{ "id": 5377232, "name": "Jay Jerry MARTINEZ, Petitioner, v. Harold A. COX, Warden of the New Mexico State Penitentiary, Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "Martinez v. Cox", "decision_date": "1965-08-23", "docket_number": "No. 7919", "first_page": "417", "last_page": "421", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "75 N.M. 417" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "405 P.2d 659" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "64 N.M. 454", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5345158 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/64/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 N.M. 459", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8842161 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/57/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 N.M. 775", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2796869 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/74/0775-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 L.Ed.2d 1242", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 S.Ct. 1904", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "366 U.S. 950", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1285608, 1285448, 1285645, 1285934, 1285660 ], "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/366/0950-02", "/us/366/0950-01", "/us/366/0950-05", "/us/366/0950-04", "/us/366/0950-03" ] }, { "cite": "287 F.2d 389", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1997809 ], "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/287/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 Iowa 951", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Iowa", "case_ids": [ 4412464 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/iowa/245/0951-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 Neb. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Neb.", "case_ids": [ 2476637 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/neb/169/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Or. 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Or.", "case_ids": [ 5034000 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or/197/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 N.M. 319", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2714314 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/62/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 F.Supp. 445", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 65212 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/221/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 F.2d 418", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 108907 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/325/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 N.M. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590385 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/60/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 Iowa 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Iowa", "case_ids": [ 2357921 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/iowa/251/0234-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 563, "char_count": 9193, "ocr_confidence": 0.645, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.2460491302262885e-07, "percentile": 0.7806781399224434 }, "sha256": "efbd6f776ae60a42ded6ee25e0825a912064cb69bcdedab500b831a79349901b", "simhash": "1:5389236644b13482", "word_count": 1515 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:36:05.656930+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Jay Jerry MARTINEZ, Petitioner, v. Harold A. COX, Warden of the New Mexico State Penitentiary, Respondent." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PER CURIAM.\nPetitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court upon his allegation that he has fully completed service of his sentence of imprisonment \u201cfor a term of not less than two nor more than ten years * * * all of said sentence except the first eighteen months is hereby suspended.\u201d\nSections 42-1-54 and 55, N.M.S.A.1953, permit an allowance of certain \u201cgood time\u201d and \u201cmeritorious good time\u201d to be Credited upon the time a prisoner serves. It has been stipulated that petitioner has earned two months \u201cgood time\u201d and three months and twenty-four days of \u201cmeritorious good time,\u201d and, that if this is credited against the eighteen month sentence not suspended, he completed his full sentence on April 15, 1965.\nThe conviction here was for the.unlawful possession of narcotics, contrary to \u00a7 54\u2014 7-13, N.M.S.A.1953, the statutory penalty for which is not less than two nor more than ten years. The question of whether petitioner is entitled to Credit for good time under the particular sentence imposed turns upon a proper interpretation of \u00a7 54-7-15 (D), N.M.S.A.1953,\u2019which expressly provides that the \u201cimposition or execution of a sentence (imposed in a narcotics conviction) shall not\u2019be suspended * * \u2019* until the minimum imprisonment provided for the offense shall hav\u00e9 been served.\u201d The minimum sentence in this case is two years, but since the petitioner has not challenged the sentence imposed, the question of whether the court was authorized to suspend a part of the statutory minimum sentence is not before us, and we expressly do not decide it.\nWe are not unmindful that our statute was adopted from the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, and that \u00a7 54-7-49, N.M.S.A. 1953, directs us to construe it so as \u201cto make uniform the laws of those states which enact it.\u201d Consequently, we must consider the fact that the Supreme Court of Iowa construed the identical provision in Masteller v. Board of Control of State Inst., 251 Iowa 234, 100 N.W.2d 111, as not preventing the application of good time statutes to reduce the period of actual imprisonment below the statutory minimum. Notwithstanding the provision of the Iowa Narcotic Drug Act providing for a minimum and maximum sentence, the Supreme Court held that the trial court had authority to impose only the minimum sentence. We think its conclusion that \u201cgood time\u201d should be deducted from that sentence resulted largely from a consideration of the history of the Iowa indeterminate sentence law and the various amendments to that state\u2019s Narcotic Drug law, as well as important differences between ours and the Iowa indeterminate sentence law.\nOwens v. Swope, 60 N.M. 71, 287 P.2d 605, laid at.rest the contention that \u201cgood time\u201d is to be deducted from the minimum sentence for the purpose of fixing the date of a prisoner\u2019s final discharge from the penitentiary. We there said that under the law then in effect \u201cservice of the minimum sentence less good time merely fixes a date when the inmate of the penitentiary becomes eligible for parole.