{ "id": 1573393, "name": "CHURCH OF THE HOLY FAITH, Inc., v. STATE TAX COMMISSION et al.", "name_abbreviation": "Church of the Holy Faith, Inc. v. State Tax Commission", "decision_date": "1935-07-15", "docket_number": "No. 4034", "first_page": "403", "last_page": "419", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "39 N.M. 403" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "43 P.2d 777" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "33 La. Ann. 850", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "La. Ann.", "case_ids": [ 322701 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/la-ann/33/0850-01" ] }, { "cite": "9 S. W. 892", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Tenn. 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Tenn.", "case_ids": [ 8537771 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/tenn/87/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 Ga. 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga.", "case_ids": [ 871330 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga/53/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 S. D. 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "S.D.", "case_ids": [ 5357431 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sd/47/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 N. W. 400", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 Minn. 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Minn.", "case_ids": [ 109445 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/minn/154/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 N. W. 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "173 Minn. 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Minn.", "case_ids": [ 268534 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/minn/173/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 N. W. 802", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Minn. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Minn.", "case_ids": [ 156556 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/minn/158/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 N. W. 783", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 Minn. 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Minn.", "case_ids": [ 758249 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/minn/45/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 Miss. 637", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Miss.", "case_ids": [ 771626 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/miss/130/0637-01" ] }, { "cite": "37 N. M. 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1575362 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/37/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "9 A. 907", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Vt. 202", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Vt.", "case_ids": [ 11267132 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/vt/59/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 U. S. 662", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3591193 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/164/0662-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 N. E. 198", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5537489 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/174/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 N. E. 977", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5571841 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/189/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 U. S. 662", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11729137 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/188/0662-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 N. M. 15", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1559120 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1002" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/38/0015-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 A. L. R. 1166", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "241 N. W. 93", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "122 Neb. 586", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Neb.", "case_ids": [ 4626600 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/neb/122/0586-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 N. Y. S. 660", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "130 Misc. 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Misc.", "case_ids": [ 779808 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/misc/130/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 Utah, 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Utah", "case_ids": [ 8874076 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/utah/40/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 S. W. 1141", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "127 Tenn. 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Tenn.", "case_ids": [ 8535874 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/tenn/127/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 P. 61", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "64 Colo. 529", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Colo.", "case_ids": [ 5283542 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/colo/64/0529-01" ] }, { "cite": "13 P.(2d) 1093", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 1586527, 1468815 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/36/0293-01", "/okla-crim/54/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "36 N. M. 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1586527 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/36/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 P. 245", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "28 N. M. 666", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8843586 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/28/0666-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 P. 101", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "28 N. M. 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8841832 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/28/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 P. 927", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "19 N. M. 