{ "id": 1559177, "name": "VESELY, Commissioner of Public Lands, v. RANCH REALTY CO.", "name_abbreviation": "Vesely v. Ranch Realty Co.", "decision_date": "1934-08-17", "docket_number": "No. 3990", "first_page": "480", "last_page": "482", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "38 N.M. 480" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "35 P.2d 297" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "34 N. M. 602", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1556119 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/34/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 N. M. 120", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1551443 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/31/0120-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 428, "char_count": 6010, "ocr_confidence": 0.475, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.5916105598991863e-07, "percentile": 0.8183316865191754 }, "sha256": "8feebfdb6ce26472369dbe41b27272eef2bbfd0315d96b03e26d49e4037e8628", "simhash": "1:8c48253c6a11ca17", "word_count": 1002 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:29:00.087305+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "\u2022 SADLER, HUDSPETH, BICKLEY, and ZINN, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "VESELY, Commissioner of Public Lands, v. RANCH REALTY CO." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WATSON, Chief Justice.\nAppellee held three purchase contracts of state lands, of several years standing, embracing a large acreage on which large sums had been paid, and on which lands valuable improvements had been made.\nOn November 15, 1932, Commissioner Hinkle canceled the contracts and simultaneously issued to appellee a lease for the same lands.\nOn May 24, 1933, Commissioner Vesely, having succeeded Commissioner Hinkle, cited appellee to show cause why the lease should not be canceled and the contracts reinstated. The citation set forth \u2022 that the cancellation of the contracts \u201cand issuance of lease * * * in their stead' was contrary to\u201d N. M. Const, art. 4, \u00a7 32.\nAfter hearing, the commissioner made his order canceling the lease and reinstating the contracts, from which an appeal was allowed to the district court.\nThe matter was heard in the district court1 on the record of the proceeding in the land office, and some additional evidence. Judgment was rendered upholding the lease, and directing its reinstatement. Erom that judgment the present appeal of the commissioner was allowed.\nThe first point brought to our attention is that 30 days\u2019 notice was not given by Commissioner Hinkle prior to the action he took, as required by 1929 Comp. St. \u00a7 132-121. This omission is entirely immaterial in this connection. The notice requirement is obviously for the benefit of the lessee or other party whose rights it is proposed to terminate. He might complain. Why the state or a succeeding commissioner should be heard to object, we do not see.\nIt is next contended that the transaction was violative of N. M. Const, art. 4, \u00a7 32, prohibiting the exchange, transfer, remission, release,' postponement, or diminution by the Legislature of any obligation or liability, held, owned by, or owing to the state, and generally prohibiting the extinguishment of any such obligation or liability except by payment thereof into the proper treasury, or by propfer proceeding in court-.\nIt requires some liberality of construction to find in these extinguished contracts an obligation or liability of the purchaser owed '\u00a1to the state. The state agreed to sell the 'land. The purchaser did not expressly agree 'to buy it. He agreed to make the payments \u00a1promptly, it is true, and to pay the taxes. \u25a0But the only remedy expressly reserved by ithe state for default was cancellation at the \u00a1option of the commissioner, with retention of \u2018all payments of principal and interest, as liquidated damages.\nHowever that may be, this constitutional \u2019provision must here be interpreted in the light of another, article 13, \u00a7 2, which vests the commissioner with the direction, control', care, and disposition of all public lands, under such regulations as may be provided by law. We have often pointed out the large powers thus conferred, notably in State ex rel. Otto v. Field, 31 N. M. 120, 241 P. 1027, and have referred to the commissioner as a business manager. American Mortgage Co. v. White, 34 N. M. 602, 287 P. 702.\nIt is not here questioned that the commissioner had statutory authority to make such contracts of sale, which themselves contemplate cancellation. The only \u201cregulation provided by law\u201d which the commissioner is said to have violated is that of notice before cancellation, here immaterial. We think that it is within the broad discretion of the commissioner to cancel contracts like these, retaining sums paid as damages. We see nothing in article 4, \u00a7 32, to prevent it.\nPerhaps the most serious contention goes to the transaction as a whole. The contracts were canceled at the instance of the purchaser and immediately replaced with a lease. The annual cost under the contracts greatly exceeded that under the lease. There was a corresponding loss in. state or institutional revenue. It is urged that the spirit of Constitution and statute, representing the public policy of the state, has thus been violated.\nWe are not insensible that the state may suffer in losing an advantageous sale, and in having the land back on its hands to lease at the present minimum rental. How the commissioner can prevent this, under this form, of contract, is not pointed out. So far as we are aware, all the purchaser need do, if he wishes the contract extinguished, is make default in payment.\nThere can be nothing to the contention then, unless ' it be that the commissioner should not issue a lease to a purchaser who has just defaulted and been canceled out, because it encourages defaults that would not otherwise occur. This is entirely proper for suggestion to the Legislature or to the commissioner, as matter of statutory regulation or land office rule. We do not see how the courts can declare or enforce such a policy.\nAs to this particular case, it should be said that there does not appear the slightest ground for questioning the propriety of Commissioner Hinkle\u2019s act. His successor evidently thought that it was illegal because done by agreement, rather than on notice. The purchaser represented to the commissioner that the burden of carrying the contracts had become too heavy to be borne under existing conditions, and that it must have relief or suffer a loss of its payments and improvements. It did suffer a large forfeiture to the state. The record does not disclose any untruth or bad faith in the representation. The commissioner was not unsympathetic of the plight of those whose purchase commitments have turned out to be unprofitable investments. Whether a different attitude in general or in this particular case would be or have been wiser is not for us to say. We find no illegality or impropriety.\nThe judgment will be affirmed, and the cause remanded. It is so ordered.\n\u2022 SADLER, HUDSPETH, BICKLEY, and ZINN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WATSON, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "E. K. Neumann, Atty. Gen., and Carl B. Livingston, of Santa F\u00e9, for appellant.", "Francis O. Wilson, of Santa F\u00e9, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "35 P.(2d) 297\nVESELY, Commissioner of Public Lands, v. RANCH REALTY CO.\nNo. 3990.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nAug. 17, 1934.\nE. K. Neumann, Atty. Gen., and Carl B. Livingston, of Santa F\u00e9, for appellant.\nFrancis O. Wilson, of Santa F\u00e9, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0480-01", "first_page_order": 516, "last_page_order": 518 }