was enacted creating a new crime and providing new and distinct rules of evidence.\nState v. Lowenstein, 109 Ohio St. 393, 142 N.E. 897, 899 (1924), superceded by statute, Passing Bad Checks, Ohio Rev.Code Ann. \u00a7 2913.11 (West 1986), as stated in State v. Rudd, 55 Ohio Misc.2d 1, 562 N.E.2d 955, 956-57 (Ohio Mun.Ct.1988). These courts recognized that \u201cthe evils referred to are all quite distinct from those consequent on fraud, and the statute is to be regarded as creating a new and distinct offense.\u201d State v. Avery, 111 Kan. 588, 207 P. 838, 839 (1922), superceded by statute, Kans. Stats. Ann. \u00a7 21-554 (1963), as stated in State v. Beard, 197 Kan. 275, 416 P.2d 783, 785 (1966).\n{20} Unlike obtaining property by false pretenses,\n[t]he present statute is aimed at a practice which has become a menace to trade, an evil and a mischief in the field of commerce, where the major portion of business is done on paper____[I]t is a crime, an injury to society, to undermine, in any degree, the very foundation upon which all credit rests.\nState v. Yarboro, 194 N.C. 498, 140 S.E. 216, 220 (1927) (Stacey, C.J., concurring). Admittedly, these cases do not interpret statutes requiring a check to be given \u201cin exchange for a thing of value.\u201d They do, however, take into account the purposes behind these worthless checks statutes, which are similar to those stated in the modern Act.\n{21} Even though some courts, like those cited above, took notice of the purpose of bad-cheeks legislation, \u201c[a] number of courts clung to the notion that there could be no intent to defraud unless something of value was obtained by the accused, and therefore a check given in payment of an antecedent obligation was held not within the scope of the ordinary bad check law.\u201d Bad Check Laws, supra, at 454 (emphasis added). For a time, at least initially, New Mexico seems to have followed the latter trend by \u201cclinging to the notion\u201d of \u201cantecedent obligations.\u201d\n{22} Davis, decided in 1921, and the second case cited by our Court of Appeals for the pre-existing debt rule stands for just such a proposition. In that case, this Court concluded that the 1919 version of the Act did not apply to a buyer who obtained goods on open account and later settled the existing account with a bad check. Davis, 26 N.M. at 524-25, 194 P. at 882. The then recently amended 1919 Act defined the crime as \u201cattempted larceny\u201d or \u201clarceny,\u201d committed \u201cif money or property is obtained from another\u201d by use of a worthless check. Compare \u00a7 1560 (1907), with 1919 N.M. Laws, ch. 182, \u00a7 1 (emphasis added). Since the goods had already been \u201cobtained\u201d before the issuance of the check, this Court held that the Act did not apply because \u201cthere could be no ... fraudulent intent.\u201d Davis, 26 N.M. at 525, 194 P. at 882 (\u201cThe question is whether or not it is a violation of the section of the statute quoted for one to issue a check in payment of an outstanding account, credit not being given on the strength of the cheeks so issued. Clearly it is not a violation of the statute, because ... there [could] be no intent to defraud, which is the gist of the offense.\u201d).\n{23} Davis seems to have overlooked the 1919 Act\u2019s newly-added provision that appears to contradict this reasoning: \u201cthe making ... of a check, ... payment of which is refused by the drawee because of lack of funds or credit, shall be prima facie evidence of intent to defraud.\u201d 1919 N.M. Laws, ch. 132, \u00a7 1 (emphasis added). Whether or not correct at the time, however, Davis does stand for the proposition that the 1919 Act, with its particular language pertaining to obtaining property and an intent to defraud, does not cover worthless checks issued to pay antecedent obligations.\n{24} Significantly, our Legislature amended the 1919 Act soon thereafter to eliminate the language that money or property must be \u201cobtained from another\u201d by use of the fraudulent check. Compare 1919 N.M. Laws, ch. 126, \u00a7 1, with 1929 N.M. Laws, ch. 132, \u00a7 1. At the time, the 1929 amendment was characterized in a scholarly journal as part of a national trend, a \u201cflurry of legislation definitely resolving the doubt in respect to checks given for antecedent obligations in favor of their inclusion within the statutory penalty.