{ "id": 5323256, "name": "Marguerite K. ARMIJO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WORLD INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Armijo v. World Insurance", "decision_date": "1967-07-10", "docket_number": "No. 8259", "first_page": "204", "last_page": "207", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "78 N.M. 204" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "429 P.2d 904" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "84 A.L.R.2d 176", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192, 196, 199, 209, 213, 216" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 P.2d 903", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1935, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 Wash. 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash.", "case_ids": [ 1303927 ], "year": 1935, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash/184/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 Utah 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Utah", "case_ids": [ 8869440 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1938, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/utah/95/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 Mo. 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mo.", "case_ids": [ 1359012 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mo/360/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 Fla. 648", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Fla.", "case_ids": [ 1897557 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1935, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/fla/118/0648-01" ] }, { "cite": "260 F.2d 768", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 444530 ], "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/260/0768-01" ] }, { "cite": "247 S.W. 1024", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 S.W.2d 252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10160952 ], "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/327/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 F.2d 534", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1162651 ], "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/178/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 S.E.2d 452", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 Ga.App. 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga. App.", "case_ids": [ 1567700 ], "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/91/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ark. 416", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1464546 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/215/0416-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 P.2d 689", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1945, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 Cal.2d 305", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2189868 ], "year": 1945, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-2d/27/0305-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 P.2d 144", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1951, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Cal.App.2d Supp. 928", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. Supp. 2d", "year": 1951, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 N.M. 3", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2803921 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/74/0003-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 N.M. 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5323819 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/78/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 N.M. 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8502403 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/76/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 N.M. 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2809348 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/77/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 N.M. 671", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2804135 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/77/0671-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 N.M. 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2808502 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/77/0512-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 731, "char_count": 12074, "ocr_confidence": 0.67, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.369511477155848e-08, "percentile": 0.4418549112322765 }, "sha256": "b8a2b9ec74814908433a5ba6839f509c7cf0489691e4490959118657d54a966c", "simhash": "1:b2dd96435318efba", "word_count": 2041 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:27:10.359171+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "CHAVEZ, C. J., and NOBLE, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "Marguerite K. ARMIJO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WORLD INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nOMAN, Judge, Court of Appeals.\nThe plaintiff brought suit to recover death benefits in the amount of $5,000.00 under a policy of insurance issued by defendant to plaintiff\u2019s deceased husband. The policy provides for the payment of certain benefits for certain designated losses which occur by accidental means.\nIn its brief in chief defendant has correctly summarized the conditions or events which must occur, in order to meet the policy requirements, before defendant is obligated under the policy to pay for loss of life. These requirements are (1) that the insured sustain bodily injuries through purely accidental means, (2) that the injuries wholly and continuously disable the insured from the date of the accident to the time of death, (3) that death result within 90 days from the date of the accident, and (4) that death result from the accidental bodily injuries independently and exclusively of disease and all other causes. This last condition, and particularly the underlined portion thereof, presents the basic issue on this appeal.