{ "id": 2771140, "name": "Herman WALTERS, Individually and as father, next friend and guardian of Wally Joe Walters, a minor, Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. Mannelyn HASTINGS and Manuel Hastings, Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellees, v. James L. Brown, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Walters ex rel. Walters v. Hastings", "decision_date": "1972-07-28", "docket_number": "No. 9335", "first_page": "101", "last_page": "108", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "84 N.M. 101" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "500 P.2d 186" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "95 N.E. 913", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1911, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ohio St. 424", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio St.", "case_ids": [ 982043 ], "year": 1911, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-st/84/0424-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 P.2d 905", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Cal.2d 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12122620 ], "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-2d/41/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 Or. 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Or.", "case_ids": [ 4810478 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1920, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or/94/0550-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 Am.St.Rep. 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Am. St. Rep.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 N.E. 742", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "190 N.Y. 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "case_ids": [ 4460338 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny/190/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 N.E. 423", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "214 N.Y. 255", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "case_ids": [ 72176 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny/214/0255-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 N.Y.S. 295", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.", "case_ids": [ 5585147 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nys/155/0295-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Misc. 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Misc.", "case_ids": [ 1886072 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/misc/91/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "494 P.2d 9", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 Cal.Rptr. 385", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "6 Cal.3d 784", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2274612 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-3d/6/0784-01" ] }, { "cite": "270 A.2d 662", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "259 Md. 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md.", "case_ids": [ 1889572 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md/259/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 N.M. 706", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5333506 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/83/0706-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 P. 68", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "year": 1915, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 N.M. 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2388973 ], "year": 1915, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/21/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 P.2d 1085", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "11 Cal.2d 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2224882 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-2d/11/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 N.M. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2720279 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/68/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 N.M. 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2787029 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/69/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 N.M. 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8503602 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/76/0546-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1069, "char_count": 24485, "ocr_confidence": 0.675, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.6491010959834453e-07, "percentile": 0.8238860643998935 }, "sha256": "d548b5ba35b0b434d527c9d9dad115df123f444155fc22137cf659e539b67d20", "simhash": "1:31faf6c24da208c4", "word_count": 4077 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:55:55.751115+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "COMPTON, C. J., and OMAN, J\u201e concur." ], "parties": [ "Herman WALTERS, Individually and as father, next friend and guardian of Wally Joe Walters, a minor, Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. Mannelyn HASTINGS and Manuel Hastings, Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellees, v. James L. Brown, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nSTEPHENSON, Justice.