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 4705826 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/19/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 U. S. 545", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3606384 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/174/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 P. 987", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "10 N. M. 416", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 11272446 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/10/0416-01" ] }, { "cite": "37 N. M. 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1575362 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/37/0178-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1303, "char_count": 40694, "ocr_confidence": 0.707, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.5251654878651886e-07, "percentile": 0.8840127358776515 }, "sha256": "c1eefdc1347d9f5b53c290a7fc7a3cb2bf87ca6ab510dd2386e0ee31ddf3c3d8", "simhash": "1:fb250ce8f38e64a6", "word_count": 6800 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:29:01.191463+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "SADLER, C. J., and HUDSPETH, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "CHURCH OF THE HOLY FAITH, Inc., v. STATE TAX COMMISSION et al." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BICKLEY, Justice.\nThe appellant is a corporation organized for religious purposes under the provisions of an act authorizing the organization of corporations for religious, benevolent, charitable, scientific, or literary purposes, or for the establishment of colleges, academies, seminaries, churches, or libraries. Section 32-506 et seq., Comp. Stats. 1929 (Laws 1880, c. 2).\nAll of its funds are devoted to religious and charitable purposes through the religious and charitable activities of the parish church.\nThe officers of the state seeking to subject certain property of appellant to a tax are met with the assertion by appellant that under the provisions of section 3 of article 8 of the State Constitution the said property is exempt from taxation. The constitutional provision is \u25a0 found in article 8, \u00a7 3, as follows: \u201cThe property of the United States, the state and all counties, towns, cities and school districts, and other municipal corporations, public libraries, community ditches and all laterals thereof, all church property, all property used for educational or charitable purposes, all cemeteries not used or held for private or corporate profit,'and all bonds of the state of New Mexico, and of the counties, municipalities and districts thereof shall be exempt from taxation.\u201d\nThe property involved is a dwelling house and the lot upon which it is situated, acquired by devise, and is rented by appellant and the proceeds turned over to the parish church and used as other funds of the corporation are used, that is, for religious and charitable purposes.\nThere is no claim that the property itself as the source of the rentals is used for religious or charitable purposes, in the sense that it is used as a house of worship, or as a hospital, infirmary, or other similar charities.\nThe first thing we are required to determine is the meaning of the phrase \u201call church property.\u201d\nAmong some ten definitions of \u201cchurch\u201d given by the lexicographers, two have gotten into the law books generally. One is: \u201cA society of persons who profess the Christian religion.\u201d The other: \u201cThe place where such persons regularly assemble for worship.\u201d\nAppellant claims the benefit of the first definition and asserts that the phrase \u201call church property\u201d means \u201call property of churches,\u201d or \u201call property owned by churches.\u201d Appellees resist this conception. Appellant also claims -the benefit of other provisions of the section on the ground that the property involved is used for religious and charitable purposes. This is also resisted.\nA similar controversy arose in Chicago Theological Seminary v. Illinois, 188 U. S. 662, 23 S. Ct. 386, 387, 47 L. Ed. 641, affirming the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court reported in 189 Ill. 439, 59 N. E. 977, which followed People v. Chicago Theological Seminary, 174 Ill. 177, 51 N. E. 198.\nThe plaintiff in error claimed exemption under its charter entitled:' \u201cAn Act to Incorporate the Chicago Theological Seminary.\u201d That corporation had power \u201cto acquire, hold and convey property, real and personal.\u201d Its object was declared to be \u201cto furnish instruction and the means of education to young men preparing for the gospel ministry.\u201d Section 5 provided: \u201cThat the property, of whatever kind or description, belonging or appertaining to said seminary, shall be forever free and exempt from all taxation for all purposes whatsoever.\u201d\nSection 6 provided: \u201cThis Act * * * shall be construed liberally in all courts for the purposes therein expressed.\u201d\nThe Supreme Court of Illinois had held that the provision granting the exemption from taxation in section 5 referred only to property used in connection with the seminary and did not include other property which might be owned, rented, or held by the seminary as an investment, although the income thereof was used solely for school purposes. The pieces of real estate upon which the taxes were levied were acquired by the plaintiff in error by gift or purchase and were held by it to promote the objects for which it was incorporated, and the rentals received were used for those purposes, although the property was not used in immediate connection with the seminary. The Supreme Court of the United States, in affirming the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court, said: \u201cThe rule is that, in claims for exemption from taxation under legislative authority, the exemption must be plainly and unmistakably granted; It cannot exist by implication only; a doubt is fatal to the claim.