{ "id": 8842115, "name": "VUKOVICH v. ST. LOUIS, ROCKY MOUNTAIN & PACIFIC CO.", "name_abbreviation": "Vukovich v. St. Louis, Rocky Mountain Co.", "decision_date": "1936-08-24", "docket_number": "No. 4186", "first_page": "374", "last_page": "380", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "40 N.M. 374" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "60 P.2d 356" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "112 Or. 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Or.", "case_ids": [ 4948580 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or/112/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 N.M. 650", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1556024 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/34/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 P. 356", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 N.M. 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2388385 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/21/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 P. 694", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "695" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 N.M. 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8841348 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/28/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 S.W. 884", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 Ky. 345", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ky.", "case_ids": [ 4856021 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ky/209/0345-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 Wyo. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wyo.", "case_ids": [ 8515189 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wyo/38/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 Mont. 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mont.", "case_ids": [ 4880400 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mont/81/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 N.E. 369", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 Ill. 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2420526 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/290/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 S.E. 323", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 W.Va. 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "W. Va.", "case_ids": [ 8636446 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/w-va/108/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "13 P.(2d) 39", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 Wash. 677", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash.", "case_ids": [ 852072 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash/168/0677-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 S.W. 770", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 Tenn. 660", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Tenn.", "case_ids": [ 8535206 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/tenn/150/0660-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 Or. 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Or.", "case_ids": [ 4628731 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or/104/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 N.W. 1013", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "200 Mich. 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich.", "case_ids": [ 1761741 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich/200/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "242 N.W. 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Neb. 138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Neb.", "case_ids": [ 2380318 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/neb/123/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 S.W.(2d) 777", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10253133 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/51/0777-01" ] }, { "cite": "16 S.W.(2d) 386", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10293201 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/16/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "236 N.W. 378", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 N.W. 756", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "204 Wis. 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis.", "case_ids": [ 8694356 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis/204/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "36 N.M. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1586559 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/36/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "37 N.M. 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1575432 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/37/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "35 N.M. 544", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1557957 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/35/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 N.M. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1554474 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "947" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/33/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 N.M. 451", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1559154 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/38/0451-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 890, "char_count": 15910, "ocr_confidence": 0.707, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.037699648184207e-07, "percentile": 0.936871995239877 }, "sha256": "eee1b392497ef1d73030f6ee67f487cc26b778b4fc37097e5f9988015d018293", "simhash": "1:8f6d2b509507f636", "word_count": 2687 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:58:32.968106+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "HUDSPETH, BICKLEY, and ZINN, JJ., concur.", "BRICE, J., did not participate." ], "parties": [ "VUKOVICH v. ST. LOUIS, ROCKY MOUNTAIN & PACIFIC CO." