{ "id": 1560836, "name": "ORTEGA et al. v. OTERO", "name_abbreviation": "Ortega v. Otero", "decision_date": "1944-12-20", "docket_number": "No. 4844", "first_page": "588", "last_page": "596", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "48 N.M. 588" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "154 P.2d 252" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "3 A. 2d 914", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 Pa. 581", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 1187920 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa/333/0581-01" ] }, { "cite": "16 N.E.2d 41", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 Mass. 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 864491 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/300/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 N.M. 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563048 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/46/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 P.2d 348", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 Cal.App.2d 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 6040568 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-2d/20/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 A.2d 279", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 Pa. 6", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 1193017 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa/335/0006-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 N.M. 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563065 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/46/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 N.Y.S. 566", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.", "case_ids": [ 3507866 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nys/44/0566-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 Misc. 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Misc.", "case_ids": [ 347801 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/misc/19/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 N.E.2d 455", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 N.E.2d 738", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 Mass. 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 3836934 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/305/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "10 N.E.2d 100", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 Mass. 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 887931 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/298/0213-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 926, "char_count": 21197, "ocr_confidence": 0.735, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.8466407821561095e-07, "percentile": 0.8403439737220201 }, "sha256": "123d384fefaa2ac1fd4899f470cd41b3b1e5dbf60767857d858a3f5756c076bc", "simhash": "1:c9dd411e90556b92", "word_count": 3528 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:14:22.857793+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "SADLER, C. J., and MABRY, BRICE, and THREET, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "ORTEGA et al. v. OTERO." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BICKLEY, Justice.\nThe appellant (defendant), who is a person certified as qualified to teach in the schools of the state, was, in writing, duly employed as Rural School Supervisor for Valencia County. After serving a few \u25a0months charges were preferred against him and after a hearing he was discharged by the board, from which decision he appealed to the State Board of Education, which decided that the charges were not sustained and that he was qualified to hold the position and that the written contract theretofore entered into between the County Board .and the appellant was and continued to be in full force and effect.\nBefore the decision of the State Board was rendered the plaintiffs (appellees) commenced an action in the District Court against the appellant to enjoin him from interfering with the property under their \u2022control and from holding himself out as Rural School Supervisor and from interfering with the management of the schools, school teachers, and the plaintiffs.\nThe defendant answered, denying the \u2022charges; denying that any proof of defendant\u2019s guilt had been produced against him in the hearing before the County Board; setting forth the claim that he was \u25a0entitled to an appeal to the State Board of Education, and that the State Board had reversed the decision of the County Board and otherwise putting at issue the allegations of the complaint and prayed that the complaint be dismissed.'\nThe District Court made certain findings and conclusions and thereupon rendered judgment granting to plaintiffs the relief they prayed for, and enjoined defendant accordingly.\nThe hearing in the District Court took such a turn that the sole question involved is: Does the State Board of Education have the power to entertain an appeal from the decision of a County Board of Education in case of a discharge of a Rural School Supervisor, and thereby perhaps set at naught the decision of the County Board?