{ "id": 5372918, "name": "MAJOR OIL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK, ALBUQUERQUE, New Mexico, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Major Oil Development Co. v. First National Bank", "decision_date": "1965-05-17", "docket_number": "No. 7583", "first_page": "179", "last_page": "183", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "75 N.M. 179" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "402 P.2d 160" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "58 S.E. 621", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 W.Va. 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "W. Va.", "case_ids": [ 8630092 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/w-va/62/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 F.2d 795", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 975562 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/88/0795-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 F.2d 949", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 477925 ], "year": 1937, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/191/0949-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 N.M. 195", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2718383 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/68/0195-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 P. 799", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Cal.App. 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App.", "case_ids": [ 2138019 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app/95/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 A.L.R. 1417", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "218 P. 424", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "192 Cal. 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal.", "case_ids": [ 2143274 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal/192/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 A.L.R. 1273", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 N.W. 185", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "252 Mich. 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich.", "case_ids": [ 1841411 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich/252/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 N.Y.S. 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 P. 354", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Cal.App. 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App.", "case_ids": [ 2125732 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app/98/0523-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 499, "char_count": 7924, "ocr_confidence": 0.652, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.446063651887353e-08, "percentile": 0.2785853538179253 }, "sha256": "f3a33f1866b1a12579d8d3347005eba1de914a6a0bd667ac28e1912af859e1bd", "simhash": "1:73c7396b77077f7a", "word_count": 1343 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:36:05.656930+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "CHAVEZ and COMPTON, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "MAJOR OIL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK, ALBUQUERQUE, New Mexico, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CARMODY, Chief Justice.\nThe basic question for our decision is whether striking out the name of one of two payees on a check is a forgery within the contemplation of our statute (\u00a7 48-10-8, N.M.S.A.1953).\nThe above statute provided for a six-months limitation on bank liability in cases of \"a forged or raised check.\u201d This section has since been repealed by the Uniform Commercial Code (see particularly \u00a7 50A-4-406, N.M.S.A.1953). The check in question was issued by the appellant, made payable to the First National Bank of Oklahoma City and Herman L. Hurst. The check was apparently cashed by Hurst at another Oklahoma bank and cleared through the appellant\u2019s account in the appellee bank. However, the words on the face of the check \u201cFirst National Bank of Oklahoma City and\u201d were stricken by a line drawn through them, and the only endorsement is that of Hurst.\nAfter being paid by the bank, the check was returned to appellant together with the bank statement under date of June 1, 1959. Appellant did not discover the alteration of the check until early in 1962, at which time the bank was notified of the error. Appellant filed suit for the face amount of the check together with interest, and appellee, in its answer, alleged the limitation provided in \u00a7 48-10-8, supra. The court rendered judgment in favor of appellee, basing its decision, in part, upon the limitation statute.\nAppellant\u2019s argument is, in effect, that inasmuch as the statute mentions only \u201cforged or raised\u201d checks, therefore it does not include a material alteration. Appellant argues, by analogy, that because the Uniform Commercial Code specifically mentions \u201cmaterial alterations,\u201d therefore it follows that the legislature, in enacting \u00a7 48-10-8, supra, must have intended to exclude from the term \u201cforgery\u201d the matter of \u201cmaterial alterations.\u201d\nWe are cited cases from California and New York, which, upon first reading, would seem to bear out this theory. However, an analysis of the cases makes it apparent that in each of them the court was dealing with a problem of a forged endorsement, and not a change on the face of the check such as we have here. See Merchants\u2019 National Bank of Los Angeles v. Continental National Bank, 1929, 98 Cal.App. 523, 277 P. 354; Kleinman v. Chase National Bank, 1924, 124 Misc.R. 173, 207 N.Y.S. 191. Therefore, we do not feel that the decisions above mentioned are persuasive.