{ "id": 5327898, "name": "Michael SVEJCARA, Jr., and Matilda Svejcara, his wife, Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants, v. Lyman Jimmie WHITMAN, Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Svejcara v. Whitman", "decision_date": "1971-06-18", "docket_number": "No. 558", "first_page": "739", "last_page": "742", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "82 N.M. 739" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "487 P.2d 167" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "80 N.M. 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5357214 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/80/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "242 U.S. 85", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3934635 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/242/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 P. 206", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 Wyo. 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wyo.", "case_ids": [ 8515706 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wyo/10/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 P. 146", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "year": 1914, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 N.M. 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 4704657 ], "year": 1914, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/19/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 U.S. 387", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12054506 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/397/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12054849 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/397/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 N.M. 735", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8504809 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/76/0735-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 N.M. 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566873 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1940, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/44/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 N.M. 170", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5322753 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/78/0170-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 N.M. 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5360601 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/81/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 P. 766", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "year": 1924, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 N.M. 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8841819 ], "year": 1924, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/29/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 N.M. 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2713962 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/62/0405-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 604, "char_count": 10184, "ocr_confidence": 0.695, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.5168881905688954e-07, "percentile": 0.8111017283247015 }, "sha256": "8979e0b5acbefae57955b382864e064506b663c3cf48d094fbd6505343eb6a7b", "simhash": "1:84cb30643c50247d", "word_count": 1645 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:16:32.756560+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "SPIESS, C. J., and SUTIN, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "Michael SVEJCARA, Jr., and Matilda Svejcara, his wife, Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants, v. Lyman Jimmie WHITMAN, Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nHENDLEY, Judge.\nDefendant appeals an adverse decision whereby plaintiffs recovered for property damage, personal injuries and punitive damages. Defendant\u2019s appeal concerns (1) punitive damages, '(2) punitive damages after a statutory violation fine was paid as being double jeopardy and (3) admission of defendant\u2019s liability policy for purpose of - assessing punitive damages. Plaintiffs\u2019 cross-appeal concerns the measure of the punitive damage award in that it did not (1) make plaintiff whole or relate to the enormity of defendant\u2019s conduct, and (2) the award was grossly inadequate in view of the extreme anti-social implication of driving while intoxicated.\nPUNITIVE DAMAGES.\nDefendant contends that in the \u201c * * * case at bar, the evidence produced was that of an ordinary intersectional accident.\u201d We review the facts as established by the record.\nPlaintiffs were traveling east on Broadway in Farmington at a speed of less than 10 miles per hour. They were approximately in the center of the intersection of Broadway and Orchard when they were struck by defendant\u2019s car. The impact of the collision spun plaintiffs\u2019 car almost 90 degrees and caused it to strike a light pole on the median. The force of the impact blew out the left rear tire, bent the left rear wheel, ruptured the gas tank, and bent the left rear door and fender for a total damage exceeding $1,000.00. Both plaintiffs received considerable personal injury some of which are permanent and disabling.\nDefendant, prior to this trial, pleaded guilty to driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor and reckless driving. Defendant testified that at the time of the accident he was traveling at a speed of three miles per hour and also explained the reasons for pleading guilty.\nThe trial court found that \u201cThe proximate cause of the accident was defendant\u2019s negligence, which under the circumstances amounted to wilful and wanton misconduct.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s position is that his admission . of \u25a0 guilt to driving while intoxicated and reckless driving without other evidence is insufficient to allow imposition of punitive damages. We decide adversely to defendant.\n\u201c * * * Section 70.26 of the Ordinances of the City of Farmington provides :\n\u201c \u2018Reckless Driving.\nAny person who drives a vehicle carelessly and heedlessly in wilful or wanton disregard the rights of safety of others, and without due caution and circumspection, and at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger any person or property is guilty of reckless driving * * * \u2019 \u201d\nThis Ordinance is substantially the same as \u00a764-22-3, N.M.S.A.1953 (1969 Supp.).\nProof of a plea of guilty and conviction based thereon is admissible under circumstances where the same act is involved in both criminal and civil proceedings. Vargas v. Clauser, 62 N.M. 405, 311 P.2d 381 (1957). Such admission is substantial evidence of the truth of the matter and will support a finding. Ward v. Ares, 29 N.M. 418, 223 P. 766 (1924). The guilty plea supports a finding of wilful and wanton misconduct which is a prerequisite to an award of punitive damage.\nDefendant states that he adequately explained away his admission. This is not for us to decide. We do not weigh the evidence or decide on the credibility of the witness. That is the function of the trial court. We only review the evidence in the light most favorable to the successful party to see whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings. Martinez v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 81 N.M. 371, 467 P.2d 37 (Ct.App.1970).