{ "id": 2804584, "name": "Blynn STASEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. H. B. STASEY, d/b/a Stasey Construction Company, and Houston Fire and Casualty Insurance Company of Fort Worth, Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Stasey v. Stasey", "decision_date": "1967-01-03", "docket_number": "No. 7989", "first_page": "436", "last_page": "440", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "77 N.M. 436" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "423 P.2d 869" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "70 N.M. 475", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2850353 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/70/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 N.M. 265", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5317330 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/61/0265-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 N.M. 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5316894 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/61/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 N.M. 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590363 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/60/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 N.M. 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1562255 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/47/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 N.M. 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1569657 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/42/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "37 N.M. 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1575432 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/37/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 P.2d 747", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 1575393, 1575343 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/37/0141-01", "/nm/37/0139-01" ] }, { "cite": "37 N.M. 139", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1575343 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/37/0139-01" ] }, { "cite": "35 N.M. 544", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1557957 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/35/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "35 N.M. 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1557896 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/35/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 N.M. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1554474 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/33/0227-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 551, "char_count": 10466, "ocr_confidence": 0.651, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1765544133702781e-07, "percentile": 0.5876404377243616 }, "sha256": "854e92e8f47893a332b14de8b9718287454ed0652144b517c29b08438319460c", "simhash": "1:b6ed1de230ef7d49", "word_count": 1735 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:38:38.028708+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "NOBLE and COMPTON, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "Blynn STASEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. H. B. STASEY, d/b/a Stasey Construction Company, and Houston Fire and Casualty Insurance Company of Fort Worth, Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nOMAN, Judge, Court of Appeals.\nThis is a claim for workmen\u2019s compensation benefits. Claimant sustained a compensable injury on July 14, 1962. He was paid compensation benefits and medical expenses until September 21, 1963. From and after September 21, 1963, defendants failed and refused to pay claimant any further benefits, and no promise was made by defendants to pay benefits after that date.\nNegotiations were conducted between \u2022claimant and his attorneys on the one hand, and a representative of defendants and their attorneys on the other hand, looking toward a possible settlement of the claim. Settlement was never effected, and claimant filed bis complaint herein on November 11, 1964.\nThe court concluded that the claim is barred by \u00a7 59-10-13.6, N.M.S.A.1953, which provides in part:\n\u201cIf an employer or his insurer fails or refuses to pay a workman any installment of compensation to which the workman is entitled under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act [59-10-1 to 59-10-37], after notice has been given as required by section 59-10-13.4 New Mexico Statutes Annotated, 1953 Compilation, it is the duty \u2022of the workman, insisting on the payment \u2022of compensation, to file a claim therefor .as provided in the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act, not later than one [1] year after the failure or refusal of the employer or insurer to pay compensation.\n\u201c * * * if the workman fails to file a claim for compensation within the time required by this section, his claim for compensation, all his right to the recovery of compensation and the bringing of any legal proceeding for the recovery of compensation are forever barred.\u201d\n* * * * * *\nThe claimant seeks a reversal of the judgment dismissing his complaint, and relies upon two points for reversal. The first point is that:\n\u201cTHE SUBSTANTIVE-REMEDIAL RULE SET OUT IN TAYLOR v. AMERICAN EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY IS NO LONGER VALID AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN WORKMEN\u2019S COMPENSATION CASES CAN BE TOLLED BY A MISREPRESENTATION BY THE INSURANCE COMPANY AS TO THE DATE ON WHICH THE LAST PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION WAS MADE.\u201d\nHis second point is that:\n\u201cTHE EMPLOYEE WAS MISLED BY A MISREPRESENTATION BY ' THE INSURANCE COMPANY AND \u25a0 THE INSURANCE COMPANY IS ESTOPPED FROM RELYING ON ' THE STATUTE -OF LIMITATIONS.\u201d\n. If point I is resolved against the claimant, then it follows that point II need not be considered.\nThe misrepresentation which claimant asserts should operate to toll the one-year period of limitations as provided in \u00a7 59\u201410\u2014 13.6, N.M.S.A.1953, was a representation made by an insurance adjuster. This adjuster represented defendant insurance company in handling the claim, and, as a part of his duties in this regard, delivered the compensation checks to claimant on behalf of the insurer. As above stated, the last of these checks covered the period up to September 21, 1963.\nOn about June 24, 1964, the claimant and his father, who is the defendant employer, conferred with claimant\u2019s attorneys at the offices of one of these attorneys. In the course of this conference, the claimant and his father were questioned as to when compensation had last been paid to claimant. They had no definite recollection of the date when compensation benefits had been terminated, except that it was in the autumn of 1963.\nThereupon, one of the attorneys called the adjuster and asked for the date when compensation payments had ceased. The adjuster advised he did not have the information immediately available, but that he would telephone this information to the attorney\u2019s office as soon as he obtained it. Within a day or two thereafter he called the attorney\u2019s office and talked to the secretary, advising that claimant had received compensation through November 25, 1963.