{ "id": 5355298, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sam DENNIS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Dennis", "decision_date": "1969-04-18", "docket_number": "No. 236", "first_page": "262", "last_page": "265", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "80 N.M. 262" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "454 P.2d 276" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "379 P.2d 188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 Wash.2d 789", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1034566 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-2d/61/0789-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 P.2d 868", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 Wash.2d 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1034591 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-2d/61/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 N.M. 15", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1579470 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/52/0015-01" ] }, { "cite": "14 A.L.R.3d 1166", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 A.2d 872", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.M. 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2809731 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/77/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 N.M. 459", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8842161 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/57/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 N.M. 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2806033 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/74/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 N.M. 672", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5372643 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/75/0672-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 N.M. 507", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5324840 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/78/0507-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 P. 47", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "year": 1913, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 N.M. 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 4696467 ], "year": 1913, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/18/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 A.2d 50", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 N.J. 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J.", "case_ids": [ 563900 ], "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj/30/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 N.E.2d 245", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 Mass. 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 4022833 ], "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/343/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "242 A.2d 819", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "4 Md.App. 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md. App.", "case_ids": [ 2331307 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md-app/4/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 N.W.2d 856", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 Iowa 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Iowa", "case_ids": [ 2346218 ], "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/iowa/233/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 P.2d 411", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1947, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 Cal.2d 43", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2346585 ], "year": 1947, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-2d/31/0043-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 525, "char_count": 7424, "ocr_confidence": 0.666, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.2233618013528834e-07, "percentile": 0.867255388248504 }, "sha256": "085a5029e92940bafb19d3cfaced3d0aaae8af78b7546a6c0b43388522ccc4e6", "simhash": "1:9077bb6a9df99df2", "word_count": 1224 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:41:23.226975+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "SPIESS, C. J., and HENDLEY, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sam DENNIS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nOMAN, Judge.\nDefendant appeals from his conviction of arson under \u00a7 40A-17-5, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl. Vol. 6, 1964). This section of our statutes provides:\n\u201cArson. \u2014 Arson consists of the intentional damaging by any explosive substance or setting fire to any bridge, aircraft, watercraft, vehicle, pipeline, utility line, communication line or structure, railway structure, private or public building, dwelling or other structure.\n\u201cWhoever commits arson is guilty of a third degree felony.\u201d\nDefendant attacks the constitutionality of this act on the ground:\n\"* * * THAT IT DOES NOT REQUIRE THE FINDING OF ANY SPECIFIC INTENT, MALICE, INTENT TO DO A WRONGFUL ACT OR AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY OR MORES AND WOULD PERMIT THE CONVICTION OF A PERSON WHO INTENTIONALLY BURNED A BUILDING EVEN THOUGH ACTING WITH COMPLETE HONESTY AND WITH HONORABLE INTENTION.\u201d\nSection 40A-17-6, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl. Vol. 6, 1964), which immediately follows the foregoing quoted section, defines aggravated arson and makes it a second degree felony. The only differences between arson and aggravated arson are that in aggravated arson the damaging must be \u201cwillful or malicious\u201d and it must cause a person \u201cgreat bodily harm.\u201d\nThe fact that the Legislature used the word \u201cintentional\u201d in defining arson, and \u201cwillful or malicious\u201d in defining aggravated arson, indicates a legislative intent to eliminate the \u201cwillful or malicious\u201d state of mind required to constitute arson under our prior statutes [\u00a7\u00a7 40-5-1 to 40-5-5, N.M.S.A.1953, being N.M.Laws 1927, ch. 61, \u00a7\u00a7 1 to 5], and the \u201cwillful and malicious\u201d state of mind required to constitute arson at common law. Ex parte Bramble, 31 Cal.2d 43, 187 P.2d 411 (1947); State v. Ferguson, 233 Iowa 354, 6 N.W.2d 856 (1942); Butina v. State, 4 Md.App. 312, 242 A.2d 819 (1968); Commonwealth v. Lamothe, 343 Mass. 417, 179 N.E.2d 245 (1961); State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 152 A.2d 50 (1959); 2 Anderson, Wharton\u2019s Criminal Law & Procedure, \u00a7 388 (1957); 5 Am.Jur.2d, Arson and Related Offenses, \u00a7 1 at 801 (1962).