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "SADLER, Chief Justice.\nThe plaintiff (appellee), recovered compensation and attorney\u2019s fees in the district court of Colfax county under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Law (Comp.St. 1929, \u00a7' 156-101 et seq.) for the death of her husband in a mine accident. The defendant against whom said recovery was had seeks a review of the judgment by .this appeal.\nThe husband, Ilija Vukovich, while employed by defendant as a coal miner, on July 27, 1931, suffered an injury from accident arising out of and in the course of his employment by the falling of rock in the mine. The major injury was a broken back. He was admittedly totally disabled 'by reason of the injury from the date thereof until his death on June 1, 1932, and was paid disability compensation throughout such period. The deceased left .surviving him his widow, the plaintiff, and five children of whom the eldest was over eighteen years of age.\nThe claim or suit for compensation was not filed until April 1, 1933. While this was only ten months from the date of death, it was slightly more than twenty months after the injury claimed to have resulted in death.\nThroughout the proceedings in the district court, the defendant urged at every opportunity the proposition that under our statute a claim for death compensation must be filed within one year after the injury, and that the claim in this case is therefore barred. An attempt heretofore has been made to have us determine this specific question. See State ex rel. St. Louis, Rocky Mountain & Pacific Company v. District Court, 38 N.M. 451, 34 P.(2d) 1098. There it was sought to obtain a permanent writ of prohibition on the theory that the one-year limitation was jurisdictional. After hearing, we denied the writ upon the ground that prohibition was not a proper remedy. We did not construe the limitation statute, although for the purposes of that decision we felt called upon to assume that a recovery of compensation could not be upheld because barred by the statute.\nThe defendant assigns six errors. The first being decisive, we shall consider it alone. It is that the claim for compensation is barred under 1929 Comp. \u00a7 156-116, because not filed within one year after the date of injury. The section-relied upon as barring the claim reads as follows: \u201cIn event any injury from accident arising out of and in the course of the employment of a workman should result in and be the proximate cause of his death and he should leave surviving him any dependents, as\nherein defined,' entitled to compensation under the terms hereof, payment thereof may be received or claim therefor filed by such person as the court may authorize or permit, on behalf of the beneficiaries entitled thereto, and such claim shall be filed and answer made thereto and other procedure had as in cases filed by injured workman, Provided, that no claim shall he filed or suit brought to recover such compensation unless claim therefor be filed within one year after the date of such injury.\u201d (Italics ours.)\nWe have never before been called upon to construe the limitation provisions of our Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act in the respect now invoked. In Caton v. Gilliland Oil Co., 33 N.M. 227, 264 P. 946, 947, construing L.1917, c. 83, \u00a7 13 (carried forward as amended in 1929 as 1929 Comp. \u00a7 156-113), which provides the limitation applicable to claims for non-fatal injuries, we said: \u201cIf anything can be- said to be made >lain by this remarkably complicated sec-ion, it is this: An employer having knowledge of the injury, must, within 31 lays after its occurrence, pay the first in-uallment of compensation. If the employ-.\u25a0r fails or refuses so to do, the workman must, within 60 days thereafter, file his claim for compensation. If he does not, his claim, his right, and his remedy are forever barred.\u201d For other similar holdings, see Taylor v. American Employers\u2019 Ins. Co., 35 N.M. 544, 3 P.(2d) 76, and Maestas v. American Metal Co., 37 N.M. 203, 20 P.(2d) 924.\nThe meaning obviously suggested by the language of this section is that a claim by dependents on account of injury resulting in death is barred unless suit be filed within one year from date of such injury. The defendant relies upon the apparent as the real meaning and says there is no room for construction.\nThe plaintiff\u2019s argument is not without appeal. Succinctly stated it is this: The word \u201cinjury\u201d may have two meanings. It can refer either to the physical injury or bodily hurt, or connote the legal injury suffered by those in whose favor a cause of action arises by reason of the compen-sable death of an employee. As here used in fixing the limitation at one year \u201cfrom the date of such injury,\u201d it is said it must have been employed in the latter sense, for until that event no right of action exists in the dependents. Hence, the word \u201cinjury\u2019,\u2019 where last used in this section means \u201cdeath,\u201d or includes death, and, claim having been filed within one year after death, is timely.\nReliance is placed upon the statutory definition of the word \u201cinjury\u201d or \u201cinjuries\u201d carried in subsection (l) of section 156-112, reading, so far as material, as follows : \u201cIn this act, unless the context otherwise requires * * * (1) the\nwords \u2018injuries sustained in extrahazardous occupations or pursuit,\u2019 as used in this act shall include death resulting from injury.