{ "id": 2802354, "name": "Teodulo GONZALES et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants and Cross-Appellees, v. OIL, CHEMICAL AND ATOMIC WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO and its Members, et al., Defendants-Appellees, Oil Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers, Local Union 3-658, Arthur Lopez, Walter C. Peterson, Dale F. Cross, Jack L. Smith, L. U. Marshall, William A. Hanley, and Marvin Sell, Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Gonzales v. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union", "decision_date": "1966-10-17", "docket_number": "No. 7882", "first_page": "61", "last_page": "70", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "77 N.M. 61" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "419 P.2d 257" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "62 A.L.R. 311", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 N.E. 272", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 Mass. 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 851760 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/263/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 A.L.R. 1202", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 U.S. 694", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6145525 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/322/0694-01" ] }, { "cite": "250 F.2d 51", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 699449 ], "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/250/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 N.M. 695", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1587637 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/58/0695-01" ] }, { "cite": "1 A.L.R. 170", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 P. 528", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "23 N.M. 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2394293 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/23/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 N.M. 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2715202 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/67/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 N.M. 219", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2712993 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/62/0219-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 N.M. 27", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5321015 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/73/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 157", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 F.2d 771", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 892009, 891879 ], "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/336/0771-02", "/f2d/336/0771-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 U.S. 252", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167669 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/377/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 U.S. 236", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6164086 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/359/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 U.S. 634", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6165917 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/356/0634-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 U.S. 131", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6163134 ], "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/355/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 L.Ed. 1025", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 U.S. 656", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11302319 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/347/0656-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 U.S.C. \u00a7 141", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 N.M. 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8842287 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/57/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 N.M. 340", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1587651 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/58/0340-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 N.M. 267", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2776087 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "270" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/63/0267-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 N.M. 262", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2787509 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/69/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 N.M. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5376785 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/75/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 N.E.2d 769", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "786" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "31 Ill.2d 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2832377 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/31/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 F.2d 759", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1243004 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/182/0759-01" ] }, { "cite": "1 A.L.R. 170", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "168 P. 528", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "23 N.M. 