\u201d\nThe court continued:\n\u201cThe reasoning of the supreme court of Illinois (174 Ill. 177, 51 N. E. 198), in refusing the exemption claimed, so far as relates to the property not connected with the seminary, is best stated in the language of the opinion of that court. After stating the rule of construction, as above mentioned, the court said ([174 Ill.] p. 181 [51 N. E.] p. 199):\n\u201c \u2018If, however, taking the express words of the act, and without extending their meaning by implication, they may be held to include all property belonging or appertaining to the \u201cseminary\u201d mentioned in the 2d section, or to include all the property belonging or appertaining to the corporation, and there is reasonable ground for doubt which was intended by the legislature, that doubt must be resolved in favor of the state. In other words, if the language is capable of a broad or more restricted meaning, the latter must be adopted. The 2d section of the charter mentioning certain property to be located in or near the city of Chicago, and which is denominated \u201cthe seminary,\u201d we think the words in the 5th section, \u201csaid seminary,\u201d refer to that particular property, and to so hold seems to do no more than to give the language of the two sections their literal and ordinarily understood meaning. To say, as is contended by appellee, that \u201csaid seminary\u201d was intended to mean the corporation is to extend the meaning of those words by implication, which is not permissible.\n\u201c \u2018It is said that the only entity mentioned in the charter capable of owning property is the corporation, and therefore it could not have been intended that property belonging or appertaining to the seminary was meant by \u00a7 5. We think this position is based upon a too limited meaning of the words \u201cbelonging or appertaining,\u201d as here used. Of course, if the language of \u00a7 5 had been that the property, of whatever kind or description, owned by the said seminary shall be forever free from all taxation, etc., or if, as counsel seem to assume, the words \u201cbelonging or appertaining\u201d here necessarily meant ownership of the property, then there would be force in this argument of counsel. It is undoubtedly true that the word \u201cbelonging\u201d may mean ownership, and very often does. But that is not its only meaning. Webster\u2019s International Dictionary defines it: \u201c2. That which is connected with a principal or greater thing; an appendage, an appurtenance.\u201d He also defines the word \u201cpertain\u201d as meaning \u201cto belong or pertain, whether by right of nature, appointment, or custom; to relate, as \u2018things pertaining to life.\u2019 \u201d Manifestly, the purpose of \u00a7 S was to exempt property owned by the corporation, but it does not follow that the intention was to include in that exemption all property owned by it used for purposes of the school.\u2019\n\u201cWe think there is force in this reasoning, and we are disposed to concur in the result arrived at.\n\u201cIt is contended by counsel for plaintiff in error that the words \u2018said seminary,\u2019 contained in \u00a7 5 of the charter, referred to the corporation created by the act, and not to the school buildings and grounds, and that, therefore, the exemption necessarily exempted from taxation all the property against which the judgments below were rendered.\n\u201cHere are two different constructions of the exemption clause, each of which might be maintained with some plausibility. That view which limits the range of the exemption to property used in immediate connection with the seminary might seem to many to be the correct one, while in the opinion of others the broader claim of total exemption would be the best founded. The judges of the supreme court of Illinois have unanimously taken the former view, while counsel for the plaintiff in error very strongly and very ably has taken and maintained the other. We can ourselves see that a construction either way would not be clearly erroneous, or, at any rate, either construction would not be so obviously erroneous as to leave no doubt upon the question. In such cases we think the rule as to the construction of statutes of exemption from taxation should be applied, and as there may be room for reasonable doubt whether a total or only a partial exemption was meant, the partial exemption should alone be recognized.\u201d\nTo say the least, there is as much or more ambiguity in the phrase \u201call church property\u201d read with the context as there was in the language in the Illinois statute. There are many other decisions to the same effect as those cited from Illinois and the Supreme Court of the United States.\nMr. Cooley in his work on Taxation (4th Ed.) at section 680, treats of \u201cthe importance of use of property as against ownership.\u201d He says:\n\u201cA right to exemption from taxation may be granted in such terms as to include all the property of the corporation or association, without regard to the use to which it is put, unless the constitution expressly limits the right to exempt according to the use made of the property. If statutes were read literally, a statute exempting \u2018all\u2019 property \u2018owned\u2019 or \u2018held\u2019 or \u2018belonging to\u2019 certain institutions or persons, without qualifying words would be held to include all property so owned regardless of its use in connection with the business of the owner or otherwise; and it is often held that statutes using one or more of such terms and not expressly limiting the exemption to property used for certain purposes, included all property so owned without regard to its use. * *' * On the other hand, there is authority in favor of limiting exemptions, even when on their face they include all property owned by certain institutions, to property used for the purposes thereof, especially in case of exemption or commutation of railroad companies, on the theory that the intention to exempt all the property is not clear. Generally such a grant is in express terms limited to property which is held by the corporation or association for the purposes for which it was created or organized; and, even when there is no such express limitation, (italics ours) these cases hold that a grant of exemption from taxation should not be construed as applying to property of a corporation or association which is not necessary for or used in the business or object for which it was created. * * * And it has been held that an exemption of property from taxation, although in general terms, does not apply to property held, not for use in carrying on its business, but for the purpose of selling or leasing the same, or for mere convenience; that an exemption of manufacturing corporations from taxation does not exempt property of such a corporation not used nor invested in its manufacturing; and that an exemption of the property of a canal company does not exempt property used merely as the residence of its superintendent. * * *\n\u201cIf the exemption depends on the use made of the property, rather than the ownership, the title to the property is immaterial, i. e., the title need not be in the user claiming the' exemption. In such a case it is the use and not the ownership which determines the right to the exemption. It follows that the owner may claim the exemption although the use is by another.