{ "id": 5326397, "name": "Lemuel Joe HALES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Frank VAN CLEAVE, Employer, and Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company, Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Hales v. Van Cleave", "decision_date": "1967-06-09", "docket_number": "No. 34", "first_page": "181", "last_page": "187", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "78 N.M. 181" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "429 P.2d 379" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "75 N.M. 765", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5377725 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/75/0765-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 N.M. 7", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8841140 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/57/0007-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 N.M. 368", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8841892 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/57/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 N.M. 454", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2775280 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/63/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 N.M. 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5344806 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/64/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 N.M. 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2786634 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/69/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 N.M. 29", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5373662 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/75/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 N.M. 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8502705 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/76/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 N.M. 671", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2804135 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/77/0671-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 N.M. 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5322022 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/73/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 N.M. 735", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8504809 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/76/0735-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 N.M. 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2850482 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/70/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 N.M. 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5349162 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/71/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 N.M. 712", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2798717 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/74/0712-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 N.M. 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5345448 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/64/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 P.2d 681", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 2853913 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/72/0406-02" ] }, { "cite": "72 N.M. 406", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2853913, 2853558 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/72/0406-02", "/nm/72/0406-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 N.M. 725", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2801365 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/74/0725-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 P.2d 625", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 5323819 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/78/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 N.M. 3", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2803921 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/74/0003-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 N.M. 726", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8504752 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/76/0726-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 N. M. 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2809348 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/77/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 N.M. 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2849891 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/70/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 N.M. 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2850318 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/70/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 N.M. 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2718343 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/68/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "9 A.L.R.2d 699", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 N.M. 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1580734 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/53/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 N.M. 