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2394293 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/23/0306-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 952, "char_count": 20222, "ocr_confidence": 0.666, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.566897974329819e-07, "percentile": 0.886094131356693 }, "sha256": "317d0540c416710b76db12c47e9544e1fb98817e0e36b5e938fe769f75189d29", "simhash": "1:22569823540f5dc9", "word_count": 3245 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:38:38.028708+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "CHAVEZ and COMPTON, JJ., and La-FEL E. OMAN, J., Court of'Appeals, concur." ], "parties": [ "Teodulo GONZALES et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants and Cross-Appellees, v. OIL, CHEMICAL AND ATOMIC WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO and its Members, et al., Defendants-Appellees, Oil Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers, Local Union 3-658, Arthur Lopez, Walter C. Peterson, Dale F. Cross, Jack L. Smith, L. U. Marshall, William A. Hanley, and Marvin Sell, Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nJOE W. WOOD, Judge, Court of Appeals.\nA labor dispute resulted in a strike and picketing at the mines and mills of Kermac Nuclear Fuels Corporation in Valencia \u2022County, New Mexico. The sixty-six plaintiffs are alleged to be employees of the corporation. The union-defendants are the international and local 3-658 of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union. Each of the eight individual defendants is alleged to be either a union representative, officer or member. The amended complaint seeks damages as a result of alleged acts of defendants committed in connection with the labor dispute.\nConcluding that it did not have jurisdiction, the trial court dismissed the amended complaint on the ground \u201cthat the subject matter * * * has been pre-empted by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, a federal statute, * * * \u201d Plaintiffs\u2019 appeal requires a determination of (1) the claims asserted and (2) New Mexico jurisdiction over these claims.\nDefendants\u2019 cross-appeal under \u00a7 21-2-1 (17) (2), N.M.S.A.1953, raises issues of (1) res judicata, (2) the applicability of \u00a7 59-13-2, N.M.S.A.1953, and (3) the sufficiency of pleadings alleging agency and a class action.\nThree claims for relief are asserted. They are: (1) that from July 24, 1961, to September 9, 1961, defendants wilfully and maliciously prevented each of the plaintiffs from going to or engaging in their employment; this alleges a common law tort; Crawford v. Taylor, 58 N.M. 340, 270 P.2d 978; (2) that five of the plaintiffs were imprisoned in the union hall on August 11, 1961; this is a sufficient allegation of false imprisonment; Sanchez v. Securities Acceptance Corp., 57 N.M. 512, 260 P.2d 703; and (3) that defendants prevented the plaintiffs from pursuing their employment and interfered with their use of the public roads, contrary to \u00a7\u00a7 59-13-1 and 59-13-2, N.M.S.A.1953. This alleges a statutory violation and is sufficient under \u00a7 21-1-1(9) (h), N.M.S.A.1953.\nThe parties raise no question as to whether the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (29 U.S.C. \u00a7 141) is applicable to the labor dispute out of which these claims arise. The issue of federal pre-emption having been presented on the basis that federal labor law is applicable, the issue will be answered on that basis.\nNumerous cases deal with the question of pre-emption, that is, whether federal labor law so occupies the field that state courts are prevented from asserting jurisdiction. The following cases are of particular interest: United Construction Workers, etc. v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 74 S.Ct. 833, 98 L.Ed. 1025; Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131, 78 S.Ct. 206, 2 L.Ed.2d 151; International Union, etc. v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 78 S.Ct. 932, 2 L.Ed. 2d 1030; San Diego Building Trades Council, etc. v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775; Local 20, Teamsters, etc. Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 84 S.Ct. 1253, 12 L.Ed.2d 280; and Price v. United Mine Workers, 336 F.2d 771 (6th Cir. 1964).\nThese cases instruct us to this effect: (1) the nature of the defendants\u2019 conduct must be examined in determining whether state jurisdiction has been preempted and (2) when defendants\u2019 conduct is marked by violence, threats of violence or imminent threats to public order, the states, have jurisdiction \u2019to grant compensa- - tion for the consequences of that conduct..\nEach of the three claims alleges violence and threats of violence on the part of defendants.'\nThe main thrust of defendants\u2019 claim of federal pre-emption is against the claim of a statutory violation. While the complaint alleges violation of \u00a7\u00a7 59-13-1 and 59-13-2, N.M.S.A.1953, the wording of the complaint indicates that the only portion of the statute involved is '\u00a7 59-13-2(B), N.M.S'.A. 1953. It reads:\n\u201cIt shall be unlawful in connection with any labor dispute for any person individually or in concert with others' to hinder or prevent by mass picketing, violence or threats of violence, force, coercion, or intimidation of any kind, the pursuit of any lawful work or employment, or to obstruct or interfere with entrance to or egress from any place of' employment, or to obstruct or interfere' with free or uninterrupted use of any public roads, streets, highways, railways, airports or other ways of travel or con-' veyance.\u201d\nThe attack on this statute is threefold. First, it is asserted that the jurisdiction remaining to the states is jurisdiction, over, common law torts as opposed to jurisdiction over statutory violations, relying on United Construction Workers, etc. v. Laburnum Construction Corp., supra; International Union, etc. v. Russell, supra; and San Diego Building Trades Council, etc. v. Garmon, supra.