\nAlthough involving different facts, we are persuaded that the decision in Detroit Piston Ring Co. v. Wayne County & Home Savings Bank, 1930, 252 Mich. 163, 233 N.W. 185, 75 A.L.R. 1273, is more in line with the determination of the legislative intent, the Michigan statute (as does ours) referred to a forged or raised check. Nevertheless, the court held that the limitation statute applied to facts necessarily within the knowledge of the drawer at the time the check was returned to him, \u201c * * namely, whether his name has been forged or the check raised, or the name of the payee changed.\u201d\nIn California, contrary to appellant\u2019s assertion, the supreme court of that state determined, in a situation not completely unlike that facing us, that the limitation statute relating to \u201ca forged or raised check\u201d was applicable in a case in which a part of the name of the payee was erased. Union Tool Co. v. Farmers\u2019 and Merchants\u2019 National Bank, 1923, 192 Cal. 40, 218 P. 424, 28 A.L.R. 1417. The court stated:\n\u201cThe statute to which reference has been made must be taken, if possible, in its natural and usual sense; it should not receive a strained construction. The checks as originally drawn were first altered by changing the name of the intended payee and afterward by fraudulently indorsing the payee\u2019s name thereon. Those acts certainly amounted to forgery within the definition of that term as found in any of the citations dealing with such an offense to which attention has been called by counsel. Any material alteration of a writing with intent to defraud any one, so as to make the writing appear to be different from what it was originally intended to be, is a forgery.\n\u00ab* * *\n\u201c * * * It is our view that where, as here, the canceled checks and a statement of his account with the bank are regularly furnished to the depositor, the statute begins to run from the time the alleged \u2018forged or raised\u2019 check was delivered to the depositor as a voucher supporting the payment made by the bank.\u201d\nIn at least one later opinion, Atwell v. Mercantile Trust Company, 1928, 95 Cal.App. 338, 272 P. 799, the California Court of Appeals distinguished the Union Tool case in its determination that the language in Union Tool referring to the forged endorsement was not necessary for that decision, but, nonetheless, with this noted exception, the language quoted above relating to alterations on the face of the checks remains the law of California.\nAppellant asserts there is a distinction between the drawing of a line through the name of one of the payees as was done here and the erasure of part of the name as occurred in the Union Tool case. However, it would seem to us that an erasure, if artfully done, would be much less noticeable than the act done in this case; but, in any event, the attempted differentiation does not impress us. It is a distinction without a difference, particularly in view of the definitions of \u201cforgery\u201d hereinafter mentioned.\nAlthough in no sense condoning the obvious negligent act on the part of the bank in paying the check at issue here, nevertheless it should have been obvious to the appellant at the time the check was returned with the bank statement, even upon a cursory examination, that there had been a change made on the face thereof. The bank\u2019s responsibility is great, but there is also a duty on the part of a depositor to protect its own interest. See Aireo Supply Company v. Albuquerque National Bank, 1961, 68 N.M. 195, 360 P.2d 386.\nThe New Mexico criminal statutes relating to forgery, which were in effect at the time, would undoubtedly encompass the striking of the name of one of the payees (see \u00a7\u00a7 40-20-1 and 2, and \u00a7\u00a7 40-20-7 and 8, N.M.S.A.1953). Blackstone\u2019s Commentaries, Lewis\u2019s Edition, Book IV, page 1643, in its definition of \u201cforgery,\u201d states, in part:\n\u201cIt may with us be defined at common law to be \u2018the fraudulent making or alteration of a writing to the prejudice of another man\u2019s right, * * *.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis added.)\nSee also Rowley v. United States, (8th Cir. 1951), 191 F.2d 949; Keese v. Zerbst, (10th Cir. 1937), 88 F.2d 795; and State v. Lotono, 1907, 62 W.Va. 310, 58 S.E. 621. To. us, it is clear that the material alteration in the case at bar is included in the definition of \u201cforgery.\u201d\nIt is to be noted that we are not here considering the rights of a holder in due course, but only the rights and responsibilities of a bank depositor. Although it is argued by appellant that \u00a7 48-10-10, N.M.S.A.1953, should be found to be applicable in this case, nevertheless we do not believe that this statute, which provides a five-year limitation as to the presumption of correctness of statements of account, can be considered to be applicable where the change is made upon the face of the check, as it was here. The instant 'case relates to a forgery by a material alteration, not the mathematical correctness of the statement of account.\nEven though the trial court based its decision upon another ground in addition to that above discussed, nevertheless, in view of our determination, it is not necessary for uc to consider that question.\nThe judgment will be affirmed. It is so ordered.\nCHAVEZ and COMPTON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "CARMODY, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Dale B. Dilts, Albuquerque, for appellant.", "Rodey, Diclcason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, John P. Eastham, Duane C. Gilkey, Albuquerque, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "402 P.2d 160\nMAJOR OIL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK, ALBUQUERQUE, New Mexico, Defendant-Appellee.\nNo. 7583.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nMay 17, 1965.\nDale B. Dilts, Albuquerque, for appellant.\nRodey, Diclcason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, John P. Eastham, Duane C. Gilkey, Albuquerque, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0179-01", "first_page_order": 235, "last_page_order": 239 }