\nThe material facts are that decedent sustained an accidental fall on June 1, 1964. As a result, he suffered physical injuries and disabilities. One such resulting injury and disability from which he did not readily recover was a minor head injury, which apparently produced a subdural hematoma on both sides of his head, resulting in slight mental confusion and euphoria.\nOn July 24, 1964, the blood and fluid under the dura, which were compressing the brain, were removed by an operative procedure. Thereafter, his mental confusion began clearing rapidly and disappeared; the slight neurological signs, which were observed by the doctor prior to the operation, also disappeared; he was making a very dramatic, steady, and excellent recovery; and, in the opinion of the doctor, there was every reason to believe he would have recovered from his injury and the surgery, but for a subsequent accident on July 28, 1964.\nOn July 28, and while still hospitalized from the surgery of July 24, he fell from his hospital bed. As a result of this fall, a surgical wound on the left side of his head was disrupted, and spinal fluid began draining out of his wound.\nHe was later taken to the operating room and, upon the wound being opened to a greater depth, \u201cthere was a gush of fluid, bloody fluid, with fresh bleeding.\u201d Thereafter, the operating doctor, who was called as a witness by plaintiff, stated that decedent\u2019s condition deteriorated, and it was more or less a steady downhill course until his death on October 9, 1964.\nThe doctor called by defendant as a witness also stated he was very pleased as to the results of the first surgery on July 24, that decedent certainly seemed better, \u201cand that after the second fall there was always a chronic battle.\u201d\nDecedent was 67 years of age at the time of his death. He had a long history of diabetes, but such was controlled, and he had worked actively for many years. He had shown some little evidence of aging during the latter part of his life. He also suffered from arteriosclerosis, either as a part of the aging process or as a result of his diabetic condition. The terminal events, or conditions existing at the time of his death, were arteriosclerosis, basilar artery thrombosis, bronchopneumonia, and diabetes aggravated by cerebral injury, with subdural hematoma. The trial court found:\n\u201c4. That on July 28, 1964, Alfonso A. Armijo sustained an accident causing bodily injury which resulted in his death on October 9, 1964. That from the date of said accident, Alfonso A. Armijo was continuously disabled until his death. That the death of Alfonso A. Armij o was directly caused by said accident independent and exclusive of disease and all other causes.\u201d\nIt is this finding which defendant contends is not supported by the evidence, and particularly that portion thereof which states that death was caused by the accident of July 28 independently and exclusively of disease and all other causes. Attacks are made on other findings and conclusions of the trial court, but it is conceded that these other findings and conclusions must stand or fall with the finding just quoted.\nIn determining whether or not the finding is supported, we should first decide what effect must be given to the policy language, \u201cindependently and exclusively of disease and all other causes.\u201d\nIn the recent case of Couey v. National Benefit Life Ins. Co., 77 N.M. 512, 424 P.2d 793 (1967), we had to construe the meaning of \u201csolely as a consequence\u201d thereof \u201cindependently of all other causes.\u201d That language and the language here involved are so nearly the same in meaning, that we consider our holding in that case controlling here. In that case we stated that liability for the loss arises if the accident is the proximate efficient cause of the loss, and that it could not have been intended that liability should arise only when the accident was literally the sole cause.\nAlthough we do not suggest that other terms may not be used to correctly describe or define the causal relationship between the accident and the loss, within the contemplation of the language, \u201cindependently and exclusively of disease and all other causes,\u201d in the Couey case, as above stated, we used \u201cproximate efficient cause.\u201d Proximate is defined in Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged (1966) as \u201cvery near, next immediately preceding.\u201d In Black\u2019s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951), it is defined as \u201cnearest and closest in causal connection.\u201d In 2 Bouv. Law Diet., Rawle\u2019s 3d rev. 1914, p. 2762 it is defined as \u201ccloseness of causal connection.\u201d\nProximate cause is defined in 2 Bouv. Law Diet. (3d rev. 1914) as:\n\"That which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new cause, produces an event, and without which the event would not have occurred. The proximate cause is that which is nearest in the order of responsible causation; That which stands next in causation to the effect, not necessarily in time or space but in causal relation.\u201d\nEfficient cause is defined in Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary as \u201cthe immediate agent in the production of an effect.\u201d\nWith these definitions in mind, we must then ascertain if there is any substantial evidence to support the court\u2019s finding, \u201cThat the death of Alfonso A. Armijo was directly caused by said accident independent and exclusive of disease and all other causes.\u201d When a question of fact is presented, and the trial court makes a finding involving this question, this finding will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence. Couey v. National Benefit Life Ins. Co., supra; Tsosie v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., 77 N.M. 671, 427 P.2d 29; Varney v. Taylor, 77 N.M. 28, 419 P.2d 234 (1966); Board of County Comm\u2019rs v. Vargas, 76 N.M. 369, 415 P.2d 57 (1966).