\nWally Joe Walters, minor son of Herman and Mary Jo Walters, was seriously injured in an automobile collision on March 1, 1969. He was a passenger in a car driven by Mannelyn Hastings, minor daughter of Manuel Hastings who owned the vehicle. Herman Walters and Manuel Hastings are brothers-in-law, having married sisters. The other vehicle was driven by a man named Spiller.\nThe senior Walters consulted Mr. Brown, an attorney, very shortly after the accident and employed him on a contingent fee basis. Whether this employment covered all claims arising from the accident and injuries, as asserted by Mr. Brown, or only the claim against Mr. Spiller, as asserted by Mr. Walters, forms the central issue of this lawsuit.\nThe contingent fee agreement (\u201cthe contract\u201d) was reduced to writing and signed by the attorney and clients, the latter having signed on March 5, 1969. The first paragraph of the contract provides:\n\u201cThe following are the terms under which we will undertake to represent you in connection with the accident and resultant injuries and damages which we have discussed.\u201d\nFurther provisions normal to such contracts follow. None of them bear upon the controvers}\u2019\u2019. '\nFollowing execution of the contract, the facts of the occurrence were developed and the claim against Mr. Spiller was settled without suit with his liability insurer for the amount of the coverage. Mr. Brown received his fee in regard to this settlement.\nContacts between Mr. Brown and Mr. and Mrs. Walters were frequent from March onward. Further information indicated that claims against others might be fruitful. Included among these were claims against Mr. Hastings, under the family purpose doctrine (his daughter, Mannelyn, had received a citation on account of the manner in which she had allegedly driven) ; a local automobile repair concern (based upon possible negligence in repairing the brakes of the Hastings car); and the manufacturer of the Hastings vehicle based upon the possibility of defective brakes.\nMr. and Mrs. Walters were unaware of the existence of any of these claims (including the Spiller claim), the legal theories upon which they were predicated, their possible efficacy or the amount which might be recovered from them until advised by Mr. Brown subsequent to the execution of the contract.\nAfter the Spiller settlement was concluded, relations between the parties seemed to deteriorate. Mr. Brown advocated an attempt to realize on the claim against Mr. Hastings, or at least against his liability carrier. Mr. and Mrs. Walters indicated that this was out of the question because of the family relationship, although they lost little time in doing precisely that following Mr. Brown\u2019s discharge as we shall presently see.\nEventually the Walters decided to discuss the claim against Mr. Hastings directly with Mr. Jetter, adjuster for Mr. Hastings\u2019 liability insurer (\u201cthe adjuster\u201d), expressing dissatisfaction with Mr. Brown\u2019s fee. Mr. Jetter was aware of Mr. Brown\u2019s representation of the Walters. Counsel were consulted as to how Mr. Brown could be discharged. On November 14, 1969, Mrs. Walters dictated a letter signed by Mr. Walters, discharging Mr. Brown. There appears to have been no assertion by the Walters up to that time that Mr. Brown had only been employed in relation to the Spiller claim or that the contract had been fully performed or was at an end.\nNegotiations commenced between the Walters and the adjuster immediately. On December 18, 1969, Mr. Brown responded to the letter of dismissal. The response stated that if Mr. Walters did not wish to pursue the matter because of the family situation, he was willing that the matter be dropped; but if the claim against Mr. Hastings was pursued, he felt the contract should be honored.\nIn early 1970, the Walters and Mr. Jetter agreed on a settlement which included $5,688.10 for medical expenses incurred plus $3,000.00 for future medical expenses to Mr. Walters. $5,000.00 of medical expenses had already been paid under the medical payments provisions of the policy. The injured minor was to receive $20,000.-00 for pain and disability.\nMr. Brown, learning of the agreement, filed a charging lien with the insurer. This \u201cfriendly suit\u201d was filed to implement the settlement. One-third of the gross amount, the subject matter of this appeal, was paid into the registry of the court by the Hastings\u2019 insurer and a Petition for Interpleader was filed bringing in Mr. Brown and asking the court to declare the rights of the parties.\nIt was agreed at pretrial that Mr. Brown would be cast in the role of a plaintiff and Mr. Walters a defendant. The case was tried to a jury which rendered its verdict in favor of Mr. Brown in the sum of $2,000.00. He moved for judgment non obstante veredicto and, alternatively, for a new trial. The motion was denied and judgment was entered on the verdict. Mr. Brown appeals. Mr. Walters cross-appeals.