\u201d Bad Check Laws, supra, at 454 & n. 20 (citing 1929 N.M. Laws, ch. 126, along with statutes from Indiana, Michigan, and Montana). Continuing along that same line of thought, \u201c[t]he Tentative Draft of the American Law Institute\u2019s Model Penal Code (1955), \u00a7 206.22, established] as a crime the issuance or passing of a check knowing that it will not be honored, regardless of whether or not property was thereby obtained.\u201d State v. Goerdes, 48 N.J.Super. 293, 137 A.2d 100, 104 (N.J.Super.Ct. Law Div.1957) (citing the Model Penal Code proposal in support of the proposition that false pretenses and issuing of a worthless cheek are distinct crimes).\n{25} During the subsequent decades, New Mexico courts had no occasion to revisit Davis, and specifically the \u201cnotion\u201d of the antecedent-debt exclusion, in light of the 1929 amendments to the Act, as well as changes thereafter. That lack of opportunity is unfortunate. Accordingly, Davis continues to stand as cited precedent for the antecedent-debt rule, despite material changes in the Act, reflecting notable changes in societal attitudes towards the crime of issuing worthless checks. Decades later, we now have such an opportunity.\n{26} Continuing with our analysis of the evolution of the Act, in 1963 the Legislature replaced the Act in its entirety with what, for the most part, is the statute in its present form. Compare 1963 N.M. Laws, ch. 315, \u00a7\u00a7 1-10, with \u00a7\u00a7 30-36-1 to -10. As previously observed, the 1963 Act was the first to include the language at issue today, \u201cin exchange for anything of value.\u201d Compare 1963 N.M. Laws, 315, \u00a7\u00a7 1-10, with \u00a7 1560 (1907); 1919 N.M. Laws, ch. 132, \u00a7 1; 1929 N.M. Laws, ch. 126, \u00a7 1; 1937 N.M. Laws, ch. 142, \u00a7\u00a7 1-5; 1953 N.M. Laws, ch. 132, \u00a7 1; 1959 N.M. Laws, ch.113, \u00a7\u00a7 1-2; 1961 N.M. Laws, ch. 206, \u00a7 1. With the 1963 replacement, the Legislature continued the trend, begun in 1929, that the check need not be issued to \u201cobtain[]\u201d property. Compare 1919 N.M. Laws, ch. 132, with 1929 N.M. Laws, ch. 126, \u00a7 1, and 1963 N.M. Laws, ch. 315, \u00a7\u00a7 1-10. Presumably, given these trends and the inclusion of a purpose statement that saying as much, our Legislature intended courts to focus on the evils of the worthless check itself and less on whether a check issued to pay for a present transaction or a pre-existing obligation.\n{27} In 1992 the antecedent debt \u201cnotion\u201d resurfaced in Platt, the only case to date that has construed the 1963 Act. Platt, 114 N.M. at 722, 845 P.2d at 816. In Platt, an owner, seeking to renovate his property for use as an inn, entered into a contract for the purchase and installation of carpeting and drapes. Id. at 722, 845 P.2d at 816. The owner paid for those goods and services by a series of checks, some of them worthless, having been issued after the goods were delivered and installed, and some of them in payment of previous checks that had been returned for insufficient funds. Id.\n{28} Like the open account in Davis, the owner argued that his check had issued to pay for a pre-existing debt \u2014 the installations already performed and the goods already delivered. Platt, 114 N.M. at 722, 845 P.2d at 816. Correctly, our Court of Appeals rejected that argument and instead \u201cread Davis as limited to its facts.\u201d Platt at 723, 845 P.2d at 817. Based on this reading, the Platt court determined that the pre-existing debt exception would only apply to \u201csituations in which something of value has previously been delivered to a person in reliance on that person\u2019s credit, and the check is later tendered as partial payment on the credit account.\u201d Id. In other words, the kind of open account litigated in Davis.\n{29} According to Platt, the modern Act does apply to transactions in which goods and services are delivered before the issuance of a check, if a creditor/debtor relationship was not contemplated and the \u201cparties intended to have a cash transaction.\u201d 114 N.M. at 723, 845 P.2d at 817. Because the parties in Platt \u201cintended to have a cash transaction,\u201d and there was \u201cno evidence that [the contractors] intended to extend credit to defendant,\u201d then \u201cthe fact that the goods and services were delivered before the check was issued did not signify that an exchange did not occur within the meaning of Section 30-36-4.