\u201d\nThe following are excerpts from the note to the Cooley text:\n\u201cIt has been frequently decided that a general exemption, of the property of a corporation from taxation is to be construed as referring only to the property held for the transaction of the business of the company. Ford v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 164 U. S. 662, 17 S. Ct. 230, 41 L. Ed. 590.\n\u201cEven when ownership is all that is required by statute, the statute is often construed as including only property used in carrying out the purposes for the protection of which the exemption was granted.\u201d Willard v. Pike, 59 Vt. 202, 218, 9 A. 907.\n\u201cOwnership \u2018refers only to property used in immediate connection with the seminary, and does not include other property which may be owned, rented, or held by the said seminary as an investment, even though the income thereof is used solely for school purposes.\u2019 \u201d\n\u201cEven where a charter of a religious school expressly exempted \u2018the property, of whatever kind or description, belonging or appertaining to\u2019 it, the exemption was held not to include lands yielding 'rents used for the support of the school.\u201d\nWe proceed then to an examination of the provision of our Constitution with such aids as we may lay hold of to ascertain tbe reasonable and probable intent of the framers of the Constitution.\n\u201cExemption statutes may be roughly classified as belonging to one of three groups, viz.: (1) Those making ownership of the property by a certain institution or class of people the test; (2) Those making the particular use of the property rather than the ownership the test; and (3) Those making both ownership and use the test. Especially is this classification important in connection with exemption of charitable, religious and educational institutions. If ownership is the test, then the use is often held immaterial. If use is the test, then the ownership is generally immaterial.\u201d Cooley, Taxation (4th Ed.) \u00a7 690.\nIn Temple Lodge No. 6, A. F. & A. M., v. Tierney, 37 N. M. 178, 20 P.(2d) 280, 283, upon a comparison of section 141-110, Comp. Stats. 1929, which dates back as far as all features here important to Laws 1882, c. 62, \u00a7 3, which governed such exemptions in Territorial days, with the constitutional provision now under consideration, we said as to property \u201cused for educational and charitable purposes\u201d : \u201cWhile both use and ownership were formerly requisite, use alone now suffices.\u201d\nThe constitutional provision before us reads: \u201cThe property of the United States, the state and all counties, towns, cities and school districts, and other municipal corporations * * * shall be exempt from taxation.\u201d Article 8, \u00a7 3.\nHere ownership seems plainly the sole test. Elsewhere in the section \u201call property used for educational or charitable purposes, all cemeteries not used or held for private or corporate profit * * * shall be exempt from taxation.\u201d Here use seems to be the sole test. The section also contains the phrase, \u201cpublic libraries, community ditches and all laterals thereof, all church property,\u201d are exempt from taxation. As to these three kinds of property, no specific qualifying words are used which will serve to pigeonhole them into either the ownership or use classifications. It is at once suggested that ownership by the United States, state, county, town, city, school district, or other municipal corporation is not necessary to constitute a library a public library. The nature of the use would seem to be the determining factor. If there could not be a public library unless it were owned by the state or a legal subdivision thereof, such as a county, town, city, or school district, then there would have been no need of mentioning them specially because they would have been exempt under the first clause where ownership in the public is all sufficient to afford the exemption. As to \u201ccommunity ditches and all laterals thereof,\u201d we sense the only instance of a concurrence possibly of ownership and use as requisites. Perhaps these words express the meaning conveyed by the supplanted statute when it declared \u201cirrigating ditches, canals and flumes belonging to communities and used exclusively for irrigating lands, without any charge or compensation for the same or for the water thereof, except the necessary work and charges to keep the same in repair.\u201d\nThere would seem to be a logic in making ownership the test as to exemptions of property of the United States, the state, and all counties, towns, cities, and school districts and other municipal corporations. As to the property of the United States, the statement is little more than a declaration of inability of one sovereign to tax another related sovereign. For the state to tax its own property would simply be taking money out of one pocket and putting it into another. The county, town, cities, and school districts and other municipal corporations being merely subdivisions of the state, performing under powers delegated to them by the state some of the purposes of state government, it would seem illogical to embarrass the performance of such duties by placing tax burdens upon these state agencies, or, in other words, imposing in effect taxes upon itself. These are the only instances where a specific word appropriate to indicate ownership as the test is used. \u201cOf\u201d indicates the relationship of possession. Webster\u2019s International Dictionary. The word has been held equivalent to \u201cbelonging to.