\nMr. Brown has consistently asserted that the contract covered the claim against Mr. Hastings or his insurer. This assertion was advanced in a motion for summary judgment, was called to the attention of the court during the course of trial and culminated in a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto. With equal consistency, Mr. Walters has contended that the contract was ambiguous as to what \u201cclaims\u201d were covered. The court throughout held that the phrase \u201cwhich we have discussed\u201d rendered the contract ambiguous and that a question of fact was present as to whether the claim against Mr. Hastings was covered by the contract. Parol evidence was allowed on the issue of what \u201cclaims\u201d were covered.\nMany of our opinions deal with the admissibility of parol evidence and the purposes for which it may be admitted in construction of contracts.\nIn Maine v. Garvin, 76 N.M. 546, 417 P.2d 40 (1966), this court stated the rule applicable to the admissibility of parol evidence :\n\u201cParol evidence may not be received when its purpose and effect is to contradict, vary, modify, or add to a written agreement, but is generally admissible to supply terms not in the written contract, to explain ambiguities in the written agreement, or to show fraud, misrepresentations, or mistake.\u201d\nThe Maine case involved a contract of employment of a real estate broker. The contract authorized the broker to \u201csell\u201d real estate. This court held that the contract was ambiguous because it was unclear whether the word \u201csell\u201d contemplated an \u201cexchange\u201d of the real estate. See also Jernigan v. New Amsterdam Casualty Company, 69 N.M. 336, 367 P.2d 519 (1961).\nIf definition problems created by words used within the four corners of a contract create ambiguities requiring the admission of parol evidence, an even more compelling need for the use of parol evidence is presented when the words within the four corners of the contract make reference to activities or discussions not further explained. In Harp v. Gourley, 68 N.M. 162, 359 P.2d 942 (1961) the contract in question provided that the lessee was to pay the broker\u2019s commission in a \u201ctransaction\u201d for the lease of real estate. Since the contract did not define or explain the extent of the \u201ctransaction\u201d which formed the basis of the contract, this court citing Wachs v. Wachs, 11 Cal.2d 322, 79 P.2d 1085 stated:\n\u201cThe trial court should therefore have permitted appellant to plead and prove the surrounding circumstances, not for the purpose of varying the terms of the written instrument, but for the purpose of aiding the court in interpreting the contract of the parties as embodied in the written instrument.\u201d\nIn the case at hand, the contract in question refers to \u201cthe accident and resultant injuries and damages which we have discussed.\u201d The contract is ambiguous because it is impossible for a court to determine the precise terms of the contract by a mere examination of the instrument. Therefore, parol evidence was properly admissable to clarify the ambiguity, but it ought to have been restricted in such a way as to serve that function only.\nThe mere fact an ambiguity existed does not mean that the remaining portions of the contract should be laid aside and disregarded so that the unambiguous agreements of the parties are reformed by parol evidence.\nThe principle applicable to determine the extent of admissability of parol evidence once an ambiguity has been found to exist in a contract was stated in Schwentker v. Hubbs, 21 N.M. 188, 153 P. 68 (1915):\n\u201c[Pjarol evidence is admissible, in the construction of contracts, to ascertain the signification which ought to be given to any phrase or term in the contract which is ambiguous or susceptible of more than one interpretation Elliott on Contracts, \u00a7 1655, citing Browne, Parol Evidence, 179.\u201d\nThus, the function of the parol evidence admitted in this case should have been to clarify the ambiguity in the contract, giving effect to those portions of the contract which were not ambiguous and giving effect to the contract in its entirety so clarified. Any broader use of parol evidence would undermine the principle stated in the Maine case, supra, that \u201cparol evidence may not be received when its purpose and effect is to contradict, vary, modify, or add to a written agreement.\u201d For admission of parol evidence in the case of ambiguity serves explanatory and clarification purposes only.\nAn examination of the contract makes it very clear that the only ambiguity which arises from the phrase \u201cwhich we have discussed\u201d has to do with \u201cthe accident and resultant injuries and damages,\u201d the phrase which immediately precedes the ambiguity.\nThe evidence conclusively shows that the accident discussed was the one which occurred March 1, 1969, in which Wally Joe Walters was injured. The resultant injuries which were discussed were those which the minor received in the accident. The resultant damages discussed were those which accrued to the minor for pain and disability, and those suffered by the father for medical treatment and associated expenses. The evidence is clear on this score.