\u201d\nIn suggesting that the phrase \u201cinjuries sustained in extrahazardous occupations or pursuit\u201d should be treated as the equivalent of the word \u201cinjury\u201d for present purposes, counsel remind that in Cuellar v. American Employers\u2019 Ins. Co., 36 N.M. 141, 9 P.(2d) 685, we noted absence of the exact phrase elsewhere in the act. We so accept it.\nIn support of their argument plaintiff\u2019s counsel cite cases holding that by the word \u201cinjury,\u201d as used in the 'statutes of- certain states, is meant the state of facts which first entitles claimant to compensation. Acme Body Works v. Industrial Commission, 204 Wis. 493, 234 N.W. 756, opinion supplemented, 236 N.W. 378; Texas Employers\u2019 Ins. Ass\u2019n v. Wonderley (Tex.Civ.App.) 16 S.W.(2d) 386; Fidelity Union Casualty Co. v. Koonce (Tex.Civ.App.) 51 S.W.(2d) 777; Astuto v. Ray Gould Co., 123 Neb. 138, 242 N.W. 375. See, also, 71 C.J. 965. These cases hold under the statutes construed that if the injury does not develop until after the accident, the cause of action arises when the injury, develops or becomes apparent and not necessarily at the time of the accident.\nThat the authorities are not uniform even in this holding is indicated by decisions from certain other jurisdictions. 71 C.J. 1018; Cooke v. Holland Furnace Co., 200 Mich. 192, 166 N.W. 1013, L.R.A. 1918E, 552; Lough v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 104 Or. 313, 207 P. 354; Graham v. J. W. Wells Brick Co., 150 Tenn. 660, 266 S.W. 770; Ferguson v. State Dept. of Labor, 168 Wash. 677, 13 P.(2d) 39; Salyer v. Ott, State Compensation Commissioner, 108 W.Va. 410, 151 S.E. 323; Central Locomotive & Car Works v. Lindstrom, Industrial Comm., 290 Ill. 436, 125 N.E. 369. But we do not have this question before us and, aside from considering the analogy urged in connection with plaintiff\u2019s argument, it is enough at this time to note the divergence of view suggested by the conflicting decisions mentioned.\nAfter carefully weighing the able argument presented by plaintiff\u2019s counsel, further reading and reconsideration of the controlling statute leaves us satisfied that the meaning impressed on the mind from a first reading is the true meaning intended by the Legislature in writing the statute. In other words, we conclude that the apparent and the real meaning are not different. An analysis of the language of section 156-116 leaves no doubt in our minds of the correctness of this conclusion. Paraphrased and omitting unessential parts, the statute reads: \u201cIn event any injury * * * should result in and be the proximate cause of his death * * * no claim shall be filed or suit brought to recover such compensation unless claim therefor be filed within one year after the date of such injury.\u201d (Italics ours.)\nThe statute itself clearly differentiates between injury and death. The one must precede and be the responsible agency' of the other in an unbroken chain of causation. The one is the cause; the other its effect. In words as clear and unambiguous as language is capable of, having thus discriminated between injury and death, as between cause and effect, in making death compensable, the statute then proceeds to limit the time within which claim for said compensation must be filed. In this connection, it reads: \u201cProvided, that no claim shall be filed or suit brought to recover such compensation unless claim therefor be filed within one year after the date of such injury.\u201d (Italics ours.)\nIn using the words \u201csuch injury,\u201d the Legislature could only have referred to the physical injury theretofore mentioned as resulting in the death from which it is clearly and painstakingly dissociated in meaning/ The grammatical construction, the syntax, the context, all point unerringly to the correctness of this conclusion. \u201cSuch injury\u201d \u2014 what injury? No other antecedent for the words, \u201csuch injury,\u201d so readily suggests itself as the injury previously mentioned. That injury could not mean death, because it is spoken of as the cause of death.\nIn so holding we do not overlook the statutory declaration that the words \u201cinjuries sustained in extrahazardous occupations or pursuit,\u201d as used in the act and treated as the equivalent of the word \u201cinjury,\u201d shall \u201cinclude death resulting from injury\u201d unless the context otherwise requires. Here it plainly does \u201cotherwise require\u201d; indeed, leaves no alternative, unless we pervert the obvious significance of the words employed. The interpretative or defining clause in a statute should be employed only for the purpose of clarify- i ing what is doubtful; not to take away a meaning that is patent. 59 C.J. 948.\nThe plaintiff\u2019s argument rests on an assumption that the Legislature did the unnatural thing of selecting two words to convey a meaning by connotation which one .would have expressed plainly and without indirection. Had the Legislature intended to make the limitation one year .from death, the substitution of the single word \u201cdeath\u201d for the two words \u201csuch injury\u201d where the latter occur would indisputably have expressed that intent. It failed to do so, and we are powerless to make the substitution. Central Locomotive & Car Works v. Lindstrom, Industrial Commission, 290 Ill. 436, 125 N.E. 369; Chmielewska v. Butte & Superior Min. Co., 81 Mont. 36, 261 P. 616; Martini v. Kemmerer Coal Co., 38 Wyo. 172, 265 P. 707.