\nThe cases do not support this contention. While Laburnum and Russell held that states had jurisdiction over common law actions, there was no issue as to jurisdiction over statutory violations. In the Garmon c\u00e1se the application of the California statute was denied, not because it was a statute, but - because' activities -regulated by the statute had-been pre-empted. \" \u2022\nThe proposed distinction between a common law tort and a statutory violation is-without merit. The conduct involved is- the basis for jurisdiction. As stated in Garmon :' \u25a0\n\u201c * * * [Jjudicial concern has necessarily focused on the nature of the activities which the States -have sought to .regulate, rather than on the method, of regulation adopted. \u25a0 * * * \u201d\nSecond, it is asserted that \u00a7 59-13-2 (B), N.M.S.A.1953, applies to both violent and non-violent conduct. Because it does not distinguish between types of conduct, and because state jurisdiction is limited to violent conduct, defendants contend that New Mexico, does not have jurisdiction over claims alleging a violation .of the statute. They point out that the statute would afford, relief for \u201ccoercion or intimidation-of any kind\u201d- and would apply to coercion or intimidation consisting of non-threatening speech or peaceful picketing.\nYoungdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., supra, held that the Arkansas court had \u201centered the pre-empted domain of the National Labor Relations Board insofar as it enjoined peaceful picketing * * *.\u201d In the Garmon case a damage award based on a California statute was reversed. The award was based on peaceful union activity. State jurisdiction over the peaceful activity had been pre-empted by the federal labor law.\nNew Mexico courts cannot give effect to those portions of the statute authorizing damages for peaceful activities in connection with a labor dispute where federal labor law is applicable. Its jurisdiction over such activities is pre-empted by the federal labor law.\nSection 59-13-2, N.M.S.A.1953, was enacted by Laws 1959, Chapter 26. Section 4 of the act provides that if any portion of the act is \u201cinvalid or inoperative by virtue of Federal pre-emption\u201d the remainder of the act is not affected. Applying the severability provision, the claim of statutory violation based on violence or threats of violence is a claim over which the trial court has jurisdiction.\nThird, it is asserted that \u00a7\u00a7 59-13-1 and 59-13-2, N.M.S.A.1953, cannot be enforced by New Mexico courts because they conflict with the federal statute. They say this conflict is shown by comparing ohr statute with \u00a7\u00a7 7 and 8 of the federal statute (29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 157 and 158). Defendants would apply the following language from the Garmon decision:\n\u201c * * * When an activity is arguably subject to \u00a7 7 or \u00a7 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted.\u201d\nDefendants contend the portion of the New Mexico statute relating to violence or threats of violence cannot be given effect by our courts because such is \u201carguably subject\u201d to the federal act. They assert that New Mexico courts have no jurisdiction because our statute poses a potential conflict with the federal statute.\nGarmon held that California could not enforce its statute authorizing an award of damages on the basis of certain peaceful union activities because the statute raised a potential conflict with federal labor law. The \u201carguably subject\u201d theory was applied to the facts of that case\u2014the peaceful union activity. In so holding, Garmon expressly recognized the jurisdiction of state courts to award damages for' conduct marked by violence and threats to public order, and stated:\n\u201c * * * State jurisdiction * * * in these situations *\u25a0 * * \u2022 is not overridden in the absence of clearly expressed congressional direction.\u201d\nThe' \u201carguably subj ect\u201d theory is \u25a0 not a basis for ousting New Mexico courts of jurisdiction over violations of our statute based on violence or threats of violence.\nEach of the three claims being based on violence or threats of violence, the federal labor law did not pre-empt the jurisdiction of the New Mexico court. The trial court erred in dismissing the amended complaint on this ground.\nDefendants\u2019 cross-appeal asserts that the trial court correctly dismissed the amended complaint even if New Mexico jurisdiction has not been pre-empted.\nThe first contention on the cross-appeal is that plaintiffs\u2019 suit is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Defendants invoke the doctrine on the basis of Valencia County Cause No. 10692.\nIn that suit eight of the present plaintiffs \u25a0sued the defendants in this action. Their complaint sought an order restraining defendants from their alleged acts of violence and from interfering with \u201cplaintiffs\u2019 and their fellow employees\u2019 pursuit of their employment.\u201d Before any answer was filed, the parties stipulated:\n\u201c* * * [Tjhat -the above entitled matter shall be dismissed, inasmuch as all matters in' controversy, as set forth in the pleadings, have now been fully set-tied.\u201d\nBased on this stipulation, the trial court dismissed the action. .