{ "id": 1577072, "name": "STATE v. WALKER", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Walker", "decision_date": "1946-09-14", "docket_number": "No. 4960", "first_page": "132", "last_page": "135", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "50 N.M. 132" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "172 P.2d 588" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "152 S.W.2d 20", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 N.M. 6", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1577077 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/50/0006-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 Colo. 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Colo.", "case_ids": [ 2713736 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/colo/111/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 P. 2d 218", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 Cal.App.2d 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4526543 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-2d/31/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 P. 215", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 N.M. 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8512754 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/24/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 P. 583", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 N.M. 479", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8842713 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/28/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 P.2d 455", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Cal.App. 586", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App.", "case_ids": [ 2046692 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app/41/0586-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 P. 619", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 N. M. 25", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8841227 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/29/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "24 S.W. 1038", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1045" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 Mo. 495", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mo.", "case_ids": [ 955330 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mo/119/0495-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 505, "char_count": 7747, "ocr_confidence": 0.693, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.773836632896514e-08, "percentile": 0.36058492213252585 }, "sha256": "d83eaec8631a526425513574b522f9a9512c23cd6100b7848d797ea78db56be0", "simhash": "1:27077edf7eedbd58", "word_count": 1331 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:49:56.977012+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "SADLER, C. J., and BRICE, LUJAN, and HUDSPETH, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE v. WALKER." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BICKLEY, Justice.\nA criminal information was filed in the district court charging Aubrey Walker with the murder of his wife, Martha Walker. His defense was that he did not know the gun was loaded and that it went off accidently. A jury returned a verdict against him of voluntary manslaughter. A motion for new trial was filed and overruled. The sentence of the court was that the defendant be imprisoned for a term of not less than seven years and not more then ten years, and that he pay the costs of the prosecution. Seeking to reverse this judgment, defendant has appealed and has filed a supersedeas bond.\nThe details of the occurrence are reflected in the summaries of the testimony of the State\u2019s witnesses Phillips and Tharp, prepared by counsel for the State and accepted as correct by counsel for defendant.\n\u201cWitness Phillips testified:\n\u201c \u2018He (defendant) said she had thrown something at him; that they had quarrelled and they had been drinking some. He said he went over to the desk ... let me see . . . he wanted to see how many, war bonds he had because he was thinking of cashing some to make some improvements on his place. He said he saw the gun in the drawer with the bonds and he picked it up. He said he thought he would frighten her. He said he didn\u2019t point the gun at her and knew it was not loaded.\u2019\n\u201cMr. Tharp Testified:\n\u201c \u2018The first he (defendant) said was, \u201cWe had a fuss and we were drinking and we always fussed when we drank. We didn\u2019t fuss any other time.\u201d * * * He said during the time they were fussing his wife threw a match case at him. I believe those are the words he used. * * * He said then he went to the desk, after the match case was thrown * * * he never did specifically say the time * * * but he went to the desk and went to the drawer in the desk to get some bonds he calculated on selling \u2014 cashing out, and that the gun was in the same drawer with the bonds. He picked it up to scare her and didn\u2019t think it was loaded. He never did say ' he pulled the trigger. He said he pointed it' to scare her.\u2019 \u201d\nIt is the admission of this testimony as to what defendant said at the coroner\u2019s inquest that is the basis of defendant\u2019s single assignment of error as follows:\n\u201cThe court erred in permitting evidence of statements made by the defendant before the coroner\u2019s jury to be introduced at the trial of this case.\u201d\nMore specifically, defendant\u2019s counsel complains that the statements (a) were not freely and voluntarily made; (b)- they were made while the defendant was in a stupor; (c) he was not advised of his rights and (d) he was not given an opportunity to consult counsel.