\nHaving found support in the record for wilful and wanton misconduct we need not consider defendant\u2019s cases and discussion on intoxication as a basis for awarding punitive damages. A finding of wilful and wanton misconduct will support an award of punitive damages. As stated in Bank of New Mexico v. Rice, 78 N.M. 170, 429 P.2d 368 (1967):\n\u201c * * * The rule is stated in the disjunctive in Stewart v. Potter, 44 N.M. 460, 104 P.2d 736 (1940), and Loucks v. Albuquerque National Bank, 76 N.M. 735, 418 P.2d 191 (1966). Loucks says:\n\u2018 * * * Punitive or exemplary damages may be awarded only when the conduct of the wrongdoer may be said to be maliciously intentional, fraudulent, oppressive, or committed recklessly or with a wanton disregard of the plaintiffs\u2019 rights.\u2019 \u201d\nPUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD AND STATUTORY VIOLATION FINE AS BEING DOUBLE JEOPARDY.\nDefendant contends that the recent United States Supreme Court cases of Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970); Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 90 S.Ct. 1184, 25 L.Ed.2d 435 (1970) changes the rule in Colbert v. Journal Publishing Co., 19 N.M. 156, 142 P. 146 (1914).\nColbert stated:\n\u201cAs stated by the Supreme Court of Wyoming: \u2018Where the act is punishable criminally, the judgment for the act as an offense against the criminal laws is for the wrong done the public, while the damages awarded in a civil action, although punitive and inflicted by way of example and punishment, are for the offense committed wantonly or maliciously against an individual sufferer.\u2019 Cosgriff v. Miller, 10 Wyo. 190, at 236, 68 P. 206 at 217.\u201d\nDefendant contends that Ashe and Waller changed that rule when the doctrine of collateral estoppel was used in those criminal cases as a part of the Fifth Amendment\u2019s guarantee against double jeopardy.\nAshe defined collateral estoppel as it applied there as:\n\u201c\u2018Collateral Estoppel\u2019 is an awkward phrase, but it stands for an extremely important principle in our adversary systern of justice. It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit. Although first developed in civil litigation, collateral estoppel has been an established rule of federal .criminal law at least since this Court\u2019s decision more than 50 years ago in United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 37 S.Ct. 68, 61 L.Ed. 161.\u201d\n\u25a0 We fail to see how, what we consider to be the very limited holding of Ashe and Waller, apply to or change Colbert. Ashe and Waller apply only to a double jeopardy situation criminal action. The word \"jeopardy\u201d as used in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, \u00a7 15 of the New Mexico Constitution is used in its technical sense and is only applicable to criminal proceedings. We cannot agree with defendant that \u201cboth punitive damages and criminal sanctions serve the same end. * * * \u201d Punitive damage serves a civil end to an individual, while criminal sanctions serve a criminal end to the public.\nDEFENDANT\u2019S LIABILITY INSURANCE AS EVIDENCE IN ASSESSING PUNITIVE DAMAGES.\nThe day before trial defendant was served with a subpoena duces tecum for the production of defendant\u2019s liability insurance policy. Defendant\u2019s motion to quash the production was denied. The policy could not be found and upon completion of trial and before the court\u2019s decision defendant was reminded to produce the policy. A copy of the policy was produced.\nIt is defendant\u2019s position that \u201cthere was no legitimate reason to receive defendant\u2019s policy of insurance, that the receipt of such policy influenced and prejudiced the decision of the trial court, and that reversible error was committed by allowing its introduction.\u201d\nPlaintiffs assert that since defendant admitted ordinary negligence in open court prior to the admission of the $100,000.00 insurance policy and that since the admission of the policy was only after all the testimony was in, the \u201cinsurance policy then becomes like any asset and a pertinent factor in the setting of exemplary damages (unless by its terms such damages are clearly excluded.)\u201d\nDefendant contends the asset argument for use in assessing punitive damages is ridiculous. Defendant bases this contention on the grounds that punitive damages are for the \u201climited purpose of punishment of-the offender\u201d and \u201cdefendant would suffer no hardship by reason of payment by the [insurance] company of his damages.\u201d\nIn our opinion it is not necessary to discuss the various contentions of the parties and we make no ruling as to the propriety-of admitting an insurance policy under these circumstances. We will assume for purpose of this opinion that the admission of the policy was improper. The issue is then was the improper admission prejudicial to defendant in view of the award of $6,600.00 to Michael, $7,800.-00.. to Matilda and punitive damages of $7,580.00. We think not.\nAs stated in Sweitzer v. Sanchez, 80 N.M. 408, 456 P.2d 882 (Ct.App.1969):\n\u201cHere, the amount of the exemplary damages is left to the \u2018sound discretion\u2019 of the. trial court as the fact finder. This amount is to be based on the circumstances of the case, that is, the \u25a0 enormity of the offense, * * * the nature of the wrong committed and such aggravating circumstances as may be shown. * * * \u201d\nWhat were the circumstances here ? Defendant was driving in a reckless manner while intoxicated. He turned into slow moving on-coming traffic. He stated he was traveling three miles per hour and yet the force of his car\u2019s impact spun plaintiffs\u2019 car almost 90 degrees, blew out the left rear tire, bent the left rear wheel, ruptured the gas tank, and bent the left rear door and fender for a total damage exceeding $1,000.00. The collision caused both plaintiffs to receive personal injuries some of which are permanent and disabling.\nUnder the foregoing circumstances we cannot say as a matter of law that the award indicates in any way prejudice to the defendant since the award was not so disproportionate to the circumstances.\nBy reason of the foregoing we necessarily hold against plaintiffs on their cross-appeal which claims inadequacy of punitive damages.\nAffirmed.\nIt is so ordered.\nSPIESS, C. J., and SUTIN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HENDLEY, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "\u25a0Richard L. Gerding, Tansey, Rosebrough, Roberts & Gerding, Farmington, for appellant.", "James L. Brown, Farmington, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "487 P.2d 167\nMichael SVEJCARA, Jr., and Matilda Svejcara, his wife, Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants, v. Lyman Jimmie WHITMAN, Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.\nNo. 558.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nJune 18, 1971.\n\u25a0Richard L. Gerding, Tansey, Rosebrough, Roberts & Gerding, Farmington, for appellant.\nJames L. Brown, Farmington, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0739-01", "first_page_order": 795, "last_page_order": 798 }