{ "id": 2740742, "name": "Chester Francis ROHRER, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. EIDAL INTERNATIONAL, Employer, and Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company, Insuror, Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Rohrer v. Eidal International", "decision_date": "1968-11-27", "docket_number": "No. 195", "first_page": "711", "last_page": "714", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "79 N.M. 711" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "449 P.2d 81" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "74 N.M. 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2800260 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/74/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 N.M. 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2802936 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/77/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 N.M. 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2790248 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/69/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 A.L.R.2d 933", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 N.M. 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2852834 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/70/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 N.M. 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5346436 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/71/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 N.M. 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2797437 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/74/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 N.M. 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5320416 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/73/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 N.M. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5323082 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/78/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 N.M. 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5323819 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/78/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 N.M. 34", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2853358 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/70/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 N.M. 137", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5373265 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/75/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 N.M. 25", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2736605 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/79/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 N.M. 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5324474 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/78/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 N.M. 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8502705 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/76/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 N.M. 623", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8503968 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/76/0623-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 P.2d 881", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 8504419, 8504446 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/76/0686-01", "/nm/76/0687-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 N.M. 686", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8504419 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/76/0686-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 N.M. 74", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2738290 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/79/0074-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 N.M. 642", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5326842 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/78/0642-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 N.M. 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2802314 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "on review of other issues 78 N.M. 642, 436 P.2d 502 (1968)" }, { "parenthetical": "on review of other issues 78 N.M. 642, 436 P.2d 502 (1968)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/77/0050-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 560, "char_count": 11201, "ocr_confidence": 0.678, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.86983167326429e-07, "percentile": 0.8427222977092487 }, "sha256": "1456efa1d55dac0f133453d58b676cd58da3a4c10cc695348ef3711a4f5a3cae", "simhash": "1:25a580ee52501c2e", "word_count": 1815 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:21:18.946358+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "SPIES S, C. J., concurs." ], "parties": [ "Chester Francis ROHRER, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. EIDAL INTERNATIONAL, Employer, and Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company, Insuror, Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nWOOD, Judge.\nThe dispositive issue is \u201cactual knowledge\u201d of the occurrence which dispenses with written notice of accident and compensable injury under our Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act. Section 59-10-13.4(B), N.M.S.A.1953. This issue is raised by both parties; plaintiff in appealing from a judgment in his favor, defendant by cross-appeal. Plaintiff complains of (1) the finding as to when the employee gave the employer \u201cactual notice\u201d and (2) the refusal of his requested finding as to when plaintiff knew he had suffered a compensable injury. Defendant complains of the trial court\u2019s conclusion that notice to the employer was reasonable.