{ "id": 2853358, "name": "L. H. LANGLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NAVAJO FREIGHT LINES, INC., and Transport Indemnity Co., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Langley v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.", "decision_date": "1962-01-24", "docket_number": "No. 7010", "first_page": "34", "last_page": "39", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "70 N.M. 34" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "369 P.2d 774" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "67 N.M. 459", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2714015 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/67/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 N.M. 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2848176 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/65/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 N.M. 214", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2846856 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/65/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 N.M. 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2713113 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/62/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 N.M. 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566833 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/44/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 N.M. 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1560828 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/48/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 N.M. 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2715469 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/67/0156-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 564, "char_count": 12005, "ocr_confidence": 0.721, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1339327142122735e-07, "percentile": 0.7662054814778777 }, "sha256": "aaa484bb2a1ff6470c3a5fb4d7dd4630e0b969faa0ccb76801752ad4e71b423e", "simhash": "1:a3eca38201e955cc", "word_count": 2044 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:50:52.194101+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "CARMODY and NOBLE, JJ., concur.", "COMPTON, C. J., and MOISE, J., not participating." ], "parties": [ "L. H. LANGLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NAVAJO FREIGHT LINES, INC., and Transport Indemnity Co., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CHAVEZ, Justice.\nPlaintiff-appellant, L. H. Langley, an employee of appellee, Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., filed claim under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act for injuries received on May 16, 1960. By answer, appellees affirmatively alleged that appellant at no time gave written notice of any accident and/or resultant injury, and that no superintendent or foreman, or other agent in charge of the work in connection with which the accident occurred, had actual knowledge of its occurrence as provided by \u00a7 59-10-13.4, N.M. S.A., 1953 Comp.\nThe case was tried by the district court without a jury, who found for appellees and entered judgment dismissing the claim. This appeal followed.\nThe trial court found that appellant did not give notice in writing to appellee-employer, Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., within sixty days after the occurrence of the accident, and that the appellant was not prevented by any reason of his alleged injury, or by any other cause beyond his control, from giving such notice within the time provided.\nAppellant, an employee of Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., at Roswell, New Mexico, suffered an injury to his back while lifting a bundle of pipe on May 16, 1960. Appellant, although feeling pain in his back, felt it was a pulled muscle and thought that it would get well. He had the same sensation before and each time it would go away. He continued working as dock foreman until June 21, 1960, when he consulted Dr. C. D. Kaiser of Roswell. Appellant was given a conservative treatment to try to relieve pain and hospitalized on June 26, 1960. At the hospital he was treated by traction and medication and released on July 1, 1960. Appellant returned to work on July 5, 1960, and worked until September 16, 1960. Due to his injury, appellant was unable to work from September 16, 1960 to January 21, 1961. During the above period appellant saw Dr. Kaiser and underwent surgery by Dr. W. A. Jones, a neuro-surgeon at El Paso, Texas. On January 23, 1961, appellant was reemploycd by Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. at a lower rate than what he was receiving at the time of the injury, with a permanent disability of 10% of the body as a whole.\nW. E. Nelson, the terminal manager for Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. at Roswell, was the immediate superior of appellant. Nelson visited appellant at' the hospital on June 27 or 28, 1960, at which time appellant told Nelson that it was not an old injury. Nelson\u2019s information as to the injury at the time that he visited appellant at the hospital was the appellant\u2019s back was hurting him.