\nOn about November 2, 1964, a conference was had between the attorneys for claimant and the attorney for defendants. During this conference the attorneys for the claimant stated that the statute of limitations would run on November 25, 1964, and that claimant would proceed to file suit before that date.\nOn about November 10, 1964, the attorney for defendants informed claimant\u2019s counsel that his information was that claimant had last received compensation payments on September 21, 1963. The complaint was then filed on November 11, 1964.\nThis court has, on many occasions, construed the limitations provisions of our workmen\u2019s compensation act, which, except for the time within which the claim must be filed, have been substantially the same as they now appear in \u00a7 59-10-13.6, N.M.S. A.1953.\nIn Caton v. Gilliland Oil Co., 33 N.M. 227, 264 P. 946, decided in 1928, it was held that the claim was barred because it was not filed within the sixty-day period of limitations then provided by statute. This holding was reaffirmed and followed in Mumford v. State Highway Commission, 35 N.M. 404, 1 P.2d 115. It is true that in neither of these cases was the question of tolling the statute raised, but they do clearly stand for the principle that, under our workmen\u2019s compensation act, if the claimant does not file his claim for compensation within the time provided, \u201c * * * his claim, his right, and his remedy are forever barred.\u201d\nAlthough this language is not identical with the language of \u00a7 59-10-13.6, N.M. S.A.1953, with regard to the effect of failure to timely file a claim, the meaning is the same. In the statute it is expressed in the following language:\n\u201c * * * his claim for compensation, all his right to the recovery of compensation and the bringing of any legal proceeding for the recovery of compensation are forever barred.\u201d\nIn 1933, this court issued its opinion in Taylor v. American Employers\u2019 Ins. Co., 35 N.M. 544, 3 P.2d 76, which is the case claimant urges upon us as setting forth a rule which is no longer valid. In this case the court reaffirmed the holding in the Caton and Mumford cases in the face of claims of waiver and estoppel. In Edinburg v. Southwestern Public Serv. Co., 37 N.M. 139, 19 P.2d 747, although it is not stated what facts were alleged in the claim which might have constituted an excuse for late filing, the court stated such were unavailing to enlarge the limitation of time within which the claim must be filed, and cited the Cat\u00f3n and Taylor cases as authority for the holding.\nIn Maestas v. American Metal Co., 37 N.M. 203, 20 P.2d 924, this court reaffirmed its prior holdings and stated that the timely filing of a claim is:\n\u201c * * * limitation on the right of action, which is wholly statutory, and not a mere limitation upon the remedy, and is absolute and unconditional * * * \u201d\nIn 1937 the legislature enacted what appears now as \u00a7 59-10-14, N.M.S.A.1953, except for a minor amendment passed in 1959. This section of our statutes provides the only reason or excuse for tolling or extending the time within which suit must be filed, and it provides:\n\u201cThe failure of any person entitled to compensation under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act [59-10-1 to 59-10-37] to give any notice, file any claim, or bring suit within the time fixed by the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act shall not deprive such person of the right to compensation where the failure was caused in whole or in part by the conduct of the employer or insurer which reasonably led the person entitled to compensation to believe the compensation would be paid.\u201d\nAll the cases above cited had been decided long before 1937.\nThis court, since the enactment in 1937 of this section of our workmen\u2019s compensation act, has repeatedly reaffirmed its position set forth in the earlier cases cited above, except for giving effect to the tolling of the time limitation for the reasons set forth in \u00a7 59-10-14, N.M.S.A.1953. Wilson v. New Mexico Lumber & Timber Co., 42 N.M. 438, 81 P.2d 61; Elsea v. Broome Furniture Co., 47 N.M. 356, 143 P.2d 572; Lucero v. White Auto Stores, Inc., 60 N.M. 266, 291 P.2d 308; Garcia v. New Mexico State Highway Dept., 61 N.M. 156, 296 P.2d 759; Swallows v. City of Albuquerque, 61 N.M. 265, 298 P.2d 945; State ex rel. Kermac Nuclear Fuels Corp. v. Larrazolo, 70 N.M. 475, 375 P.2d 118.\nThe legislature has seen fit in some thirty-eight years to enact only the one provision for extending the time in which a claimant may file his claim under the workmen\u2019s compensation act, and this provision does not embrace conduct such as that upon which claimant here relies. The claimant recognizes this, but urges .us to 'overrule our many cases holding that the failure of a claimant to timely file suit forever bars his claim, his right, and his remedy. He cites many cases, some in the area of workmen\u2019s compensation and many more in other areas of the law, wherein the courts .have rejected the distinction between a remedial statute of limitations and a substantive statute of limitations.\nHowever, in view of the express language of ou'r statute as to^ the effect of a failure to timely file suit, which language we cannot ignore; the uniform position taken by this court over so many years in the construction and application of -this language; the fact that the legislature has never taken action to change this statutory language so as to accomplish a result different from that expressly stated, or to in any way alter or detract from this court\u2019s construction of the language of this limitation statute; and the fact that the legislature has taken action only on the one occasion to provide for reasons or excuses which will extend the time within which suit must be filed, which reasons or excuses are set forth in \u00a7 59-10-14, N.M.S.A.1953; we are not inclined to ignore this express statutory language and the legislative intent manifested by that language and by the continued concurrence of the legislature for over thirty-eight years in this court\u2019s construction and application of that language, nor are we inclined to reverse our position so uniformly adhered to over so many years.\nSince claimant must fail under his point I, consideration of his point II is unnecessary.\nThe judgment dismissing the complaint should be affirmed.\nIt is so ordered.\nNOBLE and COMPTON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "OMAN, Judge, Court of Appeals." } ], "attorneys": [ "Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, John P. Eastham, Albuquerque, for appellant.", "Sutin & Jones, Albuquerque, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "423 P.2d 869\nBlynn STASEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. H. B. STASEY, d/b/a Stasey Construction Company, and Houston Fire and Casualty Insurance Company of Fort Worth, Defendants-Appellees.\nNo. 7989.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nJan. 3, 1967.\nRehearing Denied Feb. 27, 1967.\nRodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, John P. Eastham, Albuquerque, for appellant.\nSutin & Jones, Albuquerque, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0436-01", "first_page_order": 468, "last_page_order": 472 }