\" Bouvier.\nLikewise, there are no specific words indicating use as the test applied to \u201cpublic libraries, community ditches * * * all church property.\u201d That does not mean that neither use nor ownership are requisite. In other words, no new classification was created, and public libraries, community ditches, and church property fall either into one or the other or both of the classifications described by Mr. Cooley.\nWe must credit the Constitution makers with the knowledge that it was the territorial policy evinced in the act of 1880 which remains in force as Comp. Stat. 1929, \u00a7 32-508, to extend to corporations organized for religious purposes the privilege and power to \u201ctake such real and personal property as is necessary or proper for the furtherance of its objects\u201d (purposes) and with the knowledge that by the statute (section 32-506, Comp. Stat. 1929), authorizing such incorporations, the purpose of establishing \u201cchurches\u201d was one of the religious aims specially mentioned. That is to say \u201cchurches\u201d in that statute is used in a different sense than as being the corporate entity. The language is, \u201cmay organize a corporation for religious * * * purposes, or for the establishment of * * * churches,\u201d showing that the establishment of churches is one of the purposes of the corporation and not the corporation itself. And, also, that the grant of power therein to take real and personal property was restricted to such property as was \u201cnecessary or proper for the furtherance of its objects [purposes].\u201d\nWe assume they were familiar with the exemption statute passed shortly thereafter (1882) which exempted from taxation \u201cthe grounds, buildings, books, papers and apparatus of * * * religious institutions and societies, when the property of said institutions and societies shall be devoted exclusively to the appropriate objects of such institutions.\u201d\nIn view of the foregoing, it seems likely that if the framers of the Constitution had intended to depart entirely from use as a test and make ownership by religious institutions and societies the sole test of whether church property was exempt, they would have used words appropriate to manifest such intention by saying that \u201call property of churches\u201d or all property \u201cbelonging to churches,\u201d in the sense contended for by appellant and as heretofore defined, that is, that a church is \u201ca society of persons who profess the Christian religion.\u201d\nThey must be credited with knowledge that corporations were entitled to own only such property as is necessary or proper to enable them to carry out the objects of their creation, and if they had intended to depart from the policy well known to the law to restrict property holdings of corporations to such property as is necessary to carry out the objects of its creation, they would have said so in plain and unmistakable language.\nEven if it were held that \u201cchurch property\u201d meant property of the churches, we would be required to inquire whether even in the face of the word \u201call\u201d we must not hold that it was the intent to consider both ownership and use in determining whether the exemption is limited to property ordinarily understood to be necessary and proper for religious purposes. See Chicago Theological Seminary v. Illinois, supra, and Gunter v. Jackson, 130 Miss. 637, 94 So. 844.\nThe framers of the Constitution were not without models in the Constitutions and statutes of other states. In most, they would have found use for religious worship or purposes to be the sole test. They would have found a very few provisions making ownership the sole test. It would be found that the Constitution of only one other state employs phraseology similar to ours, namely, Minnesota, as follows: \u201cAll churches, church property and houses of worship, * * * shall be exempt from taxation.\u201d Article 9, \u00a7 1.\nAssuming that the framers of the Constitution had the Minnesota Constitution before them as a model, the phrase \u201call church property\u201d was likely thought by them to cover \u201call churches, church property and houses of worship,\u201d because it would seem plain that churches and houses of worship are church property, and therefore surplus language.\nThere seems to be a distinction between church property in the sense of property used for religious purposes and \u201cproperty used for educational or charitable purposes.\u201d Aside from the proposition that religious teaching is educational, and giving \u201ceducational purposes\u201d a broader significance, still a church as an entity may enjoy under the construction here employed, in addition to its exemption of property used for religious purposes, property which it uses for \u201ceducational or charitable purposes.\u201d So that, for example, if a church as an entity has established a church property, and also \u201ccolleges, academies, seminaries, libraries, hospitals,\u201d it may claim them all as exempt under the clause of the Constitution, exempting \u201cproperty used for educational or charitable purposes.\u201d\nThe Constitution of Minnesota prior to 1906 exempted from taxation \u201call churches, church property used for religious purposes, and houses of worship.\u201d Const. 1857, art. 9, \u00a7 3. Under that provision it was held that a rectory or parsonage belonging to a church society and actually used as a residence of a priest or minister of the society was not exempt. See County of Ramsey v. Church of the Good Shepherd, 45 Minn. 229, 47 N. W. 783.\nThe Minnesota Constitution was amended in 1906 so as to eliminate the words-\u201cused for religious purposes\u201d immediately following the words \u201cchurch property.