{ "id": 2789430, "name": "COASTAL PLAINS OIL COMPANY, a corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William V. DOUGLAS, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Coastal Plains Oil Co. v. Douglas", "decision_date": "1961-08-15", "docket_number": "No. 6800", "first_page": "68", "last_page": "72", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "69 N.M. 68" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "364 P.2d 131" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "63 N.M. 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2778387 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/63/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 N.M. 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5346488 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/64/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 N.M. 807", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1587701 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/58/0807-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 N.M. 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1578315, 1578139 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/51/0427-01", "/nm/51/0427-02" ] }, { "cite": "44 N.M. 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566916 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/44/0592-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 N.M. 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5317390 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/61/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 F.2d 165", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 7413759 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/146/0165-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 418, "char_count": 6456, "ocr_confidence": 0.688, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.649611801173801e-07, "percentile": 0.8239302754716588 }, "sha256": "fc8263c89c037a0026336a7344f9c96c6e5da07de83c005b0cfff61f048e722a", "simhash": "1:978ae646312abd0a", "word_count": 1057 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:59:48.755337+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "COMPTON, C. J., and NOBLE, J., concur.", "CHAVEZ and MOISE, JJ., not participating." ], "parties": [ "COASTAL PLAINS OIL COMPANY, a corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William V. DOUGLAS, Defendant-Appellee" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CARMODY, Justice.\nAppellant (plaintiff below) urges error by the trial court in denying appellant the right to file a reply to a counterclaim and thereafter in entering judgment which practically offset the amount sought in the complaint by the amount alleged in the counterclaim.\nThe record contains no testimony, no transcript of any hearing, and discloses only the following:\nAppellant filed its complaint, which was timely answered by the defendant, with a counterclaim included therein. Within a few days, after the filing of the answer and the counterclaim, appellant propounded interrogatories, which dealt mainly with questions respecting the claim made in the counterclaim. The interrogatories were promptly answered by appellee. A little more than a year later, on February 16, 1960, the following stipulation was filed:\n\u201cStipulation\n\u201cIt is stipulated by counsel for plaintiff and defendant that the total amount claimed by plaintiff against the defendant under the complaint is and should be $10,125.00, which includes an earlier transaction involving $2,125.00 indebtedness. It is further stipulated that the total amount due the defend- ' ant from plaintiff under the counterclaim is $9,815.79, which leaves a balance of $309.21 due from the defendant to the plaintiff.\n\u201cPlaintiff contends that of the amount due the defendant the sum of $4,006.16 was agreed to be paid and accepted in stock of the plaintiff corporation by the defendant, however, since the counterclaim stands undenied and the question of this additional agreement is not specifically raised by the pleadings, the Court intends to enter judgment based upon the stipulated amount due and not hear testimony regarding the additional contract not raised by the pleadings.\n\u201cMr. Rhodes offered and petitioned the Court to be allowed to file a reply to the counter-claim or a counter-claim to the counter-claim, setting out a contract showing the $4,006.16 of the amount stipulated as being included in the $9,815.79, was paid by a contract in which the defendant agreed to accept stock of the plaintiff corporation in lieu of that amount of cash, which application was denied by the Court.\u201d\nOn February 19, 1960, appellant moved \u201cto set aside that judgment ordered by the court on the 16th day of February, I960:\u201d Also on February 19th, the record discloses that a final decree was filed, which is as follows:\n\u201cFinal Decree\n\u201cThe above entitled and numbered cause coming on for hearing and the plaintiff appearing by and through its attorneys, White and Rhodes, and the defendant appearing by and through his attorneys, Tansey & Rosebrough, and the court having examined the stipulation entered into by the attorneys;\n\u201cNow, Therefore, It Is Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed:\n\u201cThat the plaintiff, Coastal Plains Oil Company shall not be allowed to present evidence concerning a contract off-setting the defendant\u2019s counter claim; that the total amounts (sic) claimed by the plaintiff against the defendant is and should be $10,125.00 and that the total amount claimed against the plaintiff under the counter claim is and should be $9,815.79.\n\u201cAnd It Is Further Ordered that the plaitiff (sic) shall have judgment in the amount of the difference, amounting to $309.21, plus court costs of $16.-70.\u201d\nThe only other matters in the record proper relate to the appeal to this court.\nAppellant\u2019s first point is that \u201cthe refusal to allow amendment of pleadings was an abuse of discretion.\u201d It relies on Rule 15(a) (Sec. 21-1-1(15) (a), N.M.S.A. 1953), which is the same as the federal rule, Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 15(a), 28 U.S.C.A., and provides that leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires.\nWhether this rule applies in a case where there is no pleading to be amended, we do not need to determine. The question is whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the appellant to file a reply to the counterclaim, under the circumstances as disclosed by the record.\nAppellant argues that his request was denied because it was not timely, and that appellee made no showing of prejudice. However, there is nothing in the record to bear out such a contention.\nWe have no way of knowing what was submitted to the trial judge, nor what the reason or reasons were for denying the motion to file a reply. On the record, there is no showing that the failure to file a reply was due to oversight, inadvertence or excusable neglect. Neither does the record disclose that the interests of justice required the allowance of appellant\u2019s request. Compare, Frank Adam Electric Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Mfg. Co., 8 Cir., 1945, 146 F.2d 165; In re Stern\u2019s Will, 1956, 61 N.M. 446, 301 P.2d 1094.\nThe ruling of the trial court is presumed valid, and the burden was on appellant to show the manner in which the trial court abused its discretion. We will not substitute our discretion for that of the trial court.\nUpon a doubtful or deficient record, every presumption is indulged in favor of the correctness and regularity of the decision of the court below. Hobbs v. Town of Hot Springs, 1940, 44 N.M. 592, 106 P.2d 856; Fisher v. Terrell, 1947, 51 N.M. 427, 187 P.2d 387; and In re Quantius\u2019 Will, 1954, 58 N.M. 807, 277 P.2d 306.\nAppellant lastly contends that judgment was entered by default on the counterclaim without a three-day notice as provided by Rule 55(b) (Sec. 21-1-1(55) (b), N.M.S.A.1953).\nSuch an assertion hardly merits discussion by reason of the fact that appellant\u2019s own motion to set aside the judgment specifically admits service of notice of hearing on the merits. We have held that the rule has no application where judgment is entered on the merits after due notice. State Collection Bureau v. Roybal, 1958, 64 N.M. 275, 327 P.2d 337. Compare, Ranchers Exploration & Development Co. v. Benedict, 1957, 63 N.M. 163, 315 P.2d 228. In addition, the judgment was entered on stipulated facts, and appellant actually recovered judgment, although in a relatively small amount.\nWe find no merit in either of appellant\u2019s points relied upon for reversal. The judgment will be affirmed. It is so ordered.\nCOMPTON, C. J., and NOBLE, J., concur.\nCHAVEZ and MOISE, JJ., not participating.", "type": "majority", "author": "CARMODY, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "White & Rhodes, Albuquerque, for appellant.", "Tansey & Rosebrough, Farmington, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "364 P.2d 131\nCOASTAL PLAINS OIL COMPANY, a corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William V. DOUGLAS, Defendant-Appellee\nNo. 6800.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nAug. 15, 1961.\nWhite & Rhodes, Albuquerque, for appellant.\nTansey & Rosebrough, Farmington, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0068-01", "first_page_order": 100, "last_page_order": 104 }