\nWe recognize that in other situations where the evidence is in dispute or in doubt, the ambiguity must be resolved by the trier of the facts, but such is not the case here. The undispttted evidence here lends itself to resolution of the ambiguity as a matter of law. The first paragraph of the contract, with the ambiguity removed, should have been applied as though it read, in substance:\n\u201cThe following are the terms under which we will undertake to represent you in connection with the accident which occurred on March 1, 1969, in which your minor son, Wally Joe, was injured and the resultant injuries to Wally Joe and damages which he, and you, have or will suffer.\u201d\nMr. Walters has consistently argued that an issue of fact existed as to what \u201cclaims\u201d were covered and that the \u201cclaim\u201d against Mr. blastings was not agreed to be covered. The difficulty with this argument is that the contract, neither as written nor as clarified, is couched in terms of \u201cclaims.\u201d It is rather expressed in terms of the accident, injuries, and damages. There being no restrictive language as to what accident, injuries, or damages were covered it is not susceptible to the construction which Mr. Walters would place upon it.\nWe hold that the contract, with the ambiguity clarified and resolved by the undisputed evidence, as a matter of law, covered all claims arising from the accident and the resultant injuries and damages including the Hastings\u2019 claim.\nMr. Walters urges in the alternative that if the contract did cover the Hastings\u2019 claim, nevertheless Mr. Brown was discharged for good cause, and that there was substantial evidence from which the jury could have found that such was the case.\nThere is no question but that the Walters had the power to discharge their attorney, either with or without cause. In this, the parties are agreed. The issue is whether they were justified in doing so.\nMr. Walters predicates his claim that Mr. Brown\u2019s discharge was justified on three grounds, each of which he asserts is supported by substantial evidence. These grounds are:\nA. Mr. Brown\u2019s delay in obtaining the money from the Spiller settlement for his client. Mr. Walters says that the case was settled on June S, 1969, but that the funds were not actually disbursed until September of that year. The record shows that Mr. Brown agreed with the adjuster for Mr. Spiller\u2019s liability carrier that the policy limits would be paid in settlement on June 5. However, this was a settlement only in a limited sense. The documentation of the settlement was not agreed upon with the adjuster. Mr. Brown testified that the company\u2019s attorney, situated in another city, first wished to file a friendly suit to implement the settlement, since Wally Joe Walters was a minor. From this he was dissuaded by Mr. Brown. The company\u2019s attorney also wanted a release in ordinary form, but Mr. Brown was concerned lest such a release discharge other parties against whom claims might exist, as, for example, Mr. Hastings. A form of documentation was ultimately agreed upon, prepared and executed. Finally, the company\u2019s attorney insisted upon the institution of guardianship proceedings, a procedure which Mr. Brown did not resist, and guardianship proceedings were prepared and instituted. It was only after these things had been accomplished that funds were requested and disbursed. This evidence was undisputed.\nOn the subject of unreasonable delay, Mr. Walters testified in response to a question as to whether he had any complaints about Mr. Brown\u2019s handling of the Spiller case:\nA. \u201cNot handling the case. I thought he took too long, but not being familiar with the legal transactions \u2014 I know at the time we was in straits for money. Our bills was \u2014 we had run out of money on Wally, and \u2014 \u201d\nThere was no testimony to the effect that an unreasonable length of time was consumed in implementing the settlement. Nevertheless, Mr. Walters argues that \u201c * * * the jury was entitled to believe that this could have been accomplished in a more brisk manner.\u201d If they did so believe, they would have predicated their belief on pure speculation.\nWe hold that there is no substantial evidence that there was any unreasonable delay by Mr. Brown in obtaining the settlement funds.\nB. Mr. Brown delayed in notifying his client that an agreement for settlement had been reached. Mr. Brown stated that he advised Mrs. Walters immediately but that he had no specific, recollection of the time this was done. Mr. Walters testified that he did not know of it for some time, but further said that he didn\u2019t know when he was notified of the Spiller settlement and that, although he didn\u2019t remember when he learned of it, it was possible that Mr. Brown\u2019s statements on this score were accurate.