\u201d Platt, 114 N.M. at 723, 845 P.2d at 817.\n{30} Up to that point, we have no dispute with Platt. However, despite Platt\u2019s newly functional approach and its purported limitation of Davis, the Court of Appeals then proceeded to limit the Act\u2019s application to a \u201ccontemporaneous transaction.\u201d Based on the timing of the exchange, \u201ca worthless cheek is given for something of value if the worthless check is issued as part of a contemporaneous transaction.\u201d Platt, 114 N.M. at 723, 845 P.2d at 817. In other words, if the worthless check is not part of a contemporaneous transaction, then presumably it would be in payment of an antecedent debt and the modern Act would not apply. Though seemingly circular in its analysis, it is Platt\u2019s condition of contemporaneousness that caught the eye of the Court of Appeals in the present case.\n{31} Applying Platt to this case, the Court of Appeals asked whether a \u201cpayment of wages earned is payment of a pre-existing debt\u201d or a \u201ccontemporaneous transaction.\u201d Cruz, 2010-NMCA-011, \u00b6\u00b6 32-33, 147 N.M. 753, 228 P.3d 1173. The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from Platt on the basis that, in Platt, \u201cthe recipients of the cheek sought payment on the very day they provided services,\u201d and that \u201cthere [was] nothing to suggest that the recipients ever agreed to a delay before being compensated for their work.\u201d Cruz, 2010-NMCA-011, \u00b6 40, 147 N.M. 753, 228 P.3d 1173. On the other hand, the workers \u201cin this case worked for a week with the expectation that they would have to wait another week before being paid for their labor.\u201d Id. In other words, according to the Court of Appeals, the workers became creditors of their employer, in effect loaning the employer their wages for the week it took to deliver their payroll cheeks. Having previously \u201cread Davis as limited to its facts,\u201d Platt, 114 N.M. at 723, 845 P.2d at 817, the Court of Appeals now, in effect, exhumed it. And along with it, came the discredited exception of an antecedent or pre-existing debt.\nThe Amended Act Evidences Legislative Intent to Change the Act\u2019s Application\n{32} Although Platt was on the right track in limiting Davis \u201cto its facts,\u201d it failed to appreciate that, after Davis, the Act was amended or replaced nine times. Platt, 114 N.M. at 722-23, 845 P.2d at 816-17 (failing to consider, for example, changes made in 1929 N.M. Laws, ch. 126, \u00a7 1; 1963 N.M. Laws, ch. 315, \u00a7\u00a7 1-10; and 1979 N.M. Laws, ch. 8, \u00a7\u00a7 1-2). Section 4 of the 1963 Act made it a crime, for the first time, to issue a check \u201cin exchange for anything of value, with intent to defraud\u201d \u2014 the essence of the crime still today. Compare 1963 N.M. Laws, ch. 315, \u00a7 4, with \u00a7 30-36-4. It also defined \u201cthing of value\u201d in the way it is still defined today: \u201cmoney, property, services, goods and wares and lodging.\u201d Compare 1963 N.M. Laws, ch. 315, \u00a7 2, with \u00a7 30-36-2. The existing purpose statement was also first added in 1963. See \u00a7 30-36-3.\n{33} These changes, along with those made in 1929, discussed earlier, indicate, a legislative intent to alter the Act\u2019s application. See Truong v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2010-NMSC-009, \u00b6 36, 147 N.M. 583, 227 P.3d 73 (\u201cIn our statutory construction, we must give effect to those changes. \u2018This Court has long held that we must avoid constructions of statutory amendments that would render the change unnecessary and meaningless.\u2019 \u201d (quoting State v. Nick R., 2009-NMSC-050, \u00b6 28, 147 N.M. 182, 218 P.3d 868)). Although Platt read a \u201ccontemporaneous transaction\u201d into the Act, the modern Act does not indicate that the Legislature contemplated a \u201ccontemporaneous exchange\u201d or any other specialized meaning of \u201cexchange.\u201d See \u00a7 30-36-4. As previously noted, the word \u201ccontemporaneous\u201d does not appear in the text of the modern Act.\n{34} The Legislature\u2019s inclusion of \u201cservices\u201d in the definition of \u201cthing of value,\u201d also indicates that \u201cexchange\u201d should not be limited to \u201ccontemporaneous exchange.