\nThe language of our statute is plain and, thus, 'must be given effect. Ex parte DeVore, 18 N.M. 246, 136 P. 47 (1913); State v. Ortiz, 78 N.M. 507, 433 P.2d 92 (Ct.App.1967). There is no room for construction when the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous. Martinez v. Research Park, Inc., 75 N.M. 672, 410 P.2d 200 (1965); State v. Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 74 N.M. 55, 390 P.2d 437 (1964); State v. Thompson, 57 N.M. 459, 260 P.2d 370 (1953); State v. Ortiz, supra.\nThe Legislature is the proper branch of government to determine what behavior should be proscribed under the police power, and, thus, to define crimes and provide for their punishment. N.M. Const. Art. IV, \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2; State v. Allen, 77 N.M. 433, 423 P.2d 867 (1967); State v. Hughes, 3 Conn.Cir. 181, 209 A.2d 872, 14 A.L.R.3d 1166 (1965); 16 Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, \u00a7 281 at 544 (1964). A statute is sustainable as a proper exercise of that power only if the enactment is reasonably necessary to prevent manifest or anticipated evil, or is reasonably necessary to preserve the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. State v. Prince, 52 N.M. 15, 189 P.2d 993 (1948); State v. Spino, 61 Wash.2d 246, 377 P.2d 868 (1963).\nAs suggested by defendant, and as stated by the Supreme Court of Washington in State v. Spino, supra, wherein a similar arson statute was held unconstitutional, a person could be prosecuted under this statute for burning an old shed or outbuilding which is his own property, and without any intention on his part of hurting, gaining advantage over, or benefiting from another. Under our statute, anyone intentionally undertaking to raze, demolish or destroy by any explosive substance, or by fire, any old, unuseable, or dangerous structure, vehicle, or craft, as enumerated in this statute, even though it belongs to him, or he is acting under the express directions and authority of the owner thereof, is guilty of arson. The fact that his act may benefit the public, and no one could possibly be harmed, or injured thereby, is no defense, if he intended to accomplish the destruction.\nThe issue, as to the requisite intent or mental state, presented to the Supreme Court of Washington in the Spino case, is identical with that presented in this case. In the Spino case the word \u201cwilfully\u201d was used in the arson statute there involved, whereas \u201cintentional\u201d is the word in our statute prescribing the mental state with which the damaging by any explosive substance or fire must be accomplished. However, in defining the word \u201cwilfully,\u201d the Washington court expressly stated that \u201c * * * given its ordinary meaning of 'intentionally,\u2019 then it is a crime to 'intentionally burn any property.\u2019 \u201d We do not mean to suggest that we would necessarily have given the same effect to the word \u201cwilfully\u201d had that term, rather than \u201cintentional,\u201d been used in our statute, because the word \u201cwilfully,\u201d as used in the criminal law, has been given many meanings. However, since the Washington court held \u201cwilfully\u201d means \u201cintentionally,\u201d we are faced with the identical question presented in the Spino case.\nAs stated in the Spino case:\n\u201c * * * Legislatures may not, under the guise of the police power, impose restrictions that are unnecessary and unreasonable upon the use of private property or the pursuit of useful activities * * *\n\u201cNo conceivable public purpose can be served by the prosecution and punishment of those who set fires for innocent and beneficial purposes.\u201d\nWe add to this, no conceivable public purpose can be served by the prosecution and punishment of others who use explosives to raze or destroy structures for innocent and beneficial purposes, which razing or destruction is prohibited by our statute. Compare State v. Prince, supra.\nThe holding in the Spino case was reaffirmed in State v. Paquet, 61 Wash.2d 789, 379 P.2d 188 (1963).\nWe hold \u00a7 40A-17-5, supra, to be invalid, in that it is not a reasonable exercise of the police power. In view of this holding, we need not consider the other issues raised by defendant in this appeal.\nWe are not impelled by any concern for the public welfare, as was our Supreme Court in State v. Prince, supra, to decide whether the prior arson statutes have been disturbed by the repealing provisions of N.M.Laws, 1963, ch. 303, known as the Criminal Code and now appearing as Chapter 40A, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl. Vol. 6, 1964). There are at least two reasons why we are not so impelled: (1) Section 40A-1-3, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl. Vol. 6, 1964), which was enacted as a part of the Criminal Code, provides:\n\u201cIn criminal cases where no provision of this code is applicable, the common law, as recognized by the United States and the several states of the Union, shall govern.\u201d\n(2) Article 15 of the Criminal Code relates to criminal damage of real and personal property and provides for punishment therefor.\nThe judgment of conviction must be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to vacate the judgment and sentence and to quash the information.\nIt is so ordered.\nSPIESS, C. J., and HENDLEY, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "OMAN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert W. Ward, Lovington, for defendant-appellant.", "James A. Maloney, Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, Spencer T. King, James V. Noble, Asst. Attys. Gen., for plaintiff-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "454 P.2d 276\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sam DENNIS, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 236.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nApril 18, 1969.\nRobert W. Ward, Lovington, for defendant-appellant.\nJames A. Maloney, Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, Spencer T. King, James V. Noble, Asst. Attys. Gen., for plaintiff-appellee." }, "file_name": "0262-01", "first_page_order": 318, "last_page_order": 321 }