\nWe agree with the statement of the Missouri Supreme Court made in State v. Young, 119 Mo. 495, 24 S.W. 1038, 1045, quoted by counsel for appellant:\n\u201cThe great question, after all, is, was the statement voluntary? and it must be determined from the facts in each case.\u201d\nWe indicated in State v. Archuleta, 29 N. M. 25, 217 P. 619, that a voluntary statement was not rendered inadmissible merely because the party making the statement was under arrest, and was not warned of the effect of the statement. And see People v. Chan Chaun, 41 Cal.App. 586, 107 P.2d 455, 457, where it was said:\n\u201cIt is better and safer practice to inform an accused that his replies may be used against him, but if the statements are not made under oath, or under conditions requiring such a warning, the failure to specifically so instruct an accused does not affect the admissibility of the statement as evidence.\u201d\nAnd in State v. Dena, 28 N.M. 479, 214 P. 583, the principles of exclusion applicable to confessions are discussed and New Mexico cases cited, and it was decided that where confessions are freely and voluntarily made, without duress, coercion, hope, fear, and without promise of reward or immunity, even though while accused is under arrest and before advice of counsel is obtained, are admissible in evidence. So it seems that defendant\u2019s specific objections (c) and (d) are without merit.\nWe may also say in passing, for what it is worth, that defendant did not request that the question of whether the statements were voluntary be submitted to the jury, doubtless because the defendant did not produce any evidence in conflict with the prima facie showing of voluntariness made by the State. See State v. Anderson, 24 N.M. 360, 174 P. 215. The facts apearing from the record do not persuade us that the defendant was in a stupor or was not in full possession of his faculties when the statements were made. No specific objection of that sort was made when the testimony was offered but we have reviewed the record nevertheless.\nAfter carefully considering the. record and briefs of counsel for defendant, we do not find merit in the contention that the statements of the defendant at the coroner\u2019s inquest were not free and voluntary.\nWe have referred to the principles of exclusion applicable to confessions. It is held in California that admissions not amounting to confessions are not controlled by the stricter rules applying to confessions. In People v. Durazo, 31 Cal.App.2d 559, 88 P. 2d 218, it was decided:\n\u201cVoluntary statements of accused containing damaging admissions but not constituting confession of guilt were properly admitted without preliminary proof that admissions were voluntarily made where accused had full opportunity to show that statements were involuntary.\u201d\nSee also People v. Chan Chaun, supra.\nWhether the California doctrine is correct or not, we need not now decide. But where the statements made by a participant in an occurrence is to a considerable extent exculpatory, this may be a circumstance to consider as tending to support the view that the statements were voluntarily made. Statements in the main exculpatory, are frequently made with some eagerness and with an absence of reluctance.\nFurthermore, defendant himself, either on direct or proper cross-examination, when he took the stand in his own defense, testified in substantial effect to the matters related by the witnesses Phillips and Tharp, who detailed the defendant\u2019s statements made at the coroner\u2019s inquest. Under such circumstances, even if otherwise erroneous, though we think in fact it was not, the admission in evidence of the testimony complained of does not constitute prejudicial error. See Honda v. People, 1943, 111 Colo. 279, 141 P.2d 178; State v. Talamante, 50 N.M. 6, 165 P.2d 812.\nFinally, it may be well to refer to the principle governing review of such questions.\nIn 24 C.J.S., Criminal Law, \u00a7 1869, it is said:\n\u201cRulings of the trial court on the competency of witnesses will not be disturbed in the absence of abuse of discretion. * * *\n\u201cSimilarly, it is peculiarly the province of the trial, as distinguished from the appellate, court to pass on the preliminary proofs essential to the admission of' certain kinds of evidence, such as evidence received in prior proceedings, dying declarations, and secondary evidence generally, confessions, etc.\u201d\nAmong the numerous cases cited in support of the text is State v. Di Stefano, Mo., 1941, 152 S.W.2d 20, where it was decided:\n\u201cWhere defendant objects to the admission of confession on the ground that it was involuntary, unless manifest error has been committed, appellate court will defer to trial court\u2019s ruling in view of its better opportunity to arrive at the truth.\u201d\nFrom all of the foregoing, it appears that the judgment must be affirmed.\nAnd it is so ordered.\nSADLER, C. J., and BRICE, LUJAN, and HUDSPETH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BICKLEY, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Otto Smith and Robert V, Wollard, both of Clovis, for appellant.", "C. C. McCulloh, Atty. Gen., and Robert W. Ward, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "172 P.2d 588\nSTATE v. WALKER.\nNo. 4960.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nSept. 14, 1946.\nOtto Smith and Robert V, Wollard, both of Clovis, for appellant.\nC. C. McCulloh, Atty. Gen., and Robert W. Ward, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0132-01", "first_page_order": 152, "last_page_order": 155 }