\nThe finding concerning \"actual notice\u201d.\nOn March 11, 1966 plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The trial court found:\n\u201cPlaintiff did not give written notice of a compensable injury but he gave actual notice to the defendant employer on April 14, 1966.\u201d\nPlaintiff attacks the date of \u201cactual notice\u201d found by the trial court; however, there is substantial evidence which supports the finding. On cross examination, plaintiff admitted he went to see an officer of the employer on April 14th and at that time the officer \u201cprobably\u201d told him he could be fired for waiting so long to report an injury. On redirect, plaintiff explained why he didn\u2019t report to the officer until April 14th. There is conflicting evidence; the officer gave the date as April 11th. It was for the trial court to resolve this conflict; it did so by the finding. Romero v. Zia Company, 76 N.M. 686, 417 P.2d 881 (1966); Torres v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 76 N.M. 623, 417 P.2d 435 (1966).\nPlaintiff also contends the trial court should have found that plaintiff verbally reported the accident to his superintendent either on the day of the accident or the following day. Both plaintiff and the superintendent so testified. However, the superintendent contradicted this testimony on cross examination. He testified that he didn\u2019t know how long after the accident it was reported, didn\u2019t know whether the accident was reported the next day and couldn\u2019t testify that the accident was reported in March. Under these circumstances, the trial court could deny full credence to the testimony of plaintiff; it did so in finding that plaintiff gave the employer actual notice of the accident on April 14. See Bell v. Kenneth P. Thompson Co., 76 N.M. 420, 415 P.2d 546 (1966).\nWe do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court as to the credibility of the witnesses. Bell v. Kenneth P. Thompson Co., supra. Accordingly, the finding of the trial court is not erroneous.\nRefusal of requested finding concerning plaintiff\u2019s knowledge of compensable injury.\nWe are not concerned here with the sufficiency of the employer\u2019s \u201cactual knowledge\u201d ; we assume the employer had actual knowledge of an accident and compensable injury on April 14th. See Roberson v. Powell, 78 N.M. 69, 428 P.2d 471 (1967); Smith v. State, 79 N.M. 25, 439 P.2d 242 (Ct.App.1968).\nOur concern is with when plaintiff knew or should have known that he suffered a compensable injury. The period for written notice does not begin to run until plaintiff is charged with such knowledge. Sanchez v. City of Albuquerque, 75 N.M. 137, 401 P.2d 583 (1965); Langley v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 70 N.M. 34, 369 P.2d 774 (1962). The accident happened on March 11th; the employer had actual knowledge on April 14th. The closer to April 14th that plaintiff is charged with knowledge of a compensable injury then the more prompt is plaintiff\u2019s verbal report which, here, is the basis of the employer\u2019s actual knowledge. This bears directly on the legal conclusion concerning notice discussed as the third point in this opinion.\nPlaintiff requested a finding that it was not until April 14th that it was apparent that plaintiff suffered a compensable injury. He claims the trial court erred in refusing this request.\nAs in the first point, there is a conflict in the evidence. Plaintiff testified that he didn\u2019t report the accident until April 14th because he thought he would get \u201call right\u201d, that he didn\u2019t have any difficulty until April 14th and on that day went to the doctor.\nThe accident occurred when plaintiff stepped on a cable connection, twisted his left hip, fell to his hands and knees and experienced a severe pain in his left hip and back. When he got up \u201c * * * something was protruding in my hip and, as I straightened up and straightened my leg, it went back. I presume it was out of the socket.\u201d His hip was sore and painful. He \u201c * * * limped from the time I was hurt.\u201d \u201cIt got progressively worse.\u201d \u201cIt wasn\u2019t doing any better, so I went to the doctor\u201d on April 14th. The doctor was of the opinion that plaintiff had a 50% disability of the left hip when he saw him on April 14th and thereafter plaintiff \u201cstayed status quo.\u201d\nIt was for the trial court to resolve the conflict in plaintiff\u2019s testimony. Tapia v. Panhandle Steel Erectors Co., 78 N.M. 86, 428 P.2d 625 (1967); Hughes v. Walker, 78 N.M. 63, 428 P.2d 37 (1967). Accordingly, it did not err in refusing to find that plaintiff did not have knowledge of a compensable injury until April 14th. See Roberson v. Powell, supra; Sanchez v. City of Albuquerque, supra; Higgins v. Board of Directors of N.M. State Hosp., 73 N.M. 502, 389 P.2d 616 (1964).\nThe conclusion that notice was reasonable. I\nSince no written notice was given, plaintiff\u2019s claim for compensation is barred unless the employer had \u201cactual knowledge\u201d under \u00a7 59-10-13.4(B), supra. Roberson v. Powell, supra; Smith v. State, supra. If the employer had \u201cactual knowledge\u201d, it acquired that knowledge by plaintiff\u2019s verbal notice thirty-four days after the accident. Defendants do not claim they did not know of the \u201coccurrence\u201d after plaintiff\u2019s verbal report. They contend that verbal notice given thirty-four days after the accident cannot constitute \u201cactual knowledge\u201d within the meaning of \u00a7 59 \u2014 10\u2014 13.4(B), supra. It is on this basis that defendants contend the trial court erred in concluding that they had \u201creasonable notice.