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1587662 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/58/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 P.2d 953", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 5348435 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/71/0280-02" ] }, { "cite": "71 N.M. 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5348435, 5346789 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/71/0280-02", "/nm/71/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 N.M. 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2852886 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/72/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 N.M. 613", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2804016 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/74/0613-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 N.M. 555", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8503624 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/76/0555-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 919, "char_count": 18833, "ocr_confidence": 0.655, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.869343683186443e-07, "percentile": 0.9523140152186479 }, "sha256": "94a4d3568af2bb482895c76fcca01b60f78138402669c2c682463a2a4c7b36d1", "simhash": "1:b56bc0045567cdf0", "word_count": 3203 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:27:10.359171+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "SPI\u00c9SS and WOOD, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "Lemuel Joe HALES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Frank VAN CLEAVE, Employer, and Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company, Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nOMAN, Judge.\nThis is a suit under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act of New Mexico. It is unquestioned that plaintiff sustained compen-sable injuries on December 22, 1964, while employed by defendant, Van Cleave; that he was entitled to the maximum compensation benefits of $38.00 per week during the period of his total disability; that he received weekly benefits at this rate from defendant, Mountain States Mutual Casualty-Company, from the date of his injury to February 28, 1966, for a total period of sixty-two weeks and total compensation of $2,356.00; and that he was furnished medical and hospital attention by the said compensation insurer between the date of his accident and the date of trial of this cause on November 3, 1966.\nThe principal dispute in this case arose over the percentage of permanent disability which plaintiff sustained as a result of his injuries. His position was, and still is, that he is permanently and totally disabled. The trial court found he was partially disabled to the extent of 25%. He has taken this appeal from a judgment awarding him compensation benefits at the rate of $9.50 per week for 438 weeks, based upon a 25% partial permanent disability, in addition to the compensation benefits previously paid to-him.\nHis first asserted error is that the trial court\u2019s finding as to the nature of the injuries he sustained, although supported by the evidence, is not a full, true and correct resume of the injuries, and that the trial court should have adopted his requested \u2019 finding which details his injuries, the complications arising therefrom, the recovery made from each such injury and complication, and the probability that he will require further medical attention at some time in the future. This requested finding covers almost two pages of the transcript. The court\u2019s finding correctly describes the nature of the injuries sustained, but does so in \u25a0 general terms and does not go into the mi-' nute details requested by plaintiff. The Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts are here applicable. Section 59-10-13.9, N.M.S.A.1953, Rule 52(B) (a) (2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provides that:\n\u201cThe findings of fact shall consist only of such ultimate facts as are necessary to determine the issues in the case, as distinguished from evidentiary facts supporting them. * * *\u201d\nThe court\u2019s finding was sufficient, and he was not required to detail the evidence. State ex rel. State Highway Comm\u2019n. v. Pelletier, 76 N.M. 555, 417 P.2d 46 (1966); Brundage v. K. L. House Construction Co., 74 N.M. 613, 396 P.2d 731 (1964); Hoskins v. Albuquerque Bus Co., 72 N.M. 217, 382 P.2d 700 (1963); Griego v. Hogan, 71 N.M. 280, 377 P.2d 953 (1963); Goodwin v. Travis, 58 N.M. 465, 272 P.2d 672 (1954); Campbell v. Doherty, 53 N.M. 280, 206 P.2d 1145, 9 A.L.R.2d 699 (1949).\nPlaintiff next contends the trial court erred because in one finding he refers to \u201cthe time of his [plaintiff\u2019s] recovery,\u201d and in another he refers to \u201cplaintiff\u2019s recovery from the injuries received in the accident.\u201d Plaintiff argues that the evidence is all to the effect that he has not recovered. It is apparent that the court was referring to the healing period, or the period of plaintiff\u2019s total disability. See Rhodes v. Cottle Const. Co., 68 N.M. 18, 357 P.2d 672 (1960). In the one finding to which objection is made, the court, after referring to the plaintiff\u2019s recovery, continues to recite the nature of plaintiff\u2019s disability following his recovery. And, as above stated, the court found plaintiff has a 25% permanent disability to his body as a whole as a result of the injuries he sustained.