\u201d That the definition of \u201cthing of value\u201d specifically includes \u201cservices,\u201d \u201cproperty,\u201d and \u201clodging\u201d indicates that the modern Act should apply even when contemporaneous exchanges are not possible, expected, or typical. For example, it is not uncommon for employers to pay wages by check with a week\u2019s delay. It is not uncommon for tenants to use cheeks to pay their rent for the coming month. Vacationers commonly pay well in advance for lodging to reserve a space (for example, on a cruise or for vacation rental). The Act gives no indication that such transactions should be excluded. Such checks are unquestionably \u201cgiven in return for\u201d services, property, or lodging, whether or not the transaction can be described as contemporaneous.\n{35} If an exchange need not be contemporaneous, then what strictures exist to limit coverage under the Act? Simply put, as selected by our Legislature, there must be an exchange, a quid pro quo of some kind, involving \u201canything of value.\u201d The Act would appear not to apply, for instance, to checks given gratuitously, such as charitable donations. Beyond that, although we do not here decide questions not directly presented to us, the Act would appear to apply. Our Legislature appears to have decided, as a matter of public policy, that it is more important to punish and deter the issuance of worthless checks than whether goods and services were provided contemporaneously with that check. We will enforce that policy choice.\nOther States\n{36} We recognize that other states have adopted a contemporaneous transaction test. See Platt, 114 N.M. at 723, 845 P.2d at 817 (listing cases in support of its adoption of the contemporaneous transaction rule and its reading of Davis that the Act excludes \u201csituations in which something of value has previously been delivered to a person in reliance on that person\u2019s credit, and the check is later tendered as partial payment on the credit account\u201d). We note, however, that in each of the cases cited in Platt and Cruz, the statute in question is materially different from our modern Act. See Ledford v. State, 184 Ga. App. 556, 362 S.E.2d 133, 133-34 (1987) (per curiam) (requiring a contemporaneous exchange for the Georgia Act to apply when the statute in question called for the issuance of the check to be \u201cin exchange for a present consideration or wages,\u201d rather than \u201cin exchange for something of value\u201d (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Parker v. State, 484 So.2d 1033, 1036 (Miss.1986) (requiring the recipient of a check to have relied upon the issued check itself for the Mississippi statute to apply, when the Mississippi statute was called \u201cfalse pretenses by delivery of a bad check\u201d (emphasis added)); Hoyt v. Hoffman, 82 Nev. 270, 416 P.2d 232, 233 (1966) (requiring the maker of a check to receive a benefit \u201cas a result of\u2019 a cheek\u2019s delivery in order to apply the Nevada act, but also asserting that the purpose of the statute in question was \u201cto charge a defendant who obtains a benefit as a result of the check\u201d and that \u201c[t]he legislature did not intend to make it a crime to issue a worthless check absent damage or injury to the payee thereof\u2019). Unlike the Georgia, Mississippi, and Nevada statutes, our Act does not require an exchange for present consideration, it has never mentioned false pretenses, and it does not require that anything happen \u201cas a result\u201d of a check\u2019s delivery. See \u00a7\u00a7 30-36-1 to -10.\n{37} The Court of Appeals also cited State v. Sinclair, 274 Md. 646, 337 A.2d 703, 707-11 (1975); State v. Cote, 62 Ohio Misc.2d 202, 594 N.E.2d 198, 199 (Ohio Mun.Ct.1991); and Hindman v. State, 378 So.2d 663, 664 (Miss. 1980). Cruz, 2010-NMCA-011, \u00b636, 147 N.M. 753, 228 P.3d 1173. Upon close examination, however, none of these cases consider statutes that include the provisions of the Act we find determinative today, which include \u201cexchange for anything of value,\u201d \u201cthing of value\u201d defined to include \u201cservices,\u201d and an explicit purpose statement to reduce harm to the banking system. Each case makes reference to \u201cobtain[ing]\u201d things of value through the use of a check. See Sinclair, 337 A.2d at 706-07 (interpreting a Maryland statute that required that \u201cmoney, credit, goods, wares or anything of value\u201d are obtained by means of a check and had previously been considered a form of false pretenses, did not