\u201d\n\u201cVerbal notice\u201d is considered in determining the employer\u2019s actual knowledge. However, the \u201cverbal notice\u201d is not determinative in and of itself. All the facts and circumstances must be considered, including the promptness of the verbal notice. In the following cases the employer received \u201cverbal notice\u201d on the day of the accident or the following day. This promptness, together with the other circumstances, was sufficient to charge the employer with \u201cactual knowledge\u201d. Baca v. Swift & Co., 74 N.M. 211, 392 P.2d 407 (1964); Lozano v. Archer, 71 N.M. 175, 376 P.2d 963 (1962); Winter v. Roberson Construction Co., 70 N.M. 187, 372 P.2d 381, 96 A.L.R.2d 933 (1962). See also Buffington v. Continental Casualty Co., 69 N.M. 365, 367 P.2d 539 (1961).\nIt is the totality of the facts and circumstances that determines whether the employer has \u201cactual knowledge.\u201d The, facts and circumstances were sufficient to charge (he employer with \u201cactual knowl-\nedge\u201d in Waymire v. Signal Oil Field Service, Inc., 77 N.M. 297, 422 P.2d 34 (1966), although the verbal notice was not promptly given; it not being given until nine days after the accident. The employer was not charged with \u201cactual knowledge\u201d in Scott v. General Equipment Co., 74 N.M. 73, 390 P.2d 660 (1964) since the only circumstance was a verbal notice not given until thirteen days after the accident.\nHere the verbal notice is the only circumstance on which the employer can be charged with \u201cactual knowledge\u201d. This \u25a0verbal notice was not given until thirty-four 'days after the accident. Under Scott v. 'General Equipment Co., supra, this is in\u2022sufficient to charge the employer with ^\u201cactual knowledge\u201d.\nThere is an additional reason wliy the employer cannot be charged with \u201cactual knowledge\u201d. The concern with \u201cactual knowledge\u201d is to determine whether written notice is excused. Thus an inquiry concerning \u201cactual knowledge\u201d is relevant only within the time allotted for giving written notice. Specifically, if notice is not given or excused within the time provided by \u00a7 59-10-13.4(A), N.M.S.A.1953, the claim is barred. \u201cActual knowledge\u201d only excuses the failure to give written notice when such actual knowledge is acquired within the time allotted for the written notice. Although used in a different context, the following statement from Scott v. General Equipment Co., supra, is pertinent:\n\u201cTo hold otherwise would effectively nullify the requirement of written notice, and would stretch \u2018actual knowledge\u2019 excusing the same beyond recognition.\u201d\nNothing in the record of this case indicates anything to prevent plaintiff from .giving written notice to the employer. Accordingly, under \u00a7 59-10-13.4(A), supra, he was required to give written notice within thirty days. Even if the facts and circumstances were such that the employer had \u201cactual knowledge\u201d on the thirty-fourth \u25a0day, such actual knowledge could not excuse the failure to give written notice because the time for giving written notice had expired.\nSince there was no written notice, the conclusion by the trial court that the employer had \u201creasonable notice\u201d necessarily means \u201cactual knowledge\u201d by the employer. For both of the reasons discussed above the employer did not have \u201cactual knowledge\u201d ; the conclusion is erroneous.\nThere being neither written notice nor actual knowledge within the meaning of \u00a7 59-10-13.4, N.M.S.A.1953, plaintiff\u2019s claim for compensation is barred. Roberson v. Powell, supra; Smith v. State, supra.\nThe judgment is reversed. The cause is remanded with instructions to set the judgment aside and enter a new judgment dismissing the complaint.\nIt is so ordered.\nSPIES S, C. J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "WOOD, Judge." }, { "text": "ARMIJO, Judge\n(dissenting).\nI disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority and would remand with instructions to the trial court to determine the issue of latency.\nAppellant requested a conclusion of law that his injury was latent, based on his request for findings of fact supporting this result. Appellees tendered requested findings and conclusions to the contrary. By its judgment the trial court seemingly resolved this issue in appellant\u2019s favor but failed to so specify in its decision. As noted in the majority opinion there was dispute in the evidence on this point sufficient to support a finding pro or con.\nI think this presents an \u201cirreconcilable conflict\u201d situation similar to that in Baker v. Shufflebarger & Associates, Inc., 77 N.M. 50, 419 P.2d 250 (1966) (on review of other issues 78 N.M. 642, 436 P.2d 502 (1968)). See also Walter E. Heller & Company of California v. Stephens, 79 N.M. 74, 439 P.2d 723 (1968).\nI dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "ARMIJO, Judge" } ], "attorneys": [ "LeRoi Farlow, Farlow & Duffy, Albuquerque, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Allen C. Dewey, Jr., Peter J. Adang, Modrall, Seymour, Sperling, Roehl & Harris, Albuquerque, for defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "449 P.2d 81\nChester Francis ROHRER, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. EIDAL INTERNATIONAL, Employer, and Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company, Insuror, Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants.\nNo. 195.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nNov. 27, 1968.\nRehearing Denied Dec. 19, 1968.\nLeRoi Farlow, Farlow & Duffy, Albuquerque, for plaintiff-appellant.\nAllen C. Dewey, Jr., Peter J. Adang, Modrall, Seymour, Sperling, Roehl & Harris, Albuquerque, for defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0711-01", "first_page_order": 743, "last_page_order": 746 }