\nThe word \u201crecovery\u201d does not necessarily imply a complete return to the normal or usual state. It is correctly used in referring to a return toward a normal or 'usual state. Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged (1966). We are of the opinion that there is no doubt- as to the trial court\u2019s meaning of the use of the word \u201crecover,\u201d but, if there be any doubt, such doubt must be'resolved. in-favor of the judgment: Massey v. Beacon Supply Co., 70 N.M. 149, 371 P.2d 798 (1962); Hinkle v. Schmider, 70 N.M. 349, 373 P.2d 918 (1962).\nThe plaintiff\u2019s next three- points are all directed at his claims that there is no evidence to support the trial court\u2019s finding and conclusion that plaintiff has. sustained only a 25% permanent disability, and that the evidence shows conclusively that he is permanently and totally disabled.\nTotal and partial disability-were defined in N.M.Laws 1963 ch. 269, \u00a7 1; which was in effect at the time of the accident out\u2019of which this cause arises, in the following language:\n\u201cA. \u2018total disability\u2019 means a condition whereby a workman, by reason of an injury arising out of, and in the course of, his employment, is wholly unable to perform the usual tasks in the work he was performing at the time of his injury, and is wholly unable to perform any work for which he is fitted by age, education, training, general physical and mental capacity, and previous work experience; and\n\u201cB. \u2018partial disability\u2019- means a condition whereby a workman, by reason of injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, is unable to some percentage extent to perform the usual tasks in the work he was performing at the time of his injury and is unable to some percentage extent to perform any work for which he is fitted by age; education, training, general physical and mental capacity and previous work experience.\u201d\nPlaintiff was born on September 25, 1944, was twenty years of age at the time of the accident, and was twenty-two years of age at the time of the trial. He completed the second year of high school, and attended about twelve weeks of his junior year before quitting. Thereafter, he completed a correspondence course in mechanics and received a certificate from the school offering the course. He is of average mental capacity for a person his age.\nInsofar as his work experience is concerned, he worked for about six months in a service station, worked for almost a year in different capacities in connection with mining, and worked at some odd jobs of short duration.\nThe evidence adduced at the trial came from three witnesses: the plaintiff, Dr. Walsh of Silver City, New Mexico, who was his treating physician, and who was called as a witness by plaintiff, and Dr. Hastings, an orthopedic surgeon of Tucson, Arizona, who was selected by plaintiff, but to whom plaintiff was referred by Dr. Walsh. Dr. Hastings\u2019 testimony was offered by defendants, and consisted of a letter of December 22, 1965, and an attached report of consultation and examination. The letter and the report were received into evidence by stipulation of the parties.\nThe plaintiff testified on direct examination that mining is the only type of work he had ever done, that he was raised around miners, and that he had been unable to'do any work since the injury. On cross-examination he testified to his work experience in a filling station and in performing odd jobs of short duration. On redirect examination, he again testified he had been unable to engage in any employment since his injury, and that he would go back to work if he felt he were able to engage in mining. On further redirect examination he testified that by training and experience he figured he was qualified only to do mining.\nDr. Walsh testified that in his opinion the plaintiff was not able and will not be able to perform the work of a miner, and is unable to perform work which requires him to lift heavy objects, or which will require extensive bending, stooping, or squatting. He testified that in his opinion the plaintiff\u2019s disability arises primarily from the injury to his left hip; that there are many things which he can do; that he is able to perform the normal duties of a filling station attendant; that he can perform the duties of any type of work which requires only arm strength; that he can perform the duties of any type of work which permits him to sit a large portion of the time; and that he has sustained a 25% permanent disability on a functional basis as a result of the injuries he sustained in the accident.\nDr. Hastings gave it as his opinion that plaintiff had sustained about a 25% general disability as a result of his injuries.\nFindings of the trial court supported by substantial evidence will not be disturbed on appeal. Varney v. Taylor, 77 N. M. 28, 419 P.2d 234 (1966); Berryhill v. United States Cas. Co., 76 N.M. 726, 418 P.2d 185 (1966).