\u201d Then the question of the exemption of parsonages came again before the court under the amended constitutional provision in the case of State v. Church of Incarnation, 158 Minn. 48, 196 N. W. 802, and it was held that a parsonage owned by the church society and actually used and maintained by the society as a residence for its priest or minister free of charge or rent was exempt from taxes. That case held to that extent only, but the court does, however, indicate a rule which is applied in the case of State v. Union Congregational Church, 173 Minn. 40, 216 N. W. 326, 327, and which we think should be applied in the case at bar. The court in the last-cited case quoted the earlier decision declaring: \u201cThe words \u2018used for religious purposes\u2019 have been eliminated, so that the language relating to churches is now as broad as that relating to institutions of learning.\u201d\nThe court in the Union Congregational Church Case then says that:\n\u201cGenerally speaking, it may be said that the rule governing exemption from taxation as to the real property of educational institutions is that all property reasonably necessary for, and primarily used and devoted to, the proper purposes of the institution, and so located with reference to the main buildings or activities of the institution as to be reasonably suitable for such purposes, is exempt from taxation. * * *\n\u201cApplying the same rule to church societies, a lot and dwelling house rented to others, and not used in any way for religious or church purposes, and not shown to be intended or necessary for such use in the future, are not exempt.\u201d\nThe court went on to say:\n\u201c2. Counsel for defendant argues that the Constitution makes no reference to the purpose for which the property shall be used, that no limit is placed on the use of the property, and urges .that the term \u2018church property\u2019 should be construed as if it read \u2018all property owned by a church corporation or religious society.\u2019 To this we are unable to agree. The connection in which the words are used does not indicate or require such a construction. The words used in the Constitution are, \u2018all churches, church property and houses of worship.\u2019 The. words \u2018churches\u2019 and \u2018houses\u2019 of worship\u2019 clearly refer-to the kind of use made of the buildings. A building in the usual architectural form of a church, if used for a railway station or business house, would not be a church or a house of worship, and an ordinary business building used only for religious services would be a church or house of worship. So it is the use of the property which determines whether or not it is a ehurch or house of worship. The term \u2018church property,\u2019 used in immediate connection with the words \u2018churches\u2019 and \u2018houses of worship,\u2019 readily bears the same construction that it is the use or relation of the property to the purposes and activities of the church organization which determines whether or not it is church property. That is the reasonable construction, and the one here adopted.\n\u201cThe general rule is that laws and constitutional provisions exempting property from taxation are to be strictly construed. Such laws are to be given a reasonable and practical construction that will give effect to their manifest purpose, but will not be extended by construction or implication. Unless clearly so expressed and intended, it is not to be assumed that the Legislature or the people intended to permit religious corporations and charitable and educational institutions to hold tax free any amount of real estate they might be able to acquire, without reference to the need or use thereof. The evil of permitting any class of corporations or societies to become tax exempt proprietors and landlords on a large scale is too well known. As said by Justice Holt in the Carleton College Case [154 Minn. 280, 191 N. W. 400]:\n\u201c \u2018If the church could acquire and hold free from taxes property used in business enterprises, she would depart from her true mission and become a competitor of other business concerns, a field in which she is entitled to no advantage over them.\u2019\n\u201cThe owning of city and village residence property for the purpose of renting the same and receiving income therefrom is a business enterprise engaged in by many corporations and individuals.\n\u201cWithout express provision to that effect, we are not willing to hold that by the constitutional provision in question, as amended, the Legislature or the people intended to open wide the door of exemption and relieve from taxation all real estate owned by church corporations or religious societies, irrespective of the use of such property.\n\u201cA number of cases are cited from other states. Most, if not all, of these cases arose under constitutional or statutory provisions differently worded than our Constitution. In the South Dakota case (Dakota Wesleyan University v. Betts, 47 S. D. 618, 201 N. W. 524) the exemption was \u2018all property, both real and personal, belonging to any educational institution,\u2019 and \u2018all property used exclusively by and for the support of such institution.\u2019 This, of course, is a wide open provision, exempting not only all property owned by the institution, but also any property used exclusively by it for support even if owned by others.\n\u201cOther cases cited from Georgia, Tennessee, and Louisiana were under exemption laws, using such words as \u2018any house belonging to\u2019; real estate \u2018so long as it belongs to\u2019; and \u2018all property of\u2019 \u2014 all very clearly making ownership the test. Mayor, etc., of Savannah v. Solomon\u2019s Lodge, 53 Ga. 93; University of the South v. Skidmore, 87 Tenn. 155, 9 S. W. 892; New Orleans v. Poydras Orphan Asylum, 33 La. Ann. 850.\u201d\nSince the language in question, \u201call church property,\u201d had not been theretofore employed in the constitutional exemption provision of any other state than Minnesota, we think it. not unreasonable to assume that the framers of our Constitution were familiar with it when framing section 3 of article 8 of our Constitution.\nSince \u201cchurches\u201d and \u201chouses of worship\u201d are manifestly \u201cchurch property,\u201d the Minnesota Supreme Court still had to deal with the question of the meaning of the phrase \u201cchurch property,\u201d and we think that they gave the correct answer.