\nThe trial court erroneously answered this question in the negative.\nThe following finding and conclusion of the trial court incorporated in the judgment discloses the theory of the decision; \u201cThat the sole question involved in this action is strictly one of law and that Rural School Supervisors appointed pursuant to Section 55-807 of the Laws of New Mexico, Annotated, 1941, are not teachers and can be discharged by.the Boards of Education of the counties in which said respective Rural School Supervisors are so appointed, and in a case where a Rural School Supervisor is so discharged by a County Board of Education, no appeal lies to the State Board of Education and the decision of the County Board of Education is final and cannot be reviewed by the said State Board, and that the 'answer of the Defendant, in this cause, although taken as admitted, does not constitute a defense to the complaint filed by the Plaintiffs and that the Defendant, Jose. Luis Otero, was discharged by the Valencia County Board of Education as Rural School Supervisor of Valencia County, New Mexico and his appeal and the decision of the State Board of Education are not authorized by law * *\nThe question is: Did the court give too narrow a signification to the word \u201cteachers\u201d? The immediately controlling statute is as follows: \u201cDischarge of contract teachers\u2014Hearing\u2014Written charges\u2014Notice\u2014Right of appeal to state board\u2014Hearing de novo\u2014Decision final\u2014Salary pending appeal.\u2014No teacher having a written contract shall be discharged except upon good cause and after hearing on written charges, which, together with written notice of the time and place of hearing, shall be served upon said teacher at least five (5) days prior to such hearing. Such teacher shall have the right to appeal within ten (10) days to the state board of education, which board shall hear the matter de novo at a time and place to be by it fixed and the decision of such state board of education shall be final. Pending its decision upon appeal, such teacher shall be entitled to receive the salary contracted for. (Laws 1923, ch. 148, \u00a7 1105, p. 290; 1925, ch. 73, \u00a7 20, p. 99; C.S. 1929, \u00a7 120-1105; Laws 1941, ch. 202, \u00a7 3, p. 399.)\u201d 1941 Comp. \u00a7 55-1113.\nAppellant earnestly argues that since by the provisions of 1941 Comp. \u00a7 55-807, County Boards of Education may employ as Rural School Supervisors only such persons as are \u201ccertified as qualified to teach in the schools of the state\u201d, it follows that the provisions of Chapter 202, L. 1941, 1941 Comp. 55-1111, 55-1112, 55-1113, being \u201cAn Act Relating to the Employment and Discharge of and Contracts with Teachers in the Public Schools of New Mexico and! Amending Section 20 of Chapter 73, Laws of 1925, and Declaring an Emergency,\u201d applies to Rural School Supervisors with respect to the right of appeal to the State Board of Education from a decision of a governing board discharging such Rural School Supervisors.\nCounsel for the National Education Association of the United States, a nonprofit organization of teachers, chartered under the laws of the District of Columbia in 1896 and by Act of Congress in 1906, has filed a brief amicus curiae, aligned with appellant.\nWe have not been favored with a brief on behalf of appellees.\nAmicus curiae states:\n\u201cMany states have a statutory definition of \u2018teacher\u2019: e.g., Section 1722(c) of the West Virginia Code of 1943 provides that \u2018Teacher shall mean teacher, supervisor, principal, superintendent, public school librarian, or any other person regularly employed for instructional purposes in a public school of this State.\u2019\n\u201cWhere there is no such statutory definition of \u2018teacher\u2019 many courts have construed the term to mean all employees certificated as teachers. For example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts declared that \u2018a principal is merely a teacher who is entrusted with special duties of direction and management.\u2019 McDevitt v. School Committee of City of Malden, 1937, 298 Mass. 213, 10 N.E.2d 100; Downey v. School Committee of Lowell, 1940, 305 Mass. 329, 25 N.E.2d 738. The Ohio Supreme Court said that the term 'teacher\u2019 in the teacher tenure act is not to be narrowly construed and may be so interpreted as to cover an assistant county superintendent. State ex rel. Frank v. Meigs County Board of Education et al., 1942, 140 Ohio State 381, 44 N.E.2d 455.\u201d\nNew Mexico has no case law interpreting the scope of the designation \u201cteacher\u201d and no express statutory definition thereof.\nWe are thus confronted with an issue of first impression, and must from the materials at hand distill the will of the Legislature.