\nIt is urged that to declare the statute as having this meaning may result in great hardship in particular cases, as where the employee dies so short a time prior to expiration of a year from date of the injury as to render it physically impossible to prepare and file the claim within the year limited; that since the statute makes com-pensable all actionable deaths within one year of the injury proximately causing same (1929 Comp. \u00a7 156-116), it could not have been intended to create the right and as to certain cases leave the dependents remediless.\nIt is true, as counsel suggest, that a case of individual hardship may arise upon which the statute will operate with peculiar harshness, as where death occurs within an hour or a day of the limitation period. Although, as defendant\u2019s counsel suggest, the victims of such situation in reality suffer no greater misfortune than dependents of him who dies but shortly after expiration of one year from date of injury when admittedly compensation is not recoverable. Partusch v. Kaufman-Straus Co., 209 Ky. 345, 272 S.W. 884.\nWhether the Legislature actually \u25a0considered this possibility and thought the case where it would arise likely to be so isolated as not to warrant provision for it we cannot know. This is not such a case, for here there remained to plaintiff after death of her husband approximately two months within which a timely filing of the claim might have been had. But the fact that hardship may result can furnish no warrant for the courts to'supply what the Legislature has omitted or to omit what it has inserted. Martini v. Kemmerer Coal Co., supra; Chmielewska v. Butte & Superior Mining Co., supra. \u201cWhat the Legislature intends is to be determined, primarily, by what it says in the act. It is only in cases of ambiguity that resort may be had to construction. Courts cannot r'ead into an act something that is not within the manifest intention of the Legislature, as gathered from the statute itself. To do so would be to legislate, and not to interpret. There is no ambiguity in this statute, .and it neither requires nor admits of construction.\u201d De Graftenreid v. Strong, 28 N.M. 91, 206 P. 694, 695. For other pronouncements of this court on the rule applicable in construing statutes where the \u2022meaning of the language used is plain, see Harrison v. Harrison, 21 N.M. 372, 155 P. 356, L.R.A.1916E, 854, Atlantic Oil Producing Co. v. Crile, 34 N.M. 650, 287 P. 696.\nAn examination of F. Robertson Jones\u2019 Digest of Workmen\u2019s Compensation Laws in the United States and Territories (11th Ed.), revised to December 1, 1929, fails to disclose a statute of any sister state or territory containing the identical language of our limitation provision. Section 10 of this digest gives the corresponding provisions of the various workmen\u2019s compensation acts as to notice of injury and limitations. In Arizona claims must be filed within one year after injury or accrual of right. . In California death claims must be filed within one year after death and 240 weeks after injury. In Michigan, within six months after injury or death, or last payment, if any. Nebraska, six months after injury or death. Iowa, two years from date of injury. Oregon, one year after injury. Washington, one year after injury or accrual of right. In the larger number of states the requirement is, as disclosed by the digest, that claim must be filed within a specified time after injury or death.\nCounsel on neither side have cited, nor has our research disclosed, a single case exactly in point. The one nearest in point we have discovered is Dragicevic v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 112 Or. 569, 230 P. 354, 355. It was a death claim. The dependent father resided in Jugo-slavia. Claim was filed more than one year after date of the fatal injury. This was held to he too late. The court said:\n\u201cMoreover, in subdivision (d) of section 6632, O.L., the rule is thus laid down:\n\u201c \u2018No application shall be valid or claim thereunder enforceable in nonfatal cases unless such claim is filed within three months after the date upon which the injury occurred, nor in fatal cases unless such claim is filed within one year after the date upon which the fatal injury occurred.\u2019\n\u201cAs stated, the death occurred October 1, 1917. No claim of any kind was filed until March 27, 1922, and the claim upon which the claimant relies as having been made by himself was not filed until November 14, 1922. More than one year having elapsed in both instances since the date of the accident, neither the Commission nor the court had any jurisdiction to entertain the claim.\n\u201cFor both reasons the decision of the circuit court was wrong. It must be reversed, and the proceeding dismissed.\u201d\nIt follows from the foregoing that the judgment of the lower court must be reversed. The cause will be remanded, with directions to set aside the judgment heretofore rendered and enter judgment for the defendant.\nIt is so ordered.\nHUDSPETH, BICKLEY, and ZINN, JJ., concur.\nBRICE, J., did not participate.", "type": "majority", "author": "SADLER, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Crampton & Robertson, of Raton, for appellant.", "Fred J. Voorhees, of Raton, and H. A. Kiker, of Santa F\u00e9, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "60 P.(2d) 356\nVUKOVICH v. ST. LOUIS, ROCKY MOUNTAIN & PACIFIC CO.\nNo. 4186.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nAug. 24, 1936.\nCrampton & Robertson, of Raton, for appellant.\nFred J. Voorhees, of Raton, and H. A. Kiker, of Santa F\u00e9, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0374-01", "first_page_order": 398, "last_page_order": 404 }