\nEvidence substantially supports a finding of fact if the evidence is such as would be acceptable to a reasonable mind as adequate support for the finding. Tapia v. Panhandle Steel Erectors Co., No. 8167, 78 N.M. 86, 428 P.2d 625; Wilson v. Employment Security Comm\u2019n, 74 N.M. 3, 389 P.2d 855 (1964).\nThe evidence relative to the cause of death consists of the testimony of the two medical experts, certain written medical reports, a copy of the certificate of death, and a copy of the corrected certificate of death.\nIn addition to., the facts above related, the .operating, doctor stated that in his' opinion the fall from the bed on July 28. was the direct cause of death. He admitted that the whole chain of events, including \u201cthe pre-existing diabetes, the fall of June 1st, the development of cerebral arteriosclerosis, and the flare-up of the diabetes\u201d all played some part in the ultimate death. But he described the fall of June 28 as \u201cthe incident which precipitated his [decedent\u2019s] downhill course to the point of death,\u201d and as \u201cthe primary precipitating condition leading to his death.\u201d\nThe other doctor, who was called as a medical expert by defendant, testified: \u201cThat the terminal events were cerebral arteriosclerosis with a basilar artery thrombosis, and as a terminal problem that he had diabetes mellitus. That this was complicated by bronchopneumonia.\u201d\nHowever, he immediately followed this testimony by stating that he felt in order to explain what happens at the end of life we have to look to the beginning of it, that the average individual develops and performs a long and successful life, and that he then begins to decline, due to a number of factors. This decline or aging process can be accompanied by disease, by accidents, and by injuries, and can be affected or accelerated thereby. Mr. Armijo had shown some little evidence of aging during the latter part of his life, but had been \u201cactively performing very pleasant duties,\u201d with a showing of some decline, some problems with diabetes. Then he summarized the fall of June 1, which disabled decedent. After the operation of July 24, decedent seemed,\n\u201c * * * to be perhaps back to this previous situation * * * which has been pei'haps accelerated a little bit by his first fall. [The fall of June 1] Then' he falls out of bed and declines sharply again and develops infection. The wound' opens, he has problems, he is unable to care for himself. He becomes a problem, and this is related to the second fall here. [The fall of' July 28] He improves perhaps to a lesser degree, certainly, and then. declines again at home and gets b.elow again this point of competence, goes in. the hospital for the terminal stay and dies of the accumulation of these events. * * * \u201d\nThe doctor stated that it was pretty hard to separate all of these things and determine the extent to which any one of them contributed to death, and that:\n\u201cIn the older people it is sometimes difficult to say a fall is an exclusive cause of death. I don\u2019t think I can honestly say it is exclusive cause of death. I think [it] certainly is one of the major contributing factors to the accelerated death of Mr. Armijo. * * * \u201d\n\u25a0 In one of the exhibits, which was a claim form furnished by defendant, one of the questions contained in the form and the answers thereto made by the physician were as follows:\nQuestion: \u201c3(a) Was death due directly to accidental bodily injury?\nAnswer: \u201c3(a) Yes. If yes, give date of accident \u2014 7-28-64.\nQuestion: \u201c3(b) What was the nature and full extent of injury?\nAnswer: \u201c3(b) Fell out of bed injuring head.\u201d\nAlthough the evidence may have supported a contrary finding, we are of the opinion that under the rationale of our holding in Couey v. National Benefit Life Ins. Co., supra, the evidence lends substantial support to the finding of the trial court. See also Stokes v. Police and Firemen\u2019s Ins. Ass\u2019n, 109 Cal.App.2d Supp. 928, 243 P.2d 144 (1951); Brooks v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 27 Cal.2d 305, 163 P.2d 689 (1945); Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Fairchild, 215 Ark. 416, 220 S.W.2d 803 (1949); Inter-Ocean Cas. Co. v. Scott, 91 Ga.App. 311, 85 S.E.2d 452 (1954); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 178 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1949); Brown v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 327 S.W.2d 252 (Mo. 1959); Martin v. Travelers\u2019 Ins. Co., 247 S.W. 1024 (Mo.App.1923); New York Life Ins. Co. v. McGehee, 260 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1958); Jones v. General Accident, Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 118 Fla. 648, 159 So. 804 (1935); Young v. New York Life Ins. Co., 360 Mo. 460, 228 S.W.2d 670 (1950); Lee v. New York Life Ins. Co., 95 Utah 445, 82 P.2d 178 (1938); Kearney v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 184 Wash. 579, 52 P.2d 903 (1935). For additional cases see, Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 176, 192, 196, 199, 209, 213, 216 (1962).\nFinding no error, the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.\nIt is so ordered.\nCHAVEZ, C. J., and NOBLE, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "OMAN, Judge, Court of Appeals." } ], "attorneys": [ "Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, Robert M. St. John, Albuquerque, for appellant.", "Keleher & McLeod, Russell Moore, Albuquerque, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "429 P.2d 904\nMarguerite K. ARMIJO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WORLD INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 8259.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nJuly 10, 1967.\nRodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, Robert M. St. John, Albuquerque, for appellant.\nKeleher & McLeod, Russell Moore, Albuquerque, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0204-01", "first_page_order": 244, "last_page_order": 247 }