\nThe doctrine of res judicata is not applicable. Section 21-1-1(41) (a), N.M. S.A.1953, is controlling. If the complaint ;in the Valencia County case was a class 'action, so that \u00a7 21-1-1(23) \u25a0 (c), N.M.S.A. 1953, was applicable, the dismissal was in accordance therewith. The order of dismissal did not specify in what manner the action was dismissed; accordingly, the dismissal was without prejudice. Section 21-1-1(41) (a) (2), N.M.S.A.1953. Being dismissed without prejudice, the Valencia \u2018County cause is not a bar to this action. 50 C.J.S. Judgments \u00a7 635.\nIf the complaint .in the Valencia County case was. not a class action, then the stipulation effectively dismissed the case. It was a voluntary dismissal. \u201cA voluntary dismissal is as if the suit had never been brought.\u201d McCuistion v. McCuistion, 73 N.M. 27, 385 P.2d 357. Thus, there is no prior suit to which res judicata could be applied.\nThe second contention on the cross-appeal applies only to the defendant unions. They assert the trial court correctly dismissed the amended complaint as. to them. Their contention is that \u00a7 59-13-2 (B), N.M. S.A.1953, does not apply to them. This section makes it unlawful \u201cfor any person in\u2022-dividually or in concert with others\u201d to - commit'certain acts. Subsection B does not expressly refer to labor organizations.'. Defendants assert that 'an express' reference to labor . organizations ;in \u00a7 59-13-2(A), \u2022N.M.-S-.A.1953\u2019, indicates that such organizations were not included in Subsection B. \u25a0Plaintiffs contend-that labor organization is included within the meaning of the word \u2022\u201cperson.\u201d \u25a0 Neither \u201cperson\u201d nor \u201clabor organization\u201d is defined by the statute.\nThe statute is to be read and .given effect as written. Burch v. Foy, 62 N.M. 219, 308 P.2d 199. Words used in a .statute are to be given their ordinary and usual meaning unless a different intent is clearly indicated. State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Marquez, 67 N.M. 353, 355 P.2d 287.\nWebster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary defines .\u201cperson\u201d both as an individual .human being and as \u201ca body of persons, or a corporation, partnership, or other legal entity that is recognized by law as the subject of rights and duties.\u201d State ex rel. Northwestern Colonization & Improvement Co. of Chihuahua v. Huller, 23 N.M. 306, 168 P. 528, 1 A.L.R. 170, states that:\n\u201cThe word \u2018person\u2019 is a generic term of comprehensive nature, embracing natural and artificial persons, * *\n\u201cPerson\u201d being inclusive, rather than exclusive, and its meaning including bodies of persons as well as individuals, the \u25a0union defendants are subject to \u00a7 59-13-\u25a02(B),. N.M.S.A.1953.\n-The third contention on cross-appeal is \u2022that-the amended complaint was-properly dismissed because it failed to contain necessary allegations of agency and was insufficient as a class action.\nThe plaintiffs allege that the acts of defendants of which they complain were done individually and as agents of the two union 'defendants. Further, it is alleged that the defendants, \u201ctheir agents, members, officers, representatives and employees acting in conjunction with them\u201d did the acts complained of.\nThe amended complaint alleges that the acts complained of were done by the defendants and by their agents. The pleading was sufficient to give. defendants \u201ca fair idea of what the plaintiff is complaining.\u201d Kisella v. Dunn, 58 N.M. 695, 275 P.2d 181. No distinct forms are necessary to state a claim. Madrid v. Spears, 250 F.2d 51 (10th Cir. 1957). The allegations of agency are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.\nThe allegations of a class action closely follow the wording of \u00a7 21-1-1(23) (a), N.M.S.A.1953. The individual defendants are sued both as individuals and as representatives of a class. The allegations as to \u201cclass\u201d are not clear.' We will consider that the \u201cclass\u201d was meant to be (1) the \" unions and (2) the members of the unions. The challenge to the sufficiency of this pleading is that the amended complaint is deficient in its allegations as- to a class.\nTo the -extent that this pleading is for the purpose of suing the unions,' it is surplusage. Section 51\u201418\u20145.1, N.M.S.A. 1953, provides that unincorporated associa- ' tions may -be sued in their own name. The union defendants are sued as unincorporated labor organizations; Being sued in their own name, no allegations of a class action were necessary to make them defendants in this action.\nTo the extent that the pleading is for the purpose of making the individual members of the union defendants in this cause, the facts alleged in the complaint are insufficient. As stated in'3 Moore, Federal ; Practice \u00a7 23.06 at 3423 (2d ed. 1964):\n\u201cAn action, of course, is not a class suit merely because it is designated as such in the pleadings; whether it is or is not depends upon the attending facts. * * *\u00bb\nAn essential prerequisite to a class suit is the existence of a \u201cclass.\u201d The class alleged is the members of the union. The facts alleged which give jurisdiction to the New Mexico courts and on which any award of damages must be based, are violence and threats of violence. It might be possible for persons committing such acts to constitute a \u201cclass,\u201d but such is not al-' leged.