{ "id": 1556029, "name": "STATE v. GOMEZ et al.", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Gomez", "decision_date": "1929-08-08", "docket_number": "No. 3395", "first_page": "250", "last_page": "254", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "34 N.M. 250" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "280 P. 251" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "170 U. S. 283", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3599116 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/170/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 N. M. 633", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1554385 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/33/0633-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 P. 929", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 N. 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M. 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8841629 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/28/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 P. 382", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 N. M. 295", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 P. 1177", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 N. M. 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 4695668 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/18/0211-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 504, "char_count": 7943, "ocr_confidence": 0.714, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.9759820779603026e-07, "percentile": 0.8506700583701984 }, "sha256": "a1ed79fd06da2d58816d8b1f9ea0b27cb1f06967082e247dd755f928ab380c37", "simhash": "1:b9ccb96675a58324", "word_count": 1423 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:51:24.898591+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "BICKLEY, C. J., and WATSON, PARKER and CATRON, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE v. GOMEZ et al." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION OF THE COURT\nSIMMS, J.\nThe state brought suit against the administrators of the estate of Francisco Gomez, who. died in 1919, to collect-a succession tax upon said estate, under the provisions of chapter 122 of the Laws of 1919. Defense was made on the. grounds: (a) That the said act fails to meet the requirements of article 4, \u00a7 16, of the Constitution, because its title is defective; and (b) that said act is void because it conflicts with article 8, \u00a7 1, of the Constitution. The trial court held with the defendants, and the state has appealed.\nThe title to the act in question reads:\n\u201cAn Act providing for a tax on transfers of property; fixing the rate thereof; providing machinery for the appraisal of decedents\u2019 estates; for the collection of such taxes, and repealing all acts and parts of acts in conflict with this act.\u201d\nArticle 4, \u00a7 16, of our Constitution provides:\n\u201cThe subject of every bill shall be clearly expressed in its title, and no bill embracing more than one subject shall be passed except general appropriation bills and bills for the codification or revision of the laws; but if any subject is embraced in any act which is not expressed in its title, only so much of the act as is not so expressed shall be void. * * *\u201d\nAppellees contend that the statute in question, when its context is examined, proves not to be an act imposing a tax on the \u201ctransfer of property,\u201d but, instead, it is rather a tax on the right to inherit property from a deceased person, or what is called a succession tax. They claim that the body of the act is so repugnant to the title as to violate the requirements of the Constitution above quoted.\nSimilar questions relative to the titles of legislative enactments have been before us repeatedly. State v. Ingalls, 18 N. M. 211, 135 P. 1177; In re Dexter-Greenfield Drainage District, 21 N. M. 295, 154 P. 382; State ex rel. Board of Education v. Saint et al., 28 N. M. 165, 210 P. 573; State ex rel. Whittier v. Safford, 28 N. M. 535, 214 P. 759; State v. Candelaria, 28 N. M. 573, 215 P. 816; Davy v. McNeill, 31 N. M. 11, 240 P. 482; State v. Armstrong, 31 N. M. 235, 243 P. 333; Burch et al. v. Ortiz, 31 N. M. 429, 246 P. 908; State v. Miller, 33 N. M. 200, 263 P. 511; State ex rel. Taylor v. Mirabal, 33 N. M. 553, 273 P. 929; Grant et al. v. State, 33 N. M. 633, 275 P. 95.\nAs appellee\u2019s counsel aptly says in his brief, \u201cThe difficulty is in applying these rules to a particular \u25a0 case.\u201d Each case must be decided on its own set of facts and circumstances. There are certain considerations, however, which the courts should always keep in mind. To the legislative branch of our government is committed the drafting of statutes. Court should be slow to interfere by pronouncing the work of the legislature insufficient. It often happens that one person would entitle the same act in a different way from another. To some minds, the title of an act should be so definite and nice in its definitions and distinctions as to be an index of the act itself; to others, this is unnecessary, and a more general and sweeping treatment of the subject is all that is required. We can all agree, however, on the soundness of the constitutional inhibition against surprises, concealed or \u201cjoker\u201d provisions in bills which might deceive both the lawmakers and the general public.