\nRelevant evidence which is acceptable to a reasonable mind as adequate support for a conclusion is substantial. Wilson v. Employment Security Comm\u2019n., 74 N.M. 3, 389 P.2d 855 (1963); Tapia v. Panhandle Steel Erectors Co., 428 P.2d 625, 78 N.M. 86, issued May 8, 1967. The credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony are to be determined by the trial court, as the trier of the facts, and are not matters to be determined by an appellate court. Dotson v. Farmer\u2019s, Inc., 74 N.M. 725, 398 P.2d 54 (1965); Sanchez v. Garcia, 72 N.M. 406, 384 P.2d 681 (1963); Varney v. Taylor, supra.\nWe are of the opinion that the trial court\u2019s findings are supported by substantial evidence. We would reach the same result, even if we were to disregard that portion of Dr. Walsh\u2019s testimony whereby he gave it as his opinion that plaintiff has suffered a 25% permanent disability on a functional basis. We agree with plaintiff that a certain percentage of functional disability is not necessarily the same percentage of disability attributable to an injury under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act. However, a medical expert may properly express his opinion in percentages as to the impairment of the physical functions of a claimant. Seal v. Blackburn Tank Truck Serv., 64 N.M. 282, 327 P.2d 797 (1958).\nThe plaintiff\u2019s next contention is that the trial court erred in finding that defendants, more than thirty days prior to the trial, offered to settle plaintiff\u2019s claim for more than plaintiff is entitled to receive. Plaintiff admits that defendants offered to pay him $8,322.00, plus a reasonable attorney\u2019s fee, in addition to compensation and medical expenses previously paid, that this offer was in writing and was made more than thirty days prior to the trial, and that it was refused. His position is, however, that he is permanently and totally disabled, and thus the offer was for less than he is entitled to receive. Our foregoing holding, that the court\u2019s finding, that plaintiff has sustained a 25% permanent disability, is supported by the evidence, disposes of his contention that he is entitled to more than the amount offered. Since the plaintiff recovered less than the amount offered, the trial court properly held that he is not entitled to an attorney\u2019s fee. Section 59-10-23, subd. D, N.M.S.A.1953; Rhodes v. Cottle Const. Co., supra; Rayburn v. Boys Super Market, Inc., 74 N.M. 712, 397 P.2d 953 (1964); Boggs v. D & L Const. Co., 71 N.M. 502, 379 P.2d 788 (1963).\nPlaintiff\u2019s next contention is that the trial court erred in failing to require payment by defendants of $52.00, the amount plaintiff was charged by Dr. Walsh for appearing and testifying at the trial on behalf of the plaintiff. The trial court expressly ruled that plaintiff is not entitled to costs. The only provision of our Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act relating to the assessment of medical witness fees appears in \u00a7 59-10-13.10, subd. B, N.M.S.A.1953. If it can be said that Dr. Walsh was a medical witness within the contemplation of this provision, still, the language thereof provides: \" * * * the court may assess against the defendants the fees allowed any medical witness * * The court is not required to assess such fees against defendants. As stated in 2 Larson, Workmen\u2019s Compensation Law, \u00a7 83.20 at 352:\n\u201cLike attorneys\u2019 fees, other fees and expenses must be borne by the parties themselves, in the absence of a statute shifting the incidence of such expenses.\u201d\n\u00edj\u00ed # % 5{C i}C\nSection 20-1-4, subd. B, N.M.S.A. 1953, as amended in- 1959, provides the district court \u201c * * * may order the payment of a reasonable fee, to be taxed as costs * * *, for any witness who qualifies as an expert and who testifies in the cause in person or by deposition.\u201d Again, this statute only authorizes the trial court to tax an expert fee as costs. It does not require the trial court to do so.\nSection 21-1-1(54) (d), N.M.S.A.1953, provides in part:\n\u201cCOSTS. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; *\nIn view of the amount of the offer made and rejected, and the subsequent recovery by plaintiff on the trial, there is certainly a question as to whether or not plaintiff was the prevailing party. However, we dispose of plaintiff\u2019s contention on another basis.\nAs noted above, the trial court expressly directed that plaintiff is not entitled to costs.\nAs held in Mills v. Southwest Builders, Inc., 70 N.M. 407, 374 P.2d 289 (1962), the matter of assessing costs under this last cited statute lies within the discretion of the trial court, and an appellate court will not interfere with the trial court\u2019s exercise of this discretion in this regard, except in the case of abuse. See also Loucks v. Albuquerque Nat\u2019l Bank, 76 N.M. 735, 418 P.2d 191 (1966). Nothing has been urged upon us, and we find nothing, which causes us to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.