\nWe think the phrase \u201cchurch property,\u201d as used in the section of the Constitution under consideration, means property required for the use of the church. In the field of hooks, if we are confronted with the expression \u201claw books,\u201d \u201cschool books,\u201d \u201chymn books,\u201d we understand that the words indicate a peculiar use to which the books are put. If we see an allusion to a \u201cgrocery store\u201d or a \u201cdrug store\u201d or a \u201chardware store,\u201d we get a mental picture of the kind of store referred to without regard to ownership th\u00e9reof. So when we see the expression \u201cchurch property,\u201d we know at once that it is property used for religious worship and instruction.\nThe quid pro quo theory as a justification for exempting property from taxation where the exemption is for the promotion of religious, educational, charitable, or similar objects, deemed beneficial to the state, is frequently invoked in support of liberal construction of exemption provisions. See Temple Lodge, No. 6, A. F. & A. M., v. Tierney, supra. Taxation is the rule, exemption the exception, and it is plain that the quid pro quo theory as supporting the exception fails as to property of a church as an entity which is not necessary for or is not used to promote the object or purposes of the church. It must be supposed that the teaching and inculcating of religious ideas is beneficial to the state. This theory sought to be encouraged by exempting church property from taxation necessarily rests upon the assumption that the property of the church as a religious society will be held and used by the church for those purposes for which the church was incorporated and exists. In so far as the property of the church is not so employed, there is no quid pro quo.\nOur construction would logically lead to a holding that buildings with land they occupy and furnishings therein, used for religious purposes, or for residence of the priests or ministers, together with adjacent land reasonably necessary for convenient use of such buildings, are exempt from taxation.\nThe greater the amount of property that escapes taxation, the greater the burden is upon other property holders to bear the support of the government. That alone should not deter us from adopting a construction which will give to religious societies or corporations every immunity conferred by law, but public convenience, private justice, and individual hardship should cause us. to hesitate and carefully examine the provision of law which is said to confer such privilege.\nWe conclude that the property in-question is not being used for religious purposes and therefore is not \u201cchurch property,\u201d and also that said property is not being used for \u201ccharitable purposes\u201d and is therefore subject to taxation. The fact that the rents accumulated from such property are used for religious or charitable purposes does not alter the situation. Whether the rents so used are exempted is not a question presented and as to which we express no opinion.\nThe judgment of the district court sustaining the defendants\u2019 (appellees\u2019) demurrer and dismissing plaintiff\u2019s complaint must be affirmed, and it is so ordered.\nSADLER, C. J., and HUDSPETH, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BICKLEY, Justice." }, { "text": "ZINN, Justice\n(dissenting).\nI cannot reconcile the views of the majority with the-opinion of this court in the case of Temple Lodge No. 6, A. F. & A. M., v. Tierney, 37 N. M. 178, 20 P. (2d) 280, 283. Tierney, appellee, in that case urged the very rule now relied upon by the majority in this case, and which rule was rejected. Appellee there urged the strict rule of interpretation in claims for exemptions from taxation. This court, to my mind, adopted a liberal rule of construction, or at least held that the Constitutional Convention and the people when they adopted our Constitution had extended the field or liberalized the policy of exemption. That being the pronouncement of this court, and bowing to the rule promulgated in the Temple Lodge Case, I cannot lying myself to an agreement with the majority.\nBy construction, the majority finds that \u201call church property\u201d m\u00e9ans property used for religious purposes. What of the house set aside for the use of the parson or rector?\nIn the Temple Lodge Case this court said:\n\u201cNot only did our Constitution makers depart in method and phraseology from systems of exemption common in other states; they departed considerably and significantly from the then existing territorial system, with which certainly they were familiar. The exemptions as of territorial days still appear in 1929 Comp. St. as section 141-110. Though compilers have traced its origin to the General Appropriation Act of 1891 (chapter 94, \u00a7 7), it dates back, as to all features here important, to Laws 1882, c. 62, \u00a7 3. It reads:\n\u201c T41-110. The following property shall be exempt from taxation: Property of the United States and of this state, counties, cities, towns and other municipal, corporations, when devoted entirely to public use and not held for pecuniary profit; all pub-lie libraries, the grounds, buildings, books, papers and apparatus of literary, scientific, benevolent, agricultural and religious institutions and societies, when the property of the said institutions and societies shall be devoted exclusively to the appropriate objects of such institutions and not leased or rented or otherwise used with a view to pecuniary profit; irrigating ditches, canals and flumes belonging to communities and used exclusively for irrigating lands, without any charge or compensation for the same or for the water thereof, except the necessary work and charges to keep the same in repair; and cemeteries not held and used for pecuniary profit.\u2019\n\u201cA comparison of this with the constitutional provision which supplanted it discloses an elimination of those qualifying expressions which we are now asked to apply as if they had been retained. The elimination must have been deliberate and studious. The conclusion is natural, and not readily to be avoided, that a purpose existed to extend the field or liberalize the policy of tax exemption.\u201d\nClearly the Constitutional Convention, had they intended use and not ownership as the criterion of exemption, had clear language before them as a guide.