\nThe Act under consideration is what is commonly-termed an \u201cinheritance\u201d tax law. Regardless of whether it should be technically classified as an \u201cinheritance tax,\u201d \u201cestate tax,\u201d \u201csuccession tax,\u201d \u201clegacy tax\u201d or \u201cdeath tax,\u201d it is clear that its main purpose is to tax the transfer of property which takes place by certain kinds of transfers only; i. e., by will, inheritance, or gift to take effect at death. It does not tax transfers by' deed, bill of sale or other instrument conveying- property inter vivos. It confines its operations exclusively to transfers effectuated by or to take effect at death.\nSo far as the theory of the Act is concerned, appellees properly contend that it is a \u201csuccession tax\u201d because it lays the burden upon the right to receive or \u201csucceed to\u201d property of a decedent. This does not prevent the Act from also being properly called a \u201cTransfer Tax\u201d Act because that is-the broadest and most inclusive term which can be used in reference to any of the so-called \u201cdeath tax\u201d acts. Whether they should be properly classified as \u201cinheritance,\u201d \u201cestate,\u201d \u201csuccession,\u201d \u201clegacy,\u201d or by any other name, they are all \u201ctransfer\u201d taxes. In Gleason & Otis on'Inheritance Taxation, (4th Ed.), P. 242, in speaking of the difficulty of classifying the various statutes on this subject, it is said:\n\u201cPerhaps the whole subject would be more aptly described as \u2018Transfer Taxes\u2019 but there are many such taxes, such as sales taxes and various excise duties which come within that term and yet have nothing to do with what are generally understood to be inheritance taxes. The definition which has seemed to the authors most concise and comprehensive is that given in the earlier editions of this work \u2018A tax levied upon any form of donative TRANSFER from the dead to the living, or by the living in contemplation of or effective at death\u2019.\u201d\nWe therefore hold that in denominating the act \u201cAn Act providing for a tax on transfers\u201d the legislature did not use a term repugnant to the nature and purpose of the act.\nBut appellees, contend that the word \u201ctransfer\u201d not being limited to such as take place either by or at death, is too broad a term to support what is simply a succession tax statute and which does not apply to transfers by deed, bills of sale, or other instrument inter vivos. We have held that the legislature may use a word in a particular or limited sense in the title to a bill, as opposed to the general or usual sense, without doing violence to the constitutional provision. Burch et al v. Ortiz, 31 N. M. 427, 429, 246 P. 908, 909. Speaking for this court, Justice Parker said:\n\u201c* * * of course, ordinarily the taking of an appeal means the application to a superior court to review some order or judgment of an inferior court. But it is clear in this instance that the word \u2018appeal\u2019 as used in the title and in the body of the act, was used in a different sense, and was used in the sense of the removal of the whole cause from the inferior to the superior court. In such a case, there is no violation of the constitutional provision. * * *\u201d\nFrom the title to the act under consideration and from the context of the act itself, it is plain that in using the words \u201ctax on transfers of property\u201d the legislature meant and intended such transfers of property as occurred \u201cby or at death.\u201d So construed, we see no justification for holding that the title is insufficient to meet the requirements of the Constitution.\nNext, appellees contend that it is apparent from Sections 1, 2 and 3 of the act itself, that it lays a tax upon the property which the beneficiary receives and therefore it is in violation of Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which provides:\n\u201cTaxes levied upon tangible property shall be in proportion to the value thereof, and taxes shall be equal and uniform upon subjects of taxation of the same class.\u201d\nSince we have held with appellees that the statute under examination is a succession tax or a tax upon the right or privilege to succeed to the property of the deceased, it is not a tax upon tangible property and does not violate the section and article of the constitution named. Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 18 S. Ct. 594, 42 L. Ed. 1037.\nIt follows that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings, \u00e1nd it is so ordered.\nBICKLEY, C. J., and WATSON, PARKER and CATRON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "SIMMS, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "J. Frank Curns and J. W. Chapman, both of Santa Fe, for the State.", "E. R. Wright, of Santa Fe, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "[No. 3395.\nAug. 8, 1929.]\nSTATE v. GOMEZ et al.\n[280 Pac. 251.]\nJ. Frank Curns and J. W. Chapman, both of Santa Fe, for the State.\nE. R. Wright, of Santa Fe, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0250-01", "first_page_order": 270, "last_page_order": 274 }