mention of services, and provided that there was \u201c \u2018presumptive evidence of such intent to cheat and defraud\u2019 only where there ha[d] not been a return or tender of the return of the \u2018thing so obtained,\u2019 \u201d and it is impossible to \u201creturn\u201d services); Cote, 594 N.E.2d at 200 (interpreting an Ohio statute that defined defraud as \u201c \u2018knowingly obtain, by deception, some benefit for oneself or another, or to knowingly cause, by deception, some detriment to another\u2019 \u201d); Hindman, 378 So.2d at 664-65 (interpreting a statute that not only required that a check be used to obtain money, or articles of value or services, but also specifically codifying that \u201cpast due\u201d accounts were excluded).\n{38} Not only do the cases cited in Cruz apply significantly different statutes, but they apply those statutes in a manner similar to the common-law prohibition against false pretenses. Compare State v. Rochette, 25 Conn.App. 298, 594 A.2d 1006, 1010 (1991) (\u201cTo be found guilty of [obtaining property by false pretenses], a person, therefore, must knowingly make a false representation with the intent to defraud, and that false representation must induce action that effectively causes the accused to receive something of value without compensation.\u201d), with Hindman, 378 So.2d at 665 (\u201c[Rjeliance upon the cheek must have been the efficient inducement which moved the party receiving it to part with something of value, including valuable services, relying upon its validity.\u201d). As previously discussed, the purpose of our Act and our general history of worthless check legislation do not support such a reading.\n{39} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the antecedent or pre-existing debt exception no longer applies to criminal prosecutions under the Act, including the State\u2019s case against Defendant herein. We also reject the requirement of a contemporaneous transaction as set forth in Platt. The language of the Act requiring \u201can exchange for anything of value\u201d is to be read broadly, according to its terms, in conjunction with the rest of the Act, and in light of the history, purpose, and context of the Act as set forth in this opinion.\nCONCLUSION\n{40} We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for consideration of the remaining issues raised, but not decided, before the Court of Appeals.\n{41} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nWE CONCUR: CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice, PATRICIO M. SERNA, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justices.\n. \"Cheats and false pretenses\" required that a person\ndesignedly, by any false pretense, or by any privy or false token, and with intent to defraud, obtain from any other person any money or goods, wares, merchandise or other property, or shall obtain with such intent the signature of any person to any written instrument, the false making whereof would be punishable as forgery ...\nSection 1551 (1897).\n\u201cCheats and false representations\" required that a person with intent to cheat and defraud, shall obtain, or attempt to obtain, from any other person or persons any money property or valuable thing whatever by means or by use of any trick or deception or false or fraudulent representation or statement or pretense, or by any other means or instrument or device commonly called the \"confidence game,\u201d or by means or by use of any false or bogus check, or by any other printed, written or engraved instrument or spurious coin or metal.\nSection 1553 (1897).", "type": "majority", "author": "BOSSON, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Gary K. King, Attorney General, Ann M. Harvey, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.", "Jacqueline L. Cooper, Acting Chief Public Defender, Carlos Ruiz de la Torre, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "2011-NMSC-038\n263 P.3d 890\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. Debbie CRUZ, Defendant-Respondent.\nNo. 32,130.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nSept. 14, 2011.\nGary K. King, Attorney General, Ann M. Harvey, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.\nJacqueline L. Cooper, Acting Chief Public Defender, Carlos Ruiz de la Torre, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent." }, "file_name": "0548-01", "first_page_order": 584, "last_page_order": 593 }