\nAppellant was injured in a truck-railroad-train accident in 1947, but fully recovered from this injury and was gainfully employed continuously as a truck driver and dock foreman from September 21, 1957, to the time of the injury sustained on May 16, 1960.\nAppellant received an insurance form or statement of claim in triplicate for group insurance from the Truck Drivers\u2019 Union. Appellant first took the forms which were in blank to Dr. C. D. Kaiser who filled in the attending physician\u2019s statement and signed the same on July 7, 1960. On July 13, 1960, appellant filled in the part to be completed by the employee and also signed the form. On the morning of July 13, 1960, appellant took the forms to W. E. Nelson, and left them on his desk. Nelson filled in the part to be completed by the employer, signed each of the three forms, and returned them to appellant at the close of the working day on July 13, 1960. Appellant \u201cguessed\u201d that the forms were notice to Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.\nDr. Kaiser, in his statement, set out that the injury was a \u201clumbrosacral strain and disc syndrome,\u201d stated the dates of treatment at his office and at the hospital, and that the injury arose out of appellant\u2019s employment.\nAppellant stated in the part completed by him that the disability was a \u201cruptured disc.\u201d He described how the injury occurred and set out that the injury occurred on the job. By mistake, appellant wrote that the injury occurred on June 16, 1960, whereas it actually occurred on May 16, 1960.\nAppellant asserts three points upon which he relies for reversal:\nI. The court erred in denying plaintiff\u2019s requested finding of fact No. 1, concerning the latent and disabling nature of the injury.\nII. The court erred in denying plaintiff\u2019s requested findings of fact Nos. 2, 3 and 4, concerning written and actual knowledge of plaintiff\u2019s injury.\nIII. The court erred in denying plaintiff\u2019s requested finding of fact No. 5, concerning the liquidated sum stipulated as recoverable by the plaintiff, and the attorney fees to be allowed to plaintiff\u2019s attorney.\nWe will discuss points I and II together. Section 59-10-13.4, N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp., provides:\n\u201c59-10-13.4. Notice to employer.\u2014 A. Any workman claiming to be entitled to compensation from any employer shall give notice in writing to his employer of the accident and of the injury within thirty [30] days after their occurrence; unless, by reason of his injury or some other cause beyond his control the workman is prevented from giving notice within that time, in which case he shall give notice as soon as may reasonably be done, and at all events not later than sixty [60] days after the occurrence of the accident.\n\u201cB. No written notice is required to be given where the employer or any superintendent or foreman or other agent in charge of the work in connection with which the accident occurred had actual knowledge of its occurrence.\u201d\nThe parties stipulated as follows:\n1. That at the time of the injury complained of appellant was employed as a dock foreman by Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. at wages in excess of $100 per week.\n2. That appellant\u2019s employment was covered by the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act.\n3. That the total time lost from work due to appellant\u2019s injury was twenty weeks.\n4. That the medical reports of W. A. Jones, M. D., neuro-surgeon of El Paso, Texas, would be admitted in evidence at the trial.\n5. That the total medical expenses of appellant due to this injury and treatment thereof were $1425.28.\n6. That the liquidated damages of appellant, according to the stipulation herein-before referred to, appear in the requested findings of fact of appellant as follows:\n(a) Payment for total temporary disability \u2014 $760;\n(b) Payment for medical expenses\u2014 $1425.28;'\n(c) Payment for 10% partial permanent disability \u2014 $1900; total \u2014 $4085.28.\n7. The total attorney fees requested were $1395.\nThe evidence is undisputed that appellant suffered his back injury on May 16, 1960, during the course of his employment. He thought it was a pulled muscle and would get well. Appellant had previously had the same sensation several times and each time the pain went away. He continued working until June 21, 1960, when he saw Dr. Kaiser. \u25a0 Dr. Kaiser testified that appellant had radiation of pain in his back and down in his right leg. Appellant was given conservative treatment to relieve pain and to try to relax the muscle spasm. Appellant was hospitalized on June 26, 1960, was discharged on July 1, 1960, and was to return to work on July 5, 1960, which he did.\nThe first time that it became apparent to appellant that he had suffered a compensable injury was on June 21, 1960. Thus the period for giving notice began to run from the time that appellant knew, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that he had sustained an.injury by accident in the course of his employment.. Montell v. Orndorff, 67 N.M. 156, 353 P.2d 680; Anderson v. Contract Trucking Co., 48 N.M. 158, 146 P.2d 873.