\nThe power relative to appointment or employment of rural school supervisors was introduced by amendment of Section 120-804, N.M.Stats. Ann.Comp. 1929, by introducing the following language appearing in Section 5 of Chapter 119, L. 1931: \u201cSaid Board may employ a rural school supervisor at the expense of the county, which supervisor must be approved by the State Board of Education and must have such educational qualifications as may be determined by said Board of Education, such supervisors to be permitted only in counties whose rural teachers number fifty or more.\u201d\nThis section was amended by Chapter 114, L. 1937, but in no material particular so far as it related to employment of rural school supervisors, the only change being the addition of the word \u201cState\u201d before the phrase, \u201cBoard of Education\u201d in the second place that said phrase, \u201cBoard of Education\u201d appears in the sentence, and omitting the phrase \u201csuch supervisors to be permitted only in counties whose rural teachers number fifty or more.\u201d The section was again amended by Chapter 173, L. 1939, so as to read: \u201cSaid board may employ a rural school supervisor at the expense of the county, which supervisor shall be nominated by the county superintendent of schools and must be approved by the state board of education. Such supervisors must have a minimum of one (1) year actual teaching or supervisory experience in the elementary schools of New Mexico and must have high school graduation and at least a Bachelor of Arts degree or its equivalent from a fully accredited college or university, and at least fifteen (15) hours training in class room supervision. * * *\u201d 1941 Comp. 55-807.\nThus appears an inclination toward giving the status of \u201cteacher\u201d to the position of rural school supervisor. Why the requirements for certification as a teacher and other educational requirements including \u201cat least fifteen (15) hours training in class room supervision\u201d unless the supervisor is to teach through advice and counsel to teachers, and supervision of class room work? Such in practice is the function of rural school supervisors including class room instruction to the pupils when occasion requires.\nThe understanding of the parties as reflected in the written contract affords some enlightenment. It is therein said that the supervisor must supervise the schools assigned, be prompt, thorough and conscientious, \u201cjudicious in punishment and watchful to the morals of the pupils.\u201d This fairly implies a required direct contact with and instruction of such pupils.\nThe record further throws some light on the nature of the work of a supervisor. From a portion of the minutes of the State Board of Education, we quote the following: \"Testimony of Mrs. Mary Watson, Director of Elementary Education, was to the effect that she had examined the work of Mr. Otero in Valencia County and found that he had made a careful selection and placement of instructional material, that the interest and content of such material was acceptable, that the daily program worked out by Mr. Otero was satisfactory, that he had given diagnostic tests in 1942-43 and had selected material that would be used in 1943-44 to remedy weaknesses revealed by these tests.\u201d\nA conventional definition of \u201cteacher\u201d is: \u201cOne whose occupation is to instruct.\u201d Webster. It requires no undue liberality of construction in view of the above mentioned required educational equipment and practice to say that a practicing rural school supervisor is a teacher.\nWe now turn to a consideration of Chapter 202, Laws 1941, 1941 Comp. \u00a7\u00a7 55-1111, 55-1112, 55-1113, to discover if we may whether with its history there is therein contained any definitive material touching on the meaning of the word \u201cteacher\u201d.\nIt is recalled that prior to this enactment we had Section 20 of Chapter 73 of the 1925 Session Laws of New Mexico, appearing as Section 120-1105 in the 1929 Compilation, which read as follows: \u201cNo board of education, county school superintendent or board of school directors, or any member of such boards, shall discharge a teacher without granting to such teacher full hearing and the right of appeal to the state board of education.\u201d\nThis was amended by Section 3 of Chapter 202, L. 1941, 1941 Comp. 55-1113, to read as follows:\n\u201cSection 3. Section 20 of Chapter 73 of the 1925 Session Laws of New Mexico, appearing as Section 120-1105 in the 1929 Compilation of the New Mexico Statutes Annotated, be and the same is hereby amended to read as follows:\n\u201cSection 120-1105. No teacher having a written contract shall be discharged except upon good cause and after hearing on written charges, which, together with written notice of the time and place of hearing, shall be served upon said teacher at least five (5) days prior to such hearing. Such teacher shall have the right to appeal within ten (10) days to the State Board of Education, which Board shall hear the matter de novo at a time and place to be by it fixed and the decision of such State Board of Education shall be final. Pending its decision upon appeal, such teacher shall be entitled to receive the salary contracted for.