{
  "id": 5341239,
  "name": "Jose E. BLEA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LOWDERMILK BROTHERS, INC., as Employer, Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company, Inc., as Insurer, Defendants-Appellees",
  "name_abbreviation": "Blea v. Lowdermilk Bros.",
  "decision_date": "1971-11-19",
  "docket_number": "No. 726",
  "first_page": "322",
  "last_page": "323",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "83 N.M. 322"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "491 P.2d 539"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.",
    "id": 9025,
    "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 52,
    "name_long": "New Mexico",
    "name": "N.M."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "76 N.M. 321",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.M.",
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1966,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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    {
      "cite": "79 N.M. 485",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.M.",
      "case_ids": [
        2745494
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      "weight": 2,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nm/79/0485-01"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:09:20.437308+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "WOOD, C. J., and HENDLEY, J., concur.",
      "SUTIN, J., not participating."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Jose E. BLEA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LOWDERMILK BROTHERS, INC., as Employer, Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company, Inc., as Insurer, Defendants-Appellees."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "OPINION\nCOWAN, Judge.\nPlaintiff appeals from a judgment denying him recovery and dismissing his claim for workmen\u2019s compensation.\nWe affirm.\nOn May 26, 1968, while employed as a foreman for defendant Lowdermilk Brothers, Inc., plaintiff received a compensable injury when he slipped and splayed his legs. He was paid compensation for 54 weeks by the defendant insurance company and was treated or examined by an orthopedic surgeon, a neurosurgeon, and two psychiatrists.\nAfter compensation was suspended plaintiff filed suit, alleging total disability. Evidence at the trial was that the plaintiff had fully recovered from physical or organic injury resulting from the accident. He had no disability either from an orthopedic or a neurological standpoint and, in the words of his treating orthopedist when he last saw the plaintiff on March 21, 1969, \u201c . . . there was no medical impairment of function as regards his locomotive system, his back or his neck, which would render him impaired. . . \u201d He had been cleaning his yard, chopping weeds, mowing the lawn, trimming bushes and trees, repairing and replacing the roof, driving a motor vehicle on trips, and doing other physical labor. He performed all the tasks which he had prior to the injury except gainful employment. There was little, if any, labor required of him in his job as a foreman although he was, at times, called upon to do some physical labor.\nHis claim at the trial was that he was totally disabled because of lack of motivation and that this \u201clack of motivation\u201d was an element of traumatic neurosis resulting from the injury. He did not urge or attempt to prove, nor does he now argue, that he is partially disabled to any percentage-extent.\nHe urges by his first two points that the court erred in making the following findings:\n\u201c10. The psychiatric condition (hereafter called traumatic neurosis) which plaintiff suffered might possibly have been caused by the accidental injury of May 26, 1968, but it is not established as a medical probability.\n\u201c11. The traumatic neurosis which plaintiff suffered is not severe nor moderate, but is only of a mild degree, and the resultant disability therefrom is only slight, and plaintiff is able to perform the usual tasks in the work he was performing at the time of said accidental injury.\u201d\nHe further argues under a third point that other of the court\u2019s findings were generally unsupported by the evidence.\nThe court\u2019s finding number 11, with the conclusions of law based thereon that the defendant was not totally disabled and was not entitled to further compensation benefits, is dispositive of this appeal. It is therefore unnecessary to discuss the other claimed error.\nThe applicable law is set out in Lopez v. Schultz & Lindsay Construction Company, 79 N.M. 485, 444 P.2d 996 (Ct.App.1968), where this court stated:\n\u201cIn viewing the evidence to determine whether or not it substantially supports the findings, it must be viewed, together with all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom, in the light most favorable to support the findings. The credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are to be determined by the trial court and not by the appellate court. . . . The appellate court may not properly substitute its judgment for that of the trial court as to the credibility of any witness or as to the weight to be given his testimony. It is not for the appellate court to say what testimony should be given credence and what should be disbelieved. . . . Although we are firmly committed to the view that our Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act must be liberally construed to effect its purpose, this view of liberal construction applies only to the law and not to the facts. On appeal only that evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom which support the findings will be considered. All evidence unfavorable to the findings will be disregarded. . . . \u201d\nAlthough not uncontradicted, there was evidence that the plaintiff was suffering from a \u201cmild, not a moderate and not a severe traumatic neurosis\u201d and that this was not disabling. There was also evidence that if the plaintiff had been suffering from a severe, or even a moderate, degree of traumatic neurosis he would have been unable to engage in the various activities herein mentioned. As one of the psychiatrists testified when questioned concerning plaintiff\u2019s lack of motivation, \u201cI am telling you he is happy with his present lot. I don\u2019t think that he is suffering from a severe degree of these symptoms. If he were, he would not be able to engage in all these other activities. It would be impossible.\u201d\nPlaintiff relies on Ross v. Sayers Well Servicing Company, 76 N.M. 321, 414 P. 2d 679 (1966), but that case is distinguishable because there the medical evidence was uncontroverted, and here it is not.\nConcluding that the court\u2019s finding number 11 is supported by substantial evidence, we affirm the judgment.\nIt is so ordered.\nWOOD, C. J., and HENDLEY, J., concur.\nSUTIN, J., not participating.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "COWAN, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Edward J. Apodaca and Jacob Carian, Albuquerque, for plaintiff-appellant.",
      "Ray Hughes, Deming, for defendantsappellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "491 P.2d 539\nJose E. BLEA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LOWDERMILK BROTHERS, INC., as Employer, Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company, Inc., as Insurer, Defendants-Appellees.\nNo. 726.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nNov. 19, 1971.\nEdward J. Apodaca and Jacob Carian, Albuquerque, for plaintiff-appellant.\nRay Hughes, Deming, for defendantsappellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0322-01",
  "first_page_order": 448,
  "last_page_order": 449
}