\nThe next question we must determine is whether appellant gave the employer written notice of the accident and injury within thirty days from the date of the discovery of the compensable injury. We answer this question in the affirmative.\nThe form or statement of claim, plaintiff\u2019s exhibit No. 2, filled in and signed by Dr. C. D. Kaiser, shows that appellant\u2019s injury was a \u201cdisc syndrome,\u201d and that the injury arose out of appellant\u2019s employment. It also shows that appellant received treatments on June 21, 22, 23, 25 at Dr. Kaiser\u2019s office, and received treatments at the hospital on June 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 and July 1. Dr. Kaiser signed the statement on July 7, 1960. Appellant completed part I of the statement of claim, setting out that the disability was due to appellant\u2019s occupation. To the question on the form \u2014 \u201cWhere did the injury occur,\u201d appellant filled in \u2014 \u201con job.\u201d To the question- \u2014 -\u201cDescribe the injury. Tell how it happened.\u201d Appellant wrote in \u201cunloading freight, picked up piece of steel pipe.\u201d Appellant, by mistake, stated that the injury occurred on June 16, 1960, whereas it occurred on May 16, 1960.\nOn the early morning of July 13, 1960, appellant left the statement of claim, plaintiff\u2019s exhibit No. 2, on the desk of W. \u00c9. Nelson, the terminal manager, who filled in part II, the part to be completed by the employer. Nelson wrote in that appellant was employed on September 3, 1957, and that when the disability occurred appellant was a permanent employee. Nelson recommended payment of the claim; that appellant\u2019s occupation was dock foreman; that the first full day appellant was unable to work was on June 22, 1960, and that he resumed work on July 5, 1960. Nelson then set out the name and address of employer, Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., Roswell, New Mexico, and signed the same on July 13, 1960. All statements were written in by each of the respective parties, in their own handwriting, and in triplicate.\nAppellees concede that there are no comparable facts to the case before us in any of our decisions. They cite Ogletree v. Jones, 44 N.M. 567, 106 P.2d 302, wherein we held that a casual statement of injury is not sufficient. Appellees also say that if the case is reversed it would be contrary to our holdings in Bolton v. Murdock, 62 N.M. 211, 307 P.2d 794; Copeland v. Black, 65 N.M. 214, 334 P.2d 1116; Yardman v. Cooper, 65 N.M. 450, 339 P.2d 473; Gallegos v. George A. Rutherford, Inc., 67 N.M. 459, 357 P.2d 50.\nWe cannot agree with appellees. In Gallegos v. Rutherford, supra, we held that notice of a latent injury was required, and due to the workman\u2019s failure to timely give notice after the latent character of the injury became obvious, the claim was barred. Citing Montell v. Orndorff, supra, and other cases.\nIn the case before us the latent character of the injury became obvious on June 21, 1960, when appellant was examined by Dr. Kaiser. On July 13, 1960, appellant placed the insurance form or statement of claim on W. E. Nelson\u2019s desk. This statement, filled out by appellant, shows clearly on its face that appellant\u2019s injury occurred on the job while lifting some steel, and arose out of appellant\u2019s employment.\nViewing all of the circumstances and evidence in this case, and following our rule that the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act is remedial in character and should be liberally construed, we hold that the statement of claim, or insurance form, appellant\u2019s exhibit No. 2, with all of its contents, and signed by W. E. Nelson, constituted written notice to Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., of the injury within thirty days from the date that appellant discovered that he had suffered a compensable injury.\nThe judgment of the district court is reversed and remanded with instructions to set aside the order of dismissal and enter judgment for appellant in the total sum of $4085.28, and attorney\u2019s fees for appellant\u2019s attorney in the district court in the sum of $1395.00. Attorney\u2019s fees for appellant\u2019s attorney on this appeal are allowed in the sum of $500.\nIt Is So Ordered.\nCARMODY and NOBLE, JJ., concur.\nCOMPTON, C. J., and MOISE, J., not participating.", "type": "majority", "author": "CHAVEZ, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Wm. W. Osborn, Roswell, for appellant.", "McAtee, Toulouse, Marchiondo, Ruud & Gallagher, Albuquerque, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "369 P.2d 774\nL. H. LANGLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NAVAJO FREIGHT LINES, INC., and Transport Indemnity Co., Defendants-Appellees.\nNo. 7010.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nJan. 24, 1962.\nRehearing Denied April 3, 1962.\nWm. W. Osborn, Roswell, for appellant.\nMcAtee, Toulouse, Marchiondo, Ruud & Gallagher, Albuquerque, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0034-01", "first_page_order": 66, "last_page_order": 71 }