{ "id": 5337417, "name": "UTE PARK SUMMER HOMES ASSOCIATION, Incorporated, a corporation, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. The MAXWELL LAND GRANT COMPANY, a corporation, et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Ute Park Summer Homes Ass'n v. Maxwell Land Grant Co.", "decision_date": "1972-03-10", "docket_number": "No. 9351", "first_page": "558", "last_page": "561", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "83 N.M. 558" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "494 P.2d 971" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "49 P. 178", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "year": 1897, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 Cal. 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal.", "case_ids": [ 1931415 ], "year": 1897, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal/117/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "242 P.2d 958", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1952, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 Cal. App.2d 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2241317 ], "year": 1952, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-2d/110/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 N.W.2d 111", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10795644 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/142/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 N.M. 479", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2719075 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/68/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 N.M. 652", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2744693 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/79/0652-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 A.L.R. 952", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "year": 1925, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 N.M. 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1551498 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1925, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/31/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 P. 123", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "year": 1914, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 N.M. 565", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 4704148 ], "year": 1914, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/19/0565-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 U.S. 515", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3641483 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1908, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/208/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 P. 1038", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "year": 1906, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "13 N.M. 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 4676068 ], "year": 1906, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/13/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 N.M. 730", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2809639 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "the \"first appeal\"" }, { "parenthetical": "the \"first appeal\"" }, { "page": "733" }, { "page": "252" }, { "page": "733-735" }, { "page": "252" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/77/0730-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 582, "char_count": 10512, "ocr_confidence": 0.679, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.9138555272476107e-07, "percentile": 0.7320556140531745 }, "sha256": "9652df44b6e501dde1a928f4dd9e9f0b438ddd28e6357b019587b36ed0efdec2", "simhash": "1:4495b26e9b863363", "word_count": 1789 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:09:20.437308+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "McMANUS and OMAN, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "UTE PARK SUMMER HOMES ASSOCIATION, Incorporated, a corporation, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. The MAXWELL LAND GRANT COMPANY, a corporation, et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nSTEPHENSON, Justice.\nPlaintiffs-Appellees (plaintiffs) filed suit alleging that the corporate plaintiff\u2019s membership were owners of property in Ute Park cabinsite area as were the individual plaintiffs; that Defendant-Appellant (defendant) had owned, platted and sold the cabinsite area and still owned land designated on the plat as \u201cGolf Course,\u201d \u201cTennis Court\u201d and \u201cClub House\u201d; that the plat \u201cwas displayed to plaintiffs and the agents and servants of defendant orally represented to plaintiffs that said tract would be reserved and developed by defendant\u201d for such uses and purposes; that the \u201crepresentations -were part of a plan or scheme of development of such cabinsite area, were material inducing factors in the sale of cabinsites by defendant, and were relied upon by plaintiffs; * *\nIt was further alleged that defendant threatened to sell the tract in question without restriction as to its use or purpose and prayed that defendant be enjoined from making any sale of the tract \u201cwithout restriction of its use or purpose to golf course, tennis court, and clubhouse uses.\u201d Other relief, no longer pertinent, was also sought.\nThis is a second appeal. See Ute Park Summer Homes Ass\u2019n v. Maxwell Land Gr. Co., 77 N.M. 730, 427 P.2d 249 (1967) (the \u201cfirst appeal\u201d).\nOn the first appeal, in which plaintiffs sought reversal of an adverse summary judgment, the question presented was:\n\u201c* * * [WJhether or not some legal right in, or relative to the use of, the \u2018golf course\u2019 area, which right is properly enforceable by the plaintiffs, came into existence by the use of the plat and the representations by the defendant\u2019s agents in accomplishing the sales of the lotSj and which legally enforceable right is still in existence.\u201d 77 N.M. at 733, 427 P.2d at 252. (Emphasis supplied.)\nThe opinion on the first appeal reversed the summary judgment, holding that:\n\u201c * * * [T]he stated facts, if found to be true, would support a right in the lot owners, which is enforceable by plaintiffs, * * * \u201d 77 N.M. at 733-735, 427 P.2d at 252.\nThereafter, trial was had and the court determined the facts to be generally as alleged by plaintiffs and entered judgment in their favor. The court found, inter alia, that some of the lots were sold by use of the plat which bore the alleged notations and that the subject area was referred to by those who showed the lots on behalf of defendant as a place where a golf course would be constructed or which would be used as a playground or recreational area. It is not claimed that these findings were not supported by substantial evidence, although they are attacked on other grounds.\nThe decree restricted defendant\u2019s use of the tract in question \u201cto a golf course, a playground, or a recreation area,\u201d and defendant was enjoined from making any sale of the property without such restrictions on its use.\nDefendant now draws our attention to the plat, pointing out that it labels the area in question \u201cgolf course,\u201d as contrasted with the decree, which speaks in terms of \u201ca golf course, a playground, or a recreation area.\u201d Whereas in the first appeal defendant asserted that the plat violated the parol evidence rule as being an attempt to vary the deeds, it now asserts that evidence of oral statements and representations made by its agents and servants in conjunction with the plat at the time of sales violates the parol evidence rule in that such evidence tends to vary and enlarge the writing on the plat, the scope of the testimony being broader than the words on the plat. It concludes that the use should have been restricted to \u201cgolf course.