\u201d Section 54\u2014 7-15(D), N.M.S.A.1953, however, prohibits parole or probation of one convicted under the Narcotic Drug Act until the full minimum sentence provided by law has been served. It is our settled judgment that a consideration of all of the controlling statutes requires a construction that \u201cgood time\u201d allowances, for the purpose of final discharge from imprisonment, are only deductible from the maximum sentence provided by law. Owens v. Swope, supra, requires that construction.\nUnited States v. Figueroa, 325 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1963) and Conley v. United States Board of Parole, 221 F.Supp. 445 (S.D. N.Y.1963) are clearly distinguishable by reason of basic differences between the federal narcotics statute and our own.\nIt is contended that, if an effect is given to \u00a7 54-7-15 which prevents credit being given to him for good time, it conflicts with \u00a7\u00a7 42-1-54 and 55; that repeals by implication are not favored; and that \u201ca reasonably fair interpretation,\u201d Alvarez v. Board of Trustees of La Union Townsite, 62 N.M. 319, 309 P.2d 989,. requires a construction that \u00a7 54-7-15 (D) applies only to suspensions of sentences granted by the court imposing the sentence. Petitioner, however, overlooks another equally important rule of statutory construction. It is a fundamental rule that where the general statute, if standing alone, would include the same matter as a special act, and thus conflict with it, the special act will be considered as an exception to or qualification of the general statute. Andersen v. Heltzel, 197 Or. 23, 251 P.2d 482; Thompson v. Commercial Credit Equipment Corp., 169 Neb. 377, 99 N.W.2d 761; Iowa Mut. Tornado Ins. Ass\u2019n v. Fischer, 245 Iowa 951, 65 N.W.2d 162.\nWe are unable to agree with petitioner that the title to Ch. 146, Laws 1961, violates \u00a7 16, Art. IV of the New Mexico Constitution in failing to clearly express the subject of the legislation in the title thereof and in embracing more than one subject. The title is:\n\u201cAn Act Relating t'o Narcotic Drugs and Marijuana; Amending Section 54\u20147-15, New Mexico Statutes Annotated, 1953 Compilation (Being Laws 1953, Chapter 25, Section 3 as Amended); to Prohibit \u25a0 Suspension or Deferral of \u25a0 Execution or Imposition of Sentence Under Certain Conditions; Increasing' the Minimum Prison Sentence.\u201d\nThe specific attack is based upon the theory that the prohibition against suspension of such sentences refers only to restrictions upon the power of courts to suspend sentences but does not give notice that credit for good time may likewise be restricted under certain conditions. As we have pointed out, however, the word \u201csuspension\u201d applied equally to suspension of imposition of the sentence by the court and to suspension of its execution by the executive. We find no failure of the title to this act to give adequate notice of the subject of the legislation, nor does the act offend the Constitution as containing more than one subject.\nPetitioner\u2019s argument that failure to order .his immediate release constitutes a deprivation of due process, cannot be sustained. Statutory ineligibility for probation or parole does no violence to due process of law concepts, Conley v. United States Board of Parole, supra, Cf. Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950, 81 S.Ct. 1904, 6 L.Ed.2d 1242 (1961), and we perceive of no material difference between that and statutory ineligibility resulting from a requirement that good time allowance should be computed only on the maximum term required to be imposed under the indeterminate sentence law.\nThe fact that \u00a7 54\u20147-15 (D), supra, denies probation to narcotics viol\u00e1tors but allows such a violator, who is an addict and-who has been certified as cured by a hospital or correcting institution, to be eligible for probation, forms the basis for the contention that the statute denies equal protection of the laws, in contravention of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. II, \u00a7 18 of the New Mexico Constitution. We recently indicated that equal protection does not prohibit classification for legislative purposes, provided that there is a rational and natural basis therefor, that it is based upon substantial differences between those to whom it does and those to whom it does not apply, and that it is so framed as to embrace equally all who may be in like circumstances and situations. Gruschus v. Bureau of Revenue, 74 N.M. 775, 399 P. 2d 105.\nWe realize that this is an itnusual situation in that the classification is not based upon a distinction between the two separate offenses proscribed by the Act, i. e., unlawful possession (\u00a7 54-7-13, N.M.S.A. 1953) and possession with intent to illegally sell or deliver (\u00a7 54-7-14, N.M.S.A.1953), for one may be guilty of either offense without being an addict. ' However, we think there is a rational, natural, and substantial difference between those who are addicted to narcotics and those who are not. Since the statute is based upon a reasonable classification, it does not offend the equal protection clauses of our State or Federal Constitutions. State v. Thompson, 57 N.M. 459, 260 P.2d 370; Edmunds v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 64 N.M. 454, 330 P.2d 131.\nWe cannot agree with petitioner\u2019s final argument that the respondent has contracted to release him upon service of^ eighteen months less good time, or that the state is estopped from denying his eligibility for release. Neither the term nor the conditions under which a person convicted of a crime is confined in the penitentiary rest upon contract, nor may the state acting in its governmental capacity be estopped.\nIt follows that the writ should be discharged and petitioner remanded to the custody of the warden of the New Mexico State Penitentiary.\nIt is so ordered.", "type": "majority", "author": "PER CURIAM." } ], "attorneys": [ "Bigbee & Byrd, Arthur H. Coleman, Santa Fe, for petitioner.", "Boston E. Witt, Atty. Gen., Harry S. Connelly, Jr.,\u2019 Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for respondent." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "405 P.2d 659\nJay Jerry MARTINEZ, Petitioner, v. Harold A. COX, Warden of the New Mexico State Penitentiary, Respondent.\nNo. 7919.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nAug. 23, 1965.\nRehearing Denied Oet. 1, 1965.\nBigbee & Byrd, Arthur H. Coleman, Santa Fe, for petitioner.\nBoston E. Witt, Atty. Gen., Harry S. Connelly, Jr.,\u2019 Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for respondent." }, "file_name": "0417-01", "first_page_order": 473, "last_page_order": 477 }