{ "id": 5360872, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Earl HILLIARD, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Hilliard", "decision_date": "1970-03-20", "docket_number": "No. 445", "first_page": "407", "last_page": "409", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "81 N.M. 407" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "467 P.2d 733" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "79 N.M. 677", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2735464 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/79/0677-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 N.M. 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5361327 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/81/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 L.Ed. 1879", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 U.S. 160", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3943769 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/338/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 N.M. 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5354928 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/80/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 L.Ed.2d 136", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 S.Ct. 1171", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "386 U.S. 976", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6304938, 6304492, 6304721, 6304180, 6303925, 6305373, 6305181 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/386/0976-05", "/us/386/0976-03", "/us/386/0976-04", "/us/386/0976-02", "/us/386/0976-01", "/us/386/0976-07", "/us/386/0976-06" ] }, { "cite": "77 N.M. 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2809901 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/77/0497-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 406, "char_count": 6157, "ocr_confidence": 0.684, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5367196700449085e-07, "percentile": 0.6721104203372474 }, "sha256": "0fc40fd3e469f0ca0f7df8aa98d208db17f99e7c64f3013f8f2b31f9a9659732", "simhash": "1:e654b4ab179ec072", "word_count": 1010 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:30:08.757301+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "SPIES S, C. J., and HENDLEY, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Earl HILLIARD, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nWOOD, Judge.\nThe residence of Sgt. Pitts was burglarized sometime between 7:50 P.M. and 9 :00 P.M. His color television set was taken. This set was recovered from the trunk of defendant\u2019s car about 9:30 P.M. Defendant appeals his conviction of burglary, \u00a7 40A-16-3, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 6). The issue is the validity of the police officer\u2019s action in stopping defendant\u2019s car as it was being driven on a public street. We hold the \u201cstop\u201d was constitutionally permissible and affirm.\nDefendant moved to suppress the television set as evidence, and sought to exclude its admission as evidence during his trial. He asserts the seizure of the set was illegal because seized as an incident of an illegal arrest. This contention is based on the point in time when the arrest occurred and the \u201cprobable cause\u201d for arrest at that point. See State v. Deltenre, 77 N.M. 497, 424 P.2d 782 (1966), cert. denied 386 U.S. 976, 87 S.Ct. 1171, 18 L.Ed.2d 136 (1967).\nDefendant seeks to have the validity of the seizure of the television set (there was no search) determined by whether there was probable cause for his arrest when stopped by the officer. This view was rejected in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). That case: (1) recognizes that the constitutional prohibition against ttnreasonable searches and seizures governs \u201c * * * whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, * * * \u201d; (2) states that whenever such restraint occurs, the central inquiry is \u201c * * * the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen\u2019s personal security * * * \u201d and (3) holds that \u201c * * * a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest. * * * \u201d\nThus, defendant\u2019s efforts to limit the inquiry to the moment he was stopped and to whether probable cause for arrest existed at that moment are misdirected. The issue, under Terry v. Ohio, supra,- is the reasonableness of the invasion of the citizen\u2019s personal security. State v. Lewis, 80 N.M. 274, 454 P.2d 360 (Ct.App.1969), states:\n\u201c * * * To justify such an invasion of a citizen\u2019s personal security, the police officer must be able to specify facts which, together with rational inferences therefrom, reasonably warrant the intrusion. These facts are to be judged by an objective standard \u2014 would the facts available to the officer warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe the action taken was appropriate?\u201d (Citations Omitted)\nThe officer started his investigation of the burglary by going to the residence and obtaining information from Pitts. He had left the residence and was enroute to the police station when a car turned in front of him. The officer recognized defendant as the driver and followed defendant\u2019s car. The officer was able to get directly behind defendant\u2019s car within two or three blocks. The officer then turned his spotlight on defendant\u2019s car and defendant pulled to the side of the road and stopped.\nWhat facts were available to the officer to warrant stopping defendant at that point? Pitts had given the officer two items of information. (1) On the afternoon prior to the burglary, defendant and Howard Jackson visited Pitts at his house. While there, defendant put his hand on the television set and said: \u201c \u2018Man, you have got some nice hocking material.\u2019 \u201d (2) Later, Pitts was in a bar. Defendant and Jackson entered the bar. Pitts saw Jackson grab defendant by the arm and heard Jackson say: \u2018\u201cMan, Pitts is back, we have got to go get rid of that thing.\u2019 \u201d Pitts immediately left the bar, went home, discovered the burglary and reported it to the police.\nIn addition, when defendant turned in front of the officer, the trunk of defendant\u2019s car was open about one foot, tied with a belt. The officer saw some sort of furniture in the car but was not sure what it was. He determined that the furniture was a television set as he walked from the police car to defendant\u2019s car. This identification of the furniture as a television set, however, did not occur until after defendant had stopped in response to the spotlight.\nThree facts justified the officer in stopping defendant\u2019s car \u2014 defendant\u2019s reference to the television set as good \u201chocking\u201d material; Jackson, upon seeing Pitts, telling defendant they had to \u201cget rid of that thing;\u201d and the officer\u2019s observation of unidentified furniture in the trunk of the car shortly after the burglary was reported. With this information, it would have been poor police work to have failed to investigate defendant. Terry v. Ohio, supra.\nThe officer\u2019s action was reasonable. The result of this constitutionally permissible \u201cstop\u201d was that the officer saw that the furniture being transported was a television set. At that point, the officer testified \u201cI wouldn\u2019t let them go.\u201d At that point an arrest, defined as the initial stage of a criminal prosecution in Terry v. Ohio, supra, had occurred.\nThe substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). Even if the officer did not have probable cause to arrest the defendant when he stopped defendant with his spotlight, he did have probable cause once he determined the furniture in the trunk was a television set. The seizure of the set as an incident to the arrest was proper. The television set was properly admitted into evidence. State v. Sedillo, 81 N.M. 47, 462 P.2d 632 (Ct.App.1969); State v. Lewis, supra; State v. Slicker, 79 N.M. 677, 448 P.2d 478 (Ct.App.1968).\nThe conviction and sentence is affirmed.\nIt is so ordered.\nSPIES S, C. J., and HENDLEY, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WOOD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Don Hancock, Alamogordo, for defendant-appellant.", "James A. Maloney, Atty. Gen., Mark B. Thompson III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "467 P.2d 733\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Earl HILLIARD, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 445.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nMarch 20, 1970.\nDon Hancock, Alamogordo, for defendant-appellant.\nJames A. Maloney, Atty. Gen., Mark B. Thompson III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee." }, "file_name": "0407-01", "first_page_order": 453, "last_page_order": 455 }