\nWe hold that this falls short of constituting substantial evidence that Mr. Brown unreasonably delayed in notifying his client that an agreement had been made, entirely apart from the fact that there is no evidence that such delay as may have occurred, if any, would have justified Mr. Brown\u2019s dismissal.\nC. Mr. Walters urges that:\n\u201cAttorney Brown had attempted, over the objection of he and Mrs. Walters, to pursue the claim against Manuel Hastings, Mr. Walter\u2019s brother-in-law.\u201d\nThere is no evidence that Mr. Brown made any \u201cattempts\u201d to pursue the Hastings\u2019 claim. There is evidence that he counselled such a course or perhaps even urged it.\nOn November 14, 1969, Mr. Walters sent a copy of the letter discharging Mr. Brown to the adjuster. The Walters arrived in the adjuster\u2019s office to commence negotiating for settlement of the Hastings\u2019 claim with such dispatch that they arrived the same day as the copy of the letter.\nThere was no evidence that there was any impropriety on the part of Mr. Brown in counselling or urging the seeking of the settlement with Mr. Hastings\u2019 liability carrier. In fact, it could be urged, with a good deal of logic, that he would have been remiss in his duty had he not done so.\nWe are confronted with a situation in which Mr. Walters is saying that he was justified in discharging Mr. Brown because of the latter\u2019s urging pursuit of the Hastings\u2019 claim against Mr. Walters\u2019 wishes and then finding Mr. Walters three days later in the adjuster\u2019s office doing precisely that. This is too much for us to swallow. We hold that there was no substantial evidence of any justification in discharging Mr. Brown for his counsel regarding the Hastings\u2019 claim.\nIn addition to the deficiencies in the evidence that we have pointed out, Mr. Walters cannot successfully assert that he was justified in discharging Mr. Brown for another reason. No evidence was tendcred or admitted tending to show that Mr. Brown had \u201cdeparted from the recognized standards of * * * practice in the community, or * * * neglected to do something required by those standards.\u201d Sanders v. Smith 83 N.M. 706, 496 P.2d 1102 (Ct.App.1972). While Sanders was a malpractice case, thus predicated on negligence, and this is not, nevertheless the analogy is clear. Mr. Sanders there and Mr. Walters here must prove some shortcoming in their attorney\u2019s professional activities in order to prevail. Sanders held that the attorney\u2019s failure to meet, or departure from, the prevailing standards must generally be established, by expert, i. e. by a lawyer\u2019s, testimony. The same is true when acts or omissions of a lawyer are advanced as justification for his discharge.\nHere there was no testimony by any informed person \u2014 an expert \u2014 that based upon the facts established, the professional standards of Mr. Brown\u2019s activities were other than above reproach. For example, how could a jury know, or even form a reasonable impression, as to whether there was an unreasonable delay in obtaining the funds from the Spiller settlement? It could not.\nWe recognize that situations may arise in which the proof is so clear and obvious that a trial court could, with propriety, rule as a matter of law on whether the attorney met the standards. Central Cab Company v. Clarke, 259 Md. 542, 270 A.2d 662 (1970). Similarly, cases may arise in which the asserted shortcomings of the attorney are such that they may be recognized or inferred from the common knowledge or experience of laymen. Id. But this case does not fall within either of those exceptions. See Annot., 17 A.L.R. 3rd 1442 (1968).\nFinally, we come to the measure of damages. Mr. Brown urges that where there is an agreement for a contingent fee and the contingency has happened, the attorney is entitled to recover the fee stipulated in his contract. Mr. Walters does not dispute the correctness of the law urged by Mr. Brown. He contents himself with reiterating that the contract did not necessarily cover the Hastings\u2019 claim and that there is substantial evidence to sustain the jury\u2019s verdict.\nWe are aware that the authorities on the subject are not harmonious. For example, in Fracasse v. Brent, 6 Cal.3d 784, 100 Cal.Rptr. 385, 494 P.2d 9 (1972),1 the majority held that an attorney discharged with or without cause is entitled to recover only the reasonable value of his services rendered to the time of discharge. The dissent urged that an attorney discharged without cause is entitled to recover the stipulated fee on the happening of the contingency. We mention this case as illustrative of these divergent views. We unhesitatingly adopt the reasoning of the dissent in that case.\nThe great majority of the better reasoned cases sustain the view that we adopt. In Friedman v. Mindlin, 91 Misc. 473, 155 N.Y.S. 295 (City Ct. of N.Y.1915), the court ruled that:\n\u201cTherefore, where, as here, the contract of retainer fixes the amount of the attorney\u2019s compensation, and the attorney has not offended, either through misconduct or neglect, the court has not the power, even though the case is settled, to reduce the amount fixed by the contract.