{ "id": 2809855, "name": "Felipa CHAVIRA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. George CARNAHAN, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Chavira v. Carnahan", "decision_date": "1967-02-20", "docket_number": "No. 7918", "first_page": "467", "last_page": "470", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "77 N.M. 467" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "423 P.2d 988" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "74 N.M. 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2804322 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/74/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 N.W. 865", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "year": 1939, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 Iowa 780", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Iowa", "case_ids": [ 8645136 ], "year": 1939, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/iowa/227/0780-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 N.M. 351", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590395 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/60/0351-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 N.M. 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1571449 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1937, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/41/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 N.M. 241", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563070 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/46/0241-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 N.M. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1589305 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/59/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 N.M. 206", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2805479 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/74/0206-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 353, "char_count": 5011, "ocr_confidence": 0.663, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.776847738404643e-07, "percentile": 0.8348351583432084 }, "sha256": "ff8802f77ba993e776183753b96591cbaa6d2e7713830270c9a77bb8aff091de", "simhash": "1:a1cd436b47ec85fa", "word_count": 818 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:38:38.028708+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "NOBLE and CARMODY, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "Felipa CHAVIRA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. George CARNAHAN, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nSPIESS, Judge, Court of Appeals.\nAfter a jury had returned a verdict for plaintiff, Felipa Chavira, the trial court granted a motion of appellee, defendant below, for judgment in defendant\u2019s favor notwithstanding the verdict to the contrary. This appeal challenges the propriety of such ruling.\nOn July 22, 1962, at about 10:00 P.M., the plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile driven by one Ferm\u00edn D. Chavez and traveling in a southerly direction along north Second Street within the city of Belen, New Mexico. At the time the defendant had parked an automobile belonging to him on his wrong side of the street facing oncoming traffic, with its left-hand wheels adjacent and parallel to the left-hand curb of north Second Street, contrary to .Sec. 64-18-52, N.M.S.A., 1953. The automobile in which plaintiff was traveling collided with the front end of the defendant\u2019s automobile, injuring the plaintiff.\nTo sustain the trial court\u2019s ruling we are required to determine that under the circumstances of this case the defendant\u2019s act in parking his automobile on the wrong side of the public street contrary to \u00a7 64\u2014 18-52, supra, was not as a matter of law a proximate cause of the collision.\nA judgment notwithstanding verdict is proper only in those cases where it can be said that there is neither evidence nor inference from which the jury could have arrived at its verdict. Townsend v. United States Rubber Co., 74 N.M. 206, 392 P.2d 404 (1964). Even though evidence may be undisputed, a judgment notwithstanding verdict is improper if different inferences may reasonably be drawn therefrom. Townsend v. United States Rubber Co., supra. It is for the jury under proper instructions to determine the weight and significance of each fact in evidence.\n\u201cProximate cause\u201d is that which In a natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any new independent cause produces the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred. Thompson v. Anderman, 59 N.M. 400, 285 P.2d 507 (1955). Proximate cause is an ultimate fact\u2014usually an inference to be drawn by \u25a0court or jury from the facts proved. It becomes a question of law only when facts regarding causation are undisputed and all Reasonable inferences therefrom are plain, consistent and uncontradictory. White v. Montoya, 46 N.M. 241, 126 P.2d 471 (1942); Greenfield v. Bruskas, 41 N.M. 346, 68 P.2d 921 (1937); American Insurance Co. v. Foutz and Bursum, 60 N.M. 351, 291 P.2d 1081 (1955).\nPlere the automobile in which plaintiff was riding had entered Second Street a distance of about 140 feet from the defendant\u2019s improperly parked automobile and was proceeding in the direction of the parked car. It was dark and the street lights were lighted. The lights were located at the intersection of two streets with \u2022Second Street. One of them was not visible from the area of the point of impact because of the location of a large tree. Neither plaintiff nor Chavez saw defendant\u2019s parked automobile.\nAs the car in which plaintiff was traveling proceeded along Second Street two automobiles approached from the opposite direction. Their lights blinded Chavez. He turned his automobile to the right to avoid the oncoming cars and collided with the front end of defendant\u2019s parked automobile.\nDefendant\u2019s .automobile was equipped with rear red reflectors as required by \u00a7 64-20-6 N.M.S.A., 1953. The effect and purpose of the reflectors on the rear of defendant\u2019s automobile was defeated through defendant\u2019s parking his automobile on the wrong side of the street and facing oncoming traffic. Whether Chavez or plaintiff would have seen defendant\u2019s car in ample time to have avoided the collision had the automobile been so parked as to expose the reflectors to oncoming traffic presented a fact question for determination by the jury, and not, in our opinion, a question of law to be decided by judgment N.O.V., Trailer v. Schelm, 227 Iowa 780, 288 N.W. 865 (1939). Terrel v. Lowdermilk, 74 N.M. 135, 391 P.2d 419 (1964), relied upon by defendant is, in our opinion, inapplicable.\nDefendant, in his answer brief, asserts that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury wherein the statute regarding use of reflectors on rear of automobiles was read to the jury and that proper objection was made to it at the time. However, appellee has not filed a cross-appeal and any objection to the trial court\u2019s instructions cannot be properly raised for consideration by way of his answer brief. Townsend v. United States Rubber Co., supra.\nThe judgment notwithstanding the verdict is set aside and the cause remanded to the trial court for further proceeding not inconsistent herewith.\nIt is so ordered.\nNOBLE and CARMODY, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "SPIESS, Judge, Court of Appeals." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lorenzo A. Chavez, Melvin L. Robins, Ben A. Luchini, Albuquerque, for appellant.", "Keleher & McLeod, Russell Moore, William B. Keleher, Albuquerque, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "423 P.2d 988\nFelipa CHAVIRA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. George CARNAHAN, Defendant-Appellee.\nNo. 7918.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nFeb. 20, 1967.\nLorenzo A. Chavez, Melvin L. Robins, Ben A. Luchini, Albuquerque, for appellant.\nKeleher & McLeod, Russell Moore, William B. Keleher, Albuquerque, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0467-01", "first_page_order": 499, "last_page_order": 502 }