\u201d\nThere are a number of answers to this line of attack. The first and most obvious, which seems to have been overlooked by the parties, is that the decree is cast in the negative\u2014prohibitory as to defendant.\nIt does not say that plaintiffs have the right to use the area for a \u201cgolf course, a playground, or recreation area.\u201d Rather, it restricts defendant to such uses. If \u201ca golf course, a playground, or recreation area\u201d (the decree) is broader than \u201cgolf course\u201d (the plat), and we are inclined to agree with defendant that it is, the effect in the context of the decree is to give defendant a broader array of choices as to the use of the land than would have been the case had the decree used only the words written on the plat.\nAny error in the choice of words in the decree is thus favorable to defendant, and, so far as we are concerned, harmless in the absence of a cross-appeid.\nEntirely apart from what we have said, the admission of testimony regarding such statements and representations was proper under the doctrine of law of the case. If an appellate court has considered and passed upon a question of law and remanded the case for further proceedings, the legal question so resolved will not be determined in a different manner on a subsequent appeal.\nThe doctrine of law of the case has long been recognized in New Mexico, since before statehood (E. g., Dye v. Crary, 13 N.M. 439, 85 P. 1038 (1906), aff\u2019d 208 U.S. 515, 28 S.Ct. 360, 52 L.Ed. 595 (1908)) and since soon after statehood (E. g., McBee v. O'Connell, 19 N.M. 565, 145 P. 123 (1914)). See also Farmers\u2019 State Bank v. Clayton Nat. Bank, 31 N.M. 344, 245 P. 543, 46 A.L.R. 952 (1925) in which the court spoke at length of the doctrine, observing that \u201cthe rule applies not only to .questions specifically decided, but also to tl;qse necessarily, involved.\u201d\nThe most recent opinion considering law of the case at length is Varney v. Taylor, 79 N.M. 652, 448 P.2d 164 (1968), in which the court reiterated the \u201cnecessary implication\u201d aspect of the doctrine.\nThe opinion on the first appeal makes repeated references to use of the plat and representations by the defendant\u2019s agents in selling the lots. The first opinion is not solely concerned with the words appearing on the plat. Rather, it is concerned with the definition of plaintiffs\u2019 rights, as determined not only by the plat itself, but also by the use made of it and the mentioned representations. For example, see the language of the first opinion quoted near the outset of this opinion. Other statements of like import appear in the first opinion. It was thus proper to admit evidence not only of the plat, but of the use made of it and representations made by salespeople. Since the issue is to be resolved as we have described under the first opinion, and the rights of plaintiffs are not determined solely by the words on the plat, the parol evidence rule could not apply to exclude evidence of use made of it and oral statements and representations by defendant\u2019s agents.\nSo far as the statute of frauds is concerned, defendant claims that what has been done here is to create an easement; that this constitutes an alienation of land, and that such is prohibited by the statute of frauds. We are not persuaded that such is the case. In the opinion on the first appeal, the court quoted with approval from Cree Meadows, Inc. (NSL) v. Palmer, 68 N.M. 479, 362 P.2d 1007 (1961) to the effect that rights such as those under consideration here \u201care created by implied grant, implied covenant, or estoppel. It makes very little difference upon which of the above three theories the holding is based.\u201d\nObviously, to create such rights in the mentioned fashion does not require an instrument in writing signed by the party to be charged. E. g., Putnam v. Dickinson, 142 N.W.2d 111 (N.D.1966); Bradley v. Frazier Park Playgrounds, Inc., 110 Cal. App.2d 436, 242 P.2d 958 (1952); Prescott v. Edwards, 117 Cal. 298, 49 P. 178 (1897). See also 3 Tiffany, The Law of Real Property \u00a7 801 (3rd ed. 1939, Supp.1971).\nWe hold that the evidence of statements and representations of defendant\u2019s agents was properly admissible under the law of the case doctrine, that its admission was not precluded by the parol evidence rule or the statute of frauds, and that error, if any, inhering in the expansion of the restricted uses from those appearing on the plat to those stated in the decree, was harmless.\nIn its second point, defendant contends that the size of the area labeled \u201cgolf course\u201d on the plat is insufficient for that purpose, and since use as a golf course is \u201cimpossible,\u201d the land should be freed of all restrictions. Thus, the first contention, that the restriction should be limited solely to a golf course, is a prelude to the second, that a golf course being impossible, plaintiffs should be denied relief.\nHere again there are a number of answers to defendant\u2019s argument, among which are:\nA. Our decision on the first point does not limit the restriction to use as a golf course. Other uses, not impossible, are permissible.\nB. It may be doubted that such impossibility was factually established. No qualified person so testified. The witnesses were equivocal on impossibility and several, at the time of sale, were not interested in a golf course as such, but rather in open spaces and unobstructed views. The court denied findings requested by defendant regarding impossibility.\nC.Looking to substance and ignoring form, defendant is seeking equitable relief, viz., to relieve the land of the consequences of the plat and the inducing uses, statements and representations of defendant\u2019s agents and servants. If a golf course was impossible, the statements and representations should not have been made. Defendant while seeking equity did not do equity, and should therefore be denied equitable relief. In 27 Am.Jur.2d Equity \u00a7 131, it is stated: \u201cThe principle under discussion is as applicable to a party defendant who seeks the aid of equity as it is to a party complainant.\u201d\nDefendant has cited a number of authorities in which developers were relieved of such burdens as we are considering, but in the main they deal with fact situations in which the development or construction for the use in question is sought to be compelled, or substantial changes of circumstances have occurred, or there has been an abandonment, or there has been a dedication to public use or the like. Such fact situations are readily distinguishable from that which confronts us.\nThe judgment should be affirmed.\nIt is so ordered.\nMcMANUS and OMAN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "STEPHENSON, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Paul A. Kastler, Raton, for appellants.", "Robert S. Skinner, Raton, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "494 P.2d 971\nUTE PARK SUMMER HOMES ASSOCIATION, Incorporated, a corporation, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. The MAXWELL LAND GRANT COMPANY, a corporation, et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nNo. 9351.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nMarch 10, 1972.\nPaul A. Kastler, Raton, for appellants.\nRobert S. Skinner, Raton, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0558-01", "first_page_order": 684, "last_page_order": 687 }