{ "id": 2804097, "name": "Lynn WESTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CARPER DRILLING COMPANY and American Employer's Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Weston v. Carper Drilling Co.", "decision_date": "1966-11-07", "docket_number": "No. 7909", "first_page": "220", "last_page": "222", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "77 N.M. 220" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "421 P.2d 435" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "72 N.M. 15", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2855386 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/72/0015-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 N.M. 613", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2804016 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/74/0613-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 N.M. 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5321463 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/73/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 N.M. 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2856368 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/72/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 N.M. 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2850768 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/70/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 N.M. 451", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5348477 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/71/0451-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 278, "char_count": 3310, "ocr_confidence": 0.653, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.708388509139945e-08, "percentile": 0.35840410000737494 }, "sha256": "dd50d60e46104795985a978aa115341c9fcec3b66557f59b226c024c8cd62a4a", "simhash": "1:31671e8e70d699f6", "word_count": 527 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:38:38.028708+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ ".' COMPTON, J., and JOE W. WOOD, J., Court.of Appeals, concur." ], "parties": [ "Lynn WESTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CARPER DRILLING COMPANY and American Employer\u2019s Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nNOBLE, Justice.\nLynn Weston has appealed from a judgment dismissing his claim for workmen\u2019s compensation benefits.\nThe trial court\u2019s finding -no. 10, that the claimant failed to prove any disability as a result of the accidental injury, is challenged as lacking substantial support in the evidence.\nSection 59-10-13.3(B), N.M.S.A.1953 (\u00a7 7, ch. 67, Laws 1959), reads:\n. \u201cIn all cases where the defendants deny that an alleged disability is a natural and direct result of the accident, the workman must establish that causal connection as a medical probability by expert medical testimony. No award of compensation shall be based on speculation or on expert testimony that as a medical possibility the causal connection exists.\u201d\nWe construed the provision in Yates v. Matthews, 71 N.M. 451, 379 P.2d 441, saying:\n\u201cThe language of the statute is clear and unambiguous in its requirement that-medical testimony be produced to establish causal connection between an accident and disability. * * * In other words, where causal connection is denied by an employer, in order to prevail, it is now encumbent upon a claimant to present one or more qualified medical experts to testify that in his or their opinion there is a causal connection as a medical probability as opposed to possibility.\u201d\nWe have consistently so interpreted the statute. Montano v. Saavedra, 70 N.M. 332, 373 P.2d 824; Luvaul v. A. Ray Barker Motor Co., 72 N.M. 447, 384 P.2d 885; Blancett v. Homestake-Sapin Partners, 73 N.M. 47, 385 P.2d 568; Brundage v. K. L. House Constr. Co., 74 N.M. 613, 396 P.2d 731.\nThe term \u201cnatural and direct\u201d as used in the statute was interpreted in Stuckey v. Furr Food Cafeteria, 72 N.M. 15, 380 P.2d 172, to signify \u201can understandable and reasonable proximity of cause and effect as distinguished from remote arid doubtful consequences resulting from, a given occurrence.\u201d\nThe pleadings in this case put in issue the question of causal connection between the asserted disability and the accident, and upon authority of our decisions supra, there may be no recovery unless such causal connection is established by the opinion of a medical expert as a medical probability.\nWe have carefully reviewed the record in this case and find no such medical opinion, nor has any been called to our attention. The medical testimony asserted by the claimant to satisfy this statutory requirement concerns only an opinion as to the claimant\u2019s then ability to perform heavy labor. Such testimony does not, however, establish the causal connection between the disability and the accident. Claimant\u2019s failure to produce such evidence supports the challenged finding and the conclusion that the claimant failed to prove a compensable injury arising out of his employment.\nOur disposition of this point makes it unnecessary to discuss other questions briefed and argued.\nIt follows that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed.\nIt is so ordered.\n.' COMPTON, J., and JOE W. WOOD, J., Court.of Appeals, concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "NOBLE, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "William J. Heck, Hobbs, for appellant.", "Girand, Cowan & Reese, Hobbs, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "421 P.2d 435\nLynn WESTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CARPER DRILLING COMPANY and American Employer\u2019s Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellees.\nNo. 7909.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nNov. 7, 1966.\nRehearing Denied Jan. 3, 1967.\nWilliam J. Heck, Hobbs, for appellant.\nGirand, Cowan & Reese, Hobbs, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0220-01", "first_page_order": 252, "last_page_order": 254 }