\nFormerly, \u201cthe grounds, * * * books, papers and apparatus of literary, scientific, benevolent, agricultural and religious institutions and societies\u201d were exempt \u201cwhen the property of the said institutions and societies shall be devoted exclusively to the appropriate objects of such institutions and not leased or rented or otherwise used with a view to pecuniary profit.\u201d\nTo my mind the departure was studied and deliberate. It was to broaden and liberalize exemptions, as this court held in the Temple Lodge Case. Now we reverse our policy in this case, and apply a strict rule.\nAgain examining the Temple Lodge Case, this court said:\n\u201cBut appellee invokes the familiar doctrine that taxation is the rule and exemption the exception, that, accordingly, he who claims exemption must overcome a presumption, and that the provision of law invoked by appellant is to be strictly construed. That general doctrine is not strange to this court. United States Trust Co. v. Territory, 10 N. M. 416, 62 P. 987; New Mexico v. United States Trust Co., 174 U. S. 545, 19 S. Ct. 784, 43 L. Ed. 1079; Samosa v. Lopez, 19 N. M. 312, 142 P. 927; State v. Board of Trustees, 28 N. M. 237, 210 P. 101; Berger v. University of New Mexico, 28 N. M. 666, 217 P. 245; Oden Buick, Inc., v. Roehl, 36 N. M. 293, 13 P.(2d) 1093.\n\u201cBut where the exemption is for the promotion of religious, educational, charitable, or similar objects, deemed beneficial to the state, and to afford a quid pro quo, an exception has frequently been declared. For expositions of this doctrine and collections of authority, see Horton v. Colorado Springs Bldg. Society [64 Colo. 529, 173 P. 61, L. R. A. 1918E, 966]; Cumberland Lodge v. Nashville [127 Tenn. 248, 154 S. W. 1141]; Salt Lake Lodge v. Groesbeck [40 Utah, 1, 120 P. 192, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 940], all hereinbefore cited; People v. Farrell, 130 Misc. 142, 223 N. Y. S. 660; and Cooley on Taxation (4th Ed.) \u00a7 673.\u201d\nIn Ancient and A. S. R. of Freemasonry v. Board of County Com\u2019rs, 122 Neb. 586, 241 N. W. 93, 97, 81 A. L. R. 1166, cited in the Temple Lodge Case, it was said that the rule of strict construction \u201cdoes not mean that there should not be a liberal construction of the language used in order to carry out the expressed intention of the fundamental lawmakers and the legislature, but, rather, that the property which is claimed to be exempt must come clearly within the provisions granting such exemption.\u201d\nDoes not the property in the instant case \u201c* * * Come clearly within the provisions granting such exemption\u201d?\nTo my mind it does. I find the plain meaning of the intended exemption in the phrase \u201call church property.\u201d This phrase does not require \u201cmetaphysical or logical subtleties,\u201d to interpret it.\nI look to our Constitution and there seek the thought which it expressed to the people of New Mexico who ratified it. I give to it the meaning found in the minds of its makers who are the people who adopted it. \u201cAll church property\u201d is plain language, and to the mind of the citizen who voted for its adoption it had but one meaning, simply all property belonging to the church, or all property of the church.\nIn the case of Todd v. Tierney, 38 N. M. 15, 27 P.(2d) 991, 1002, where we were called upon to construe article 4, \u00a7 1, of our Constitution, we said:\n\u201cIt is our duty to determine what the plain citizen intended when he voted to adopt the Constitution.\n\u201cSays Mr. Justice Story: \u2018Constitutions are not designated for metaphysical or logical subtleties, for niceties of expression, for critical propriety, for elaborate shades of meaning, or for the exercise of philosophical acuteness of judicial research. They are instruments of a practical nature, founded on the common business of human life, adapted to common wants, designed for common use, and fitted for common understandings. The people make them, the people adopt them, the people must be supposed to read them, with the help of common sense, and cannot be presumed to admit in them any recondite meaning or any extraordinary gloss.\u2019- 1 Story, Const. \u00a7 451.\n\u201cWe must give the subject a common sense and plain interpretation to carry out the intention of the plain people who adopted it.\u201d\nNow what did the people of New Mexico understand to be the meaning of the phrase \u201call church property\u201d? \u201cAll\u201d as an adjective means \u201cthe whole of,\u201d and used as in the Constitution it refers to amount, quantity, or extent. All year Includes every day thereof. \u201cAll church property,\u201d to the mind of the citizen, who voted for the adoption of the Constitution, includes every piece of property belonging to the church. Not merely \u201c * * * the grounds, buildings, books, papers and apparatus of * * * religious institutions and societies, when the property of the said institutions and societies shall be devoted exclusively to the appropriate objects of such institutions and not leased or rented or otherwise used with a view to pecuniary profit,\u201d but the Constitution used an all embracing term, denoting ownership and not use, namely, \u201call church property.\u201d\nThough I have the highest regard and respect for the views of the majority, being not in accord, I must dissent.'", "type": "dissent", "author": "ZINN, Justice" }, { "text": "WATSON, Justice\n(concurring).\nMy conclusion is that of Mr. Justice ZINN and I am in general accord with what he has said.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "WATSON, Justice" } ], "attorneys": [ "Charles B. Barker, of Santa Fe, for appellant.", "J. D. Mell, Sp. Tax Atty., and David Chavez, Jr., Dist. Atty., both of Santa Fe, and E. K. Neumann, Atty. Gen., and Quincy D. Adams, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "43 P.(2d) 777\nCHURCH OF THE HOLY FAITH, Inc., v. STATE TAX COMMISSION et al.\nNo. 4034.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nJuly 15, 1935.\nRehearing Denied Sept. 24, 1935.\nCharles B. Barker, of Santa Fe, for appellant.\nJ. D. Mell, Sp. Tax Atty., and David Chavez, Jr., Dist. Atty., both of Santa Fe, and E. K. Neumann, Atty. Gen., and Quincy D. Adams, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees." }, "file_name": "0403-01", "first_page_order": 451, "last_page_order": 467 }