\nPlaintiff next contends that he should have judgment for $1,500.00, because the medical witnesses both indicated, and the court so found, that he will probably, at some future time, need to have a fusion or arthoplastic type operation on his left hip, and Dr. Walsh testified the medical and hospital expenses incident to such an operative procedure would probably run about $1,500.00. Plaintiff cites no authority for his position that he is entitled to judgment in a workmen\u2019s compensation case for anticipated medical expenses. The. provision of our Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act relative to the responsibility of the employer to furnish medical and related benefits appears in \u00a7 59-10-19.1, N.M.S.A. 1953. Nothing in this section, or in any other section of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act, suggests that the injured employee may presently recover judgment against the employer, or the insurer, for medical expenses which may at some time in the future prove necessary as a result of the injury.\nPlaintiff\u2019s next contention is that he was entitled to an award for his travel expenses in making trips from Duncan, Arizona, where he moved with his parents after his injury and his release from the hospital, to Silver City, New Mexico and return, and from Duncan to Tucson and return. The trips to Silver City were made to see Dr. Walsh, in connection with his treatment, and the trips to Tucson were made to see Dr. Hastings in connection with his examination.\nThe plaintiff testified that he had made two trips to Tucson, and \u201cmore than 15 trips\u201d to Silver City; that it is about 85 miles from Duncan to Silver City, and about 165 miles from Duncan to Tucson; that 10 cents per mile is the amount allowed, or the going rate, for mileage; and that he had to have some meals and lodging on these trips. However, no effort was made to establish even the proximate number of these meals, or on how many of these trips he required lodging, how much these meals and lodging cost, or even the approximate cost thereof. We observe that during at least a considerable portion of the time he claims he was making these trips from Duncan to Silver City, his mother was living in Duncan, but his father was operating a mine and living in Grant County, New Mexico, in the vicinity of Silver City.\nIn his requested findings he asked the-court to find that he had been required to make \u201c22 trips\u201d from Duncan to Silver City and return, for \u201can approximate expense of $20.00 per trip,\u201d and two trips, from Duncan to Tucson and return \u201cat an aggregate expense of $80.00.\u201d He cites, absolutely no authority for his contention-that he was entitled to be reimbursed for these claimed expenses.\nThe trial court refused the requested finding tendered by plaintiff, and' concluded that plaintiff is not entitled to reimbursement for travel expenses. Since-the trial court refused the requested finding^ by plaintiff, upon whom rested the burden of establishing the amount of these expenses and his right to recover the same, if they were in fact properly recoverable,, this amounted to a finding against plaintiff on this issue. Hoskins v. Albuquerque Bus Co., supra; Hopkins v. Martinez, 73 N.M. 275, 387 P.2d 852 (1964); Tsosie v. Foundation Reserve Ins Co., 77 N.M. 671, 427 P.2d 29 issued May 1, 1967.\nEven though the testimony of the plaintiff as above outlined was not contradicted, the trial court could still determine his credibility from all the facts and circumstances, as well as his demeanor on the stand, his interest or bias shown by his testimony, his conduct, the inherent probability or improbability of his statements, and from all these matters determine the truthfulness of his testimony. Bell v. Kenneth P. Thompson Co., 76 N.M. 420, 415 P.2d 546 (1966); Beacon Supply Co. v. American Fiber Corp., 75 N.M. 29, 399 P.2d 927 (1965); Allsup v. Space, 69 N.M. 353, 367 P.2d 531 (1961); Luna v. Flores, 64 N.M. 312, 328 P.2d 82 (1958); Zengerle v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 63 N.M. 454, 321 P.2d 636 (1958); Waters v. Blocksom, 57 N.M. 368, 258 P.2d 1135 (1953); Pentecost v. Hudson, 57 N.M. 7, 252 P.2d 511 (1953). Even though we may have made a finding contrary to-that of the trial court, an- appellate court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court who heard all the evidence and observed the demeanor of the witness. Bell v. Kenneth P. Thompson Co., supra; Beacon Supply Co. v. American Fiber Corp., supra; Gish v. Hart, 75 N.M. 765, 411 P.2d 349 (1966); Hinkle v. Schmider, supra.\nThe plaintiff\u2019s final contention is that the trial court erred in making certain \u2022conclusions of law, because they were either not supported by findings or the findings were in error. The questions pertaining to the adequacy and correctness of the trial court\u2019s findings were raised in his prior points and they have been discussed above.\nFinding no error, on the part of the trial court, it follows that the judgment must be affirmed.\nIt is so ordered.\nSPI\u00c9SS and WOOD, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "OMAN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "E. Forrest Sanders, Las Cruces, for ap--pellant. - - \u2022", "Ray Hughes, Deming, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "429 P.2d 379\nLemuel Joe HALES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Frank VAN CLEAVE, Employer, and Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company, Defendants-Appellees.\nNo. 34.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nJune 9, 1967.\nE. Forrest Sanders, Las Cruces, for ap--pellant. - - \u2022\nRay Hughes, Deming, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0181-01", "first_page_order": 221, "last_page_order": 227 }