\u201d\nThe court\u2019s rationale follows:\n\u201cAn attorney, in accepting a retainer, must, upon grounds of public policy, take the chance of his client abandoning the litigation, in which case, notwithstanding his contract, he can recover only the reasonable value of such services as he has actually rendered (Andrewes v. Haas, 214 N.Y. 255, 108 N.E. 423), and of his client settling the litigation against his consent, to which, upon the same grounds, he will not be heard to object (Matter of Snyder [v. Foster], 190 N.Y. 66, 82 N.E. 742, 14 L.R.A. [N.S.] 1101, 123 Am.St.Rep. 533, 13 Ann.Cas. 441); but I do not think that, so long as he is faithful to his trust, he should be held to assume the risk of his client discharging him at will and then paying him only for the services rendered up to the time of the discharge. If his compensation is to be thus subjected to the whim of his client, then it is useless for him to contract at all, since all contracts of this character, whatever their form, would be only unilateral in effect. I do not think that the legal profession should thus be shorn of its dignity, or that justice should be thus denied to those who themselves minister at the altar of justice. Presumably, the client, in contracting for professional services to be paid for upon a contingent basis and at a definite amount, docs so because he believes it to be to his interest to make such an arrangement. The mere fact that he may later desire to have another attorney does not, in my opinion, afford an adequate reason why he should be relieved from his bargain, so long as no improper advantage has been taken of him in making the contract and his attorney observes good faith towards him after-wards.\u201d\nIn Dolph v. Speckart, 94 Or. 550, 186 P. 32 (1920), the court said:\n\u201cWritten contracts should be construed from the standpoint of the parties when they were contracting, and be so interpreted as to give effect to all the provisions, if possible. (Citing cases). A party who has wrongfully broken a contract should not be permitted to reap advantage from his own wrong, by insisting on proof which by reason of his breach is unobtainable. (Citing cases). Where one employs an attorney and makes an express valid contract, stipulating for the compensation which the attorney is to receive for his services, such contract is generally speaking, conclusive as to the amount of such compensation. A client has the unquestionable right to terminate the relationship between himself and his attorney, yet where an attorney is prematurely discharged by the client, or is otherwise wrongfully prevented from performing the professional duties for which he was employed, without fault on the part of the attorney, the latter is entitled to compensation. This is so even though the arrangement was for a contingent fee, provided the contingency has happened. The client, by wrongfully preventing the performance of the acts which entitled the attorney to the specific compensation, becomes liable in damages in such amount.\u201d\nSee also, Jones v. Martin, 41 Cal.2d 23, 256 P.2d 905 (1953); Scheinesohn v. Lemonek, 84 Ohio St. 424, 95 N.E. 913 (1911).\nMr. Walters has cross-appealed, complaining of an instruction to the effect that Mr. Brown might be entitled to reasonable compensation for services even if discharged with valid cause. Inasmuch as we have held that, as a matter of law, no such cause exists we need not consider the cross-appeal.\nOther contentions raised by the parties have been considered but in view of the disposition we make of the case, they need not be dealt with in this opinion.\nHaving held that the contract covered the claim against Mr. Hastings; that Mr. Brown\u2019s discharge was without justification; and that the amount to which Mr. Brown is entitled is that which is stipulated in the contract, there is no occasion for a retrial. The court below is directed to set aside its judgment and enter judgment in Mr. Brown\u2019s favor for the amount stipulated in the contract in respect to the I-Iastings\u2019 settlement, being the funds on deposit with the Clerk.\nIt is so ordered.\nCOMPTON, C. J., and OMAN, J\u201e concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "STEPHENSON, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Benjamin S. Eastburn, Farmington, for appellant.", "White & Cat\u00f3n, Farmington, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "500 P.2d 186\nHerman WALTERS, Individually and as father, next friend and guardian of Wally Joe Walters, a minor, Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. Mannelyn HASTINGS and Manuel Hastings, Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellees, v. James L. Brown, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Appellee.\nNo. 9335.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nJuly 28, 1972.\nBenjamin S. Eastburn, Farmington, for appellant.\nWhite & Cat\u00f3n, Farmington, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0101-01", "first_page_order": 257, "last_page_order": 264 }