\nNor is it alleged that the' individual \u2018union members, as a class, authorized or participated in the- violent conduct \u25a0on which'liability,'if any, -must.'be, based. \u25a0As stated in 31 Am-.Jur. Labor, \u00a7 138:\n\u201cMembers of labor unions- are not subject to civil liability' for-the acts of the union or its officers as s\u00fcch, unless it is shown that they personally authorized or participated in the particular acts, and the liability of a member of a labor union for the wrongful acts of his associates done without his knowledge or approval is not to be inferred from mere membership in the union. * * * \u201d See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 88 L.Ed. 1542, 152 A.L.R. 1202; Sweetman v. Barrows, 263 Mass. 349, 161 N.E. 272, 62 A.L.R. 311.\nThe amended complaint is insufficient as a class action against members of the union.\nThe order of dismissal is reversed. The cause is remanded to the .trial court with instructions to set aside its order of. dismissal and reinstate the amended complaint on' the docket of the court.\nIt is so ordered.\nCHAVEZ and COMPTON, JJ., and La-FEL E. OMAN, J., Court of'Appeals, concur.\n. Pour defendants named in the complaint \u2014Patton, Allison, Hays and Young\u2014did not appear and were not served with process.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOE W. WOOD, Judge, Court of Appeals." }, { "text": "MOISE, Justice\n(concurring in part and dissenting in part).\nI find myself in disagreement with the disposition in the opinion of the majority of cross-appellants\u2019 second point to the effect that \u00a7 59-13-2(B),.N.M.S.A.1953, does . not. apply to the unions. ' '.\n5 As stated by the majority,'rules of statutory construction, require that statutes are \u2022 to be read and given effect as written. Al- \u25a0 so, \u2019words used in statutes should be given \u25a0their ordinary and usual meaning unless something different is clearly intended. \u25a0 After stating the rules, I do not understand \u25a0 the facility with which the majority con- - eludes that the \u201cusual and ordinary\u201d meaning of \u201cpersons\u201d includes \u201clabor organizations,\u201d The fact that \u201cperson\u201d was held to \u25a0 include \u201cnatural and artificial persons, such :\u2019as corporations\u201d in the statute being inter- - preted in State ex rel. Northwestern Colonization & Improvement Co. of Chihuahua v. Huller, 23 N.M. 306, 168 P. 528, 1 A.L.R. 170, is to my mind extremely feeble and .shaky support for the conclusion here an- ^ nounced. . .\n\u201c When \u00a7 59-13-2(B), N.M.S.A.1953, which makes it unlawful for \u201cany person individually or in concert with others\u201d to do certain acts, is read with \u00a7 59-13-2(A), N.M.S.A.1953, which makes unlawful certain acts' of \u201clabor organizations or- its rep-ares entatiy.es,\u201d and with \u00a7 59-13-2(D), N.MS.A.1953, which refers to \u201cperson or. per- : sons,\u201d it.seems amply clear to me that the legislature did not intend to include \u201clabor ,. organizations\u201d within the term \u201cperson.\u201d v \u00a1I\u00a3-\u00a1iti;fiad intended to do so, .how simple \u2022 5it -should 'have been to have made \u00a7 59-13-?.\u2019'2(>R-M'sup\u2019\u2019r\u00e1; \u00ed\u00e9a'd: \u201cIt shall be unlawful in connection with any labor-,disput\u00e9 for any labor organization or its representative or for any person individually or in concert .with others to hinder * * *.\u201d Having . failed to do so under the circumstances here present, it is quite evident that \u201clabor organizations\u201d were purposely omitted from \u00a7 59-13-2(B), supra. The omission was not through oversight or inadvertence. Neither \u25a0 was it because they were intended to be included under the general term \u201cperson.\u201d Oft-repeated rules of statutory construction dictate a. result contrary to that announced by the majority. See 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, \u00a7\u00a7 4907 to 4911, inclusive; 50 Am.Jur. 261, Statutes, \u00a7 274; Sandack v. Tamme (C.A. 10), 182 F.2d 759; and a particularly lucid statement and application of the rule in Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 Ill.2d 69, 199 N.E.2d 769, 786. This court has also recognized and applied the rule. See Allen v. McClellan, 75 N.M. 400, 402, 405 P.2d 405; Reed v. Styron, 69 N.M. 262, 269, 365 P.2d 912; State ex rel. Murphy v. Morley, 63 N.M. 267, 270, 317 P.2d 317.\nI agree with, the treatment and, disposition of the appeal and cross-appeal, except as set forth above. I would reverse the trial court except as to its ruling that the claim \u25a0 against the unions based upon alleged violation by them of \u00a7 59-13-2(B), N.M-S-A-1953, and as to that, the dismissal should fog affirmed.'- -I respectfully dissent from the-opinion- of-the court insofar :as it :reverses the trial court on this.point.. \u25a0", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "MOISE, Justice" } ], "attorneys": [ "Key & May, Byron Guse, Albuquerque, for appellants.", "Kool & Kool, Albuquerque, Mullinax, Wells, Mauzy, Levy & Richards, Charles J. Morris, Dallas, Tex., for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "419 P.2d 257\nTeodulo GONZALES et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants and Cross-Appellees, v. OIL, CHEMICAL AND ATOMIC WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO and its Members, et al., Defendants-Appellees, Oil Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers, Local Union 3-658, Arthur Lopez, Walter C. Peterson, Dale F. Cross, Jack L. Smith, L. U. Marshall, William A. Hanley, and Marvin Sell, Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants.\nNo. 7882.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nOct. 17, 1966.\nKey & May, Byron Guse, Albuquerque, for appellants.\nKool & Kool, Albuquerque, Mullinax, Wells, Mauzy, Levy & Richards, Charles J. Morris, Dallas, Tex., for appellees." }, "file_name": "0061-01", "first_page_order": 93, "last_page_order": 102 }