\u201d\nThe effect of the amendment is to further protect the employment status of teachers.\nOf greater significance, however, is the time and circumstance of the amendment.\nThe Legislature of 1941 doubtless sensed the need to get in step with the march of progress toward a greater security to those who have become equipped through education and training to assume positions in our school system.\nWhat is known as Teachers\u2019 Tenure Acts have been adopted in most of the states of our union, the objects of which are to encourage men and women to make a lifetime profession of teaching and to stimulate them to seek positions in the school system requiring the qualifications of teachers, and to protect them in their employment from the whims of those possibly politically minded, and to insure their continuance in such employment.\nSo the 1941 Legislature adopted its Chapter 202. Section 1 formulates a presumption of renewal of employment of teachers and other employes certified as qualified to teach in the schools of the state in the absence of written notice of the governing board of its desire to continue or discontinue the services of such teacher or employe.\nWhether the phrase \u201cor other employe certified as qualified to teach\u201d means an employe whose employment status necessarily depends lip\u00f3n his being certified as qualified to teach we find it unnecessary to decide, because in the case of rural school supervisors such is the case.\nWhy did the Legislature of 1941 in this Chapter 202 choose to amend Section 20 of Chapter 73, L. 1925, unless it was intended as a part of the common purpose of securing continuity of service of persons employed in the schools and mentioned in Section 1 ?\nIt is well in pursuing our inquiry to consider the title of Chapter 202, L. 1941. It is: \u201cAn Act Relating to the Employment and Discharge of and Contracts with Teachers in the Public Schools of New Mexico and Amending Section 20 of Chapter 73, Laws of 1925, and Declaring an Emergency.\u201d\nIn terms it relates solely to \u201cteachers\u201d and yet in Section 1 of the Act we find a plain intent to accord teachers and \u201cother employes certified as qualified to teach\u201d, the same protection.\nSince we may, in an inquiry as to the legislative intent, examine the body of an Act, go to its title, and back again to the Act itself, we think it is manifest that the Legislature (perhaps influenced by statutory definitions which the members may have seen employed in connection with Teachers\u2019 Tenure Acts, heretofore quoted as embracing a numerous class of employes engaged in school work), deemed the word teachers in the title to be comprehensive enough to cover those who are certified as \u25a0qualified to teach and who are employed in school work.\nIf that was the legislative view when \u25a0drafting Section 1, and we think it was, then it is not difficult to comprehend why in drafting Section 3 they thought it unnecessary to repeat after the opening words \u201cNo teacher\u201d the words used in Section 1, \u201cor other employe certified as qualified to teach.\u201d\nFurthermore, we have the construction of the State Board of Education which is in accord with the view we have just expressed. The State Board assumed jurisdiction and entertained the appeal which manifests their construction of the meaning of the statute.\nIt is true that this circumstance does not meet the requirements of the rule of construction that the interpretation of a statute by a department of public officials charged with the duty of administering a statute will be of persuasive force with the courts, because of its lack of antiquity. But there is something else in the statute so far as this particular department is concerned which is just as potent. We quote from the brief of amicus curiae:\n\u201cThe District Court of Valencia County found \u2018That the State Board of Education has no jurisdiction in the matter and attempted to act wholly without authority of law.\u2019 (R. 35) Section 55-1113 provides that a teacher having a written contract shall have the right to appeal to the State Board of Education \u2018which Board shall hear the matter de novo at a time and place to be by it fixed and the decision of such State Board of Education shall be final.\u2019 Since Defendant is a certificated teacher entitled to be included under and protected by this provision, the jurisdiction of the State Board of Education can hardly be denied. However, the National Education Association respectfully draws the attention of the Honorable Court to another section of the New Mexico Statutes Annotated 1941 in addition to Section 55-1113 noted above; to wit: Section 55-101.\n\u201cSection 55-101 of New Mexico Statutes Annotated 1941 dealing with the authority and duties of the State Board of Education reads: \u2018The state board of education shall explain the true intent and meaning of the law, and shall decide without expense to the parties concerned, all controversies and disputes that arise under it, and their decision shall be final.\u2019 This provision is almost universal in the states, quasi-judicial powers having been extended to state school administrative bodies early in the history of public education in the United States.\n\u201cThe New York State Superintendent\u2019s annual report for the year 1822 contained the following statement: \u2018The school act is already too complicated in many of its provisions to increase the difficulty by driving the parties into an expensive litigation to settle a point of no great importance in itself but which derives all its interest from the passions and prejudices of the parties concerned. It were better in such cases to have a speedy decision, at the risk of being wrong, than to injure, if not derange, the whole system by a long, oppressive, and procrastinated legal controversy.\u2019 New York State Annual Report, Superintendent of Common Schools Assembly Journal 1822 at 621. The New York General Assembly, acting upon this recommendation, empowered the state superintendent to decide school controversies. Rhode Island followed suit in 1847 and New Jersey in 1851.\n\u201cAs may be seen from the New York State Superintendent\u2019s report in 1822 the original purpose of delegating quasi-judicial powers to the state school administrative officials was to expedite decisions and foster economy. Subsequently, many judicial opinions have sanctioned the procedure. Furthermore, the courts have recognized the desirability of placing the responsibility for decisions in professional controversies in the hands of educationally trained rather than legally trained persons. In People ex rel. Bowers v. Allen, 1897, 19 Misc. 464 [44 N.Y.S. 566], it was said that the procedure was justified because it keeps litigation in school matters \u2018within the compass of the department of public instruction as best fitted to mde out justice between the parties.\u2019 The technical competence of county and state superintendents to settle school controversies has been mentioned again and again by the courts of many states.\u201d\nThe argument has weight.\nAs bearing on the question see also the following cases: Bourne v. Board of Education of City of Roswell, 46 N.M. 310, 128 P.2d 733; Commonwealth ex rel. Hetrick v. School District of the City of Sunbury et al., 335 Pa. 6, 6 A.2d 279; Crawford v. Board of Education of City of Glendale, 20 Cal.App.2d 391, 67 P.2d 348; Freeman v. Medler, 46 N.M. 383, 129 P.2d 342; Frye v. School Committee of Leicester, 300 Mass. 537, 16 N.E.2d 41; Jones v. School District of Borough of Kulpmont, 333 Pa. 581, 3 A. 2d 914.\nWe call attention also to Chapter 60, Laws 1943, which amends Section 55-1111 of the 1941 Compilation. This amendment seems to lend support to the view that \u201cteacher\u201d includes an \u201cemploye certified as qualified to teach\u201d, because this Section 1 of Chapter 202, L. 1941, was definitely for the protection of \u201cteacher or other employe certified as qualified to teach\u201d, and no reason is apparent why the purpose achieved by the 1943 amendment should not be as applicable to the one group as to the other, if in fact there is any distinction, and hence there is a forceful implication that when drafting the 1943 amendment the legislators deemed \u201cteacher\u201d to embrace the general classification theretofore employed of \u201cteacher or other employe certified as qualified to teach.\u201d\nWe are likewise confronted with an inability to discover any reason for differentiation between protections against discharge to be accorded teachers and employes certified as qualified to teach, particularly in cases where being certified as qualified to teach is a condition precedent to the employment.\nOur conclusion from all of the foregoing is that a rural school supervisor is a person employed for instructional purposes and is a teacher who is entrusted with special duties of supervising public instruction in the schools, which embraces counsel and instruction of other teachers in the matter of class room instruction, as well as personal professional contact with and instruction of pupils, and hence has a teacher\u2019s status under the provisions of 1941 Comp. \u00a7 55-1113.\nIt follows that the judgment of the District Court must be reversed and the cause remanded with directions that it be dismissed.\nIt is so ordered.\nSADLER, C. J., and MABRY, BRICE, and THREET, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BICKLEY, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Charles B. Barker, of Santa\" Fe, and H. O. Waggoner, of Albuquerque, Madeline Kinter Remmlein, of Washington, D. C., amicus curiae, for appellant.", "No brief filed for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "154 P.2d 252\nORTEGA et al. v. OTERO.\nNo. 4844.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nDec. 20, 1944.\nCharles B. Barker, of Santa\" Fe, and H. O. Waggoner, of Albuquerque, Madeline Kinter Remmlein, of Washington, D. C., amicus curiae, for appellant.\nNo brief filed for appellee." }, "file_name": "0588-01", "first_page_order": 618, "last_page_order": 626 }